Remaking the military industrial relationship: A French‐American comparison

Defense industrial complexes in leading Cold War nations have downsized and reallocated resources to other productive activities in the 1990s. In this paper, we analyze the experience of two key countries ‐ the US and France. Comparing the two countries, we find similar outcomes in budgetary retrenchment and large firm restructuring but marked differences in the pace of downsizing and diversification among small and medium‐sized firms. We hypothesize that three sets of contextual differences may explain these differences: 1) institutional differences in the way that the State bureaucracies ‐ the Pentagon and the French Délégation générale pour l'armement (DGA) ‐ oversee defense industrial matters, 2) differences in military industry ownership and firm size patterns, and 3) differences in the regional distribution of defense industrial capacity and associated regional policies. In closing, we note that the two countries’ defense industrial complexes are becoming more alike and speculate on the significance of invidious competition and interactions between them. We address briefly the future of French/American arms industrial competition and cooperation, given the trend towards transnational security arrangements and defense industry globalization     

The Korean War: A 50‐year critical historiography

Scholarly research and publication in many countries has made the Korean War not only remembered, but also better understood. Material from Russia and China have been especially helpful in adding nuance and detail to now‐dated writing about the war's causes. Much more work needs to be done on Korean politics and the 1952–53 period, but in all the scholarship simply confirms the shared responsibility of all the belligerents ‐ including the Koreans ‐ in starting and continuing the war.     

Forging the Anglo‐American global defence partnership: Harold Wilson,Lyndon Johnson and the Washington summit,December 1964

This article investigates the initial phase of the relationship between the Harold Wilson government and the Lyndon Johnson administration. Despite the generally held view that relations between these two countries were neither warm or close or that Wilson was more anxious to establish a close partnership with the United States than Johnson was with Britain, the article will show that this view is rather superficial. On the contrary, it was the Johnson administration which lacked confidence in dealing with the Wilson government for several reasons. The British leadership fought its corner very well, and used Britain's ability to play a world role as a means of influencing the USA. Indeed, no other single Western ally was equal to the USA, and thus a close relationship with the USA did not necessarily mean that the other country had to have equal power and strength to the USA.     

Communication: Wrap‐up on the cost of the gulf war

This paper discusses how crises and war may “disrupt” company activities, and how companies adapt to these disruptions. Croatia is used as a case study. The original hypothesis was that war led to breaks in physical flows: in other words, that companies experienced difficulties in importing and obtaining supplies of goods. Instead, it appears that loss of customers and severely worsened conditions of payment were the principal problems for Croatian companies. Although it does not fall within the scope of this investigation, it is interesting to note that the Croatian government has not imposed any direct rationing on the industrial sector, but rather via the banking system.     

Cultural barriers to organisational unlearning: The US army,the ‘zero‐defects’ culture and operations in the post‐cold war world

Much intellectual effort in the post‐Cold War US Army has been put into examinations of how best to conduct MOOTW and urban warfare. One of the main problems for the Army in this respect is the fact that these operations require a good deal of initiative to be displayed by troops at the lowest command levels. This has not normally been forthcoming. There is, in the Army, a ‘zero‐defects’ culture that is stymying the necessary initiative. Only when this culture has been properly appreciated and tackled will the Army that has proved itself so adept at the ‘big war’ be able to conclusively tackle the ‘small war’.     

Female participation in war: Bio‐cultural interactions

Throughout history fighting has been associated with men. Cross‐cultural studies of male/female differences have found serious violence as the most distinctive sex difference there is. Is that a matter of education and social conventions, or are men naturally far more adapted to fighting than women are? This question is at the centre of public debate nowadays regarding the right and ability of women to enlist in combat roles in the armed services. The article attempts to elucidate the nature of the bio‐cultural interactions involved, whose complexity, and even existence, are all too often ignored in the debate.