基于动平衡状态理论的稳态误差机理分析

基于动平衡状态理论对稳态误差进行了分析,揭示出稳态误差的本质,并在此基础上给出了稳态误差为零的充要条件,并为稳态无差控制提供了新的思路.最后证明了基于动平衡状态理论的稳态误差为零的充要条件与基于内模原理得到的结论是等价的.     

搜索路径给定时的搜索对策问题及其应用

搜索路径给定时的最优搜索方案问题,也可以理解为是关于搜索者和目标的二人对策问题,主要讨论了当搜索路径给定时的单个搜索者和单个目标的搜索对策问题。首先根据问题的特点,利用动态规划和迭代的方法,确定关于目标逃逸路径混合策略的最优分区,证明该分区是多面体凸集;针对目标不同逃逸路径的分区,求出搜索者的最大期望收益,再将问题转化为二人有限零和对策,计算出搜索者的支付矩阵,确定最优搜索策略。最后结合海军护航行动,对我舰载直升机搜索小型海盗船进行分析和计算,说明搜索路径给定时的最优搜索对策对于双方的资源分配和提高搜索效率具有一定的应用价值。     

椭圆型方程 Chebyshev 拟谱区域分解格式的等价形式

本文对一维、二维椭圆型方程建立了Ｃｈｅｂｙｓｈｅｖ拟谱区域分解格式,对这种拟谱区域分解格式给出了一种等价的广义变分形式。     

两种伪距单点定位模型最小二乘解的等价性证明

针对伪距单点定位解算中存在的两种定位模型的最小二乘解,给出了它们关于位置估计和定位精度等价性的推证过程。描述了伪距单点定位所采用的基本定位模型和单差定位模型,依据伪距观测值精度和单差基准分三种情况分别证明了两种模型的位置最小二乘解和定位精度是等价的,通过实测数据的定位解算验证了两种模型的等价性,并比较了两种模型的最小二乘算法的效率。     

一类完全非线性函数的证明与计数

Helleseth等最近给出了一类二项式形式的完全非线性函数,这是至今为止所发现的第一类由两个互不等价的单项式组成的二项式形式的完全非线性函数。本文利用Frobinus自同构将其变形为一个新的二项式,给出了其完全非线性的简洁证明,指出了这类函数与x2是等价的,最后讨论了该类完全非线性函数的计数性质。     

两人多冲突环境下的双矩阵对策集结模型

针对用多个双矩阵对策来描述的两人多冲突环境,首先基于局中人所受到的约束条件,构造局中人面向多冲突环境的可行策略串集合;其次以所有局中人的可行策略串集合建立新的结局空间,构造局中人在新结局空间上的支付函数,进而建立两人多冲突环境下的对策综合集结模型;最后给出了一个军事例子,该算例说明了模型的实用性.     

AIP潜艇位置基准点问题研究

位置基准点问题是常规动力潜艇战术研究中的一个重要问题.由于具有两种不同的水下航行动力,AIP潜艇位置基准点问题与普通柴电潜艇的位置基准点问题具有很大的不同.给出了AIP潜艇的位置基准点问题的数学描述,在对问题进行分析的基础上,给出了AIP潜艇位置基准点问题的一个取值范围及相应的计算方法,所采用的理论和技术包括二人零和对策、最优控制以及动态规划.最后,通过计算实例对所给理论的正确性,算法的合理性及效率进行了验证.     

纯方位目标运动分析四维状态的最小二乘模型及分析*

建立了纯方位系统TMA四维状态的最小二乘模型,详细给出了非线性最小二乘算法的迭代公式,分析了非线性最小二乘模型、线性最小二乘模型可解的必要条件,以及非线性最小二乘模型与极大似然模型的等价性。     

灰色矩阵对策

本文结合灰色系统与对策论的知识,给出了以区间型灰数为元素的灰矩阵对策的定义,讨论了灰矩阵对策在纯策略与混合策略意义下的最优策略及灰解的存在性。     

固体零温零压密度的估算

固体在零温零压下的密度是一个重要的物态参数。本文利用Ｄｅｂｙｅ理论给出了零温零压密度的一种估算方法,并对８２种物质的零温零压密度进行了计算。     

An inspection game: Taking account of fulfillment probabilities of players' aims

This paper deals with an inspection game of customs and a smuggler. The customs can take two options of assigning a patrol or not. The smuggler has two strategies of shipping its cargo of contraband or not. Two players have several opportunities to take actions during a limited number of days. When both players do, there are some possibilities that the customs captures the smuggler and, simultaneously, the smuggler possibly makes a success of the smuggling. If the smuggler is captured or there remain no days for playing the game, the game ends. In this paper, we formulate the problem into a multi‐stage two‐person zero‐sum stochastic game and investigate some characteristics of the equilibrium solution, some of which are given in a closed form in a special case. There have been some studies so far on the inspection game. However, some consider the case that the smuggler has only one opportunity of smuggling or the perfect‐capture case that the customs can certainly arrest the smuggler on patrol, and others think of a recursive game without the probabilities of fulfilling the players' purposes. In this paper, we consider the inspection game taking account of the fulfillment probabilities of the players' aims. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

基于模糊双矩阵对策的作战效能评估模型

讨论了策略集清晰、支付值模糊的模糊双矩阵对策的一种求解方法,并以某型导弹混编群对抗ARM（反辐射导弹）及载机为案例进行研究,建立了基于模糊双矩阵对策的作战效能评估模型,研究结果对于双方资源分配,提高作战效能具有一定的军事应用价值。     

