‘Innovate or die’: Organizational culture and the origins of maneuver warfare in the United States Marine Corps

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, this article contributes to the understanding of the origins of maneuver warfare as the capstone doctrine of the Marine Corps. It does so by identifying a second source that fostered change in the Marine Corps – one in addition to disquiet about the conduct of the war in Vietnam – which stemmed from the challenges posed by the United States' post-Vietnam strategic and military reorientation. And second, this article examines the influence of organizational culture, or identity, on innovation in the Marine Corps. A critical strand in the growing literature on military innovation focuses on organizational culture and how it influences the behavior and responses of particular military organizations. This article contributes to this literature by analyzing the influence of the organizational culture of the Marine Corps in shaping what was deemed an appropriate response to the challenges it confronted in the 1970s.     

Conditional commitments: Why states use caveats to reserve their efforts in military coalition operations

Why do states make substantial military contributions to coalition operations, while at the same time apply reservations, or caveats, to how the coalition can use the military contributions? Caveats rose to prominence in defense and policy circles with NATO’s campaign in Afghanistan. In the scholarly security literature, the term remains a buzzword for all types of reserved efforts by states in coalition warfare, but there are few theoretical accounts addressing caveats. This article contributes to the knowledge gap on caveats through a comparative case study of Denmark’s, the Netherlands’, and Norway’s contributions to NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011. It demonstrates that caveats can occur through three different causal pathways: compromises from domestic bargaining, handling of alliance commitments, and implementation and civil–military relations. Insights into the complexity that causes caveats are highly relevant for both political and military decision-makers that are trying to coordinate states’ effort in coalition operations.     

British Strategy and the Struggle with France 1793–1815

This article examines the various constraints under which the conduct of British strategy operated during the French Wars – examples include its political and geographical situation, its far-flung colonial interests and its limited military resources and its need to maintain a strong alliance system in continental Europe – and shows how the direction that it took closely mirrored a variety of campaigns in the eighteenth century. That said, the position in which Britain found herself in the struggle against the French Revolution and Napoleon was frequently contradictory, and it is no coincidence that it was some time before the ideal combination of strategies was found that marked the period 1808–14. The fact that the difficulties involved were overcome said a great deal for the underlying strength of the British state.     

Bush path to self-destruction: Charles Taylor and the Revolutionary United Front

This article explains the demise of Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebellion. It argues that the main cause of this fate was the group's relationship with its primary sponsor, Charles Taylor. The RUF's dependency on Taylor's patronage, coupled with the rebellion's weak organisational endowments harmed the group's prospects of success. Based on original research, the article shows how Taylor used the RUF as a strategic instrument for his own regional interests, which led to the group's unravelling. More broadly, the article speaks about proxy warfare in Africa and how the relationship between resource flows and rebellion are not always beneficial to rebels as one might expect.     

Analysing coalition warfare from an intra-alliance politics perspective: The Normandy Campaign 1944

This article sets forth a framework for analysis designed to enhance our understanding of the political management of coalition warfare. The framework, based upon literature appertaining to ‘intra-alliance politics’ and International Relations (IR) theories, is applied to the case study of the Normandy Campaign of 1944. Utilising this framework we are able to consider many of the thorny issues of coalition politics and determine how these can be managed successfully to maintain Allied cohesion. Throughout the analysis the merits of the ‘realist’ and ‘pluralist’ views on maintaining Allied cohesion are appraised. The article concludes that, while both afford convincing explanations for overcoming tensions within the coalition, the pluralist approach proves superior in accounting for Allied unity. Overall, the article demonstrates that the intra-alliance politics framework is a useful device for understanding the political dynamics of the Normandy Campaign in 1944 and that it is also potentially applicable to other instances of coalition warfare; past, present, and future.     

‘Immediate redress’: USS Potomac and the pirates of Quallah Batoo

Maritime interests in the twenty-first century are not immune to the growing number of irregular challenges and hybrid threats that have come to dominate land warfare. In order to better understand these challenges a study of naval history can help provide a vital foundation. In the early 1830s the United States Navy dispatched the frigate USS Potomac to Sumatra to investigate a pirate attack on the spice trader Friendship. Potomac's crew of sailors and Marines conducted a landing at the village Quallah Batoo and fought a pitched battle. As the navies of the world approach naval irregular warfare in the new century, studying past examples like Potomac's mission can help illuminate the principles of successful naval irregular warfare.     

Institutional Analysis and Irregular Warfare: A Case Study of the French Army in Algeria 1954–1960

This article proposes a case study to illustrate the usefulness of sociological institutional analysis as a method to uncover ‘blue force’ challenges to deal with irregular warfare. The French Army's adaptation to revolutionary warfare in Algeria, starting in 1954, is used to illustrate both the application of the methodology and how institutional forces can hinder as well as overwhelm transformation for irregular warfare. The analysis emphasizes three key dimensions of the French Army's institutional adaptation: the regulative, normative and cognitive. These empirical elements are used to show how they interacted and influenced the institutional implementation of the French COIN structures.     

