The ‘bomber gap’: British intelligence and an American delusion

For most of the 1950s, manned aircraft were the prime nuclear bomb delivery method, and were therefore a vital metric for British and American intelligence when calculating the Soviet threat. Each community reached very different conclusions from the same raw intelligence, generating the ‘bomber gap’ myth in the US but not in the UK. The information available was inconclusive, so in order to understand it estimators had to rely on their assumptions, which were different. Contrasting scopes for parochial capitalisation drew their conclusions further apart. Contrary to orthodox accounts of this episode, Soviet deception did not play a central role.     

‘A Time of War’: contextual and organisational dimensions in the construction of combat motivation in the IDF

This paper explores the construction of combat motivation in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), arguing that although Israeli society at large is in a ‘Post Heroic’ era, the ‘Heroic Spirit’ is revealed during emergencies. A total of 1535 questionnaires were administered among combat soldiers during large-scale operations fought during national emergency and during small-scale routine operations. The results reveal differences in the construction of combat motivation typical for emergency vs. routine, as well as for reserves vs. regular units. These results indicate that the Post Heroic era is a condition that could be shifted according to cultural, organisational and individual determinants. This paper discusses the roots of these constructions and their implications on the theory of combat motivation and combat experience.     

The 1950 ‘Ambassador's agreement’ on USAF bases in the UK and British fears of US atomic unilateralism

The article explores the 1950 ‘Ambassador's Agreement’ (named after US Ambassador Lewis Douglas) about establishing long-term US air bases in the UK. During the discussions British representatives expressed resentment of American pressure and were concerned about the expense that developing the bases for American purposes might entail. There were even fears that Washington might use the airfields to launch an atomic bomb attack on the USSR without regard to the views of the UK government. The British consented to providing the bases because they wanted to enmesh the US further in UK and Western European defence. For their part American negotiators had wanted to further US atomic strategy without delay. Although the agreement imposed no restriction on the use of the airfields, some US officials believed that in a crisis the UK government might try to prevent them being used for atomic bombing missions.     

The Use and Abuse of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to Counter-Insurgency

This article argues that there is little evidence supporting the existence of the often praised, and allegedly subtle and successful ‘Dutch approach’ to stabilisation and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. It denounces the uncritical use of the term and refutes suggestions of historical and cultural roots to such an approach, for instance in Dutch colonial warfare in the Indonesian archipelago. It concludes by explaining the true conditions that gave rise to this notion, which seems to feed into a gratifying national self-image of the Dutch as non-martial, conflict averse and tolerant, rather than offering an original and successful formula for countering insurgencies.     

The ‘one-plus-four’ formula and transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo

In the aftermath of the signing of the ‘Accord Global et Inclusif’ (AGI) in Pretoria on 17 December 2002, not much was expected of President Thabo Mbeki's ‘imposed political monster’. In effect, after Mbeki came up with his ‘final plan’ providing for a transitional presidency made up of a president and four vice-presidents, many blamed ‘Mbeki's ignorance of Congolese political intricacies’. Mbeki's ‘one-plus-four’ formula was not only said to be unknown to the Congolese, but was also doomed to failure, given the nature of the stakeholders and the interests at stake in the DRC crisis. However, in view of the latest political developments in the DRC (a successful constitutional referendum as well as presidential, legislative and provincial elections, among others), we contend that, given the complexity of the Congolese conflict, Mbeki's design has emerged as a commendable contribution to the political solution of the Congolese crisis. Factors that have enabled such a transition mechanism to hold ought to be critically studied and eventually applied as a model for similar conflict situations in Africa and probably beyond.     

The British Army, ‘Understanding’, and the Illusion of Control

Over the past decade, Western military doctrines concerned with matters of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency have emphasised the requirement for properly ‘understanding’ the social, political and cultural environments in which those militaries may operate; the so-called human and socio-political ‘terrain’. This has led to a number of advancements and initiatives designed to facilitate the way that militaries may enhance that understanding. One of those initiatives has been the emergence from within the British military of a doctrine – JDP 04 ‘Understanding’ – designed for that purpose. Using that doctrine and other subsequent publications as a template, this article will examine the utility of ‘understanding’ for those commanders seeking to match military activities with political ends. It proposes that while any advances in understanding the operating environment are to be applauded, the ‘understanding’ of greatest importance is that relating to the feasibility of the strategic objectives at hand. If those objectives lack inherent feasibility, then the development of subordinate forms of understanding, particularly in relation to the socio-political dynamics of target societies, will likely only serve to slow the process of failure.     

The security sector and the plunder of Zimbabwe’s Chiadzwa alluvial diamonds: the ‘goat mentality’ in practice

While the human rights impact of the deployment of state security agencies in the Chiadzwa diamond fields has been explored, it is important to continue to expose the increasing tendency within the sector to take public resources that should be protected by the state and used for the benefit of the people and channel them for personal gain. The security sector stranglehold of President Robert Mugabe and the ruling political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), has facilitated the siphoning of Chiadzwa diamond revenue into the pockets of individual security personnel. The unfolding sociopolitical crisis in Zimbabwe has also meant that these security personnel have been deployed beyond conflict zones and into traditionally civilian domains, with dire consequences for the public purse. With this in mind, it is asserted that these issues have driven state security agencies to enrich themselves through what is termed in this article as a ‘goat mentality’. The article thus explores the ways in which state security agencies have been deployed and gone on to promote personal enrichment in the Chiadzwa diamond fields.     

