Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military Relations in India

How do countries transition from single service to joint operations? This article engages with the discussion on military innovation to argue that civil–military relations are the most important driver for jointness. In doing so it examines jointness in the Indian military. Relying on archival research and primary interviews this article sheds new light on the operations of the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) in Sri Lanka from 1987–1990, the 1999 Kargil War and the Post-Kargil defence reforms. The main argument is that the Indian military’s transition to jointness has been ‘incomplete’ primarily because of its prevailing model of civil-military relations. This model prevents civilians from interfering in the operational issues of the military, including on matters pertaining to jointness. It therefore recommends more forceful civilian intervention to overcome the prevailing single service approach.     

Proliferation and critical risk

Does proliferation increase the risk of war between new nuclear powers? Two schools of thought ‐ proliferation pessimists and optimists ‐ offer very different answers. The former stress the first‐strike danger of nuclear‐armed ballistic missiles and the resulting crisis instability as a cause of preemptive war. The latter stress the caution‐inducing effects of nuclear warheads and fear of retaliation as a check on would‐be attackers.

To bridge the gap between these two schools, Daniel Ellsberg's concept of critical risk is used to show how the likelihood of war changes as new nuclear powers enlarge and improve their missile forces. Ellsberg's framework suggests that the danger of war is low between recent proliferators but rises as nuclear stockpiles grow, thereby changing the payoffs associated with striking first or striking second and increasing the danger of war due to accidents, miscalculations, and uncontrollable interactions between rival nuclear forces.

Ellsberg's framework also suggests that the transition from weaponization to secure second strike force is likely to be long and difficult, in part because short‐range missiles like India's Prithvi are better suited to strike first than to strike second, and in part because negative control procedures reduce the value of striking second, thereby increasing the attraction of a preemptive strike.     

以联合训练推动军种训练提质增效

联合训练以军种训练为基本支撑,形成作战能力的关键在于军种训练与联合训练的无缝衔接。在新的领导指挥体制下,战区作为组织开展联合训练的主体,必须将军种训练纳入战区联合训练的整体计划。因此,军种训练要从标准体系、训练内容、组训模式等方面进行革新优化,切实将军种作战能力融合形成联合作战能力。本文针对当前军种在训练过程中出现的思维转变慢、训法不灵活和联训质效偏低等问题,着眼联训需求、部队建设实际以及战争发展方向,从提升联合素养、深化联合观念、丰富训练内容、引入智能化军事训练方法、优化训练环境、督导训练落实等方面提出了对策建议,以期以联合训练牵引军种训练提质增效,切实推动联合训练不断向高水平跃升。     

The origin of internal security in Colombia: Part I — A CIA special team surveys La Violencia, 1959–60

In October 1959 the Eisenhower administration dispatched a CIA Special Team to survey the violence problem in Colombia. This article, part one of a two‐part series, examines this first significant attempt by a US administration to influence that nation's internal security situation. It investigates the Special Team's actions and analyses its recommendations for transforming Colombia's conventionally‐orientated security forces. The Team's survey, which focuses on counter‐insurgency tactics, civil action, intelligence operations, psychological warfare, and covert action, is the foundation from which Colombia's modern internal security structures are derived.     

Research communication security in the 90s: A view from the UK

This paper develops a methodology for measuring the capital value of military assets in monetary terms. We distinguish between two military capital measures. One measure, called the value of military capital (services) summarizes the value of military defense assets during a particular year. A comparison of the capital‐services value of U.S. and Soviet tactical combat aircraft is provided for the period 1970–1984.

One feature of the capital‐services measure that makes it particularly interesting is that its size can be compared with such military expenditures as operating and support. While these latter expenditures reflect the readiness of a defense establishment, the relevant capital‐services measure reflects force structure and modernization.

A second measure, called the value of military capital (wealth), summarizes the military benefits obtained from defense assets over the remainder of their service lives. This measure depreciates the capital as it ages, and is useful for comparing military wealth with other types of wealth in the economy. We provide this measure for the U.S. military capital stock for 1925–1984.     

