A generalized inspection game

The paper addresses the problem of a patrol trying to stop smugglers who are attempting to ship a cargo of perishable contraband across a strait in one of M time units. The situation was modeled as a two-person zero-sum game of exhaustion by Thomas and Nisgav and this article extends their results. The game has many characteristics in common with the Inspection Game in Owen's book on Game Theory; this Inspection Game is generalized and the relations between the two games are discussed.     

Optimal betting strategies for favorable games

We examine the problem of a gambler interested in maximizing the expected value of a convex utility function of his fortune after n plays of a game. We allow any probability distribution to rule the outcome of each play, and this distribution may change from play to play according to a Markov process. We present results regarding the existence of an optimal policy and its structural dependence on the gambler's fortune. The well-known results of Bellman and Kalaba for exponential and logarithmic utility functions and coin-tossing games are generalized. We also examine the situation of general stale spaces and show that the same structural results hold.     

A remark on the customs and smuggler game

Baston and Bostock formulated a zero-sum game of exhaustion modeling the problem of Customs trying to stop a Smuggler attempting to ship a cargo of perishable contraband across a strait, when Customs has n speedboats for patrolling. Thomas and Nisgav solved this problem for one speedboat. Baston and Bostock investigated it for two speedboats. This article addresses the solution of the three-boat variant of the Customs and Smuggler game. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Continuous accumulation games on discrete locations

In an accumulation game, a HIDER attempts to accumulate a certain number of objects or a certain quantity of material before a certain time, and a SEEKER attempts to prevent this. In a continuous accumulation game the HIDER can pile material either at locations $1, 2, …, n, or over a region in space. The HIDER will win (payoff 1) it if accumulates N units of material before a given time, and the goal of the SEEKER will win (payoff 0) otherwise. We assume the HIDER can place continuous material such as fuel at discrete locations i = 1, 2, …, n, and the game is played in discrete time. At each time k > 0 the HIDER acquires h units of material and can distribute it among all of the locations. At the same time, k, the SEEKER can search a certain number s < n of the locations, and will confiscate (or destroy) all material found. After explicitly describing what we mean by a continuous accumulation game on discrete locations, we prove a theorem that gives a condition under which the HIDER can always win by using a uniform distribution at each stage of the game. When this condition does not hold, special cases and examples show that the resulting game becomes complicated even when played only for a single stage. We reduce the single stage game to an optimization problem, and also obtain some partial results on its solution. We also consider accumulation games where the locations are arranged in either a circle or in a line segment and the SEEKER must search a series of adjacent locations. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 60–77, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.1048     

The solution to an open problem for a caching game

In a caching game introduced by Alpern et al. (Alpern et al., Lecture notes in computer science (2010) 220–233) a Hider who can dig to a total fixed depth normalized to 1 buries a fixed number of objects among n discrete locations. A Searcher who can dig to a total depth of h searches the locations with the aim of finding all of the hidden objects. If he does so, he wins, otherwise the Hider wins. This zero‐sum game is complicated to analyze even for small values of its parameters, and for the case of 2 hidden objects has been completely solved only when the game is played in up to 3 locations. For some values of h the solution of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations is known, but the solution in the remaining cases was an open question recently highlighted by Fokkink et al. (Fokkink et al., Search theory: A game theoretic perspective (2014) 85–104). Here we solve the remaining cases of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations. We also give some more general results for the game, in particular using a geometrical argument to show that when there are 2 objects hidden in n locations and n→∞, the value of the game is asymptotically equal to h/n for h≥n/2. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 23–31, 2016     

Characterization of the nucleolus for a class of n-person games

An inductive procedure is given for finding the nucleolus of an n-person game in which all coalitions with less than n-1 players are totally defeated. It is shown that, for such a game, one of three things may occur: (a) all players receive the same amount; (b) each player receives his quota, plus a certain constant (which may be positive, nerative, or zero); (c) the weakest player receives one half his quota, and the other players divide the remaining profit according to the nucleolus of a similar (n-1)-person game. It is also shown that the nucleolus of such a game yields directly the nucleolus of each derived game. An example is worked out in detail.     

An infiltration game with time dependent payoff

The problem of assigning patrol boats, subject to resource constraints, to capture or delay an infiltrator with perishable contraband attempting escape across a long, narrow strait is formulated as a two-sided time sequential game. Optimal mixed strategies are derived for the situation of one patrol boat against one smuggler. Procedures for obtaining numerical solutions for R > 1 patrol boats are discussed.     

