Making Jihad or Making Money? Understanding the Transformation of Dagestan’s Jamaats into Organised Crime Groups

While terrorist and insurgent groups have often combined anti-state subversion with ‘purely‘ criminal activities in order to obtain the financial means to wage their ideological struggle, little is known about the transformation of such groups into non-ideological organised crime groups (OCG) with close links to authorities. This holds particularly for jihadist groups that have on ideological grounds ruled out collaboration with their archenemies – ‘infidels’ and ‘apostates’. Using unique ethnographic data from Russia’s Dagestan, this article explores the causes and contexts of the gradual transformation of some of Dagestan’s jihadist units – jamaats – into organised crime groups collaborating with local authorities.     

Book Reviews

The purpose of this article is to analyse British strategic nuclear targeting between 1974 and 1979, prior to the successful completion of the sophisticated modification to Polaris submarine-missile system codenamed Chevaline. It will use as its starting point the parameters for UK strategic nuclear targeting, and the foundation of the ‘Moscow Criterion’, prior to the deployment of Britain's Polaris submarines which began in 1968. It will then discuss the recommendation by the Chiefs of Staff to retarget Polaris in 1975/76 and the implications of that recommendation in terms of the British approach to strategic nuclear deterrence. The article will conclude with an assessment of these retargeting decisions on the decision to replace Polaris with the US Trident system in 1980.     

Colonial violence and its ‘Small Wars’: fighting the Kuki ‘guerillas’ during the Great War in Northeast India, 1917–1919

ABSTRACT

This paper concerns the lesser known British counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Northeast frontier of India during the First World War. Officially known as the ‘Kuki Operations’, it was considered as part of the Great War. Carried out in isolation from press and public, and shelved in colonial archives, the event remained invisible until today. Yet, it registers a critical case of colonial COIN doctrine where the ‘moral effect’ doctrine was employed without being questioned. It unleashed enormous amount of organized violence, ranging from shoot at sight to indiscriminate burning of villages, wholesale destruction of property and livestock, prevention of cultivation and rebuilding of villages, forced mass displacement in jungles or in ‘concentration camps’, and collective punishment (communal penal labour and payment of compensation) after the war. This paper argues that the theory of ‘minimum force’ and the practicability of the ‘moral effect’ doctrine as applied by the Empire, sit oddly with each other at the frontier, where violence was seen both as a natural and moral orders. Violence as an ‘imperatively necessary’ method to bring order in a disorderly frontier, in the opinion of colonial state, informs and registers Northeast India as geography of violence.     

Politics in the shadow of the gun: revisiting the literature on ‘Rebel-to-Party Transformations’ through the case of Burundi

Abstract

This article provides a critical review of ‘rebel-to-party transformation’ scholarship. It shows how three flawed assumptions have underpinned much of the literature: (1) an ideal-typical differentiation between rebel group and political party as distinct by their use or rejection of violence; (2) the analysis of armed conflict as breakdown of ‘normal’ politics, and the study of ‘rebel-to-party conversions’ as a gradual, natural shift from violence back to politics; (3) a failure to integrate the study of rebel legacies into an examination of broader authoritarian legacies. These assumptions have clouded our understanding of politico-military organizations in conflict-torn societies, which combine social protest, armed rebellion, political violence, and party politics throughout their history. Drawing on the ‘no peace, no war’ and ‘armed politics’ paradigms, this article revisits these assumptions through the case of Burundi.     

Countering Insurgents through Distributed Operations: Insights from Malaya 1948–1960

This article examines the emerging US Marine Corps concept of ‘Distributed Operations’ (DO) and its applicability to counter-insurgency. DO involves dispersing the force and empowering decentralised units so as to create a network of mobile, agile and adaptable cells, each operating with a significant degree of autonomy yet in line with the commander's overall intent. This concept's applicability to irregular campaigns is assessed with reference to the Malayan Emergency, in which the British and Commonwealth forces employed dispersed and decentralised small-unit formations to great effect. The article teases out the conditions that allowed DO to succeed in Malaya, and comments on the requirements and implications for the use of DO today in the prosecution of the ‘Long War’.     

