Space,the New Domain: Space Operations and Chinese Military Reforms

ABSTRACT

The Chinese military has embarked on a series of organizational and doctrinal reforms intended to better enable it to fight modern war. Prominent among these reforms is the growing emphasis on space to enable long-range precisions strikes and on counterspace to deny space capabilities to an adversary. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has officially designated space as a new domain and established an organization to command space forces. With this increased focus on space, the PLA may begin to develop a doctrine to govern the use of space in military operations. The higher priority given to space, especially space control, by the PLA coincides with similar actions by the US military, increasing the possibility of warfare in space and the risks of escalation.     

军事指挥类期刊对军事学术研究的透视

军事指挥类期刊主要依靠各级军事指挥员,服务于部队全面建设。在军事学术研究队伍不断发展壮大的今天,军事指挥类期刊为部队“能打仗、打胜仗”军事理论研究服务,但军事学术研究存在着研究群体优势和合成作战理论优势发挥不够的问题。因而,要高度重视军事学术研究人才培养,加大经费投入,强化军兵种之间合成作战理论研究的力度。     

‘Pounding Their Feet’: Israeli Military Culture as Reflected in Early IDF Combat History

Abstract

How did the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) organisational and military culture shape their understanding of security threats, perceptions of warfare, and instinctive responses to security challenges? Israel's early military history is marked by the stubborn persistence of accepted patterns of thought and action. In the first twenty years of its existence, the IDF habitually came to sacrifice both political and military long-term and medium-term considerations in favour of the superficial, short-term satisfaction of its drive for action. The Israeli Army as an institution separated military actions from their political implications, and all too often, granted itself freedom of action at all levels of command. That myopic pattern led to recurring raids and minor operations during the 1950s, and contributed notably to the outbreak of the Six-Day War in 1967.     

What is Doctrine?

‘Doctrine’ has been part of military vernacular for at least a century. Nonetheless, it is a concept which is rather under-explored. The aim of this article is thus to break doctrine down into its component parts in order to grasp what a military doctrine actually is. Thereafter, the article points out different ways to utilise doctrine as a military devise. A doctrine cannot be, or rather should not be, all things to all men. On the contrary, doctrine can be a tool of command, tool of education or a tool of change. The main upshot of the article is that the future of doctrine is far brighter than its critics want us to believe.     

The Millenials’ war: dilemmas of network dependency in today’s military

This work is about how the United States military has become dependent on networked technology. As arguably the largest contributor to national security, it has become so dependent that its chief doctrine integrates networked technology into nearly every specialty, with particularly intense focus on Network Centric Warfare. As the military’s old guard is replaced by the highly technical Millenial Generation, there is cause to pause when assuming this techno-acuity brings nothing but advantage and success. Vulnerabilities stemming from such extensive dependence offer opportunities for exploitation that have not gone unnoticed. The first step to moving forward from this point is to fully understand the extent to which the military has become dependent on computer networks. It might be the Millenials’ war today, but it would be quite unwise for the United States military to think about it and fight it in a purely Millenial way.     

Implementing sustainable mission command in the Hellenic Army

The modern Mission Command philosophy in military operations originated with the German concept of Auftragstaktik (mission tactics). It emphasizes in general terms the exercise of disciplined initiatives by subordinates during the execution of mission-type orders in the course of military operations that are conducted within the overall intent of a commander. The present paper contains an overview of the historical evolution of the mission command concept and its application. The paper compares the mission command concept with the detailed or linear method of command. This paper focuses on the relevance of the mission command concept for the Hellenic Land Forces (HLF) in Greece. The paper provides a historical account on when and where mission command was successfully exercised by the Hellenic Armed Forces in the modern military history of Greece. The authors support the premise that the mission command concept is essential for safeguarding Greek national security in the current environment of evolving symmetric and asymmetric threats, and in meeting operational challenges in a diverse and difficult terrain. The paper examines the cultural reasons that have impeded the adoption of the mission command concept within the HLF and recommends a three-phase model for its permanent implementation.     

