世界军品生产和军品贸易的新趋势

冷战结束后,世界军品生产和军品贸易呈现出全球化、地区化和集团化的新,趋势。具体表现为:军事工业全球化趋势增强,国际分工的内容和形成机制发生了变化,水平型分工成为国际分工的主要形式;军品贸易的对外依赖性增强,数额急剧增多;军事跨国企业得到迅速发展;高军事技术国际化程度大大提高;军事工业的地区内部兼并、合并及地区与地区之间的军事合作将贯穿于整个21世纪;军事工业集团化势头有增无减,组成地区军事工业集团的可能性增大。     

浅析伊拉克战争的特点

2003年3月20日上午10时36分(北京时间)爆发的伊拉克战争,是美国抛开联合国安理会、把“先发制人”战略用于实战的第一场战争,是一场战前遭到世界大多数国家反对、战争结束时仍未证实开战理由、战争合法性遭到怀疑的战争,是一场美英联军对遭受10多年经济制裁的弱国进行的完全不对称的战争,是一场凸显高度信息化军队与落后机械化军队之间“时代差”的战争。认真分析和研究这场战争,对于推进我国军事变革,加快信息化和机械化建设步伐,具有重要的现实意义。     

伊拉克战争进程述评

在2003年开始的伊拉克战争中,美军取得了更迭萨达姆政权的巨大胜利,但美军作为占领军的存在使之随即陷入游击战泥淖,在临时“自愿联盟”瓦解后,美军开始从伊抽身。本文从大规模作战阶段、稳定行动阶段、主要经验教训和未来形势展望四个方面对伊拉克战争及战后形势进行了总体述评。     

伊拉克战争综述

2003年3月20日美英等国联军发动的伊拉克战争是迄今为止信息化程度最高的战争,也是一场遭到大多数国家和民众(包括越来越多的美国民众)质疑和反对的战争.     

伊拉克战争对国际政治格局的影响

美国凭借其强大的势力肆意出兵攻打伊拉克。这一结果虽不能使国际政治格局发生重大变化 ,世界多极化的趋势不能改变 ,但它进一步强化了美国的单边主义思想 ,使世界多极化的进程受到严峻挑战 ,同时也将改变中东地区的力量对比 ,重塑中东地区的政治格局 ,也使联合国的权威和地位受到了严重的挑战。     

伊拉克战争动员的启示

举世瞩目的伊拉克战争表明,随着战争信息化程度的不断提高,战争动员工作发生了许多新的变化,出现了一系列新的特点。深入研究伊拉克战     

美权威机构谈伊拉克战争经验教训

美国战略与国际研究中心的《伊拉克战争的初步教训》研究报告,比较系统地分析了伊拉克战争双方的得失,内窖涵盖了陆、海、空、天、电各种力量的作战运用,时间跨越战争全过程,而且对未来作战原则和军队建设提出了建议。     

伊拉克战争中美军的作战特点

美国时间5月1日21时,布什总统在从海湾返回的“林肯”号航母上宣布:“我们在伊拉克的主要作战行动已经结束。”布什的讲话,为持续43天(实际上主要战斗在4月9日就已经结束)的伊拉克战争画上了一个模糊的句号。美军依靠大量高新武器装备和绝对空中优势,在未遇有力抵抗的情况下,以微小代价赢得了战争的胜利。应该说,伊拉克战争是美军又一次成功的作战行动,有许多有别于前几场战争的作战特点,同时也暴露出一些问题。认真分析和研究这些特点和存在的问题,对于加强我军现代化建设具有重要的现实意义。     

伊拉克战争中伊军的作战特点

2003年4月9日,伊拉克驻联合国大使穆罕默德·杜里,面对美国有线新闻网的摄像机,无可奈何地说:“Game isover”(游戏已经结束了)。同一天,美国军方发言人布鲁克斯准将说:“现在,伊拉克首都巴格达是我们名单上萨达姆政权失去控制的地区之一。”这些话表明:经过3个星期的狂轰滥炸和富有戏剧性的地面作战,美国“倒萨”战争的目的已经实现,主要作战行动基本结束。纵观整个战争,伊军没有进行过较大规模的、有一定对抗强度的、给美军造成较大伤亡的重要战斗。尽管如此,伊军在战争初期还是有一些可圈可点的特点。     

伊拉克战争后的美国大战略

本文首先定义了美国大战略的结构性因素,指出国际力量分配、美国的官僚机构以及公众是其战略局限和战略机遇的主要因素。其次,阐述了这些因素的改变,如美国实力的相对衰落、在伊拉克和阿富汗反暴乱作战行动中过分扩张的军力和美国公众对进攻性大战略的担忧,以及如何导致大战略的改变,尽管有变化,但从总体上看,美国大战略仍保持了大部分的延续性。     

The financing factor in military trade

Available sources value transfers of weapons irrespective of whether they are paid for and how. Data from the U.S. indicates that the shares of arms given for free or on credit are high. If other arms exporters, all military aid and all credits used for military purposes are considered, which is done here on the basis of rough estimates and an opportunity cost model, the true cash costs of weapons in the year of the actual transfer are small. On the other hand, the financial burden of earlier arms imports via debt service has grown over time. It most probably exceeded the true cash cost of imports of arms in the late 1980s. Large differences between arms transfer data and the actual true costs of arms transfers means that analysis of the economic effects of arms imports without considering these financial aspects makes little sense.     

