对警卫工作中反恐怖活动的思考

恐怖活动已成为世界一大公害,给一些国家和人民带来巨大的精神压力和心理恐惧,给国家政局稳定和经济发展造成巨大的负面影响。探索警卫工作中反恐怖斗争的方法、对策,对于防范和打击恐怖活动,确保各项警卫任务的圆满完成具有重要意义。     

美国反核恐怖精英“核危机搜索队”

“9.11”事件后,美国情报机构一再发出警报,称恐怖分子可能使用核材料或核装置进行恐怖活动。看不见的核阴云似乎笼罩在世人头上,核恐怖问题成了美国人生活中最大的恐惧之一。为此,美国政府采取了一系列防范措施。在美国公众的关注目光中,一直鲜为人知的美国反核恐怖精     

农村文化建设对农村社会稳定的双向效应

社会稳定是改革发展的重要前提,而保持农村稳定是全社会稳定的关键。维护农村社会稳定根本途径在于文化建设,但文化建设对农村社会稳定有双向效应。文化建设对农村社会稳定的正面效应有减贫效应、社会结构优化效应、社会控制效应、社会心理优化效应和社会化效应,而文化建设的受益不均衡效应、虚化效应、过度社会动员效应及其信息失稳效应等又不利于农村社会稳定。因此,要充分重视农村文化建设的积极作用,也要清醒认识其负面效应,并为维护农村社会稳定考虑扬正抑负的对策。     

共筑反恐防线 同护社会平安——浅析新形势下的全民防暴恐

<正>长期以来国家安全和社会稳定一直是我国当前的主旋律,只有国家安全和社会稳定,我们的发展之路才能不断推进。近些年来,国际恐怖主义及其破坏活动成为影响世界安全与稳定的一个突出因素。当前社会暴恐活动以及带有恐怖主义色彩的个人极端行为频发。根据公开的资料显示当前恐怖主义的主要特点表现为:一是恐怖活动日趋政治化;二是恐怖活动具体方式日益多样化;三是恐怖活动呈现跨国化趋势;     

民族宗教分裂势力对国家安全的影响及对策

极端民族宗教分裂势力恐怖活动已严重危害我国领土主权完整、威胁社会政治稳定,对国家安全构成严重威胁,必须采取相应对策予以打击。     

CBRNE恐怖事件的紧急响应

随着科学的进步,恐怖主义有向高技术、高智商发展的趋势。恐怖组织谋求利用化学、生物、放射性、核与高爆(CBRNE) 装置,制造产生超级恐怖效应的恐怖活动。大量的情报证实,在世界范围内始终存在着CBRNE 恐怖袭击的威胁,对CBRNE恐怖事件的紧急响应成为各国政府和公众关注的焦点。     

电子战在反恐怖作战中的作用及其运用

恐怖活动已成为威胁国家安全和社会稳定的重要因素,电子战在反恐怖作战中也越发具有十分突出的作用。文章分析了恐怖组织从事恐怖活动实施电子战的手段,以及反恐怖作战电子战的特点,提出了反恐怖作战电子战的运用对策及需要把握的几个问题。     

恐怖活动对新疆边境地区的影响及对策

长期以来,新疆恐怖活动组织与＂三股势力＂相勾结,制造了多起恐怖活动事件,给新疆边境地区的安全与稳定带来了严重威胁。为此,针对新疆边境地区的特殊性以及恐怖活动的态势,分析了恐怖活动对新疆边境地区的影响,从提升反恐的主动发现能力、加强情报预警工作、加强防范措施的严密性等方面提出了遏制新疆恐怖活动的对策。     

对恐怖活动成因的深层透析

恐怖活动是困扰当今世界和平的大敌,其发生有许多表层或直接诱因。深入分析当今世界的经济体系和社会政治体制可以发现,一个国家或地区的经济发展不平衡、对社会资源的获取不平衡。是恐怖活动发生的深层根源。由此可见,根除恐怖活动的根本途径在于加强社会的和谐与协调发展。     

心理战在反恐斗争中的作用和战法

一、心理战在反恐怖军事斗争中起着首要的根本性的作用。恐怖活动与反恐怖斗争的实质是一种心理战。其直接目的具有鲜明的政治性。恐怖势力制造骚乱、暴乱、叛乱的目的是为了在人们心理上产生巨大震撼和社会心理恐慌,企图从精神上打垮政府和社会,从而形成一种对他们有利的局面。这     

空中反恐中保卫目标重要度指标体系研究

空中恐怖袭击具有突然性和随意性的特点,其目的是通过制造恐怖事件引起巨大影响,带来社会恐慌。通过分析空中恐怖袭击对袭击目标选择的特点,剖析其规律性,从而建立空中反恐保卫目标重要度指标体系和保卫目标重要度评价模型,对保卫目标进行科学有效地划定与排序,便于在空中反恐作战中对保卫目标及早进行确定、实施空中警戒范围划定和战斗部署。     

Weakest‐link attacker‐defender games with multiple attack technologies

In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology — e.g., suicide attacks — when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti‐terrorism measures.© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

The Randomization of Terrorist Attacks

The purpose of this article is to explore the economic theoretical foundations of the idea that rational terrorist organizations deliberately randomize their attacks (by type, timing, location, and targets) to generate uncertainty and intimidation. A choice theoretic framework is applied to the analysis of the terrorist organization's behavior to determine whether welfare (utility) gains from the randomization of terrorist attacks are plausible and feasible. The randomization of attacks can appear to promise higher amounts of political influence for each resource input but it turns out that randomization cannot manufacture a situation where higher amounts of political influence are obtained for each resource input.The results imply that, rather than randomization and instability, the rational terrorist organization is more likely to prefer stability. The findings and implications provide a theoretical explanation for the non-randomness of terrorist attacks.Thismay be one small step towards explaining the patterns – non-randomness – in the time-series of terrorist incidents.     

