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基于二人有限零和对策的防空兵火力分配方法 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
为了优化防空作战过程中火力分配问题,使射击达到最佳效果,运用对策论、线性规划等理论方法,采用对策矩阵建立了防空火力分配的线性规划模型,并通过计算示例和计算机仿真初步预测了敌方的空袭兵器使用情况和我方相应的兵力分配对策。该模型建立的防空火力分配方法较好地满足了要地防空装备的战术应用问题,对提高作战效能具有一定的参考价值。 相似文献
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针对策略集模糊与具有模糊支付值的多冲突环境,建立了混合模糊双矩阵对策的综合集结模型。基于局中人的约束条件,构造局中人面向多冲突环境的可行策略串集合,建立新的结局空间;在假定模糊支付值为三角模糊数的情形下,基于模糊数的运算,构造局中人在新结局空间上的合成结局模糊支付值,建立多冲突环境下的混合模糊双矩阵对策综合集结模型,将集结模型清晰化并求解。最后,给出军事想定实例,说明了模型的实用性及有效性。 相似文献
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在Hilbert空间中,利用超梯度算法,用以逼近混合均衡问题的解集与半压缩映像不动点集的公共元,并且证明了该算法的收敛性。使用新的分析技巧证明了一个强收敛定理。 相似文献
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RNA二级结构预测是生物信息学领域重要的研究方向,基于最小自由能模型的Zuker算法是目前该领域最典型使用最广泛的算法之一。本文基于CPU GPU的混合计算平台实现了对Zuker算法的并行和加速。根据CPU和GPU计算性能的差异,通过合理的任务分配策略,实现二者之间的并行协作计算和处理单元间的负载平衡;针对CPU和GPU的不同硬件特性,对Zuker算法在CPU和GPU上的实现分别采取了不同的并行优化方法,提高了混合加速系统的计算性能。实验结果表明,CPU处理单元在混合系统中承担了14%以上的计算任务,与传统的多核CPU并行方案相比,采用混合并行加速方法可获得15.93的全局加速比;与最优的单纯GPU加速方案相比,可获得16%的性能提升,并且该混合计算方案可用于对其它生物信息学序列分析应用的并行和加速。 相似文献
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针对传统的基于静态节点的无线传感器网络(wireless sensor network,WSN)电池容量有限、节点移动受限的问题,提出了一种基于条件后验克拉美-罗下界(conditional posterior cramer-rao lower bounds,CPCRLB)的混合WSN的目标跟踪调度算法。该算法引入移动节点来参与目标跟踪,根据目标预测位置对移动节点进行运动控制,同时利用基于CPCRLB的信息效用函数选择静态节点,实现每一时刻目标的动态成簇策略。此外,还提出了一种基于运动学的预测机制,利用分区域管理的方法进一步提高跟踪精度,减少能量消耗,并能够有效避免目标丢失现象。仿真结果表明,该算法可以有效地对目标进行跟踪,在保证跟踪精度的同时相比静态网络节省了大量的能耗。 相似文献
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江泽民“七一”讲话 ,把“每个人自由而全面发展”作为共产主义社会的特征之一 ,这是对马克思主义人学理论价值目标的升华 ;把民本思想和主体自由作为人学的理论基础 ,既坚持了马克思主义中国化原则 ,又具有鲜明的当代性 ;结合社会主义现代化建设实践 ,科学阐述了人的发展条件 ,丰富、发展了马克思主义人学理论的科学体系。 相似文献
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邱少明;黄昕晨;刘良玉;俄必聪 《兵器装备工程学报》2025,(5):67-76
针对火力分配决策维度高,并且参战各方都有不同的战略目标,各方存在着相互耦合、复杂的作用关系,战场态势瞬息万变,传统DQN算法收敛速度慢的问题,提出一种基于Dueling DQN与博弈论相结合的火力分配优化方法。首先,构建二人零和博弈状态下的火力分配模型。其次,建立了同时为对抗双方进行火力分配决策的Dueling DQN算法框架,提出ε-Nash-Boltzmann策略选取动作,以敌我双方的期望收益差作为奖励函数。实验结果表明,该算法能根据战场状态以最快速度求解得到保卫我方目标的最佳策略,具备在博弈情形下求解高维度的火力分配问题的优势。 相似文献
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罗小明 《军事运筹与系统工程》2010,24(2):25-29,33
总结归纳了军事运筹学学科理论与实践应用已取得的主要成果和存在的主要问题,探究了军事运筹学创新发展的主要任务,提出了军事运筹学创新发展的基本对策。 相似文献
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针对欠定混合盲辨识问题,提出了一种基于时频单源点检测及聚类验证的盲辨识算法。检测各个源信号的时频单源点,利用奇异值分解的方法求解不同单源点集合对应的混合矢量,利用基于k均值的聚类验证技术完成源信号数目和混合矩阵的联合估计。算法放宽了已有方法对时频单源区域的假设,不需要假设信号存在时频单源区域,可以完成仅存在离散的时频单源点条件下的欠定混合盲辨识;同时克服了传统算法需要假设源信号个数已知的不足,可以有效地估计源信号数目。仿真结果验证了算法的有效性。 相似文献
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针对智能干扰条件下传输速率固定的通信系统多信道功率分配问题,建立了非对称Colonel Blotto博弈模型。在完全信息条件下,推导出了各种功率预算约束下通信方和干扰方的等效单信道最优功率分配策略,进而证明了通信方和干扰方存在唯一混合纳什均衡策略,并求得了纳什均衡收益。基于等效单信道最优功率分布,提出了一种多重扫描直接列元素交换算法,可以快速构建多信道混合功率分配矩阵,且相比于线性规划方法,可适应更多的信道数和更广的功率分布范围。通过数值仿真,验证了所提多信道混合功率分配矩阵构造算法的有效性及多信道功率分配策略的最优性。 相似文献
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We consider preventive transshipments between two stores in a decentralized system with two demand subperiods. Replenishment orders are made before the first subperiod, and the stores may make transshipments to one another between the subperiods. We prove that the transshipment decision has a dominant strategy, called a control‐band conserving transfer policy, under which each store chooses a quantity to transship in or out that will keep its second‐subperiod starting inventory level within a range called a control band. We prove that the optimal replenishment policy is a threshold policy in which the threshold depends on the capacity level at the other store. Finally, we prove that there does not exist a transfer price that coordinates the decentralized supply chain. Our research also explains many of the differences between preventive and emergency transshipments, including differences in the optimal transfer policies and the existence or nonexistence of transfer prices that coordinate the system. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010 相似文献
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Ljiljana Pavlovi 《海军后勤学研究》2002,49(1):1-14
We have asymptotically solved a discrete search game on an array of n ordered cells with two players: infiltrator (hider) and searcher, when the probability of survival approaches 1. The infiltrator wishes to reach the last cell in finite time, and the searcher has to defend that cell. When the players occupy the same cell, the searcher captures the infiltrator with probability 1 ? z. The payoff to the hider is the probability that the hider reaches the last cell without getting captured. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 1–14, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.1047 相似文献
