基于层次分析法的舰舰导弹武器系统作战环境指数研究

针对海况、大气波导、海浪杂波等环境因素对舰舰导弹武器系统作战效能的影响,采用层次分析法构建了舰舰导弹武器系统作战环境指数的层次结构,同时量化了各目标层的有关因子,确定了各目标层的权重,并建立了舰舰导弹武器系统作战环境指数的评估方法。经算例分析表明:该方法能够评估复杂环境条件对舰舰导弹作战效能的影响,为舰舰导弹的作战使用提供辅助决策支持。     

性能优良的尖端武备

虽然自上个世纪80年代以来，韩国海军的主力作战舰艇大都是在本土设计和建造的，但是舰上的武器，包括舰舰导弹、舰空导弹及鱼雷等无不是美国、法国或德国的产品，不过这种状况即将改观。近年来，纷纷登场亮相的“韩流武器”引起世人的极大兴趣，如新型水面舰艇和潜艇、超音速教练机、各种类型的导弹、主战坦克及装甲车辆等。其中，海军武器装备除各型舰艇外，舰对舰导弹、反潜导弹、     

超视距目标指示位置对舰舰导弹目标捕捉概率的影响

超视距目标指示是中远程舰舰导弹作战运用的基础。在分析目标指示数据误差形式的基础上,根据超视距目标指示的原理和舰舰导弹解命中原理和寻的雷达捕捉目标的原理,建立了基于指示站位置的超视距舰舰导弹目标捕捉模型,采用Monte Carlo法对模型进行仿真,结果表明指示站位置对舰舰导弹捕捉概率有明显的影响,得到了求取指示站合理位置的方法,该方法对提高中远程舰舰导弹的作战运用效率有指导意义。     

外军地(舰)空导弹武器系统发展综述

以世界各国曾经研制、装备和正在研制、装备的地（舰）空导弹武器系统为背景,对不同国家同时研制并装备地（舰）空导弹武器系统的能力、更新换代、相互移植以及发展动向,作了全面、深入的分析。     

对抗条件下舰舰导弹的突防概率分析

在舰舰导弹对单舰防御突防概率的基础上,研究了舰艇编队采用各种手段对抗来袭导弹条件下,舰舰导弹的突防问题,并推导出突防概率的计算公式,利用此公式计算了突防概率随舰舰导弹齐射数量的变化情况。与在单舰防御条件下舰舰导弹的突防概率模型相比,此模型更加准确。     

舰舰导弹武器系统作战效能评估

在规定舰舰导弹典型作战任务剖面的情况下,运用美国工业武器系统效能咨询委员会评估武器系统效能的方法,建立舰舰导弹武器系统作战效能评估数学模型,并进行了算例验证和分析。结果表明:该模型可有效评估舰舰导弹武器系统作战效能,为舰舰导弹武器系统作战效能的评估提供了有效且便于操作的方法。     

跨世纪反舰导弹新一族

冷战时期,舰对舰导弹的设计侧重于能够在远洋和蓝水水域作战,要求具有超视距攻击能力。目前,侧重点已转向提高沿海和黄水区域作战能力。这种转变导致导弹向远射程、超音速、高命中精度方向发展,并且成为各国海军发展反舰导弹的共同选择。美国美国海军已经制定了对舰载AGM-84“鱼叉”反舰导弹进行改进的计划,以提高其对陆攻击能     

舰舰导弹攻击样式选择的决策分析

根据舰舰导弹攻击时使用雷达方式的不同,可将舰舰导弹攻击主要归结为三种样式,即其他兵力引导攻击样式、被动雷达攻击样式和主动雷达发波攻击样式。衡量各个攻击样式优劣主要考虑攻击的隐蔽性、命中率和发挥武器最大射程等三个因素。为此建立舰舰导弹攻击样式选择问题的递阶层次结构模型,从衡量各攻击样式优劣的三个主要因素出发,对模型进行了分析。最后得出了以其他兵力引导攻击为最佳攻击样式的结论。     

眼位影响下着舰信号官指挥战位位置

着舰信号官眼位直接影响其对舰载机状态的观察和判断,恰当的着舰信号官指挥战位位置有利于着舰过程中对舰载机飞行员的正确指挥、引导和控制,保障着舰回收作业安全实施。针对俄罗斯现役“库兹涅佐夫”号航母,建立着舰信号官指挥战位位置所对应的着舰信号官眼位和视角数学模型,并结合人眼最小分辨角,针对着舰信号官指挥战位位置在全甲板范围内进行仿真分析。仿真结果表明,从着舰下滑道入口点到着舰信号官决策点过程中,着舰信号官视角变化趋势保持一致,在满足视角差阈值条件下,理想着舰信号官眼位随着着舰指挥战位在甲板上位置的变化具有明显的分布规律,应将其纳入航母着舰信号官指挥战位设计的影响因素,并为其在航母甲板上位置的合理设置提供有益参考。     