A search game with a protector

A classic problem in Search Theory is one in which a searcher allocates resources to the points of the integer interval [1, n] in an attempt to find an object which has been hidden in them using a known probability function. In this paper we consider a modification of this problem in which there is a protector who can also allocate resources to the points; allocating these resources makes it more difficult for the searcher to find an object. We model the situation as a two‐person non‐zero‐sum game so that we can take into account the fact that using resources can be costly. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium when the searcher's probability of finding an object located at point i is of the form (1 − exp (−λ_ix_i)) exp (−μ_iy_i) when the searcher and protector allocate resources x_i and y_i respectively to point i. An algorithm to find this Nash equilibrium is given. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47:85–96, 2000     

Capacity games for partially complementary products under multivariate random demands

In this study, we consider n firms, each of which produces and sells a different product. The n firms face a common demand stream which requests all their products as a complete set. In addition to the common demand stream, each firm also faces a dedicated demand stream which requires only its own product. The common and dedicated demands are uncertain and follow a general, joint, continuous distribution. Before the demands are realized, each firm needs to determine its capacity or production quantity to maximize its own expected profit. We formulate the problem as a noncooperative game. The sales price per unit for the common demand could be higher or lower than the unit price for the dedicated demand, which affects the firm's inventory rationing policy. Hence, the outcome of the game varies. All of the prices are first assumed to be exogenous. We characterize Nash equilibrium(s) of the game. At the end of the article, we also provide some results for the endogenous pricing. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 59: 146–159, 2012     

Discrete search allocation game with false contacts

This paper deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game, where a searcher and a target participate, taking account of false contacts. The searcher distributes his search effort in a search space in order to detect the target. On the other hand, the target moves to avoid the searcher. As a payoff of the game, we take the cumulative amount of search effort weighted by the target distribution, which can be derived as an approximation of the detection probability of the target. The searcher's strategy is a plan of distributing search effort and the target's is a movement represented by a path or transition probability across the search space. In the search, there are false contacts caused by environmental noises, signal processing noises, or real objects resembling true targets. If they happen, the searcher must take some time for their investigation, which interrupts the search for a while. There have been few researches dealing with search games with false contacts. In this paper, we formulate the game into a mathematical programming problem to obtain its equilibrium point. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Finite statistical games and linear programming

The dual linear programs associated with finite statistical games are investigated and their optimal solutions are interpreted. The usual statistical game is generalized to a two-sided (inference) game and its possible application as a tactical model is discussed.     

On the core and competitive equilibria of a market with indivisible goods

We consider a generalization of the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [4]. In the market which we consider, s kinds of indivisible goods are exchanged for money. The market consists of buyers and sellers. Each buyer wants to buy at most one unit of the goods, and each seller may sell more than one unit. First, we show that the set of all competitive imputations is given by the solutions of a certain linear programing problem dual to the optimal problem. Second, we show that the core of the market coincides with the set of all competitive imputations under some condition, and consider the core of the market where s=1 and the condition does not hold.     

Modified fictitious play

We describe a modification of Brown's fictitious play method for solving matrix (zero-sum two-person) games and apply it to both symmetric and general games. If the original game is not symmetric, the basic idea is to transform the given matrix game into an equivalent symmetric game (a game with a skew-symmetric matrix) and use the solution properties of symmetric games (the game value is zero and both players have the same optimal strategies). The fictitious play method is then applied to the enlarged skew-symmetric matrix with a modification that calls for the periodic restarting of the process. At restart, both players' strategies are made equal based on the following considerations: Select the maximizing or minimizing player's strategy that has a game value closest to zero. We show for both symmetric and general games, and for problems of varying sizes, that the modified fictitious play (MFP) procedure approximates the value of the game and optimal strategies in a greatly reduced number of iterations and in less computational time when compared to Brown's regular fictitious play (RFP) method. For example, for a randomly generated 50% dense skew-symmetric 100 × 100 matrix (symmetric game), with coefficients |a_ij| ≤ 100, it took RFP 2,652,227 iterations to reach a gap of 0.03118 between the lower and upper bounds for the game value in 70.71 s, whereas it took MFP 50,000 iterations to reach a gap of 0.03116 in 1.70 s. Improved results were also obtained for general games in which the MFP solves a much larger equivalent symmetric game. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

An attack-defense game with matrix strategies

This paper presents the results and the method of analysis for an attack-defense game involving allocation of resources. Each player is assumed to have several different types of resources to be divided in optimal fashion among a fixed set of targets. The payoff function of the game is convex. The “No Soft-Spot” principle of M. Dresher, and the concept of the generalized inverse of a matrix are used to determine optimal strategies for each player and the value of the game.     