任务驱动的一体化作战指挥信息系统高效协同技术

针对一体化网络中心战下各参与方作战指挥信息系统的异构性、自治性、多样性等特点给联合协同作战带来的问题,提出了任务驱动的一体化作战指挥信息系统高效协同技术。以作战目标为导向将各作战力量和资源按需聚合和自主协同,引入自主个体、虚拟任务共同体和虚拟任务执行体,构建一体化虚拟作战指挥环境,为各作战单位提供高效、协同、透明的一体化服务。分别从核心元素、系统框架分别介绍高效协同体系结构,结合陆军合成营指挥信息系统案例对高效协同技术各组成部分进行深入分析,验证该技术的可行性。     

Approximation results for min‐max path cover problems in vehicle routing

This article studies a min‐max path cover problem, which is to determine a set of paths for k capacitated vehicles to service all the customers in a given weighted graph so that the largest path cost is minimized. The problem has wide applications in vehicle routing, especially when the minimization of the latest service completion time is a critical performance measure. We have analyzed four typical variants of this problem, where the vehicles have either unlimited or limited capacities, and they start from either a given depot or any depot of a given depot set. We have developed approximation algorithms for these four variants, which achieve approximation ratios of max{3 ‐ 2/k,2}, 5, max{5 ‐ 2/k,4}, and 7, respectively. We have also analyzed the approximation hardness of these variants by showing that, unless P = NP , it is impossible for them to achieve approximation ratios less than 4/3, 3/2, 3/2, and 2, respectively. We have further extended the techniques and results developed for this problem to other min‐max vehicle routing problems.© 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

On the normality and abnormality of offsets obligations

Defence offsets have often been described as government‐to‐business compensation arrangements or contracts involving “reciprocity beyond that associated with normal market exchange”. This paper argues that it is irrelevant and misleading to use this notion as a criterion for defining offsets.

The paper also explores the apparent inconsistency between the maximising efficiency in defence procurement and the application of offsets requirements. It is shown that defence offsets are a subset of all the price‐quality‐quantity trade‐offs which in general characterise negotiations surrounding complex transactions.

It is argued that although reciprocal or offsetting arrangements are a normal aspect of commercial transacting, the operation of certain offsets schemes namely mandatory offsets obligations, may inhibit the buyer's flexibility in negotiating deals and result in inefficient procurement. This leads us to ask why these offsets schemes have persisted for so long.     

Introduction: Exploring the jungle of terminology

When twentieth-century authors wrote about ‘partisan warfare’, they usually meant an insurgency or asymmetric military operations conducted against a superior force by small bands of ideologically driven irregular fighters. By contrast, originally (i.e. before the French Revolution) ‘partisan’ in French, English, and German referred only to the leader of a detachment of special forces (party, partie, Parthey, détachement) which the major European powers used to conduct special operations alongside their regular forces. Such special operations were the classic definition of ‘small war’ (petite guerre) in the late seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries. The Spanish word ‘la guerrilla’, meaning nothing other than ‘small war’, only acquired an association with rebellion with the Spanish War of Independence against Napoleon. Even after this, however, armies throughout the world have continued to employ special forces. In the late nineteenth century, their operations have still been referred to as prosecuting ‘la guerrilla’ or ‘small war’, which existed side by side with, and was often mixed with, ‘people's war’ or popular uprisings against hated regimes.     

The Force Publique’s campaigns in the Congo-Arab War, 1892-1894

ABSTRACT

Between 1892 and 1894 the Force Publique of King Leopold II’s Congo Free State engaged in a series of little-known counter-insurgency operations against ivory and slave traders from Zanzibar, commonly referred to as Arabs. Without a particularly strong tradition of imperial service, this article argues that the predominantly Belgian officer corps borrowed and adapted methods used by more experienced colonial forces in the 19^th Century. Whether taken from existing literature or learned through experience, it reveals that the Force Publique’s counter-insurgency methods reflected many of the more recognisable aspects of traditional French and British approaches. It suggests that, despite the unique nature of each colonial campaign, basic principles could be adapted by whomsoever to overcome the military and political challenges of colonial conquest. The Force Publique’s campaigns in the Congo-Arab War, therefore, provide further evidence as to how some base theories could be universally applied.     