Merits and Limits of Counter-ideological Work Against Terrorism: A Critical Appraisal

Counter-ideological work is touted as crucial in combating terrorism. This article attempts to analyse the role of counter-ideology in dealing with a particular type of terrorism: Muslim jihadist extremism. This paper reiterates findings from existing research, in arguing that counter-ideology is indispensable for three reasons: firstly, to prevent Muslims from genuinely believing that terrorism is sanctioned by the faith; secondly, it is instructive to assure non-Muslims that Islam per se, is not the problem; and finally, it can be used to ‘rehabilitate’ terrorists who are in detention. However, this paper also suggests four criticisms of many counter-ideological efforts, and posit that in order for such work to be truly effective, the following shortcomings need to be rectified: firstly, the creation of unnecessary frontiers that may alienate potential allies; secondly, the inability to ‘preach to the right crowd’; thirdly, the perils of promoting ‘moderate’ and ‘progressive’ Islam; and finally, credibility issues associated with the people spearheading such works. An underlying factor that lurks in the background of all of these is the role of the ulama, or Islamic religious scholars. This article further hopes to contribute to the literature on counter-terrorism by exercising more scrutiny on the role of the ulama.     

‘The People are Revolting’: An Anatomy of Authoritarian Counterinsurgency

Rather than win hearts and minds, authoritarian counterinsurgency is said to rely heavily on coercion. It has a reputation for effectiveness, if also for its amorality. Still, the research into authoritarian counterinsurgency is surprisingly lacking. By distilling common features from key cases, this article concludes that this approach goes beyond the indiscriminate violence that typically captures the imagination. Like their democratic counterparts but differently, authoritarian regimes also engage in mobilisation, create narratives, and turn military advantage into political gain. The analysis explains how these tasks are undertaken and, by contradistinction, sheds light on more liberal approaches as well.     

On Government-industry Nexus and Indigenous Armed Resistance

This paper proposes a simple game-theoretic framework for analyzing the relationship between the government, industry and indigenous community, especially in the context of mounting violence surrounding displacement of indigenous communities by governments for the purposes of commercial use of their habitat. It specifically takes into account the possibility of alleged ‘nexus’ between the government and the industry and explores its implications on the level of allocation and utilities of the players. We find that the bias in allocation that occurs when the government and the industry enter a ‘nexus’ can be rectified when there is resistance from the indigenous groups. Moreover, rebellion is a dominant strategy of the indigenous community, irrespective of whether there is ‘nexus’ or not, and being in ‘nexus’ with the government is a best response for the industry. The unique SPNE occurs when there is ‘nexus’ between the industry and the government and resistance by the indigenous groups, corroborating the widespread allegations of ‘nexus’ and evidence of resistance worldwide. We also explore a few extensions of the basic model and present some narrative evidence in support of the theoretical model.     

Leadership and national security: an interrogation of the Boko Haram violence in Nigeria

This study contends that an analysis of the nexus between leadership and security offers useful insights into explaining conflict by stating that the conceptualisation of these argots, especially through the definition of leadership as a process, helps to explain and address Nigeria’s security challenges. By arguing that leaders’ ability to establish mutuality with their followers in any situation and set collectively-generated means for attaining these set goals for societal security, the study shows how such a relationship creates a secured state. This is not the case in Nigeria, where leaders’ security decisions are influenced by external actors rather than by their followers. By showing that the Nigerian ruling elite’s security agendas intersect with dominant global notions of security while neglecting genuine security interests of ordinary Nigerians, the study contextualises the complex global and local security interests in Nigeria. The lack of an intersection at home, however, has contributed to the emergence of extremists such as the Boko Haram sect, as well as the escalation of the acts of violence they perpetrate. As national insecurities become complex and intractable, ‘elegant’ or unilinear solutions – such as a military approach – lack the capacity to address these problems.     