装备采办中一级密封招标的博弈均衡分析

针对装备采办中的一级密封招标问题,分析了招标过程中的博弈特点,给出了一维贝叶斯均衡的求解方法和解析表达式,论证了在军工企业的最优战略是选择博弈的贝叶斯均衡,军方的选择是增加竞标者的人数。然后,重点分析了招标过程中的多维博弈问题,给出了多维贝叶斯均衡的一般求解方法,并针对特定的事例进行了多维均衡分析。最后,在多维博弈的框架下对一维博弈和多维博弈的均衡结果进行比较分析,结果表明：在一级密封招标过程中,多维博弈均衡是军工企业的最优战略。     

基于三方动态博弈模型的网络生存防御策略优化配置

针对网络攻防环境中防御方以提高系统生存能力为目的所进行的最优生存防御策略的选取问题,提出了一种基于完全信息动态博弈理论的生存防御策略优化配置算法。将恶意攻击方、故障意外事件及防御方作为博弈的参与人,提出了一种混合战略模式下的三方动态博弈模型,对博弈的主要信息要素进行了说明,以混合战略纳什均衡理论为基础,将原纳什均衡条件式的表达式转化为可计算数值结果的表达式,并据此增加了近似的概念,最后,将提出的模型和近似纳什均衡求解算法应用到一个网络实例中,结果证明了模型和算法的可行性和有效性。     

具有策略偏好的模糊双矩阵对策模型及其应用

针对局中人对策略有偏好、支付值模糊的双矩阵对策给出了一种具体的求解方法,首先根据加权算子集结得到局中人的策略偏好向量、利用模糊数排序方式将模型转化为清晰的双矩阵对策,再利用粒子群优化算法求解.最后以雷达电子对抗为例,建立了具有策略偏好的模糊双矩阵对策的作战效能评估模型,研究结果对于双方资源分配,提高作战效能具有一定的军...     

集群搜索对策理论在搜索-规避对抗中的应用

使用对策论的观点和方法 ,结合搜索论的知识 ,建立了一类搜索 -规避对抗对策模型 .对模型的结论做了系统分析 ,考虑了对策双方的最优策略及使用 .     

A cooperative game in search theory

Search theory originates from the military research efforts of WWII. Most researchers of that period modeled their search games in noncooperative games, where players are enemies or compete against each other. In this article, we deal with a cooperative search game, where multiple searchers behave cooperatively. First we describe several search problems and discuss the possibility of a coalition or cooperation among searchers. For the cooperative search game, we define a function named quasi‐characteristic function, which gives us a criterion similar to the so‐called characteristic function in the general coalition game with transferable utility. The search operation includes a kind of randomness with respect to whether the searchers can detect a target and get the value of the target. We also propose a methodology to divide the obtained target value among members of the coalition taking account of the randomness. As a concrete problem of the cooperative search game, we take the so‐called search allocation game, where searchers distribute their searching resources to detect a target in a cooperative way and the target moves in a search space to evade the searchers. Lastly, we discuss the core of the cooperative search allocation game. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

军事攻防中的多属性资源分配对策模型

针对资源受限情形下的两阶段攻防资源分配问题,提出一种基于多属性决策的资源分配对策模型。防守者首先将有限的防护资源分配到不同的目标上,继而进攻者选择一种威胁组合方式对目标实施打击。基于博弈论相关知识,模型的求解结果可以使防守者最小化自身损失,使进攻者最大化进攻收益。同时,针对模型的特点,给出了一些推论和证明。通过一个示例验证了模型的合理性以及相关推论的准确性,能够为攻、防双方规划决策提供辅助支持。     

Lateral capacity exchange and its impact on capacity investment decisions

We study the problem of capacity exchange between two firms in anticipation of the mismatch between demand and capacity, and its impact on firm's capacity investment decisions. For given capacity investment levels of the two firms, we demonstrate how capacity price may be determined and how much capacity should be exchanged when either manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader in the capacity exchange game. By benchmarking against the centralized system, we show that a side payment may be used to coordinate the capacity exchange decisions. We then study the firms' capacity investment decisions using a biform game framework in which capacity investment decisions are made individually and exchange decisions are made as in a centralized system. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium capacity investment levels and study the impact of firms' share of the capacity exchange surplus on their capacity investment levels.© 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

The solution to an open problem for a caching game

In a caching game introduced by Alpern et al. (Alpern et al., Lecture notes in computer science (2010) 220–233) a Hider who can dig to a total fixed depth normalized to 1 buries a fixed number of objects among n discrete locations. A Searcher who can dig to a total depth of h searches the locations with the aim of finding all of the hidden objects. If he does so, he wins, otherwise the Hider wins. This zero‐sum game is complicated to analyze even for small values of its parameters, and for the case of 2 hidden objects has been completely solved only when the game is played in up to 3 locations. For some values of h the solution of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations is known, but the solution in the remaining cases was an open question recently highlighted by Fokkink et al. (Fokkink et al., Search theory: A game theoretic perspective (2014) 85–104). Here we solve the remaining cases of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations. We also give some more general results for the game, in particular using a geometrical argument to show that when there are 2 objects hidden in n locations and n→∞, the value of the game is asymptotically equal to h/n for h≥n/2. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 23–31, 2016