Specification vagueness and supply quality risk

Specifying quality requirement is integral to any sourcing relationship, but vague and ambiguous specifications can often be observed in practice, especially when a buyer is in the initial stage of sourcing a new product. In this research, we study a supplier's production incentives under vague or exact quality specifications. We prove that a vague specification may in fact motivate the supplier to increase its quantity provision, resulting in a higher delivery quality. Vague quality specification can therefore be advantageous for a buyer to screen potential suppliers with an initial test order, and then rely on the received quality level to set more concrete quality guidelines. There is a degree, though, to which vague quality specification can be effective, as too much vagueness may decrease the supplier's quantity provision and hence the expected delivery quality. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

A three‐stage procurement optimization problem under uncertainty

This article examines a problem faced by a firm procuring a material input or good from a set of suppliers. The cost to procure the material from any given supplier is concave in the amount ordered from the supplier, up to a supplier‐specific capacity limit. This NP‐hard problem is further complicated by the observation that capacities are often uncertain in practice, due for instance to production shortages at the suppliers, or competition from other firms. We accommodate this uncertainty in a worst‐case (robust) fashion by modeling an adversarial entity (which we call the “follower”) with a limited procurement budget. The follower reduces supplier capacity to maximize the minimum cost required for our firm to procure its required goods. To guard against uncertainty, the firm can “protect” any supplier at a cost (e.g., by signing a contract with the supplier that guarantees supply availability, or investing in machine upgrades that guarantee the supplier's ability to produce goods at a desired level), ensuring that the anticipated capacity of that supplier will indeed be available. The problem we consider is thus a three‐stage game in which the firm first chooses which suppliers' capacities to protect, the follower acts next to reduce capacity from unprotected suppliers, and the firm then satisfies its demand using the remaining capacity. We formulate a three‐stage mixed‐integer program that is well‐suited to decomposition techniques and develop an effective cutting‐plane algorithm for its solution. The corresponding algorithmic approach solves a sequence of scaled and relaxed problem instances, which enables solving problems having much larger data values when compared to standard techniques. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

When to commit in a serial supply chain with forecast updating

Negotiations between an end product manufacturer and a parts supplier often revolve around two main issues: the supplier's price and the length of time the manufacturer is contractually held to its order quantity, commonly termed the “commitment time frame.” Because actual demand is unknown, the specification of the commitment time frame determines how the demand risk is shared among the members of the supply chain. Casual observation indicates that most manufacturers prefer to delay commitments as long as possible while suppliers prefer early commitments. In this paper, we investigate whether these goals are always in the firm's best interest. In particular, we find that the manufacturer may sometimes be better off with a contract that requires an early commitment to its order quantity, before the supplier commits resources and the supplier may sometimes be better off with a delayed commitment. We also find that the preferred commitment time frame depends upon which member of the supply chain has the power to set their exchange price. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

The bottleneck problem with minimum quantity commitments

Given an edge‐distance graph of a set of suppliers and clients, the bottleneck problem is to assign each client to a selected supplier minimizing their maximum distance. We introduce minimum quantity commitments to balance workloads of suppliers, provide the best possible approximation algorithm, and study its generalizations and specializations. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Commitment decisions with partial information updating

In this paper, we extend the results of Ferguson M. Naval Research Logistics 8 . on an end‐product manufacturer's choice of when to commit to an order quantity from its parts supplier. During the supplier's lead‐time, information arrives about end‐product demand. This information reduces some of the forecast uncertainty. While the supplier must choose its production quantity of parts based on the original forecast, the manufacturer can wait to place its order from the supplier after observing the information update. We find that a manufacturer is sometimes better off with a contract requiring an early commitment to its order quantity, before the supplier commits resources. On the other hand, the supplier sometimes prefers a delayed commitment. The preferences depend upon the amount of demand uncertainty resolved by the information as well as which member of the supply chain sets the exchange price. We also show conditions where demand information updating is detrimental to both the manufacturer and the supplier. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

The single period procurement problem where dedicated supplier capacity can be reserved