Between the Cracks: Actor Fragmentation and Local Conflict Systems in the Libyan Civil War

Abstract

After nearly four years of civil war, Libya continues to be described as an ‘ungoverned space’ where the collapse of state institutions reignited tribal, political, religious and ideological tensions. These accounts, however, obscure Libya’s complex subnational governance, and the role of non-state armed groups in shaping the emerging political orders. By contrast, we contend that distinct subnational political orders have emerged in Libya since 2014 in which actors engage in state-making practices driven by local interests. Using empirical evidence to explore the activity of non-state armed groups during the Libyan civil conflict, we highlight that the local conflict environments in eastern, western and southern Libya provide specific incentives that shape the process of armed group splintering and patterns of violence. The findings demonstrate that claims to authority and notions of statehood extend far beyond the state whereby governance relations are negotiated between state and non-state actors. Conflict patterns, (in)stability and the prevailing political order are therefore conditional on the nature of the dominant actor, their strategies and modes of violence within their areas of influence. Through this analysis, the paper provides a more granular understanding of the local political dynamics that drive violence in Libya and civil wars more generally.     

RETHINKING AFRICAN STATES

Understanding the nature of armed conflict in Africa requires more than a political and military analysis of forms of warfare such as the employment of children as fighters. Children are seldom only instruments for other causes but can actively support their own agenda through the choices they make. Problems of governance, resource use and social organisation also need to be considered. There arc often no clear lines between civilians and militaries and a simplistic ‘oppressor vs victim’ dichotomy is of limited use. The political character of youths can be better understood by considering the factors that shape their consciousness, as well as the predisposition of the society to care for them. Society has failed to offer youth protection from the adult consequences of immediate involvement in economy and politics. This has been a dynamic process rather than a static set of political and economic circumstances favourable to the outbreak of revolution.     

Using public health information to inform,build support and implement policies for gun violence prevention: A case study from the gun ban referendum

Gun violence is one of the most serious health problems in Brazil. Information on gun deaths and injuries is collected by the Ministry of Health. This data has been used very successfully to inform and design public policies for preventing gun violence. This article analyses the use of public health information by researchers and activists, as well as government officials and the media, to reveal the severity of firearm injuries and deaths and to gain consensus on the need for reforms to national gun laws. It also assesses the resounding ‘no’ vote in a recent disarmament referendum to decide whether to prohibit the sale of guns and ammunition. The results of the Brazilian referendum are a lesson to other countries struggling to deal with high levels of gun violence, showing that it may not always be enough to have data to back up efforts to change policies—as people's decisions around gun ownership and use, as well as their choices regarding security policies, are motivated by a complex interaction of factors.     

The Impact of ETA’s Dissolution on Domestic Tourism in Spain

In late 2011, the Spanish terrorist organization ETA announced the end of armed violence after more than forty years of illegal activity. While the existing literature has already established the negative impact of terrorist actions on international tourism in a particular region, this paper aims to determine whether ETA’s final ceasefire and definitive dissolution had a positive impact on domestic tourism in Basque Country. To that end, a directed gravity model is estimated over a panel data-set of 699 domestic tourist flows between the Spanish regions from 2008 to 2013. Results suggest that the negative impact on visitor flows was localized in the Basque Country. Also, regardless of a permanent ceasefire announced in 2010, only the 2011 ‘definitive cessation of violence’ had an immediate significant impact on the number of visitors to the Basque Country. These results complement the scarce literature on post-conflict tourism analysis and may have implications for regional authorities in affected regions in their efforts to rebuild their destination brands.     

Capitalism & the “new wars”: free markets and societal insecurity before and after the cold war, 1970–2013

Critics of globalisation suggest that growing free-market conditions generate anomie, leading ultimately to what some term ‘new wars’ and new insecurities. Others argue that liberal economies dissuade violence since people gain from peace. This study argues for a micro perspective that views predatory economic policies driving higher investment in rebellion-specific capital, such as shadow economic activity that easily translates into insurgency in weak-state settings. Investment in the shadows determines survivability against superior state forces, and survivability determines rebellion, by definition. Using civil war onset data from 1970 to 2013, as well as the Global Peace Index (GPI) and several of its individual components, which capture societal insecurity above and beyond the absence of armed violence, this study finds that countries that are more capitalistic have a lower risk of civil war and societal insecurity. The results are robust to alternative models, testing methods, and uphold when examining several relevant subcomponents of the index, such as internal conflict, violent crime, homicides, ease of access to small arms, and political instability. Surprisingly, democracy tends not to be associated with peace but associates with increased criminality whereas strong autocracy reduces it, suggesting that capitalism, more than democracy, associates with conditions favourable to societal security, independently of a country’s level of development.     