Military expenditure and the profit rate in Greece

This paper examines the effect of military expenditure on the profitability of the Greek economy for the 1962-1994 period. In the theoretical debate on the role of military expenditures they have alternatively been viewed either as a "burden on growth" (i.e. an unproductive drain of resources) or as a stimulating factor for demand, profitability and economic performance. This distinction is reflected in the Marxist tradition as well where in different theories of crisis, military expenditures have been treated either as an unproductive burden or as a savior of the capitalist system, mainly through their effect on the rate of profit. Our empirical tests for the relationship between military expenditure, the general Marxian rate of profit and the net rate of profit indicate that those expenditures have had a contradictory effect on profitability, stimulating effective demand in the short run, but affecting negatively both rates of profit over the long run.     

The strategic purpose of individual augmentee officers for junior partners in multinational military operations

ABSTRACT

This article examines the strategic purpose of Individual Augmentee Officers (IAOs) for junior partners in multinational military operations through an exploratory case study of Danish IAOs in Iraq and South Sudan between 2014 and 2017. IAOs are individual officers who are moved from their normal functions to be seconded to other units of the armed forces of their own or another country or an international institution. The study concludes that IAOs function as strategically important, yet not necessarily indispensable, supplements to military contingents in several ways: making tangible contributions to the overall mission (contributing), gaining access to information, knowledge, and experience (learning), and lobbying decision-making processes within mission headquarters (lobbying). The usefulness of IAOs depends on whether the junior partner has specific interests and a significant presence in the theatre and whether the mission is conducted as a UN mission, a NATO mission, or an ad hoc coalition.     

美军新型通信网络系统发展述评

通信网络和组网技术是实施网络中心战的重要环节。综合论述了美军当前正在发展的,适合于各级指挥机构和作战单位使用的、不同规模的最先进军用通信网络系统和新的网络通信技术,并就当前情况下我军通信网络的建设问题提出了一些建议。     

舰艇编队网络化反导作战系统研究

首先,按照网络中心战的概念,研究舰艇编队网络化反导作战系统的体系结构,以传统作战单元的功能系统为基本单元(作战节点),建立了传感器网、指控网和武器网三层逻辑网结构,定义各层的基本组成和主要功能,并在认真分析传统指挥体制和指挥方式不足的基础上,提出了“动态网络型”指挥结构和“动态分权式”指挥方式;然后,深入分析了舰艇编队网络化反导作战过程,定义了舰艇编队网络化作战模式下4种新的作战方式;最后,指出了系统实现的关键技术,阐明了各关键技术下一步的研究方向及重点.     

WARFARE IN A NEW DOMAIN: THE ETHICS OF MILITARY CYBER-OPERATIONS

While most normative evaluations of military cyber-operations have emerged from the legal community, this article assesses the legitimacy of such operations from a philosophical-ethical perspective. After reviewing the relationship between rights forfeiture and the jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria of the just war tradition, it applies these criteria to several aspects of cyber-operations, including responses to cyber-activities, the use of cyber-capabilities affecting combatants and civilians, and the use of these capabilities by contractors. Finally, it briefly addresses the legitimacy of limiting rights to privacy and anonymity in service of preventing cyber-harm.     

战场态势图互操作性及其关键技术分析

信息化战争中,战场态势图已经成为各类指控系统的核心。围绕联合作战战场态势图的互操作性问题,从分析互操作性的定义和模型入手,进一步从公共时间基准、全球指控系统、公共作战图、单一合成空图等方面,对当前美军实现战场态势图互操作性技术特点以及发展思路进行剖析。最后,对态势图构建中亟待突破的几项基础技术：面向服务的战场态势体系构建、元数据建模、多传感器数据互联等给出了总体上的研究思路。     

未来战争模式及对策浅议

未来战争呈现大纵深、立体化作战空间,快速到达、全天候的作战行动,高度发达的信息获取、控制、使用技术使战场趋于透明化,自动化、网络化、智能化的指挥系统,屈人而不夺人的军事胜利的基本特征;针对新一代战争提出了对策建议。     