Regaining Strategy: Small Powers,Strategic Culture,and Escalation in Afghanistan

Abstract

In Western operations in Afghanistan, small European powers escalate in different ways. While Denmark and the Netherlands have contributed to Western escalation through integration with British and US forces, Norway and Sweden have done so by creating a division of labour allowing US and British combat forces to concentrate their efforts in the south. These variations in strategic behaviour suggest that the strategic choice of small powers is more diversified than usually assumed. We argue that strategic culture can explain the variation in strategic behaviour of the small allies in Afghanistan. In particular, Dutch and Danish internationalism have reconciled the use of force in the national and international domains, while in Sweden and Norway there is still a sharp distinction between national interest and humanitarianism.     

United States defence contractors and the future of military operations

ABSTRACT

The United States’ global strategic outlook has shifted markedly since the end of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the United States’ strategic posture shifts, the nature of military operations is simultaneously changing rapidly. Many analysts predict that cyber-operations, autonomous weapons systems, artificial intelligence, and clandestine special forces operations will be central features in future conflicts. Although often overlooked by scholars and policy analysts, defence contractors are integral to the development and implementation of these emerging categories of warfare. This inquiry examines the evolving nature of the American defence industry and the roles corporations play in current theatres of conflict. Surprisingly, rather than becoming less reliant on defence contractors after their much-maligned performance in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, American military and intelligence agencies have become more dependent on the private sector as technology becomes increasingly central to warfare.     

The Afghan model in northern Iraq

In Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, as the Coalition's heavy forces fought in the South, in the North a handful of special operations forces, working with Kurdish rebels, clashed with the Iraqi army along the Green Line. In operations reminiscent of those used a year earlier to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, the lightly armed and heavily outnumbered Coalition forces called in air strikes to defeat Iraq's regular and Republican Guard army divisions. This article tells the story of these operations and discusses some of their implications for future US military policy. The success of the Afghan model in Iraq goes a long way toward demonstrating the efficacy of new air-heavy tactics and shows the strategic value of using light indigenous allies to replace heavy US land forces in both conventional combat and occupation operations.     

Next steps in the creation of an accidental nuclear war prevention center

In early 1983, members of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control met to discuss ideas on the establishment of a joint U.S.‐U.S.S.R. center to support cooperative efforts to prevent accidental nuclear war. William Perry (former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) began the discussion by outlining several measures he felt could help to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. Calling attention to the earlier proposals of Senators Gary Hart, Sam Nunn, and Henry Jackson, he endorsed the concept of a joint accidental nuclear war prevention center as a mechanism to support efforts of the two superpowers to prevent or reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of nuclear war. Most notable in this regard was his personal experience of an erroneous warning of a large‐scale Soviet missile attack on the U.S., which resulted from a NORAD computer malfunction. Information exchanges and consultation to clarify circumstances surrounding an accident ‐ or the misperceptions that might result from one ‐ could be facilitated by a number of different types of centers that have been suggested. Perry described one possible configuration for such a center, consisting of two stations, jointly staffed and located in Washington and Moscow.

Members of the Stanford Center met again in June 1983 to examine in more detail the issues raised by this idea and similar ones, and possible next steps involved in implementation. This paper reports on research in progress on this subject. In addition to the Perry contribution, much of the conceptual analysis of the missions of a joint center derives from the work of Alexander George on crisis prevention and crisis management.’ Those elements of the research covering the technical and ‘mechanization’ requirements are contributed by Elliott Levinthal and Ted Ralston. Lastly, the suggested negotiating approach derives from the experiences and thinking of Sidney Graybeal, former U.S. Commissioner of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).     

Waiting time analysis for a queueing system with time‐limited service and exponential timer

We consider a single‐queue with exhaustive or gated time‐limited services and server vacations, in which the length of each service period at the queue is controlled by a timer, i.e., the server serves customers until the timer expires or the queue becomes empty, whichever occurs first, and then takes vacations. The customer whose service is interrupted due to the timer expiration may be attended according to nonpreemptive or preemptive service disciplines. For the M/G/1 exhaustive/gated time‐limited service queueing system with an exponential timer and four typical preemptive/nonpreemptive service disciplines, we derive the Laplace—Stieltjes transforms and the moment formulas for waiting times and sojourn times through a unified approach, and provide some new results for these time‐limited service disciplines. © John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 638–651, 2001.     