Optimal ordering policies for a product that perishes in two periods subject to stochastic demand

This paper considers the problem of computing optimal ordering policies for a product that has a life of exactly two periods when demand is random. Initially costs are charged against runouts (stockouts) and outdating (perishing). By charging outdating costs according to the expected amount of outdating one period into the future, a feasible one period model is constructed. The central theorem deals with the n-stage dynamic problem and demonstrates the appropriate cost functions are convex in the decision variable and also provides bounds on certain derivatives. The model is then generalized to include ordering and holding costs. The paper is concluded with a discussion of the infinite horizon problem.     

Dual criteria preemptive open-shop problems with minimum makespan

In this article we present an algorithm for the minimum makespan preemptive open shop, which is superior to existing algorithms in both space and time requirements. We define the more complex generalized open shop and flexible open shop and address the minimum makespan problem on these shops. We show how we can use the algorithm for the minimum makespan open shop to achieve load balancing in simple and generalized open shops without increasing the complexity of the algorithm. Load balancing dictates that the number of busy machines in each period is as even as possible. We also consider preventive maintenance issues in the open shop, and makespan retains its minimum value. In particular we consider the scenario where a machine can be maintained during any period that it happens to be idle. Also we consider the case that a maintenance schedule is prespecified. We show that this problem can be solved via a linear programming formulation that can also take into account release times for the jobs and ready times for the machines. Faster algorithms are presented for open shops with three machines or less. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Detection of a Markovian target with optimization of the search efforts under generalized linear constraints

This paper deals with search for a target following a Markovian movement or a conditionally deterministic motion. The problem is to allocate the search efforts, when search resources renew with generalized linear constraints. The model obtained is extended to resource mixing management. New optimality equations of de Guenin's style are obtained. Practically, the problem is solved by using an algorithm derived from the FAB method. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 117–142, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.10009     

Solving partially observable agent‐intruder games with an application to border security problems

In this paper, we introduce partially observable agent‐intruder games (POAIGs). These games model dynamic search games on graphs between security forces (an agent) and an intruder given possible (border) entry points and high value assets that require protection. The agent faces situations with dynamically changing, partially observable information about the state of the intruder and vice versa. The agent may place sensors at selected locations, while the intruder may recruit partners to observe the agent's movement. We formulate the problem as a two‐person zero‐sum game, and develop efficient algorithms to compute each player's optimal strategy. The solution to the game will help the agent choose sensor locations and design patrol routes that can handle imperfect information. First, we prove the existence of ?‐optimal strategies for POAIGs with an infinite time horizon. Second, we introduce a Bayesian approximation algorithm to identify these ?‐optimal strategies using belief functions that incorporate the imperfect information that becomes available during the game. For the solutions of large POAIGs with a finite time horizon, we use a solution method common to extensive form games, namely, the sequence form representation. To illustrate the POAIGs, we present several examples and numerical results.     

The advantage of deeper pockets in Silverman's game on intervals

Silverman's game on (1, B) × (1, B) was analyzed by R. J. Evans, who showed that optimal strategies exist (and found them) only on a set of measure zero in the parameter plane. We examine the corresponding game on (1, B) × (1, D) with D > B, and show that optimal strategies exist in about half the parameter plane. Optimal strategies and game value are obtained explicitly. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Robustness of preallocated preferential defense with assumed attack size and perfect attacking and defending weapons

The problem is to protect a set of t targets by n perfect interceptors against an attack by m perfect weapons. If the defender solves for an optimal preallocated preferential defense and associated game value assuming m₁ attackers, and the attacker knows the assumption of the defender and utilizes m₂ attackers, he may be able to achieve significantly more damage than had the defender assumed that there would be m₂ attackers. The article treats the robustness of preallocated preferential defense to assumptions about the size of the attack and presents results of an alternative approach.