In this article we consider the single period procurement strategy for an item with uncertainty in its demand and uncertainty in the capacity of the supplier. Dedicated capacity can be ensured by paying a premium charge to the supplier. The other decision variable is the replenishment quantity to request. It turns out to be very easy to select the best value of this latter quantity. On the other hand, we are only able to characterize the general behavior of the expected profit as a function of the level of dedicated capacity. In general, there can be multiple local maxima as a function of the dedicated capacity. However, for the special, but important, case of normally distributed demand, normally distributed capacity and a linear cost for reserving capacity, an algorithm is developed for finding the best level of dedicated capacity. Some preliminary insights regarding the extension to multiple periods are presented. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Allocation of quality improvement targets based on investments in learning

Purchased materials often account for more than 50% of a manufacturer's product nonconformance cost. A common strategy for reducing such costs is to allocate periodic quality improvement targets to suppliers of such materials. Improvement target allocations are often accomplished via ad hoc methods such as prescribing a fixed, across‐the‐board percentage improvement for all suppliers, which, however, may not be the most effective or efficient approach for allocating improvement targets. We propose a formal modeling and optimization approach for assessing quality improvement targets for suppliers, based on process variance reduction. In our models, a manufacturer has multiple product performance measures that are linear functions of a common set of design variables (factors), each of which is an output from an independent supplier's process. We assume that a manufacturer's quality improvement is a result of reductions in supplier process variances, obtained through learning and experience, which require appropriate investments by both the manufacturer and suppliers. Three learning investment (cost) models for achieving a given learning rate are used to determine the allocations that minimize expected costs for both the supplier and manufacturer and to assess the sensitivity of investment in learning on the allocation of quality improvement targets. Solutions for determining optimal learning rates, and concomitant quality improvement targets are derived for each learning investment function. We also account for the risk that a supplier may not achieve a targeted learning rate for quality improvements. An extensive computational study is conducted to investigate the differences between optimal variance allocations and a fixed percentage allocation. These differences are examined with respect to (i) variance improvement targets and (ii) total expected cost. For certain types of learning investment models, the results suggest that orders of magnitude differences in variance allocations and expected total costs occur between optimal allocations and those arrived at via the commonly used rule of fixed percentage allocations. However, for learning investments characterized by a quadratic function, there is surprisingly close agreement with an “across‐the‐board” allocation of 20% quality improvement targets. © John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 684–709, 2001     

Strategic dynamic sourcing from competing suppliers with transferable capacity investment

We study the supplier relationship choice for a buyer that invests in transferable capacity operated by a supplier. With a long‐term relationship, the buyer commits to source from a supplier over a long period of time. With a short‐term relationship, the buyer leaves open the option of switching to a new supplier in the future. The buyer has incomplete information about a supplies efficiency, and thus uses auctions to select suppliers and determine the contracts. In addition, the buyer faces uncertain demand for the product. A long‐term relationship may be beneficial for the buyer because it motivates more aggressive bidding at the beginning, resulting a lower initial price. A short‐term relationship may be advantageous because it allows switching, with capacity transfer at some cost, to a more efficient supplier in the future. We find that there exists a critical level of the switching cost above which a long‐term relationship is better for the buyer than a short‐term relationship. In addition, this critical switching cost decreases with demand uncertainty, implying a long‐term relationship is more favorable for a buyer facing volatile demand. Finally, we find that in a long‐term relationship, capacity can be either higher or lower than in a short‐term relationship. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

Should firms conceal information when dealing with common suppliers?

A firm making quantity decision under uncertainty loses profit if its private information is leaked to competitors. Outsourcing increases this risk as a third party supplier may leak information for its own benefit. The firm may choose to conceal information from the competitors by entering in a confidentiality agreement with the supplier. This, however, diminishes the firm's ability to dampen competition by signaling a higher quantity commitment. We examine this trade‐off in a stylized supply chain in which two firms, endowed with private demand information, order sequentially from a common supplier, and engage in differentiated quantity competition. In our model, the supplier can set different wholesale prices for firms, and the second‐mover firm could be better informed. Contrary to what is expected, information concealment is not always beneficial to the first mover. We characterize conditions under which the first mover firm will not prefer concealing information. We show that this depends on the relative informativeness of the second mover and is moderated by competition intensity. We examine the supplier's incentive in participating in information concealment, and develop a contract that enables it for wider set of parameter values. We extend our analysis to examine firms' incentive to improve information. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:1–15, 2015     

Scheduling a production–distribution system to optimize the tradeoff between delivery tardiness and distribution cost

