Smart Power and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces

Abstract

From Iraq to the Gulf of Aden and the South Pacific, this paper evaluates how far theoretical ideas about smart power manifest in operational missions of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). To function within a ‘smart’ power context, this paper suggests that JSDF operates in ‘assisting’ mode, rather than the ‘threatening’ behavior of ‘hard’ power. JSDF also deployed alongside other Japanese ‘soft’ power tools – diplomatic, cultural, developmental, and NGOs, using tailored programs for different cultural and geographical contexts. Given constitutional constraints and public sensitivity towards coercive force, JSDF missions could be integrated more into a ‘whole-of-government’ approach advancing foreign policy goals through ‘smart power’.     

The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Smart Power Quandary in Southeast Asia

Abstract

China has a strong interest in pursuing a smart power strategy towards Southeast Asia and has worked laboriously to engage with regional countries economically, socially, and politically. But China has been only partially successful in achieving its goals in the region. This paper argues that China’s security policy towards Southeast Asia significantly contradicts many other objectives that Beijing wishes to accomplish. Given the deep-seated, narrowly-defined national interests of the Chinese military in the South China Sea disputes, it is likely that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will continue to pose the main obstacle to the effective implementation of a Chinese smart strategy in Southeast Asia.     

Theories of Non-Balancing and Russia’s Foreign Policy

The beginning of the twenty-first century has witnessed the emergence of balancing responses to the US hegemony, among which Russia’s foreign policies stand out as corresponding to what is understood as ‘hard balancing.’ Why is the United States being balanced against? This paper categorizes the existing theories of non-balancing into six conditions that together guarantee the absence of balancing and demonstrates that the current unipolar system can satisfy only one of them. This eases the systemic constraints and makes balancing possible. The paper then presents three cases of balancing with reference to President Putin’s foreign policy. It argues that even though in terms of relative military capabilities unipolarity still holds, the emergence of counter-hegemonic balancing is indicative of important changes in the nature of post-Cold War American domination.     

The ‘Third’ US Offset Strategy and Europe’s ‘Anti-access’ Challenge

Over the last two decades, a number of countries (most notably China, Russia and Iran) have been developing so-called anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, such as ballistic and cruise missiles, offensive cyber-weapons, electronic warfare, etc. The development of A2/AD capabilities by non-Western countries undermines the foundations of US power projection and global military-technological supremacy. In order to overcome, or at least mitigate, the impending A2/AD challenge, the US Department of Defense (DoD) began to roll out its so-called ‘third’ offset strategy in late 2014. The strategy aims to bring about innovative operational concepts and technologies and spur new doctrinal and organisational debates. This article assesses which of the operational concepts and capabilities informing current US discussions on offset may be relevant in the context of the A2/AD challenges Europeans face on their eastern ‘flank‘ and in their ‘extended southern neighbourhood‘, and which may not. Europeans must grapple with the same conceptual puzzle as the US: how to strike the right balance between defeating A2/AD capabilities and hedging against them, i.e. through alternative strategies that are less dependent on unhindered access and resort to asymmetric forms of warfare. However, they must take into account the geographical features of their eastern flank and extended southern neighbourhood, the level of technological maturity of their challengers, and their own military-technological prowess and political limitations. This suggests a somewhat different approach to offsetting A2/AD than that adopted by the US.     

Is the Horn of Africa’s ‘Cold War’ over? Abiy Ahmed’s early reforms and the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea

ABSTRACT

On 9 July 2018, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a historical agreement pledging to end their mutual animosity and work for peace. The unprecedented rapprochement was facilitated by the new leadership in Ethiopia, merging interests between the two states and external mediation. This commentary looks into Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali’s early reform initiatives and the dynamics of the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea.     

Expanding the Dragon’s Reach:The Rise of China’s Anti-access Naval Doctrine and Forces

Among the multiple dimensions of the tous azimuths modernisation of Chinese naval forces, the development of China’s anti-access capacity has recently elicited considerable interest. The important link between this capacity and an overarching vision of the use of force – i.e. a naval doctrine – has, however, often been left implicit. This article shows that the particular development of China’s naval anti-access forces – more precisely, forces with an impact on the naval balance – can be explained by a shift of China’s naval doctrine towards a distinctly pre-emptive posture, which, itself, stems from the set of constraints imposed by the framework of ‘local war under informationised conditions’.     

The fertile ground of Hell’s carnival: Charles T. R. Bohannan and the US Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps’ investigations of war criminals,collaborators, and the Huk,in the Philippines 1945–1947

Insurgencies thrive in regions where government legitimacy is absent. In the post-war Philippines, Captain Charles T. R. Bohannan of the Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps became actively aware of this dynamic. Bohannan is best known for his later work with Edward Lansdale and Ramon Magsaysay in defeating the Huk Rebellion (1950–1954). Here the author examines Bohannan’s early investigative work against Japanese war criminals, wartime Filipino collaborators, and the rising threat of communist subversion most associated with the Huk. All of these experiences fed into what would be the successful campaign against the Huk, chronicled in his seminal work, Counter Guerrilla Operations: The Philippines Experience, and offers lessons on the investigative (as opposed to tactical or psychological) nature of effective counter-insurgency work, as it relates to both legitimacy in governance and the rise of insurgencies.     

China’s ‘Three Warfares’: Origins,Applications, and Organizations

Entering the twenty-first century, China has demonstrated an assertive foreign policy, not only in employing various types of economic and military leverage but also in conducting the Three Warfares (三战) – psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare. This article attempts to identify the motives and methods of China’s Three Warfares by analyzing its history, logic, and agents. Based on this analysis, the author also presents the position of the Three Warfares in China’s foreign policy and the warfares’ impact on the international security environment involving other major powers and China’s neighbors.     

