Iran’s Nuclear Fatwa: Analysis of a Debate

For more than a decade, Iran has been referring to a fatwa issued by its Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, proscribing nuclear weapons. The fatwa, however, not only failed to influence the process that led to the resolution of Iran’s nuclear crisis, but also has been met with a good deal of skepticism. The most commonly held suspicions about the credibility of the fatwa can be summed up in five central questions: (1) Has the nuclear fatwa actually been issued? (2) Does the fatwa apply to all the aspects of nuclear weapons including their production, possession and use? (3) What is the juridical status of the fatwa? (4) Was the nuclear fatwa issued only to deceive other nations? (5) Is the fatwa really irreversible? This article tries to answer these questions by providing a chronological review of the fatwa and analyzing all the relevant statements by Khamenei. The analysis is conducted against the background of Islamic principles, Shi’a jurisprudence and the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The article concludes that the fatwa is a credible religious decree and could indeed contribute to the cause of nuclear disarmament.     

Reopen a joint school of military government and administration?

Today there are many calls for other elements of the government to do more to ‘do their part’, assist the military to restore order and stability and ‘win the peace’ in Iraq and Afghanistan, and prepare for similar roles in future conflicts. The authors here instead briefly review the history of US armed forces’ involvement in military governance operations from the Mexican War through World War II, and recommend the re-establishment of a School of Military Government similar to that created during the latter conflict.     

A family of games on 1,∞)2 with payoff a function of y/x

A two-parameter class of games on 1,∞)² is studied. The games may be regarded as analogs of Silverman games, having continuous payoff function in place of a step function of y/x. This change is motivated by a desire to move toward a model for competitive situations where the penalty for overspending increases with the amount of overspending. There are some similarities to games with bell-shaped kernel. For most of the region considered in the plane of the two parameters there are solutions of finite type, which are obtained explicitly. There are, however, pockets in this plane where no optimal strategies have been found and possibly where none of finite type exist.     

The struggle of a Kantian power in a Lockean world – German leadership in security and defence policy

ABSTRACT

German security and defence policy has undergone substantial transformation. This transformation requires an unprecedented level of political leadership, suggesting that Germany needs to solve the dilemma of how to supply leadership to increasingly demanding partners. What are the conditions under which German leadership can unfold in security and defence policy? To what degree do German role-conceptions of international agency and role-expectations of German leadership coincide? What kind of leadership outputs are produced? This study offers a comprehensive analysis of German security and defence policy in terms of supply (role conceptions) and demand (role expectations). We outline three leadership role conceptions present in the German strategic debate, which we then assess in the context of the Wendtian theory of cultures of anarchy. We then analyse Berlin's leadership in terms of outputs via the case study on Anchor Army and the Framework Nations Concept. We conclude that while Germany has tried to match leadership role expectations both rhetorically and in action, Berlin's leadership inputs have so far been insufficient. This has led to an imbalance in terms of role conceptions and expectations hampering effective German leadership in security and defence policy.     

“Effing” the military: a political misunderstanding of management

The use of commercial business management techniques is widespread in all government departments, including the Ministry of Defence. This article examines the use of popular management techniques in the Armed Forces and argues that their application is misplaced. It looks at what the “effs” – “efficiency” and “effectiveness” – mean in the business world and to the Armed Forces. It compares the definitions both in business and the Armed Forces and finds that there are few, if any, situations where the same measurements can be applied. Whilst many management techniques are suited for business, the function of the Armed Forces and its output cannot be measured in the same way, complicated by the different metrics of “efficiency” in peace and in war. This difference may not be clearly understood by some politicians, or indeed by some senior military personnel. Using examples from some of the most popular management techniques such as “Lean” and “Agile” it is possible to see that their use might actually diminish the capabilities of the Armed Forces when it comes to performing their principal role – the use of force to achieve political objectives.     

The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?

Students of international politics known as ‘proliferation optimists’ argue that when it comes to the spread of nuclear weapons ‘more may be better’ because nuclear weapons deter great power war and produce greater levels of international stability. This essay provides a critique of proliferation optimism, challenging optimism’s conception of nuclear deterrence theory, its logical underpinnings, and its policy recommendations. It does this by conducting an intellectual history of proliferation optimism, identifying the core weaknesses of proliferation optimism as a theoretical framework, and articulating the myriad threats posed by nuclear proliferation.     

