日本发展远洋型海军

冷战结束后,国际政冶、经济、军事格局处在变化重组之中。世界战略格局的变化,为日本实现其既定的由“经济大国”向“政治大国”过渡的国家战略目标提供了良好的机遇。自90年代以来,日本便加快了实现国家战略目标的步伐,根据面临的国际国内形势,重新调整了军事战略,开始由“冷战式军事战略”向“多边安全保障战略”转变。在坚持日美     

试析冷战后美国全球战略中的科技因素

在冷战后美国全球战略的建构和实施中,科技成为实现其战略目标的重要因素。本文从安全战略、经济战略和软权力战略三个维度出发,对美国全球战略中的科技因素进行分析,力图梳理出技术优势如何成为美国全球战略的脊梁。     

哈·麦金德陆权理论的发展与实践

哈·麦金德20世纪初提出的陆权理论,在地缘政治学发展史上占有重要的地位。这一理论从全球视角解读战略问题,以大历史观揭示国际政治的发展规律,不仅为英国"大战略"注入了新的思想内涵,也对20世纪国际政治、军事的发展与实践产生了深远影响。冷战结束以来,随着科技发展高速化、经济全球化、意识形态多元化和政治格局多极化趋势的加强,陆权理论得到进一步深化并被赋予了新的时代内涵,新时期陆权理论研究受到学术界的广泛关注。     

20世纪90年代以来美欧矛盾产生的原因

20世纪90年代以来,随着苏联的解体和冷战的结束,美欧同盟关系开始发生微妙而深刻的变化,美欧矛盾不断凸显和加剧。双方矛盾的焦点是单边与多边、单极与多极之争,矛盾的实质是控制与反控制的较量。矛盾的主要根源在于美欧之间在政治、经济、外交等领域内的权力、地位、利益之争以及对待国际安全问题的不同看法。     

世界主要国家后备力量建设的发展趋势

自冷战结束后，特别是进入21世纪以来，随着国际战略格局的变化和军事的转型，世界各国都根据军事变革的要求，调整后备力量建设指导思想，突出质量、减少数量，提高后备力量建设的整体效益。在这种背景下，各国在后备力量建设发展上出现了以下几个趋势。     

冷战后美国军事战略的演变

冷战后,在国际政治格局发生巨变的背景下,美国对其战略目标进行了重新的定位,对其所处的安全环境进行了多次认真地评估,并在此基础上对其军事战略进行了不断的修改和发展。从总体上说,冷战后的美国军事战略更具有进攻性,其发展变化将会对未来军事竞争的态势和国际政治格局的走势产生深远的影响。     

美国军事战略的演变

综观美国独立战争以来的战略演变,可以划分为三个不同的时代,即冷战前时代、冷战时代和冷战后时代。“冷战前”的170多年中,美国的战略理论,除了马汉的“海权论”之外,几平没有独创的东西,基本上沿袭欧洲传统的军事理论,战略思想主要是由大陆扩张发展到海外扩张,变化缓慢。但在第二次世界大战结束以后的50多年冷战及冷战后时代,随着科技的飞跃发展和国际政治的变迁,美     

实现“两个根本性转变”的几点思考

冷战结束后,国际战略环境发生了深刻变化,新的世界斗争格局正在形成。中央军委针对这一客观现实,依据毛泽东军事思想和邓小平新时期军队建设理论,及时提出了“两个根本性转变”的战略思想。如何正确理解和把握“两个根本性转变”战略思想的内涵和实质,对全面落实积极防御的战略方针具有十分重要的意义。实现“两个根本性转变”的实质是:从根本上提高我军高技术条件下的防卫作战能力,顺应时代发展的客观要求,走有中国特色的精兵之路。     

我国现阶段权力监督制度初探

发展社会主义市场经济,必须建立和健全权力监督制度。本文以建设有中国特色的社会主义民主政治为出发点,论述了我国现阶段权力监督制度建设的重要性、现状以及进一步完善的措施。     

高技术战争的开端——1991海湾战争回顾

战争起因 20世纪90年代初,东欧剧变,两德统一,美苏之间结束长期冷战状态,保持长达40多年的两极格局迅速解体,国际形势发生了重大变化,世界战略格局向多极化方向转换。旧格局的瓦解引起的国际政治力量的失调,造成了局部地区力量的真空与失衡,地区性强国纷纷跃跃欲试,伊拉克为了解决与科威特的边界纠纷和石     

The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?

Students of international politics known as ‘proliferation optimists’ argue that when it comes to the spread of nuclear weapons ‘more may be better’ because nuclear weapons deter great power war and produce greater levels of international stability. This essay provides a critique of proliferation optimism, challenging optimism’s conception of nuclear deterrence theory, its logical underpinnings, and its policy recommendations. It does this by conducting an intellectual history of proliferation optimism, identifying the core weaknesses of proliferation optimism as a theoretical framework, and articulating the myriad threats posed by nuclear proliferation.     