War’s Horizon: Soldier-Led Adaptation in Iraq and Vietnam

Wartime adaptation is a process of adjustment from the war you planned for to the one you have. This process of adjustment is done, in part, by the practitioners of war in the theater of conflict–soldier-led adaptation. Drawing upon two case studies of gun truck development in Iraq and Vietnam I argue that soldiers created networks in order to adapt to battlefield challenges and that the pattern of those networks carries implications for the likelihood of formal adoption by the organization. Simply put, the pattern of the flow of ideas, resources, and skills across the battlefield may affect the likelihood of bottom-up adaptation.     

Honour,Comradeship and Betrayal: Lord Capel’s Sword

The sword which is the subject of this article and which will be referred to as the Capel sword, is a fine example of what has become known as an Irish basket-hilt. Whilst there are other examples in existence, what makes this sword unique and particularly important is the fact that it is known to have been owned by two important Royalist military leaders, Lord Arthur Capel and Sir John Owen. These two extraordinary men came from different backgrounds but their fate was linked through circumstances beyond their control. The story this sword tells is one of comradeship, loyalty, total belief in a cause, betrayal and ultimate sacrifice.     

‘Kadyrovtsy’: Russia’s Counterinsurgency Strategy and the Wars of Paramilitary Clans

This article analyses the steps taken by the Russian government, with the aid of a powerful local clan, the so-called Kadyrovtsy, to subdue the Chechen insurgency. It highlights the strategy used by Russia, under whose patronage former anti-Russian guerrilla fighters were transformed into paramilitary allies of the Russian government; later these former insurgents were incorporated into the regular Russian army and other state security forces. The article also identifies problems that are connected with the activities of the Kadyrovtsy in Chechnya and Russia, and the spillover into the diaspora; it also contextualises the issues faced by the contemporary Chechen ruling clan and the geopolitics of the Caucasus within the research framework of paramilitarism and counterinsurgency.     

A Quarter Century of ‘Transitory Power-Sharing’. Lebanon’s Unfulfilled Ta’if Agreement of 1989 Revisited

Most countries of the Arab Mashrek are multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian. In recent years, most of them have experienced violent clashes between groups that frame their conflicts along ethnic-sectarian lines. This article investigates the Lebanese Ta’if Agreement of 1989 as a crucial case study of how to manage such conflicts through a transitory power-sharing arrangement. It presents several provisions of this agreement that adhere to three different approaches of how to deal with such conflicts: the consociational and the centripetal models of power-sharing as well as the integrationist paradigm. It thereby seeks to develop a theoretical argument about chances and risks of transitory power-sharing in deeply divided societies and derives some general lessons for managing conflicts in the Middle East.     

It Takes Two to Tango: Autocratic underbalancing,regime legitimacy and China’s responses to India’s rise

What factors do autocracies evaluate when responding to perceived threats and why might they fail to balance appropriately? I posit that autocratic leaders may choose greater exposure to an external threat if, by doing so, it preserves regime legitimacy. Specifically, the desire to promote a positive image to one’s domestic public creates incentives to publicly downplay a rival’s military progress, which then affects the state’s ability to mobilize resources to respond to the growing threat. I test this theory in the case of China’s response to India’s military rise. This research contributes to balancing theory and empirical work on East Asian security.     

Musket,Rank and File for Foot Guards,Lovell’s Pattern of 1838. Ne’er a Shot Fired in Anger?

The Pattern 1838 Musket was initially designed for the rank and file of the British army, it was instead issued to the elite Foot Guards. With arguably the lowest survival rate of any 19th Century British military firearm it is one of the rarest muskets to encounter today. This is its story …     

Britain’s ‘Independent’ V-Bomber Force and US Nuclear Weapons, 1957–1962

This article examines a secret Anglo-American programme, Project ‘E’, which equipped the RAF’s V-bomber Force with US nuclear weapons for use in wartime. It shows Project ‘E’ was ineffective as a warhead supply programme and, furthermore, that it crippled the operational effectiveness of the V-bomber Force as a whole between 1958 and 1962. This article argues that as a result of Project ‘E’, the V-Force was neither operationally nor politically independent as a nuclear deterrent force. This challenges the traditional view of the V-Force as the benchmark of nuclear independence to assess the Skybolt, Polaris and Trident programmes.     

Measuring hard power: China’s economic growth and military capacity

China’s rapid economic growth is facilitating massive increases in its military spending and causing increased security concerns in Asia and the Western Pacific. But there is uncertainty over how large China’s military spending is relative to other countries, or how fast it is growing in real terms. We address this issue by deriving a relative military cost price index based on the relative unit costs of inputs. We find that China’s real military spending is much larger than suggested by exchange rate comparisons, and even larger than standard purchasing power parity comparisons. We also find, however, that the real growth of China’s military spending has been smaller than conventionally thought. This is due to rapidly growing wages in China and the large share of personnel in China’s military budget.     

Turkey’s imperial legacy and the conflict potential in the Balkans

Turkey is the only Eurasian state surrounded in almost a full circle by acute hot or “frozen conflicts,” ranging from low-intensity violence, terrorism to fully fledged wars. The prevailing pattern of intercommunal and interethnic conflicts in the continental Balkans and on Cyprus has long been different from those in the rest of Europe and in the Near East. This difference is closely related to the fact that these lands had experienced in the past centuries-long rule by the Ottoman Empire, whose legal successor is the Republic of Turkey. The intercommunal conflict potential in the rest of Europe used to differ substantially, but the difference has been greatly reduced as Western Europe has, in one respect, become “balkanized.”