We consider a make‐to‐order production–distribution system with one supplier and one or more customers. A set of orders with due dates needs to be processed by the supplier and delivered to the customers upon completion. The supplier can process one order at a time without preemption. Each customer is at a distinct location and only orders from the same customer can be batched together for delivery. Each delivery shipment has a capacity limit and incurs a distribution cost. The problem is to find a joint schedule of order processing at the supplier and order delivery from the supplier to the customers that optimizes an objective function involving the maximum delivery tardiness and the total distribution cost. We first study the solvability of various cases of the problem by either providing an efficient algorithm or proving the intractability of the problem. We then develop a fast heuristic for the general problem. We show that the heuristic is asymptotically optimal as the number of orders goes to infinity. We also evaluate the performance of the heuristic computationally by using lower bounds obtained by a column generation approach. Our results indicate that the heuristic is capable of generating near optimal solutions quickly. Finally, we study the value of production–distribution integration by comparing our integrated approach with two sequential approaches where scheduling decisions for order processing are made first, followed by order delivery decisions, with no or only partial integration of the two decisions. We show that in many cases, the integrated approach performs significantly better than the sequential approaches. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

Bullwhip and reverse bullwhip effects under the rationing game

When an unreliable supplier serves multiple retailers, the retailers may compete with each other by inflating their order quantities in order to obtain their desired allocation from the supplier, a behavior known as the rationing game. We introduce capacity information sharing and a capacity reservation mechanism in the rationing game and show that a Nash equilibrium always exists. Moreover, we provide conditions guaranteeing the existence of the reverse bullwhip effect upstream, a consequence of the disruption caused by the supplier. In contrast, we also provide conditions under which the bullwhip effect does not exist. In addition, we show that a smaller unit reservation payment leads to more bullwhip and reverse bullwhip effects, while a large unit underage cost results in a more severe bullwhip effect. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 203–216, 2017     

Impacts of sequential acquisition,market competition mode,and confidentiality on information flow

We investigate information flow in a setting in which 2 retailers order from a supplier and sell to a market with uncertain demand. Each retailer has access to a signal. The retailers can disclose signals to each other (horizontal information sharing), while the supplier can solicit signals by offering retailers differential payments as incentives for signal disclosure (vertical information acquisition). In the base setting, market competition is in quantity, and a retailer can fully infer the signal that the other retailer discloses to the supplier. We show that the supplier prefers to sequentialize the procedure for information acquisition. Moreover, vertical information acquisition by the supplier is a strategic complement to horizontal information sharing between the retailers to establish information flow. In the equilibrium, the retailers have no incentive to exchange signals, but system wide information transparency can be realized through a combination of information acquisition and inference. We further study the signaling effect, whereby the supplier utilizes wholesale pricing as an instrument to affect the retailers' inference of the shared signals, and price competition to explore their impacts on the supplier's preference for sequential acquisition and the sustainability of information flow.     

Determination of suppliers' optimal quantity discount schedules with heterogeneous buyers

Although the quantity discount problem has been extensively studied in the realm of a single supplier and a single buyer, it is not well understood when a supplier has many different buyers. This paper presents an analysis of a supplier's quantity discount decision when there are many buyers with different demand and cost structures. A common discrete all‐unit quantity discount schedule with many break points is used. After formulating the model, we first analyze buyers' responses to a general discrete quantity discount schedule. This analysis establishes a framework for a supplier to formulate his quantity discount decision. Under this framework, the supplier's optimal quantity discount schedule can be formulated and solved by a simple non‐linear programming model. The applicability of the model is discussed with an application for a large U.S. distribution network. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 46–59, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.1052     

Coordinated replenishments from multiple suppliers with price discounts

In this study we present an integer programming model for determining an optimal inbound consolidation strategy for a purchasing manager who receives items from several suppliers. The model considers multiple suppliers with limited capacity, transportation economies, and quantity discounts. We propose an integrated branch and bound procedure for solving the model. This procedure, applied to a Lagrangean dual at every node of the search tree, combines the subgradient method with a primal heuristic that interact to change the Lagrangean multipliers and tighten the upper and lower bounds. An enhancement to the branch and bound procedure is developed using surrogate constraints, which is found to be beneficial for solving large problems. We report computational results for a variety of problems, with as many as 70,200 variables and 3665 constraints. Computational testing indicates that our procedure is significantly faster than the general purpose integer programming code OSL. A regression analysis is performed to determine the most significant parameters of our model. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 579–598, 1998     

Untruthful probabilistic demand forecasts in vendor‐managed revenue‐sharing contracts: Coordinating the chain

