EU Global Strategy in a changing world: Brussels’ approach to the emerging powers

The world is entering a period of power transition, at the outcome of which some new form of global order (or disorder) is likely to emerge. Critical to this process is the interaction between the established powers, the USA and the European Union (EU), and the emerging powers, particularly China, Brazil, India and Russia. Many analysts have classified the EU as a declining power, a perception that has been enhanced with the triple crises of sovereignty that have rocked the Union since the mid-2000s (money, borders and defence). In this context, the publication of the EU Global Strategy was an opportunity for the EU to state clearly the nature of its ongoing and future relations with the rest of the world. This article argues that, in reality, Europe as a bloc (as opposed to its member states severally) has very limited purchase with the other major powers, and an ambivalent or ill-defined grasp of how to engage with them. They, for their part, have difficulty in knowing how to understand the EU as an actor and prefer to deal bilaterally with its key member states.     

The European Union: Just an alliance or a military alliance?

Over centuries there have been different definitions and criteria for alliances. Within this, however, there are categories entitled ‘military alliances’. The article arrives at 11 different criteria for categorisation of alliances and applies them to the different facets of the European Union. It concludes that, on the broadest terms, the EU does meet the criteria for an alliance but that the jury is still out on some aspect of the European Union being a military alliance. This conclusion has consequences for the foreign, security and defence policies of several member states and, indeed, for the future of the European Union itself.     

All or nothing? The EU Global Strategy and defence policy after the Brexit

The public expects European governments and the European Union (EU) to deal with the security challenges in and around Europe. So does the US, whose strategic focus has pivoted to the Pacific. Washington, DC has made it clear that it will not, and cannot, solve all of Europe’s problems. The call for ‘strategic autonomy’ in the new EU Global Strategy of June 2016 does not come a moment too soon. But should the aim be EU strategic autonomy, without the UK, or can the aspiration still be European strategic autonomy, with the UK? Can nothing be achieved unless all are fully involved? Or are intermediate solutions possible? How EU Member States and the UK answer these questions will determine which degree of strategic autonomy the EU can achieve. With which degree of British involvement. And whether the UK itself will be left with any measure of strategic autonomy.     

Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s new leitmotif: pragmatic,problematic or promising?

A striking difference between the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy and its 2003 predecessor is the ubiquity of resilience as a new leitmotif, understood as the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crisis. Resilience provides a middle ground between over-ambitious liberal peace-building and under-ambitious stability, (re)directs attention to local resources and practices, and is ambiguous enough to be acceptable to everyone. The Global Strategy’s leitmotif is an example of the rise and spread of resilience in international discourses about crisis management and humanitarian emergencies. Although there are risks inherent to the way in which resilience reframes risks and crises, its added value lies in its power as convening concept, opening up international organizations to new ways of thinking and working, and providing a common ground for engagement.     

Implementing the Global Strategy where it matters most: the EU’s credibility deficit and the European neighbourhood

The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) is a broad and ambitious document in terms of its geographic scope and thematic priorities. However, the EU cannot devote equal attention to all aspects of the EUGS; so there is still scope for more clarity regarding the EU’s core strategic aims. This article argues that in addition to fostering internal cohesion, the EU’s strategic priority must involve stabilizing its own neighbourhood. This task has challenged the EU for decades because of an inherent credibility deficit regarding the EU’s own capabilities, yet the EUGS does not diagnose and remedy this problem as effectively as it could have. Therefore much more work will need to be done in terms of reforming EU institutions and developing common capabilities if the EU hopes to achieve its central internal and external security goals as outlined in the EUGS and related policy statements.     

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EVOLVING ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN

In 2003, the “E3”—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—engaged Iran in talks over Tehran's nuclear program and were joined in negotiations the next year by the European Union (EU). Given the dim prospects of success for these talks, why did the E3/EU pursue nuclear negotiations with Iran? This article's three-track analysis attempts to answer that question by examining the emergence of the EU nonproliferation policy prior to the E3/EU-Iran talks, analyzing the European-Iranian relationship as it pertains to cooperation and negotiations over nonproliferation and other issues, and considering contemporary influences on the E3/EU. The European Union was ultimately unsuccessful in its negotiations with Tehran, but its efforts were worthwhile. In the future, the organization can play a vital nonproliferation role; today, the circumstances that hampered previous European efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear standoff have improved and could be capitalized on by the European Union and the international community.     

Reclaiming the local in EU peacebuilding: Effectiveness,ownership, and resistance

ABSTRACT

Since the early 2000s, the “local turn” has thoroughly transformed the field of peacebuilding. The European Union (EU) policy discourse on peacebuilding has also aligned with this trend, with an increasing number of EU policy statements insisting on the importance of “the local.” However, most studies on EU peacebuilding still adopt a top-down approach and focus on institutions, capabilities, and decision-making at the EU level. This special issue contributes to the literature by focusing on bottom-up and local dynamics of EU peacebuilding. After outlining the rationale and the scope of the special issue, this article discusses the local turn in international peacebuilding and identifies several interrelated concepts relevant to theorizing the role of the local, specifically those of effectiveness, ownership, and resistance. In the conclusion, we summarize the key contributions of this special issue and suggest some avenues for further research.     

军事装备在突发事件应急响应中的应用

军事装备应用于突发事件应急响应并非不可行或大材小用,我国在自然灾害、事故灾难和海上联合救援等领域已积累了较为丰富的应用经验,国外一些国家同样有着相关应用实例。本文认为,此类应用符合我国军队宗旨与现行规制,能够满足风险社会下的应急能力（资源）整合需要,装备的优势在响应过程中也能发挥特殊作用。但相关应用并非是指一般突发事件,而是重大或特殊的突发事件。根据我国现有规制与军事装备的优势,这类装备至少可应用于巨灾式自然灾害、重大公共卫生事件、高危害性事故灾难和规模性撤侨等突发事件中。为进一步促进军事装备的此类应用,需要完善应用的相关规制,使得应用更为规范和顺畅;同时加强响应中多主体的协调,提升应用效率;以及促进军民融合的深度发展,实现双向促进。     

从大国博弈视角解读与应对第三次抵消战略

在常规军力优势相对衰落、经费预算日益缩紧的背景下,美军为维持其军事霸权,提出了旨在实现兵力全球自由投送的第三次抵消战略(Third Offset Strategy)。通过梳理抵消战略的现实背景、历史沿革和战略目的,我们发现如果把第三次抵消战略简单视作美军的军事技术发展战略甚至军事战略,就会陷入片面而幼稚的认识误区。除了防范潜在的技术诱骗和技术突袭,更应该从大国博弈的战略视角出发,全面审视和应对第三次抵消战略对我国的挑战。美军实现国家利益的需求导向、自我变革的决心勇气和创新能力、科技兴军的先进理念和以军为主的军民融合成功经验值得借鉴。要以我为主参与制定未来战争的\"游戏规则\",做到\"你打你的,我打我的\";要深入研究美军作战体系和美国国家战略的薄弱环节,有针对性地\"攻其所必救\",从而化解重大安全挑战,争得新的战略机遇期。