Nuclear opportunism: A theory of how states use nuclear weapons in international politics

How do states use nuclear weapons to achieve their goals in international politics? Nuclear weapons can influence state decisions about a range of strategic choices relating to military aggression, the scope of foreign policy objectives, and relations with allies. The article offers a theory to explain why emerging nuclear powers use nuclear weapons to facilitate different foreign policies: becoming more or less aggressive; providing additional support to allies or proxies, seeking independence from allies; or expanding the state’s goals in international politics. I argue that a state’s choices depend on the presence of severe territorial threats or an ongoing war, the presence of allies that provide for the state’s security, and whether the state is increasing in relative power. The conclusion discusses implications of the argument for our understanding of nuclear weapons and the history of proliferation, and nonproliferation policy today.     

Clausewitz and the politics of war: A contemporary theory

ABSTRACT

This paper re-examines the theoretical underpinnings of Strategic Studies, proposing a novel theory and a new framework for analysing war’s fundamental relationship with politics in line with the Clausewitzian tradition. Throughout modern history, Clausewitz’s concept of politics has been misconstrued as referring only to policy whereas in fact, for him, ‘politics’ was a much broader concept, including domestic power struggles. The political logic of war is defined here as the convergence of the interrelating factors of power struggles and policy objectives within a given polity that restrains and enables these political forces. The analysis of the Clausewitzian political logic of war is conducted through the sociological ‘liquid modern’ lens. It is argued that with power increasingly shifting from centralised state-oriented political leadership towards market forces, non-state actors and other political bodies, the effectiveness of war has been reduced. This is evident in the fragmentation of Western political systems and, as a result, suboptimal strategy and the domination of domestic power struggles in political decision-making concerning war.     

A realist before ‘realism’: Quincy Wright and the study of international politics between two World Wars

Contrary to conventional belief, IR theorist Quincy Wright and his cohort before World War II were neither idealists, legalists, nor moralists. Deeply grounded in the realism and pragmatism that marked the University of Chicago's interwar climate, Wright applied an ethically neutral and empirical approach to understanding international relations. Unlike the stereotypical interwar theorist, Wright eschewed legalism. He recognized that a struggle for power drove international politics and would continue to do so for the forseeable future. Above all, Wright embraced the complexities of international politics, rejecting monocausal explanations for war or simplistic frameworks for understanding international relations.     

Realistic Realism? American Political Realism,Clausewitz and Raymond Aron on the Problem of Means and Ends in International Politics

This article focuses on the relationship between means and ends in international politics, which is one of the core issues that has been reflected upon in international relations. Political realism, usually regarded as the dominant paradigm in international relations, provides a very specific understanding of this relationship: power and survival are considered as the unique, given and fixed ends of political action on the international scene. Consequently, a theory of international relations only concentrates on how states can make the most efficient use of the varied means the states dispose of in order to achieve these ends. However, this article argues that this dominant conception of international politics is surprisingly narrow. By focusing on other prominent thinkers traditionally labelled as 'realists', like Clausewitz and Aron, the article stresses the complexity of the relationship of means and ends and the place of power within a realist theory of international relations.     

Hans Morgenthau and the Lasting Implications of World War I

ABSTRACT

World War I was an epochal event that permanently redefined international politics. Yet, there is no consensus about what kind of international system it erected. This article argues that since 1918 to the present day, there is a unique revolutionary/revisionist system in existence. To confirm the argument, this article will revisit the mid-twentieth century writings of political realism's founding father Hans J. Morgenthau. His political thought is premised on the co-constitutive relation between ethics and politics, which characterized international politics throughout the Westphalian era and which was irreversibly lost in the tragedy of World War I. By sketching some of Morgenthau’s main arguments on the political and ethical transformations brought about by total war and total politics, the article argues that World War I generated a revolutionary system indifferent to political and non-political spheres, where insulated ethical systems clash in a kind of “global civil war”.     

How do wars end? A multidisciplinary enquiry

ABSTRACT

The cessation of military confrontations rarely coincides with the end of war. Legal and political matters continue after the last shot has been fired, civilians driven from their homes try to rebuild their houses and their lives, veterans need to adapt to their new role in civil society, and the struggle to define the history and the significance of past events only begins. In recent years, in particular, the changes in the character of contemporary warfare have created uncertainties across different disciplines about how to identify and conceptualise the end of war. It is therefore an opportune moment to examine how wars end from a multidisciplinary perspective that combines enquiries into the politics of war, the laws of war and the military and intellectual history of war. This approach enables both an understanding of how ‘the end’ as a concept informs the understanding of war in international relations, in international law and in history and a reconsideration of the nature of scientific method in the field of war studies as such.     

Fencing the bear? Explaining US foreign policy towards Russian interventions

Despite the burgeoning literature on Russia’s renewed power politics, little attention has been paid to the fact that US reactions towards Russia’s military interventions were all but coherent. The USA has chosen weak measures in Georgia in 2008 (shaming) compared to its assertive response in Ukraine in 2014 (sanctions, hard deterrence). This article assesses the explanatory power of neorealist, liberal and constructivist theories for the variation in US reactions towards Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. Our argument is that the constructivist perspective explains the cases best as it highlights the power and communality of normative assessments. The Ukraine crisis was perceived by the USA as a violation of core international norms, especially the non-use of force and the principle of territorial integrity. Relevant international norm carriers shared this assessment of the conflict. In contrast, the perception of the Georgian war centred on the issue of democracy promotion. While democracy is an important aim of US foreign policy, it does not summon the same normative importance as general principles of international law. Furthermore, the perception of the Georgian war remained contested among Western allies, which decreased the communality of the normative assessment.