Vendor‐managed revenue‐sharing arrangements are common in the newspaper and other industries. Under such arrangements, the supplier decides on the level of inventory while the retailer effectively operates under consignment, sharing the sales revenue with his supplier. We consider the case where the supplier is unable to predict demand, and must base her decisions on the retailer‐supplied probabilistic forecast for demand. We show that the retailer's best choice of a distribution to report to his supplier will not be the true demand distribution, but instead will be a degenerate distribution that surprisingly induces the supplier to provide the system‐optimal inventory quantity. (To maintain credibility, the retailer's reports of daily sales must then be consistent with his supplied forecast.) This result is robust under nonlinear production costs and nonlinear revenue‐sharing. However, if the retailer does not know the supplier's production cost, the forecast “improves” and could even be truthful. That, however, causes the supplier's order quantity to be suboptimal for the overall system. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Allocation with demand competition: Uniform,proportional, and lexicographic mechanisms

We examine capacity allocation mechanisms in a supply chain comprising a monopolistic supplier and two competing retailers with asymmetric market powers. The supplier allocates limited capacity to retailers according to uniform, proportional, or lexicographic mechanism. We study the impact of these allocation mechanisms on supplier pricing decisions and retailer ordering behavior. With individual order size no greater than supplier capacity, we show that all three mechanisms guarantee equilibrium ordering. We provide precise structures of retailer ordering decisions in Nash and dominant equilibria. Further, we compare the mechanisms from the perspective of the supplier, the retailers, and the supply chain. We show that regardless of whether retailer market powers are symmetric, lexicographic allocation with any priority sequence of retailers is better than the other two mechanisms for the supplier. Further, under lexicographic allocation, the supplier gains more profit by granting higher priority to the retailer with greater market power. We also extend our study to the case with multiple retailers. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 85–107, 2017     

Supplier‐buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation

We consider the problem of designing a contract to maximize the supplier's profit in a one‐supplier–one‐buyer relationship for a short‐life‐cycle product. Demand for the finished product is stochastic and price‐sensitive, and only its probability distribution is known when the supply contract is written. When the supplier has complete information on the marginal cost of the buyer, we show that several simple contracts can induce the buyer to choose order quantity that attains the single firm profit maximizing solution, resulting in the maximum possible profit for the supplier. When the marginal cost of the buyer is private information, we show that it is no longer possible to achieve the single firm solution. In this case, the optimal order quantity is always smaller while the optimal sale price of the finished product is higher than the single firm solution. The supplier's profit is lowered while that of the buyer is improved. Moreover, a buyer who has a lower marginal cost will extract more profit from the supplier. Under the optimal contract, the supplier employs a cutoff level policy on the buyer's marginal cost to determine whether the buyer should be induced to sign the contract. We characterize the optimal cutoff level and show how it depends on the parameters of the problem. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 41–64, 2001     

Supplier certification and quality investment in supply chains

Global sourcing has made quality management a more challenging task, and supplier certification has emerged as a solution to overcome suppliers' informational advantage about their product quality. This article analyzes the impact of certification standards on the supplier's investment in quality, when a buyer outsources the production process. Based on our results, deterministic certification may lead to under‐investment in quality improvement technology for efficient suppliers, thereby leading to potential supply chain inefficiency. The introduction of noisy certification may alleviate this under‐investment problem, when the cost of information asymmetry is high. While allowing noisy certification always empowers the buyer to offer a menu to screen among heterogeneous suppliers, the buyer may optimally choose only a limited number of certification standards. Our analysis provides a clear‐cut prediction of the types of certifiers the buyer should use for heterogeneous suppliers, and we identify the conditions under which the supplier benefits from noisy certification. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Excess procurement strategies by a dominant buyer under constrained supply

Supply chains are often characterized by the presence of a dominant buyer purchasing from a supplier with limited capacity. We study such a situation where a single supplier sells capacity to an established and more powerful buyer and also to a relatively less powerful buyer. The more powerful buyer enjoys the first right to book her capacity requirements at supplier's end, and then the common supplier fulfills the requirement of the less powerful buyer. We find that when the supplier's capacity is either too low (below the lower threshold) or too high (above the higher threshold), there is no excess procurement as compared to the case when supplier has infinite capacity. When the supplier's capacity is between these two thresholds, the more powerful buyer purchases an excess amount in comparison to the infinite capacity case.