面向服务的指挥控制系统协作方法研究

新军事变革和多样化军事任务为当前指挥控制系统带来了前所未有的挑战,研究表明面向服务协作（Service-oriented Collaboration,SOC）的应用可以有效增强信息系统的实时信息共享和协同能力,但现有平台存在自适应性和扩展性不强等问题。文章通过引入灵活对象技术,设计提出了一种基于灵活对象的服务协作应用框架,并基于指挥控制系统建立了原型系统。通过应用分析表明,本文所提出的服务协作应用框架具有很好的自适应性和扩展性,有利于信息化条件下的指挥控制系统快速构建的要求。     

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962

This article examines the nuclear command and control (C²) system implemented in Pakistan since 1998, and discusses its potential consequences for the risk of inadvertent or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. I argue that troubled civil-military relations and Pakistan's doctrine of ‘asymmetric escalation’ account for the creation of a command and control system with different characteristics during peacetime and military crises. Although the key characteristics of Pakistan's nuclear C² system allow relatively safe nuclear operations during peacetime, operational deployment of nuclear weapons during military standoffs is likely to include only rudimentary protections against inadvertent or unauthorised nuclear release. The implication of this study is that any shift from peacetime to wartime command and control procedures is likely to further destabilise Indo-Pakistani relations during the early stages of a diplomatic or military standoff, and introduce a non-trivial risk of accidental escalation to the nuclear level.     

任务驱动的一体化作战指挥信息系统高效协同技术

针对一体化网络中心战下各参与方作战指挥信息系统的异构性、自治性、多样性等特点给联合协同作战带来的问题,提出了任务驱动的一体化作战指挥信息系统高效协同技术。以作战目标为导向将各作战力量和资源按需聚合和自主协同,引入自主个体、虚拟任务共同体和虚拟任务执行体,构建一体化虚拟作战指挥环境,为各作战单位提供高效、协同、透明的一体化服务。分别从核心元素、系统框架分别介绍高效协同体系结构,结合陆军合成营指挥信息系统案例对高效协同技术各组成部分进行深入分析,验证该技术的可行性。     

基于HPTFN的网络化指挥信息系统效能评估模型

为了从系统工程和军事需求的角度提出一套综合的网络化指挥信息系统效能评估模型,在分析当前评估模型研究现状的基础上,给出评估建模应该遵循的原则。提出一种新的基于类投影型三角模糊数的网络化指挥信息系统效能评估建模方法,并对其建模原理进行详细分析。结合3个单位某系统实际,对评估模型方案予以验证,较好地说明了该模型的可行性和有效性,为网络化指挥信息系统效能评估和优化建设提供指导。     

‘Getting COIN’ at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army

This article reassesses the extent to which the British Army has been able to adapt to the counter-insurgency campaign in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. While adopting Farrell's definition of bottom-up military adaptation, this article contends that the task force/brigade level of analysis adopted by Farrell and Farrell and Gordon has led them to overstate the degree to which innovation arising from processes of bottom-up adaptation has actually ensued. Drawing on lower level tactical unit interviews and other data, this article demonstrates how units have been unable or unwilling to execute non-kinetic population-centric operations due to their lack of understanding of the principles of counter-insurgency warfare.     

网络化指挥信息系统建设的软件构件技术

研究了基于构件技术建设网络化指挥信息系统的方法,以适应随需应变和快速开发这一新的作战要求。给出了框架、构件、扩展点等基本概念,提出了基于构件的指控系统框架、业务流程、系统重组方法,讨论了通用构件模型、共享信息模型、流程控制、构件获取和数据服务机制等系统建设的关键技术,探讨了指挥控制信息系统的建设途径,为发展未来指挥控制信息系统的建设提出了一种新思路。     

Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military Relations in India

How do countries transition from single service to joint operations? This article engages with the discussion on military innovation to argue that civil–military relations are the most important driver for jointness. In doing so it examines jointness in the Indian military. Relying on archival research and primary interviews this article sheds new light on the operations of the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) in Sri Lanka from 1987–1990, the 1999 Kargil War and the Post-Kargil defence reforms. The main argument is that the Indian military’s transition to jointness has been ‘incomplete’ primarily because of its prevailing model of civil-military relations. This model prevents civilians from interfering in the operational issues of the military, including on matters pertaining to jointness. It therefore recommends more forceful civilian intervention to overcome the prevailing single service approach.