Applying Lanchester's linear law to model the Ardennes campaign

In modern warfare, many believe the decisive factor in winning a battle is seizing the right moment to shift from defense to attack, or vice versa. This paper attempts to bring that perspective to Lanchester's differential equations of warfare, and continues the application of Lanchester's linear law to the analysis of the World War II battle of Ardennes, as reported in earlier issues of Naval Research Logistics by Bracken and by Fricker. A new variable, shift time, accounting for the timing of the shift between defense and attack is explicitly included in our version of the model, and it helps obtain improved goodness of fit to historical data. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48:653–661, 2001     

Becoming the enemy: Convergence in the American and Al Qaeda ways of warfare

The United States and Al Qaeda represent two fundamentally different forms of warfare. The US, with its basis in the Western way of warfare, relies on an almost totally instrumental form of warfare and Al Qaeda, with its basis in the Islamic way of warfare, fights an expressive, existential form of warfare. This paper illustrates how both sides' ways of warfare are converging toward each other. It also argues that this is in fact a good thing because it will allow the US to understand its enemy and thereby allow the US to defeat him in terms he can understand.     

The British government and the end of French Algeria, 1958–62

Unlike France, Britain viewed the Algerian conflict from 1958 to 1962 primarily as a colonial war. The British government regarded Algérie française as an anachronism, which France would have to relinquish one day. Though Britain was no stranger to ‘dirty’ colonial wars, as simultaneous operations against EOKA nationalists in Cyprus continued to prove, it was not averse to displaying a certain smugness at having averted the kind of mess Algeria seemed to represent. Britain's interest in the latter stages of the Algerian conflict centred on four major areas: Perceptions of colonial warfare; de Gaulle's Algeria policy; Algeria and Britain's view of France in Europe and NATO; Negotiating the ceasefire and ending the conflict.     

The socialization of military power: security cooperation and doctrine development through multinational military exercises

Multinational Military Exercises (MMEs) are often viewed by states as opportunities to increase interoperability, improve cooperation, and solve common security problems. We argue that in addition to this, MMEs work as tools to shape the shared beliefs of coalition partners surrounding threat. Specifically, MMEs allow multinational forces to identify best practices, consolidate beliefs, and codify behavior through doctrine, typically by means of some institutional process. We examine our argument on MMEs through an analysis of various multinational and coalition partner efforts to identify security threats and cooperate through the development of common doctrine at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. Our analysis suggests that the use of MMEs for doctrine development does help to socialize states in terms of identifying common threats and subsequently sharing a process by which to address them.     

How Probable is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back In to the Cyber Conflict Debate

Many well-established explanations for war suggest that cyber weapons have a greater chance of being used offensively than other kinds of military technologies. This response article introduces a research agenda for the study of cyber war, and offers an example – principal-agent problems in cyber operations – to demonstrate how rigorous theoretical and empirical work may proceed.     

Wellington's use of deception tactics in the Peninsular War

Wellington's use of intelligence developed throughout his military career. Arguably, his experiences in India taught him the importance of intelligence, but it was during the Peninsular War that he honed his analytical techniques. As the war progressed, he developed sophisticated methods for the integration of strategic intelligence – largely gathered by civilian agents – with operational intelligence – collected by military personnel. This allowed him to develop operational conceptualisation, which in turn contributed to the successes he achieved over the French forces in Iberia. However, more than anything, it was his considered use of intelligence, combined with intricate deception operations in the latter stages of the conflict, which deprived the French of reliable intelligence on his own movements, and demonstrated his understanding of the importance of intelligence. This article investigates Wellington's increasing awareness of the importance of intelligence and deception during the Peninsular War.     

The legality of unmanned aerial vehicles outside the combat zone: a case study of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan

The drone is the latest tool to promote interests of a nation-state. It is clear that USA as well as other major powers anticipate that robotics will play a key role in future warfare. Today, more than 70 countries have already acquired drone technology and many others are desperate to join the ranks. This urge for drone technology will ultimately lead to a “boundless and borderless war without end.” In the case of Pakistan, the US drone campaign has raised some important issues regarding how their use could, or should, be regulated in the future. This article analyses the legal issues raised by the US's use of drone technology in non-combat zones, such as Pakistan. It is argued that a reckless disrespect of Pakistan's sovereignty has had adverse implications and consequences for the legitimacy of the Pakistani government. Drone strikes have prompted instinctive opposition among the Pakistani population, hurt their feelings and estranged them from the government. This in turn has added to Pakistan's instability and stimulated a ground-swell of animosity toward the USA.     

