Nuclear Weapons and the Vietnam War

This article analyzes why US leaders did not use nuclear weapons during the Vietnam War. To date, there has been no systematic study of US decision-making on nuclear weapons during this war. This article offers an initial analysis, focusing on the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Although US leaders did not come close to using nuclear weapons in the conflict, nuclear options received more attention than has previously been appreciated. Johnson's advisers raised the issue of nuclear weapons and threats on several occasions, and Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security adviser, looked into nuclear options to bring the war to an end. Ultimately, however, both administrations privately rejected such options. The conventional explanation for the non-use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War – deterrence – is insufficient to explain the Vietnam case. This article analyzes the role of military, political and normative considerations in restraining US use of nuclear weapons in the Vietnam War. It argues that while military and political considerations, including escalation concerns, are part of the explanation, a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons played a critical role.     

A Matter of Choice: Strategy and Discretion in the Shadow of World War II

American policy-makers are predisposed towards the idea of a necessary war of survival, fought with little room for choice. This reflects a dominant memory of World War II that teaches Americans that they live in a dangerously small world that imposes conflict. Critics argue that the ‘choice versus necessity’ schema is ahistorical and mischievous. This article offers supporting fire to those critiques. America's war against the Axis (1941–45) is a crucial case through which to test the ‘small world’ view. Arguments for war in 1941 pose overblown scenarios of the rise of a Eurasian super-threat. In 1941 conflict was discretionary and not strictly necessary in the interests of national security. The argument for intervention is a closer call that often assumed. This has implications for America's choices today.     

核时代的美国有限战争思想

从古至今,战争总的发展趋势是越来越接近战争的"绝对形态",但随着核时代的到来,这种发展趋势出现了转折。囿于核武器的巨大毁伤力与核战争的灾难性后果,全面性的核大战已越发不足取,这也成为美国军事理论界思考核时代战争形式的主要缘起。美国军事理论界的争论集中于全面战争与有限战争以及核时代有限战争的形态,即战争目标与手段选择的问题,进而得出比较一致的结论。     

Rethinking Stability in South Asia: India,Pakistan, and the Competition for Escalation Dominance

India and Pakistan are currently engaged in a competition for escalation dominance. While New Delhi is preparing for a limited conventional campaign against Pakistan, Islamabad is pursuing limited nuclear options to deter India. Together, these trends could increase the likelihood of nuclear conflict. India, for example, might conclude that it can launch an invasion without provoking a nuclear reprisal, while Pakistan might believe that it can employ nuclear weapons without triggering a nuclear exchange. Even if war can be avoided, these trends could eventually compel India to develop its own limited nuclear options in an effort to enhance deterrence and gain coercive leverage over Pakistan.     

美国在朝鲜战争中的核政策

１９５０年１１月３０日,美国总统杜鲁门在记者招待会上看似轻率地发表了美国“正积极考虑”在朝鲜战场使用原子弹的言论,引起轩然大波。经过白宫的一番澄清和补救,此后,无论是美国政府还是舆论界都没有再公开论及核武器的使用问题。然而,根据美国的解密档案文件,此番言论并非是杜鲁门的一时口误,而是美国政府在朝鲜战争期间的核政策的一部分。在整个朝鲜战争中,美国一直在考虑、策划“在危急时刻”使用原子弹的问题。那么,这项计划是如何制订实施的？它产生了什么影响？在紧急情况下美国真的会付诸实行吗？本文拟对此作一探讨。一…     

冷战后国际核扩散特征解析

文章分析了冷战结束以来,全球核态势发生的新的重大而深刻的变化,核扩散呈现出核大国纵向扩散与发展中国家横向扩散加深、核武器向恐怖分子扩散危险性增大、反导与外空争夺加剧等特征。     

朝鲜战争:现代局部战争的开端

朝鲜战争是在美苏冷战对抗的初期发生的,始终都有演变为全面战争的可能,但是战争并没有越出朝鲜国境。这场战争充分表现了现代局部战争的一些基本特征:战争目的的有限性、战争范围的有限性、战争以政治解决告终。朝鲜战争作为现代局部战争的开端,对战后世界军事产生了深远的影响。     

建立中国式辩诉交易制度的构想

美国的辩诉交易制度具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。有必要借鉴国外辩诉交易制度的合理因素,建立中国式的辩诉交易制度。建立中国式的辩诉交易制度,应对其适用条件、适用案件的范围及适用程序做出明确规定。     