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单一来源装备采办下,由于供应商在装备的定价与装备的升级改造上都存在 相对的比较优势,军方引入渐进式采办来改变自身的不利地位 应用博弈论的观点来对单 一来源装备采办下军方与供应商定价问题进行比较,实现了对单一来源装备采办与竞争策 略下各自收益分析,并用不定次重复博弈对渐进式采办进行了定量分析,对在实际采办过程 中如何实现激励合同和防止腐败问题也进行了理论上的论述。 相似文献
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Kensaku Kikuta 《海军后勤学研究》2004,51(7):977-993
There is a finite cyclic graph. The hider chooses one of all nodes except the specified one, and he hides an (immobile) object there. At the beginning the seeker is at the specified node. After the seeker chooses an ordering of the nodes except the specified one, he examines each nodes in that order until he finds the object, traveling along edges. It costs an amount when he moves from a node to an adjacent one and also when he checks a node. While the hider wishes to maximize the sum of the traveling costs and the examination costs which are required to find the object, the seeker wishes to minimize it. The problem is modeled as a two‐person zero‐sum game. We solve the game when unit costs (traveling cost + examination cost) have geometrical relations depending on nodes. Then we give properties of optimal strategies of both players. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004. 相似文献
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We consider a scenario with two firms determining which products to develop and introduce to the market. In this problem, there exists a finite set of potential products and market segments. Each market segment has a preference list of products and will buy its most preferred product among those available. The firms play a Stackelberg game in which the leader firm first introduces a set of products, and the follower responds with its own set of products. The leader's goal is to maximize its profit subject to a product introduction budget, assuming that the follower will attempt to minimize the leader's profit using a budget of its own. We formulate this problem as a multistage integer program amenable to decomposition techniques. Using this formulation, we develop three variations of an exact mathematical programming method for solving the multistage problem, along with a family of heuristic procedures for estimating the follower solution. The efficacy of our approaches is demonstrated on randomly generated test instances. This article contributes to the operations research literature a multistage algorithm that directly addresses difficulties posed by degeneracy, and contributes to the product variety literature an exact optimization algorithm for a novel competitive product introduction problem. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009 相似文献
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本文求解如下的组合对策问题:设有一堆棋子,总数N 是奇数,甲乙两人轮流取子,每人每次可取一颗、二颗,最多可取s 颗,但不能不取,直至取完后分别来数甲乙两人所取棋子的总数,总数为奇数者获胜。站在甲的立场上考虑获胜的策略,文中解决了如下两个问题:(Ⅰ)总数N 应是什么样的奇数,甲才有获胜策略;(Ⅱ)当N 一定时,甲应采取什么样的策略取子,才能获胜。 相似文献
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Firms form various alliances or use brand extensions to enter new markets in order to improve their operational efficiency and create a positive spillover. However, they do not always know the implications of these strategies for market entry and multimarket competition because the sale of products in one market can have negative spillover effects on product sales in other markets. We present an analytical framework to examine whether and how (i.e., by choosing alliance entry or independent entry) competing firms should enter a market in a situation where market spillovers occur when a firm enters a spillover-producing market to sell products that may increase or decrease the consumers' willingness to pay for products in the primary market. Our analysis shows that the operational efficiency (or quality differentiation ability) of firms in a spillover-producing market varies, and hence, the impact of market spillovers differs for firms. We identify the key factors, such as bargaining power, brand value difference in the primary market, and the extent of efficiencies and spillovers, that determine the firms benefitting from the different entry strategies. Specifically, we show that firms would be more willing to choose an alliance strategy to enter a spillover-producing market if the negative spillover is small and alliance efficiency is high. In contrast, if an alliance entry is not favored, the firms' relative operational efficiency is crucial for them to decide whether to enter the market independently under moderate spillover conditions. Finally, we show the implications of market entry strategies for managers. 相似文献
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利用演化博弈理论,探讨了联合作战中担负相同作战任务的作战单元间其策略选择根据利益变化的演化过程,建立了复制动态方程并求得平衡点解,通过复制动态的相位图直观反映了博弈的演化稳定策略,并通过Malab软件对作战单元策略选择与收益关系进行了仿真,其行为选择的演化结果与相位图展示具有一致性。研究结论表明,收益大小及变化是作战单元策略改变的重要依据,最后针对提高作战单元间的策略稳定性提出对策建议. 相似文献