伊拉克反美武装军事行动特点分析

伊拉克主要战事结束两年半了,反美武装成为驻伊美军最主要的作战对象.面对美军先进的武器装备,反美武装采取了灵活机动的战术手段.分析了伊拉克反美武装军事行动的几个特点.     

The impact of superpower arms transfers on conflict in the Middle East

I explore the relationship between superpower arms transfers and the Arab‐Israeli rivalry. My empirical analysis suggests that Soviet arms transfers to the Middle East, more than American transfers, have exacerbated interstate rivalry in the region. It also suggests that Soviet arms transfers, again more than American transfers, have encouraged compensatory arming by the other superpower. These conclusions derive from the results of cross‐correlation analysis, Granger‐causality tests, and variance decompositions, and are quite robust. While my findings paint a rather unflattering portrait of the effects of superpower involvement in the region, they do constitute grounds for optimism in light of current developments.     

Colonizing military history: A millennial view on the economics of war

We briefly illustrate the application of fundamental principles of economics to three episodes of military history for the second millennium AD. The periods, principles, and cases examined are, first, the European Middle Ages (1000-1300; opportunity cost; siege warfare); second, the Enlightenment and the Age of Battle (1618-1814; expected marginal costs/benefits; the decision to engage in battle); and third, the Cold War (1945-1989; substitution; France's nuclear force de frappe).     

Modeling the effects of military tension on foreign trade: Some preliminary empirical findings from the Greek-Turkish rivalry

In this paper we examine the effects of irreversibility on foreign trade in the case where there are two sources of uncertainty. The two sources considered in this paper are uncertainty arising from business risk and uncertainty arising from military tension. The resulting insights are then used to model the import markets of Greece and Turkey. These models are then empirically estimated, in order to ascertain, on the one hand whether there is evidence that irreversibility is indeed a factor on the supply side of these markets, and on the other hand, the direction of the incidence of military tension on foreign trade. An index of military tension is used for the two countries, based on the number of airspace violations by Turkish military aircraft of Greek airspace.     

Budget allocation under uncertainty and the costs of war and insecurity

This study presents a framework and models for the analysis of government budget allocation into defense and civilian expenditures in situations of uncertainty about the incidence of war. The models display the intricate relationships between security levels, subjective probabilities of the occurrence of war, and potential war damages. We show that poor countries tend to perceive greater probabilities of war than their richer rivals, and that the psychological burden of insecurity is larger when the country’s wealth is larger and when its preference for security is higher. We apply our models to the Israeli–Syrian arms race and show that the higher rate of growth of Israel’s gross domestic product relative to that of Syria is expected to lead to an increase in Syria’s perception of the likelihood of war and to a decrease in Israel’s perception of such a likelihood. We also show that if Syria’s regime becomes ideologically more extreme, the monetary cost of maintaining Israel’s security at the level that it enjoyed prior to the change will be very high, whereas the monetary cost of maintaining Israel’s welfare will be moderate.     

Military Spending and Economic Growth in the Middle East Countries: Bootstrap Panel Causality Test

This study revisits the causal relationship between military spending and economic growth in 10 Middle East countries via a panel causality analysis that accounts for cross-sectional dependence and heterogeneity across countries. Our results indicate unidirectional causality from military spending to growth for Turkey; one-way causality from economic growth to military spending for Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Syria; bidirectional causality for Israel; and no causality in either direction for Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. The empirical evidence does not provide consistent results regarding the causal relationship between defense expenditure and economic growth in these countries.     

Development and conflict in the Balkans: Catch-up and military expenditure

This paper analyses the convergence between countries in relation to the catch-up hypothesis concerning the level of total productivity. The catch-up hypothesis claims that poor countries tend to grow faster than rich countries through the international diffusion of knowledge and technology. We test this hypothesis for the Balkan countries and investigate the effect of military expenditure in the region on productivity growth. The aim is to investigate empirically whether productivity growth has been greater in countries with lower military expenditure, in line with theory. The results obtained show that, overall, improvements in technological change co-exist with deteriorating technical efficiency change and that there is a negative correlation between military expenditure and either total productivity growth and technological change, and a positive, but statistically insignificant, relationship with technical efficiency change. We conclude that economic growth is the key to regional development and that too great a diversion of resources to military commitments can lead to overstretch.