信息化条件下实战化联合作战协同训练

实战化训练是提高信息化条件下联合作战协同能力的基本途径。信息化条件下实战化联合作战协同训练要充分运用信息技术,构建顺畅的实战化联合作战协同训练的基本模式和运行机制,科学掌握实战化训练实施方法。     

South Africa's threat environment: a guide for the National Planning Commission

Abstract

The mandate of South Africa's recently appointed National Planning Commission includes addressing ‘defence and security matters’. This article seeks to outline the central elements of the threat environment facing South Africa in the foreseeable future. It is argued that South Africa faces no meaningful existential threat from conventional military forces but that its security forces will need to be prepared to address possible raids and attacks by conventional military forces both on home soil and on vital interests beyond the nation's borders. Other threats highlighted include the threats posed by potential insurgencies, by terrorism, and by crime, social unrest and banditry. Also addressed is the danger of so-called hybrid threats, in which two or more of the single threat types outlined here are combined. Finally, the article challenges the National Planning Commission to rethink South Africa's policy on peace operations in the light of the need to ensure the safety and security of the nation's citizenry.     

The U.S. Navy's task forces: 1–199

ABSTRACT

Grouping warships for combat has evolved greatly over the centuries. In the early 1940s, the United States Navy began to group its warships for combat in much more flexible task forces than the previous single-type-of-warship formations. This system has evolved and spread to naval forces ashore but remains fundamentally unchanged. It now covers numbers between 1 to over 1000, of which the most prominent is the first 100 or so which U.S. Navy combat forces use. The numbered fleets worldwide utilize the series covering 20-79; 1-19 and 90-99 appear to be reserved for special allocations and Commander, Pacific Fleet; numbers over 80 to the Atlantic; 100-119 for Northern Europe and briefly Tenth Fleet; the 120 series for Second Fleet as a Joint Task Force leader; the 150 series for Naval Forces Central Command; and the 180 series for Atlantic Fleet and now-Fleet Forces Command.     

Country Survey XIII: Japan's security posture and defense industry prospects

Defense budgets in Japan have been complicated compromises from numerous inputs ‐ including threat perceptions, domestic industrial/technological base development, support for the bilateral security treaty with the United States and internal bureaucratic politics ‐ but with the fall of the former Soviet Union, the clearest justification for higher spending disappeared. Double‐digit defense spending increases that were common in the 1980s have been replaced by annual increases lower than present inflation rates, resulting in negative real growth in the country's defense budget. Domestic economic problems and consistent government pressures for smaller budgets have further slowed annual growth in total spending and have contributed to lower procurement budgets. As a result, the domestic Japanese defense industry is facing far more constrained conditions from the growth years of a decade before.

Government policymakers are examining Japan's regional security environment as well as its alliance with the United States to determine the appropriate course for the country to take in the coming years. The formal security treaty with the United States is likely to remain a major element of government positions, but other aspects of the country's overall security posture are open to debate. Perceptions of a reduced threat environment are fueling additional pressures for defense budget cuts.

The domestic defense industry seeks means to assure its survival in domestic defense markets in this constrained environment. Expansion into overseas markets to offset declining domestic markets is an option that currently is constrained by policy restrictions on arms exports. Industry is advocating re‐examination of those policies and unlike earlier years, government appears willing to respond positively but cautiously to this lobbying.     

The knapsack problem with a minimum filling constraint

We study a knapsack problem with an additional minimum filling constraint, such that the total weight of selected items cannot be less than a given threshold. The problem has several applications in shipping, e‐commerce, and transportation service procurement. When the threshold equals the knapsack capacity, even finding a feasible solution to the problem is NP‐hard. Therefore, we consider the case when the ratio α of threshold to capacity is less than 1. For this case, we develop an approximation scheme that returns a feasible solution with a total profit not less than (1 ‐ ε) times the total profit of an optimal solution for any ε > 0, and with a running time polynomial in the number of items, 1/ε, and 1/(1‐α). © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013