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and popular support: counterterrorism towards an insurgency nature

The PKK has been a prolonged problem in Turkey, and various measures have been adopted to diminish and end the violence. In addition to the impacts on violence, these policies have also had an impact on public opinion and ethnic awareness of Kurds in Turkey. This article analyzes these policies and their effects on electoral support for the PKK by examining the vote shares of the pro-PKK political parties in national and local elections. It concludes that Turkey has conceptualized the issue solely as a problem of terrorism, but the goal, strategy, organization, and format of violence used by the PKK reflect the nature of an insurgency. Therefore, it is argued that Turkey, by ignoring the insurgency features, has disregarded the legitimate parts of the cause and related popular support, and thus has responded mostly with deterrent measures apart from the reforms of recent years. Results have shown that policies of deterrence culminated in a steady level of support for the PKK indicating that low level of legitimacy – as they were perceived by the people – of the policies resulted in viable popular and political support for the PKK. Despite the recent accommodative reforms, the existence of pro-PKK parties rallying electoral support in the political arena provided sustained level activities in the conventional politics in Turkey's municipal and national political system, in which they pursue pro-PKK agendas, such as ‘Autonomy’ and ‘Confederation’ as well as activities to increase the distinction in identity around the ethnic consciousness for more popular support. Yet, no clear pattern is identified between violence level and popular support in the macro-scale.     

Ideoscapes in the World Society: Framing Violence in Somalia

The article uses the example of the Somali war to analyse how globally travelling ideas and political concepts are adapted to local settings and translated into frames that promote collective action and feature violence. It outlines how two ideas with universal claim, nationalism and modernisation were combined with an anti-colonial rhetoric and evolved into the meta-narrative of Somali history. This meta-narrative changed little, and keywords such as (pan-Somali) nationalism, anti-colonialism, development, sovereignty structure most of the discursive repertoires of political actors in Somalia. The main difference is that politicized clan affiliations were during the war dragged out of their shadowy existence and placed in the spot-light of political practice. They alone were however not sufficient to justify claims to power, but were complemented by ‘injustice’, ‘modernisation’ and ‘territorial’ narratives that justified violent deeds as ‘liberation’, ‘defence’ or ‘territorial rights’. Islamists employed similar key narratives and revived the pan-Somali anti-colonialist nationalism, but rooted it in a religious rational. Their ability to abandon culturalised frames contributed to their success.     

Myopic Government and Strategic Rebels: Exchange and Escalation of Violence

This study presents a model in which the innate inability of a government to fully comprehend the ramifications of its actions, herein referred to as the myopia of the government, leads to underinvestment in counterinsurgency measures and examines the nature of exchange of violence between the government and rebels. While the idea that voters’ or a government’s myopia leads to myopic policies is well established in the related literature, surprisingly, it has never been incorporated into conflict studies. As far as we are aware, this is the first ever study that analyzes the effects of a government’s myopia on the exchange and eventual escalation of violence when the rebels are in their trying stages and shows situations in which the two-sided violence could be either strategic substitutes or complements. The results suggest that in case of a foresighted government, the acts of two-sided violence are strategic complements. When the government is myopic, however, the rebels’ use of violence is a strategic substitute for the government’s violence. The trade-off, according to the model, lies in exchanging higher levels of violence for lower chances of revolt.     

The strategic utility of New Zealand Special Forces

In 1955, the New Zealand government authorised the creation of a Special Forces unit to operate with British forces in Malaya to counter a communist-inspired guerrilla insurgency. Drawing upon the operational experiences of the New Zealand SAS largely taken from the Cold War period, and underpinned by Colin Gray's Special Forces essentials of ‘economy of force’ and ‘expansion of choice’, this article will show how New Zealand's SAS is now accepted not only as a respected and relevant part of the nation's military capability, but also empowers its political decision-makers with the confidence to take on significant, and at times difficult, strategic foreign-policy choices.