Attrition modeling in the presence of decoys: An operations-other-than-war motivation

Under various operational conditions, in particular in operations other than war (OOTW) or peacekeeping, an intervening force, here Blue, must occasionally engage in attrition warfare with an opposing force, here Red, that is intermingled with noncombatants. Desirably, Red armed actives are targeted, and not the unarmed noncombatants. This article describes some simple Lanchesterian attrition models that reflect a certain capacity of Blue to discriminate noncombatants from armed and active Red opponents. An explicit extension of the Lanchester square law results: Blue's abstinence concerning the indiscriminate shooting of civilians mixed with Red's is essentially reflected in a lower Blue rate of fire and less advantageous exchange rate. The model applies to other situations involving decoys, and reflects the value of a discrimination capability. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44 : 507–514, 1997     

Less than Meets the Eye

Observers of United States (US) interventions have almost universally characterized the 1994 Haiti intervention as multilateral, a model for how international cooperation can achieve common security goals. A closer analysis of the intervention reveals that the planning and execution of the intervention were almost entirely unilateral and therefore cost the US few if any of the theoretical costs of coalition warfare, including interoperability and policy compromise. Mapped onto the unilateral strategy and operation of the intervention, however, was a multilateral diplomatic effort that secured United Nations Security Council authorization and provided a cover for an intervention that the US had already planned and intended to execute with or without that authorization. That the US sought a multilateral cover for an intervention that it could easily accomplish unilaterally shows the importance of two factors: A domestic audience that opposed unilateral peacekeeping but would accept using US resources as part of a broader multilateral operation, and a local population that would be more responsive to a multilateral coalition than a use of force that was perceived to be unilateral. The Haiti intervention shows that the determinants of success in operations other than war are as much political as military. When the US already has overwhelming military superiority vis-à-vis its adversary, building military coalitions becomes as much about enlisting political support as aggregating material capability.     

From the Editors

For the first four years of the Algerian War British ministers and officials claimed that while supporting the French position in North Africa they did not support their policies. Successive Conservative governments sought to sustain France in North Africa because of the impact that long term insurgency in Algeria would have on Western defence by draining French human and material resources. They also feared that Western influence in North Africa could decline, opening the way for the spread of Communism, and that further humiliation for France, coming on the heels of Indochina, could lead to a ‘neutralist’ government in Paris, which would politically weeaken the Western alliance. Yet Britain's own foreign interests led it to wish to limit the spread of Arab nationalism and to avoid being tarred with the colonialist brush. The ambiguity of Britain's position led to shifting policies, which made the job of HM Ambassador in Paris, Gladwyn Jebb, particularly difficult.     

The ‘Third’ US Offset Strategy and Europe’s ‘Anti-access’ Challenge

Over the last two decades, a number of countries (most notably China, Russia and Iran) have been developing so-called anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, such as ballistic and cruise missiles, offensive cyber-weapons, electronic warfare, etc. The development of A2/AD capabilities by non-Western countries undermines the foundations of US power projection and global military-technological supremacy. In order to overcome, or at least mitigate, the impending A2/AD challenge, the US Department of Defense (DoD) began to roll out its so-called ‘third’ offset strategy in late 2014. The strategy aims to bring about innovative operational concepts and technologies and spur new doctrinal and organisational debates. This article assesses which of the operational concepts and capabilities informing current US discussions on offset may be relevant in the context of the A2/AD challenges Europeans face on their eastern ‘flank‘ and in their ‘extended southern neighbourhood‘, and which may not. Europeans must grapple with the same conceptual puzzle as the US: how to strike the right balance between defeating A2/AD capabilities and hedging against them, i.e. through alternative strategies that are less dependent on unhindered access and resort to asymmetric forms of warfare. However, they must take into account the geographical features of their eastern flank and extended southern neighbourhood, the level of technological maturity of their challengers, and their own military-technological prowess and political limitations. This suggests a somewhat different approach to offsetting A2/AD than that adopted by the US.     

Close Encounters of the Tribal Kind: the Implementation of Co-option as a Tool for De-escalation of Conflict – The Case of the Netherlands in Afghanistan's Uruzgan Province

Abstract

In contemporary counter-insurgency campaigns de-escalation is typically achieved by obtaining the local population's collaboration. The rationale underlying this approach is that such collaboration spawns control over the population and therefore weakens the insurgent's position. This article seeks to understand how this approach is practised in the reality of contemporary counter-insurgency warfare. In Iraq as well as Afghanistan counter-insurgents were confronted with fragmented indigenous societies in which the various local segments were dominated by local power-holders. Consequently, obtaining the local population's collaboration required co-option of these agents. As such a strategy of co-option is a highly localized approach, this article focuses on Afghanistan's Uruzgan province and analyzes the implementation of co-option by the Netherlands' Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), which operated there from 2006 to 2010. The analysis discusses how the counter-insurgents obtained a profound understanding of Uruzgan's societal landscape and how co-option of local power-holders became part of the counter-insurgency routine. In the end, co-option was successfully implemented as TFU even succeeded in obtaining the collaboration of previously marginalized elements of the population. However, as the methods employed for co-option were mainly of a persuasive nature, the TFU co-option strategy was less effective in containing the influence of notorious spoilers. Thus this case study provides an insight into the dynamics and limitations of co-option as a tool for de-escalation in contemporary counter-insurgency warfare.