目标定位精度较低情况下的导弹射击方法

以舰对舰导弹为例,从战术运用角度,分析和论述了几种在目标定位精度较低情况下的导弹射击方法。     

Putin – the masked nemesis of the strategy of ambiguity

Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive approach employed by Russia to reassert influence in Europe. The changing face of Russia’s strategy commenced in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia. This was followed by a large Russian conventional attack against Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas of the nation. 2014 witnessed the Russian annexation of Crimea where in just a week, Russia seized control of Crimea “without firing a shot.” The annexation of Crimea was rapidly followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in eastern Ukraine. The common thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and confuse decision makers in the West.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

Reviews

Douglas S. Derrer, We Are All the Target: A Handbook of Terrorism Avoidance and Hostage Survival. Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1992. Pp. x+135, notes, index. $14.95. ISBN 01–55750–150–5

Ian Knight, Zulu: Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift, 22–23 January 1879. London: Windrow & Greene, 1992. Pp.136, 150 illus., incl 8 colour plates, maps, biblio. £35. ISBN 1–872004–23–7

Ian Knight, By the Orders of the Great White Queen: Campaigning in Zululand through the Eyes of the British Soldiers, 1879. London: Greenhill Books and Novato: Presidio Press, 1992. Pp. 272, 17 illus., 1 map. £18.95. ISBN 1–85367–122–3

Manfried Rauchensteiner and Erwin A. Schmidl (eds.), Formen des Krieges: vom Mittelalter zum ‘Low‐intensity’ Conflict’. Graz : Verlag Styria, 1991. Pp.208. DM35. ISBN 3–22–12139–7

Harold J. Kearsley, Maritime Power and the Twenty‐First Century. Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing Company, Limited, 1992. Pp.xv + 203, 13 diagrams, index. £32.50. ISBN 1–85521–288–9     

An Unlikely Alliance: Portuguese and South African Airpower in Angola, 1968–1974

The war that Portugal was obliged to fight in Africa began in 1961 and immediately stretched the resources of its armed forces. Nowhere was this thinness more apparent than in policing the vast territory of Angola. The east and southeast of Angola were particularly vulnerable, as the area was a vast, sparsely populated region characterised by enormous featureless plains or chanas covered in tall grass and broken by an extensive river system and mountainous forests. The only military solution to policing these immense spaces was aviation and specifically the helicopter that could carry troops into battle, protect them with a gunship and bring them home when the operation was concluded. The immediate problem for the Portuguese Air Force (Força Aérea Portuguesa or FAP) in Angola and elsewhere was a scarcity of helicopters. The solution was an alliance with South Africa, which had a strong inventory of Alouette IIIs, to help in policing the east. This move was likewise in the interest of South Africa, as its threat came from Zambia through south-eastern Angola. This article examines the strategic and tactical development of this unusual, cross-cultural alliance and the symbiotic relationship that resulted in destruction of the enemies of both in Angola.     

Panjwai: a tale of two COINs in Afghanistan

The US Army has two approaches to counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. One is hard, or combat-focused, and the other is soft, or development-focused. This study examines two US Army task forces deployed to Panjwai District, Afghanistan from 2012 to 2013. CTF 4-9 and 1-38 offer a meaningful comparison because they pursued these contrasting approaches among the same population and against the same enemy at the same time and place. The study compares each unit’s approach and finds that neither approach was successful absent the other. The article concludes by recommending further research into combining the approaches at the operational level.     

国内外结构钢焊条研究的现状与发展

本文主要介绍了国外焊条的现状和发展趋势,包括焊条的高韧性、高效率、低尘低毒和耐吸潮性能,为国内的焊条研究提供了参考依据。     

物理学中的辩证自然观——控制、信息、系统与辩证自然观

和谐律、守恒律、方向律是自然辩证法中自然观的三大规律,它们贯穿、融合并体现于各具体学科的研究领域中。本文主要以自然辨证规律在控制与系统科学中的体现为依托,系统阐述物理学中控制系统理论与信息理论及其应用中自然观三大规律的具体表现。     

A Sign of Victory?: ‘Scottish Swords’ and Other Weapons in the Possession of the ‘Auld Innemie’

Many late medieval documents, notably inventories of arms and armour, of Englishmen contain references to ‘Scottish swords’ and other weapons. What did the compilers of these documents mean when they described a weapon as ‘Scottish’? How did such weapons come to be in the possession of these men? This article will attempt to explain this phenomenon drawing on primary documentary sources and surviving material culture from Glasgow Museums’ collections and others, as well as artworks from the period.     

The practice and theory of British counterinsurgency: the histories of the atrocities at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul, 1938–1939

This article details two largely unreported atrocities by British forces operating against Arab rebels during the Arab revolt, 1936–9, at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul. It then examines the military-legal system that underpinned and authorised British military forces operating in aid of the civil power, suggesting that the law in place at the time allowed for a level of reprisals and punitive actions, such as happened at al-Bassa and Halhul. The article does not conclude that the law allowed for atrocities but it does argue that it gave a basic form and understanding to an operational method that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It thus tests the idea in much of the literature on counterinsurgency that the British were restrained and used minimum force when compared to other colonial and neo-colonial powers fighting insurgents.