Military and Veterans’ Health,Health Care,and Wellbeing

Abstract

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) need to bridge a gap in their understanding of service members’ health outcomes and the issues involved in treatment, such as cost. In addition, clinicians and policy analysts must overcome existing knowledge barriers. Clinicians need to be aware of policy changes that will affect their patient load in numbers and in treatment needs. Policy analysts need to be aware of issues relevant to clinical treatment, such as quality and timeliness of care. Given the need for services and support to military personnel and families, and the fact that the fastest growing expenses in defense are health care costs, a multi-disciplinary line of research will help lawmakers understand the most efficient and effective resource use across the health care services.     

The UK,interrogation and Iraq, 2003–2008

The UK’s interrogation operations during the conflict in Iraq (2003–2008) are often portrayed by the media as involving significant amounts of mistreatment. This article demonstrates that these practices are not necessarily representative of the UK’s interrogation operations across this conflict. In doing so it contributes to the limited literature on the practice of interrogation and on the UK’s combat operations in Iraq. The UK’s interrogation capability, and therefore its intelligence-gathering capability, is shown to have rested primarily with the military’s Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT). The JFIT suffered from limitations to the number, training and experience of its interrogators and interpreters. It is argued that maintaining a permanent, higher level of preparedness for interrogation by the British armed forces is desirable.     

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Mediation in Syria: initiatives,strategies, and obstacles, 2011–2016

This article investigates mediation efforts in Syria from the outbreak of the civil war in 2011 through the spring of 2016. It describes the principal initiatives, analyses differences and similarities across mediators, and identifies strategic obstacles that prevented substantive progress. Focusing on mediation initiatives undertaken by the Arab League and the United Nations, it finds that there is considerable path dependence across efforts and that most of the limited achievements, notably ceasefires in 2012 and 2016, resulted from the application of external leverage. Settlement in Syria was conditioned on overcoming significant commitment problems, aggravated by sectarian mistrust, the fractured nature of the opposition, and international disunity. The article contributes the first review of mediation in Syria that comprehends the conflict in its entirety, systematizes data for research on conflict management, and evaluates existing mediation policy in Syria with an eye to the future.     

Improvise,adapt and fail to overcome? Capacity building,culture and exogenous change in Sierra Leone

Military capacity building (MCB) is as problematic as it is ubiquitous, with the British experience in Sierra Leone providing a rare example of ostensible success. This article critiques the dominant conceptualisation of MCB as purely a principal–agent (PA) problem, using military change scholarship to examine the impact of wartime British intervention on the Sierra Leonean armed forces. Here, indigenous military change was both externally driven and fundamentally adaptive in nature, allowing MCB to bypass some of the difficulties predicted by PA models. However, this adaptive approach nonetheless failed to reconcile Western military values with prevailing Sierra Leonean culture, complicating post-war stabilisation efforts.     

Strategy,Fleet Logistics,and the Lethbridge Mission to the Pacific and Indian Oceans 1943–1944

In modern warfare at and from the sea, logistics are crucially important to the implementation of strategy and conduct of operational campaigns. Between August 1943 and March 1944, a British joint service mission led by Major-General John Lethbridge travelled to North America, the Pacific, and India to study the organisation, equipment, and methods necessary for coming offensive operations against Japan. The British obtained valuable information from the Americans and connected with those countries of the British Empire most directly involved. The Lethbridge Mission's progress and findings informed evolving Admiralty planning for supporting naval forces to be sent to the Indian and Pacific Oceans in pursuance of British wartime strategy.     

Terrorism,Radicalisation and Moral Panics: Media and Academic Analysis and Reporting of 2016 and 2017 ‘Terrorism’

Radicalism or radicalisation has become a serious political and academic theme in recent years and any incident involving Muslims now almost automatically acquires the cachet, as events in 2016 and 2017 have shown. However, despite vast sums and resources expended on the subject no one can define what they mean by ‘it’. This should make us pause and question what precisely it is that causes so much alarm and is it worth the resources, time and effort employed to respond to it?     

De Gaulle,the ‘Anglo-Saxons’, and the Algerian war

Rejecting the orthodoxy of French diplomatic historiography that de Gaulle was the founder of a new French independence and effected a revolution in French diplomacy after freeing himself from the Algerian yoke in 1962, this essay argues that de Gaulle sought from 1958 to make Algeria a central plank of his diplomatic strategy. That strategy sought to transform the relationship with Algeria in order forit to become the key to a neo-colonial French community, the basis for French leadership in Europe and the foundation of a new relationship of equality with Britain and the United States. However, largely as a result of de Gaulle's own making this policy failed to materialise.     

Nuclear weapons,existential threats,and the stability–instability paradox

Recent scholarship has largely ignored systematic differences in the existential threats that nuclear-weapon possessors pose to other states. This study theorizes that the capacity to pose existential threats shapes nuclear-armed states’ willingness to use military force against one another. We explore three hypotheses regarding how nuclear-based existential threats can deter conflict or encourage it, including under the conditions proposed by the stability–instability paradox. We rely on a statistical analysis of nuclear-armed dyads from 1950 to 2001 and employ the Nuclear Annihilation Threat (NAT) Index to capture variation in the existential threats nuclear-armed states pose to one another. We find that being able to pose an existential threat to another state emboldens potential initiators to use military force but does not deter attacks. The emboldening effects are particularly strong under the hypothesized conditions of the stability–instability paradox. Our study provides unique contributions to ongoing debates over the political effects of nuclear weapons.     