战争工程:信息时代的战争方法学

战争工程是随着信息时代的进步而产生与发展起来的必然产物 ,反过来它将成为促进信息化战争和武器装备发展的新的动力。这种建立在系统理论基础之上 ,利用现代信息技术 ,以综合集成和战争模拟为主要方法和手段的战争工程思想 ,应该成为信息时代的战争方法学。本文给出了战争工程的定义 ,研究了战争工程产生的原因 ,描述了主要的特征和内容 ,并提出了需要注意的几个问题。     

Productive War: A Re-Conceptualisation of War

Conventional wisdom on the phenomenon of war is criticised for providing little relevant guidance to deal with the security challenges of our era. One reason is that this attitude uncritically assumes power as synonymous with force. In response, ‘productive war’ is here proposed as a re-conceptualisation of war based on Michel Foucault's alternative understanding of power. Productive war appreciates the role of violence but subordinates it to non-kinetic dynamics influencing the dimension of meaning in international security. This theoretical perspective provides a conceptual framework to deal with the dynamics of political mobilisation essential to create public support for nation-building abroad and for visions of world order.     

关于信息时代战争与战争指导问题的几点认识

随着科学技术的进步,战争形态发生了重大变化,战争指导的许多方面必然要适应此种变化,以追求战争的胜利,但经受过实践检验的战争指导原则依然没有过时.第一,正确认识信息时代战争的特点及其规律,以增强军事理论创新的针对性;第二,战争形态的划分有多种选择,战争本质不因战争形态的变化而改变,战争永远是政治的继续;第三,经受过实践检验的战争指导原则不因科学技术的进步而过时,在新的历史时期仍有强大的生命力.     

海湾战争中的电子战运用及其启示

２０世纪９０年代初的海湾战争,是一场大规模、高度现代化的局部战争,也是有史以来电子战装备最集中、手段最完善、斗争最激烈、影响也最深刻的一场战争。海湾战争中以美军为首的多国部队的胜利,主要依靠的是现代高技术的广泛应用,而电子战则是其中一张王牌,是其赢得胜利的电子战、精确制导导弹及Ｃ３Ｉ指挥系统三大法宝中的第一法宝,是决定陆、海、空战的关键因素。深入剖析这场战争中以美军为首的多国部队运用电子战的闪亮之处,对于我军积极做好军事斗争准备,打赢现代条件特别是现代高技术条件下的局部战争,具有十分重要的借鉴和…     

Nuclear Incoherence: Deterrence Theory and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia

Russian reliance on its non-strategic nuclear arsenal has been an ongoing concern for security experts. What is the Russian de facto employment doctrine for this arsenal? This article argues that Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) have no defined mission and no deterrence framework has been elaborated for them. This study disentangles Russian thoughts and deeds about regional nuclear deterrence and the role of NSNW in it. Situating the Russian case in the comparative context, the article argues that establishing a coherent theater nuclear posture and streamlining it with the national level deterrence strategy is a demanding and frequently unfulfilled task. It is likely to remain as such for both current and prospective nuclear states that consider an asymmetrical deterrence posture.     

Why Pakistan failed: tribal focoism in Kashmir

The classical repertoire of insurgency types is under-specified, and does not apply well to the case of Pakistan's conduct of insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan's approach to insurgency has been a consistent tribal variant of focoism, in which there is a reliance on imported itinerant insurgents to conduct raids to stimulate an uprising. This has its basis in the traditional warfare of the region, learned US insurgency doctrine in the 1960s, and an historical disregard for subject populations, which has led to an aversion to fostering grass-roots political movements.     

论朝鲜战争中有限战争理论的实践

朝鲜战争是第二次世界大战结束以后首次大国之间直接的军事对抗 ,也是战后唯一的大国之间直接军事对抗。战争的实践表明 ,这次大国之间的直接军事对抗 ,就其对抗的性质、程度和结局 ,对后来发生的局部战争和有限战争理论的发展有着极其深远的影响。如果说刚刚结束的伊拉克战争是一场高控制战争 ,那么朝鲜战争可以认为是高控制战争的始作。本文以大量的历史文献 ,从中美双方对战争目的、战争手段、战争规模、战争范围、战争持续时间和战争代价等方面的控制 ,比较详尽地阐述了有限战争理论在战争中的形成和初步实践过程 ,将对人们关于战后局部战争的有限性和战争控制的认识有所启示。