The rules of engagement in Somalia – a judge advocate's primer 1

Scholars disagree on the prevailing focus on insurgent ideology. Some claim that the dominant Marxist ideology of the Cold War era has been supplanted by a new focus on ethnic and national identity. Others claim that many insurgencies were always focused on identity, but the Cold War and superpower antipathies distorted perceptions of insurgencies as politically-economically focused. Yet the heart of the matter is that analysts are not faced with an ‘either/or’ proposition.     

Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?

A defender wants to detect as quickly as possible whether some attacker is secretly conducting a project that could harm the defender. Security services, for example, need to expose a terrorist plot in time to prevent it. The attacker, in turn, schedules his activities so as to remain undiscovered as long as possible. One pressing question for the defender is: which of the project's activities to focus intelligence efforts on? We model the situation as a zero‐sum game, establish that a late‐start schedule defines a dominant attacker strategy, and describe a dynamic program that yields a Nash equilibrium for the zero‐sum game. Through an innovative use of cooperative game theory, we measure the harm reduction thanks to each activity's intelligence effort, obtain insight into what makes intelligence effort more effective, and show how to identify opportunities for further harm reduction. We use a detailed example of a nuclear weapons development project to demonstrate how a careful trade‐off between time and ease of detection can reduce the harm significantly.     

Northern Ireland and minimum force: the refutation of a concept?

The debate over whether there exists a British counter-insurgency tradition of minimum force is one that has been thoroughly discussed. Is there anything left to say? This study suggests there is further insight to be attained if one explicitly evaluates the concept of minimum force in relation to the conduct of the security forces in the years of the Northern Ireland conflict. Through an examination of three key periods in the conflict, it will be shown that while there was invariably an awareness of the need to act with restraint among senior officers at the strategic level, this was often difficult to apply at the tactical level in the heat of confrontation. The argument demonstrates that the British Army, and other instruments of the state, rarely acted in a manner that could be described as ‘minimal’. Instead, it was the broader liberal values of the British state that explains largely the degrees of restraint exhibited by the government and security forces.     

ISIS’s Warfare Functions: A Systematized Review of a Proto-state’s Conventional Conduct of Combat Operations

This article gives an overall assessment of ISIS’s conventional conduct of combat operations by examining their warfighting functions patterns. In sum, the approach of ISIS comprised fundamental principles: their weapons can be organized into categories, purposeful combination of these forces in keeping with the concept of combined arms combat, and hierarchical command and control executed by experienced commanders. ISIS combat groups combined the elements of formation and firepower as well as movement and mobility. The paper concludes that ISIS obviously had a vast range of conventional capabilities at its disposal and was thus able to conduct major operations.     

The soft power of migration – a hard task for the European union

The article studies the range of problems that have emerged due to the growing immigration from Muslim countries into the European Union (EU). While describing the functions of immigrants' communities, the authors focus on their political role in the receiving states. The study of the historical development of government–diaspora relations in three cases (the UK, France, and Germany) shows that Muslim communities' political influence does not reflect their economic and cultural role, which in the future might threaten the EU security, unless these countries develop a new approach to an “acculturation” policy.     

Insurgency online: Elements for a theory of anti‐government Internet communications

The article takes the cases of Peru's Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) as the pont of departure to discuss how a insurgent political movement uses the Internet and World Wide Web (WWW). During the 1996–97 Japanese Embassy hostage incident in Lima, Peru, MRTA supporters in Japan, Europe and North America used online technology to relay the group's message to a global public. The resulting direct media access provided the MRTA with an unprecendented level of global publicity. Through referring to the ‘MRTA Solidarity Page’, the types of message transmitted, the forms of transmission (text, video, audio, e‐mail or other), and target publics (national, global, political elites, media), the article outlines the issues and theoretical challenges raised by electronic anti‐government information provision. The Internet and WWW do not alone constitute the threat to state power as some analysts suggest but does in some sense dramatically alter political communication. New media will probably co‐exist with other forms of political communication for some time.     

Ruminations of a pachyderm or what I learned in the counter‐insurgency business

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has created a pervasive climate of fear in northern Uganda. This study addresses the purpose of this conduct. Diverging from the traditional ‘greed-grievance’ approach to the study of new wars, the LRA's behaviour is analyzed from a strategic perspective. Specifically, the article focuses on the LRA's use of mutilation, abduction, surprise, and unpredictable attacks. The conclusion is that the LRA is strategically using fear as a force multiplier, to further its organizational survival, and as a way to fight a political ‘dirty war’.