Comparable deterrence – target,criteria and purpose

The last decade has seen several advances in the study of deterrence. These advances have sparked some strong disagreements regarding interpretation of the models and what their contributions signify. This paper appraises the discussions from a model theoretic perspective. It is argued that when comparing rivalling models three aspects; (i) target, (ii) criteria and (iii) type of purpose should be taken into account in order to make a proper appraisal. Informed by these aspects it is evident that the three deterrence models analysed address different aspects, in different ways and to different ends. From this perspective, the so-called Perfect Deterrence model must be recognised as a clear advancement in the research field. Model comparison will always be context relative and a plurality of models should be viewed favourably.     

New Light on the Swordmakers,Goldsmiths and Jewellers,John Ray and James Montague,Active in Partnership in London 1800–1821, With a New and Extended List of Their Known Work

Abstract

Some new information is presented on the prominent London goldsmiths and jewellers, John Ray and James Montague, of 22 Denmark Street, Soho, active in partnership from 1800 to 1821. A revised and extended list has been compiled of recorded works, including presentation swords, freedom boxes, ‘Toys’, tokens and other items, made by this highly reputable Soho workshop, during a decisive period of British history.     

The British Army, ‘Understanding’, and the Illusion of Control

Over the past decade, Western military doctrines concerned with matters of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency have emphasised the requirement for properly ‘understanding’ the social, political and cultural environments in which those militaries may operate; the so-called human and socio-political ‘terrain’. This has led to a number of advancements and initiatives designed to facilitate the way that militaries may enhance that understanding. One of those initiatives has been the emergence from within the British military of a doctrine – JDP 04 ‘Understanding’ – designed for that purpose. Using that doctrine and other subsequent publications as a template, this article will examine the utility of ‘understanding’ for those commanders seeking to match military activities with political ends. It proposes that while any advances in understanding the operating environment are to be applauded, the ‘understanding’ of greatest importance is that relating to the feasibility of the strategic objectives at hand. If those objectives lack inherent feasibility, then the development of subordinate forms of understanding, particularly in relation to the socio-political dynamics of target societies, will likely only serve to slow the process of failure.     

Africa's toy soldiers,non-state armed groups,and ‘voluntary’ recruitment

Armed conflict on the African continent has witnessed increasing recruitment of child soldiers, often at the hands of non-state armed groups. Unfortunately this practice continues unabated in the face of legal obligations prohibiting the recruitment of child soldiers under international humanitarian law, and international and regional human rights law. While international condemnation of the practice has led to attempts to increase the minimum age for recruitment to 18, a disjuncture persists between the legal obligations states sign up to, and the actual enforcement of these prohibitions at a domestic level.

International criminal law jurisprudence emanating from the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court is being monitored closely, as these courts seek to enforce the prohibition in all armed conflicts, and against both state actors and non-state armed groups. International humanitarian law only protects child soldiers who have been unlawfully recruited. In this piece, the authors take a closer look at what amounts to unlawful recruitment in light of customary international humanitarian law, since this body of law also binds non-state actors, even without further criminalising legislation at a domestic level. Moreover, the article briefly explores whether a child can ever void this protected status by volunteering to participate directly in hostilities.     

Eight Lost Years? Nixon,Ford, Kissinger and the Non-Proliferation Regime, 1969–1977

The years following the signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 have generally been seen as a period of neglect in US non-proliferation policy. While joining recent scholarship questioning this, the article also shows that the policies that emerged from the Nixon–Ford years were the product of a broad range of factors that constrained both the United States’ ability and willingness to build an effective non-proliferation regime. These included the Nixon administration’s initial skepticism regarding the NPT, as well as the global dispersion of power away from the US, combined with the continued importance of anti-Soviet containment.     

China’s ‘Three Warfares’: Origins,Applications, and Organizations

Entering the twenty-first century, China has demonstrated an assertive foreign policy, not only in employing various types of economic and military leverage but also in conducting the Three Warfares (三战) – psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare. This article attempts to identify the motives and methods of China’s Three Warfares by analyzing its history, logic, and agents. Based on this analysis, the author also presents the position of the Three Warfares in China’s foreign policy and the warfares’ impact on the international security environment involving other major powers and China’s neighbors.     

Grand Strategy and the Graveyard of Assumptions: Britain and Afghanistan, 1839–1919

This article comprises a reply to those who seek to use the British historical experience in Afghanistan in order to draw parallels with current operations in that country. It argues that, while the conceptual and physical response to the issue of Afghanistan on the part of Empire policy-makers during the period 1839–1919 was characterised by periods of indecision and mistaken assumptions, their grasp of strategic principles allowed the formulation of a series of Afghan policies that would serve to protect and indeed enhance British interests in the region for over a century and which stand in stark contrast to the seemingly incoherent Afghan strategy articulated by the current British government.     

Orde Wingate, ‘Guerrilla’ Warfare and Long-range Penetration, 1940–44

Major General Orde Wingate was a highly controversial figure in his time and remains so among historians. However, his eccentric and colourful personality has drawn attention away from the nature of his military ideas, the most important of which was his concept of long-range penetration, which originated from his observations of his operations in Italian-occupied Ethiopia in 1941, and evolved into the model he put into practice in the Chindit operations in Burma in 1943–44. A review of Wingate's own official writings on this subject reveals that long-range penetration combined local guerrilla irregulars, purpose-trained regular troops and airpower into large-scale offensive operations deep in the enemy rear, with the intention of disrupting his planning process and creating situations regular forces could exploit. This evolved organically from Major General Colin Gubbins' doctrine for guerrilla resistance in enemy occupied areas, and bears some resemblance to the operational model applied by US and Allied forces, post September 2001.