‘Blackmailing the army’ – ‘Strategic Military Refusal’ as policy and doctrine enforcement: the formation of a new security agent

The study shows how ‘strategic military refusal’ in Israel developed as a rational and institutional means to influence security policies. As opposed to the perspective that sees military refusal as a spontaneous individual act, the study illustrates how organizations operate to distribute military refusal in order to pressure decision-makers to change their military policies. This strategy has proven to be effective when the military is involved with groups that threaten it with refusal – which threatens the military's operational ability and its official and apolitical image. These include soldiers whose civilian authorities, rather than their military commanders, are perceived as an epistemic authority regarding security issues. The case study refers to the impact of strategic military refusal in Israel on security policies and the military doctrine. This was influenced by leftist groups, which, although they belonged to the parliamentary opposition, had dominant presence in the military ranks. Furthermore, the study examines the effect of the use of strategic military refusal on the model of military recruitment.     

In Search of the ‘X’ Factor: Morale and the Study of Strategy

A functional conceptualisation of morale is proposed, which focuses its meaning on motivation and the willingness to act rather than mood and group dynamics. Morale, it is argued, emerges from the subtle interrelationships of the many factors known to affect military means. It can be assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively, allowing the interaction between morale and policy to be explored in a manner that facilitates insight into the strategic process. A case study from the North African campaign of World War II is presented to explore in detail the relationship between morale and the art of war – strategy.     

Saudi Arabia,Wahhabism, and the Taliban of Afghanistan: ‘Puritanical reform’ as a ‘revolutionary war’ program

This article argues that the Taliban's revolutionary war (RW) program is puritanical reform informed by the Islamic legal duty of al-amr bi'l-ma‘ruf wa'l-nahy ‘an al-munkar (‘commanding what is good and forbidding what is reprehensible’). It also examines the history of this duty with examples of puritanical reform movements emerging from Berber tribes in North Africa and tribes in Arabia. Furthermore, the importance of this duty in Wahhabi Saudi Arabia, and its exportation to Pakistan where Taliban leaders imbibed this ideology, are discussed. Finally the article shows that corruption and abuses by the Afghan regime have given impetus to puritanical reformers: the condition precedent for puritanical reform is pervasive wrongdoing in an Islamic society.     

‘Restoring normalcy’: The evolution of the Indian army's counterinsurgency doctrine

The Indian Army has a uniquely political approach to counterinsurgency that has had great success. This essay examines the development of this doctrine over the last five decades, and the political and operational factors that influenced its development. The most important of these factors was, and remains, the Army's positional‐war orientation, which puts great emphasis on the need to prepare for conventional war. Though the doctrine has undergone some evolution, such changes have been constrained by the positional‐war orientation.     

‘Loose Nukes’ and the nuclear mirror: The dangers and opportunities resulting from the break‐up of the Soviet Union

Soviet Nuclear Fission. Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union by Kurt M. Campbell, Ashton B. Carter, Steven E. Miller, Charles A. Kraket. Harvard University, CSIA Studies in International Security, No. 1 (November 1991), pp. v. 129.     

A Sign of Victory?: ‘Scottish Swords’ and Other Weapons in the Possession of the ‘Auld Innemie’

Many late medieval documents, notably inventories of arms and armour, of Englishmen contain references to ‘Scottish swords’ and other weapons. What did the compilers of these documents mean when they described a weapon as ‘Scottish’? How did such weapons come to be in the possession of these men? This article will attempt to explain this phenomenon drawing on primary documentary sources and surviving material culture from Glasgow Museums’ collections and others, as well as artworks from the period.     

‘Kadyrovtsy’: Russia’s Counterinsurgency Strategy and the Wars of Paramilitary Clans

This article analyses the steps taken by the Russian government, with the aid of a powerful local clan, the so-called Kadyrovtsy, to subdue the Chechen insurgency. It highlights the strategy used by Russia, under whose patronage former anti-Russian guerrilla fighters were transformed into paramilitary allies of the Russian government; later these former insurgents were incorporated into the regular Russian army and other state security forces. The article also identifies problems that are connected with the activities of the Kadyrovtsy in Chechnya and Russia, and the spillover into the diaspora; it also contextualises the issues faced by the contemporary Chechen ruling clan and the geopolitics of the Caucasus within the research framework of paramilitarism and counterinsurgency.     

‘Just another border incident’: The Rann of Kutch and the 1965 India–Pakistan War

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan War of September 1965 has attracted little attention in the larger body of work on South Asia. Further, almost nothing has been written on the earlier skirmish, in April 1965, between Indian and Pakistani security forces in the Rann-of-Kutch, an uninhabited salt marsh. This article argues that the limited conflict in the Rann, its immediate consequences, and its impact on Pakistani military and civilian leaders were central to Pakistan’s consideration of a military solution to the ongoing dispute in Kashmir, which then led to Indian retaliation and the outbreak of war.     

‘Second-Class’: The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces

The defection of a significant number of Sunni officers amidst the ongoing turmoil in Syria created a unique opportunity to get access to original data on the Syrian armed forces. This study draws on extensive fieldwork to probe the sectarian question in the Syrian officer corps. On the basis of a series of interviews conducted throughout the summer of 2014, I investigate the politics and consequences of sectarian stacking in the Syrian military as well as the root causes of Sunni officers’ grievances and alienation. My conclusions draw on an original database that compiles the sectarian affiliations of 81 prominent officers who occupied the most senior military positions under Bashar al-Asad.