French foreign and security challenges after the Paris terrorist attacks

The Paris terrorist attacks in January and November 2015 have changed the relationship between French society and security. For the first time since the end of the Second World War, the assumption that France is experiencing a new form of territorial war is explicit in the public debate. It has reinforced the strong conviction among the French politicians and diplomats that security requires close cooperation with the USA and a renouncement of the Gaullist paradigm of exceptionalism. This paper analyses why the terrorist attacks have been perceived in France as a form of territorial war. Second, it explains why terrorism contributes to a growing mistrust of the French public vis-à-vis the European Union. Finally, it shows the reasons but also the limits of French military activism outside Europe, in close connection with the US-led strategy.     

Does counterterrorism spending reduce the incidence and lethality of terrorism? A quantitative analysis of 34 countries

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the US government increased its counterterrorism (CT) funding and created several Federal Agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security; Transportation Security Administration; and National Counterterrorism Center. Similarly, the 7 July 2005, London bombings also compelled the British government to increase its CT funding. These examples illustrate a phenomenon that when states experience terrorism, they dramatically increase public safety spending in order to reduce or eliminate the incidents of and casualties resulting from acts of terror. Using statistical data collected from 34 countries covering nine years, this article examines recent CT spending increases. Critically, the authors explore whether recent public safety expenditures can measurably reduce the number of domestic and international terrorist attacks. The implications of their findings should be salient for policy-makers’ assessments of their countries’ current CT strategies and policies concerning their respective Intelligence and Security Communities.     

A cost–benefit analysis of terrorist attacks

A cost–benefit analysis of terrorist attacks is developed and placed within a systematic theoretical structure. For the target or object of the attack, we consider the lost value of human lives, lost economic value, and lost influence value, counted as benefits for the terrorist. The corresponding losses for the terrorist are counted as costs. The terrorist attacks if benefits outweigh costs. Bounded rationality is enabled where the three kinds of benefits and costs can be weighted differently. We account for two ex ante probabilities of successful planning and attack, and enable the terrorist to assign different weights to its multiple stakeholders. We introduce multiple time periods, time discounting, attitudes towards risk, and subcategories for the benefits and costs. The cost–benefit analysis is illustrated with the 11 September 2001 attack, and 53 incidents in the Global Terrorism Database yielding both positive and negative expected utilities. The paper is intended as a tool for scientists and policy-makers, as a way of thinking about costs and benefits of terrorist attacks.     

Indications and warning in Belgium: Brussels is not Delphi

The terrorist attacks in France and Belgium of 2015–2016 that occurred while these countries were in a heightened state of alert raise questions about indications and warning methodology as well as effectiveness of the blanket-protection deployment of security services assisted even by the military. Response and perhaps even more anticipation may require strategic rethinking in light of the predatory attacks that target the most vulnerable spots of the public space. This study looks at threat analysis in Belgium as conducted through her intelligence fusion centre Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA)?????? since its inception in 2006. With a special focus on what is known, at the time of writing, about the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, this study hopes to put into context how the system (mal)functions and will also consider the preventive measures that respond to the threat, and the international aspects which have implications far beyond Belgian borders. Therefore, a case is made for not just a Belgian homeland security framework, but one that fits into an EU-wide security concept.     

Scheduling policies for an antiterrorist surveillance system

This article concerns scheduling policies in a surveillance system aimed at detecting a terrorist attack in time. Terrorist suspects arriving at a public area are subject to continuous monitoring, while a surveillance team takes their biometric signatures and compares them with records stored in a terrorist database. Because the surveillance team can screen only one terrorist suspect at a time, the team faces a dynamic scheduling problem among the suspects. We build a model consisting of an M/G/1 queue with two types of customers—red and white—to study this problem. Both types of customers are impatient but the reneging time distributions are different. The server only receives a reward by serving a red customer and can use the time a customer has spent in the queue to deduce its likely type. In a few special cases, a simple service rule—such as first‐come‐first‐serve—is optimal. We explain why the problem is in general difficult and we develop a heuristic policy motivated by the fact that terrorist attacks tend to be rare events. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

SUICIDE TERRORISM AND THE BACKLASH EFFECT

This paper presents a game‐theoretic model of suicide terrorism containing three agents: the terrorist leader; a targeted government; and potential terrorist supporters. Supporters join the terrorist group if they gain more from their participation than from their economic opportunities. Preemptive measures by the government can result in a backlash that encourages recruitment through new grievances. Suicide attacks can also lead to recruitment. Increases in preemption costs and/or economic opportunities can reduce the overall level of terrorism, while increasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks. An increase in the effect of preemption on recruitment, or the propaganda effect of suicide bombings has the opposite effect of increasing normal and suicide attacks, but decreasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks in the terrorist organization’s strategy profile.     

An Integro-Differential Approach To Terrorism Dynamics

This article introduces integro-differential equations as a new technique to study terrorism dynamics. An integro-differential equation is a mathematical expression that contains derivatives of the required function and its integral transforms. The technique is applied to two different dynamic models in terrorism: terrorism and tourism, and terrorist innovations. In the first model the number of tourists that appears in an integral term and also in a derivative term is impacted by the number of terrorists. In the second model the integro-differential equation for terrorist innovations relates them to terrorist attacks. The article shows how to solve, analyze, interpret, and deal with integro-differential equations. Integro-differential equations shed light on aspects of the models ignored when other techniques are used. This is particularly important for the evaluation of current counterterrorist policies, as well as to the formulation of new ones.