US strategic preferences in the early twenty-first century

This article investigates how US national security planners have envisioned the emerging strategic environment during the early twenty-first century and evaluates how their perceptions of this strategic environment have changed during these years. This conceptual evolution can be seen in how defense planners define threats, identify defense priorities, and design security strategies. Five key strategic planning documents serve as the basis for this analysis and illustrate significant shifts in how the US government has envisioned its own security requirements as well as the context within which its strategic vision will need to be realized. These planning documents are: (1) Joint Vision 2020, (2) the Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, (3) the Obama Administration's 2010 National Security Strategy, (4) US Strategic Defense Guidance entitled Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21^st Century Defense, and (5) the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020.     

Rossellini,Pontecorvo, and the neorealist cinema of insurgency

This article examines the tradition of Italian neorealism and the importance it has for films depicting guerrilla insurgencies. It looks in particular at the two films by Roberto Rossellini Rome Open City and Paisa as well as the later film by Nanni Loy Four Days in Naples. It then proceeds to locate Gillo Pontecorvo's iconic film The Battle of Algiers within this neorealist tradition and examines the degree to which the director succeeded in continuing the basic traditions of neorealism into the context of the Algerian war of Independence. The article concludes that while this film remains of great interest it should be situated in the period when it was produced and is in many ways radically disconnected from many insurgent movements of the present day.     

US-American Intervention in Europe: Morality,Justice, and Freedom in World War II Cinema

This article analyzes the American intervention in Nazi-oppressed Europe during World War II and the way in which this intervention is represented in film. Examining the visual and cinematic aesthetics of Saving Private Ryan and the mini-series Band of Brothers, the article seeks to demonstrate how film has responded to US intervention overseas. It is argued that the need to liberate Europe from the evil Other stands forth as the main, heavily moralized purpose of US military intrusion in the film and the mini-series being analyzed. To shore up this speculation, the author considers other films on the topic, namely, The Longest Day (1962) and Shutter Island (2009). The author claims that the scenes in the concentration camps that are crucial in Band of Brothers and Shutter Island have an ethical function, i.e. they justify US intervention in the foreign territory. Additionally, the article provides a brief overview of Playing for Time (1980), Schindler’s List (1993), The Devil’s Arithmetic (1999), The Grey Zone (2001), as well as the mini-series Holocaust (1978).     

The Hunt for Martín Caballero

While the success of Colombia's fight against illegal armed groups, led by Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia – ejército del pueblo (FARC-EP), is generally lauded as evidence of the effectiveness of both COIN doctrine and security assistance, the configuration of Colombia's counter-insurgency effort remains largely unstudied. This article will explain the success of one of those campaigns carried out principally by the Colombian marines (Colmar) in an area of northern Colombia known as the Montes de María. Contingent factors shaped the success of this campaign, beginning with the fact that the Montes de María forms an area where insurgents, relative late comers to the region, found it difficult to put down deep roots. However, operations to eradicate them were complicated by the inexperience of the Colmar, and by constraints placed by Colombia's Constitutional Court on COIN methods modeled on those successfully applied by the British in Malaya and Kenya. Therefore, Colmar officers initiated their five-year campaign by building up a base of popular support in the towns and targeting insurgent logistical networks. This bought time to strengthen the Colmar's combat and intelligence capabilities, and take the offensive that eventually isolated and killed the leader of the FARC in the Montes de María, Martín Caballero. Unfortunately, the failure of the Colombian government to follow up the Colmar victory by installing a regional and local governments viewed as legitimate by the population, and to resolve long standing land tenure issues, has meant that, so far, the Colmar looks to have delivered a tactical victory in a strategic vacuum.     

Causal analysis of radical Islamism in northern Nigeria's Fourth Republic

This article attempts an agential explanation of the raison d'être for Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal Jihad, also known as Boko Haram (meaning Western education is forbidden), an Islamist sect that came to public consciousness in 2009 after the extra-judicial killing of its leader. Conceptualising Nigeria as a weak state, the article identifies the failed prebendal relationship between politicians in northern Nigeria and members of Boko Haram, and the extra-judicial killing on 30 July 2009 of Mohammed Yusuf, as agential causations of the current wave of radical Islamism. The article argues for the need to transcend the orthodox interpretation of the current wave of Islamist terrorism being demonstrated by the Nigerian state to a more nuanced approach that pays attention to the essentialist, psychological, political and economic perspectives of Islamist terrorism at the structural and individual levels.     

Scheduling jobs that are subject to failure propagation

A single machine is available to process a collection of stochastic tasks. Processing is interrupted when the machine breaks down. We introduce a new model of breakdowns that more realistically incorporates the effects that job processing may have on the machine. This failure propagation model is equivalent to a Bayesian formulation in which learning about breakdown rates occurs as jobs evolve. Optimal scheduling policies are described in terms of Gittins indices and these indices are characterised in two special cases. For example, we obtain conditions which ensure that an optimal policy will only preempt a job's processing either at its completion or at a machine breakdown. We also bound the value lost by simplistic modelling which ignores the learning phenomenon. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

NATO and the broader Middle East, 1949–2007: The history and lessons of controversial encounters

The engagement of the Atlantic Alliance in the Middle East dates back to the founding of the Alliance. With one eye on this history and one eye on current controversies, this article investigates the preconditions for and nature of the allies' engagement in the region in order to assess whether the Middle East today is causing a rupture within the Alliance. The article finds that the Alliance was never likely to engage as one in the region. The Alliance instead guarded its cohesion by either letting the Alliance leader, the United States, take a lead role or by acting as a coalition enabling framework. This latter option has prevailed since the early 1980s. Today, NATO can preserve its cohesion and simultaneously engage in the region if it continues this legacy of coalition-making from within the allied framework. Conversely, an effort to engage collectively in the region will likely set of internal tensions to the extent that the Alliance itself will be at risk.     

Readiness and the optimal redeployment of resources

This paper considers the problem of the optimal redeployment of a resource among different geographical locations. Initially, it is assumed that at each location i, i = 1,…, n, the level of availability of the resource is given by a₁ ≧ 0. At time t > 0, requirements R_f(t) ≧ 0 are imposed on each location which, in general, will differ from the a₁. The resource can be transported from any one location to any other in magnitudes which will depend on t and the distance between these locations. It is assumed that ΣR_j > Σa_t The objective function consideis, in addition to transportation costs incurred by reallocation, the degree to which the resource availabilities after redeployment differ from the requirements. We shall associate the unavailabilities at the locations with the unreadiness of the system and discuss the optimal redeployment in terms of the minimization of the following functional forms: \documentclass{article}\pagestyle{empty}\begin{document}$ \sum\limits_{j = 1}^n {kj(Rj - yj) + } $\end{document} transportation costs, Max \documentclass{article}\pagestyle{empty}\begin{document}$ \mathop {Max}\limits_j \,[kj(Rj - yj)] + $\end{document} transportation costs, and \documentclass{article}\pagestyle{empty}\begin{document}$ \sum\limits_{j = 1}^n {kj(Rj - yj)^2 + } $\end{document} transportation costs. The variables y_j represent the final amount of the resource available at location j. No benefits are assumed to accrue at any location if y_j > R_j. A numerical three location example is given and solved for the linear objective.     

Minimal LST representations of MAP(n)s: Moment fittings and queueing approximations

A Markovian arrival process of order n, MAP(n), is typically described by two n × n transition rate matrices in terms of rate parameters. While it is straightforward and intuitive, the Markovian representation is redundant since the minimal number of parameters is n² for non‐redundant MAP(n). It is well known that the redundancy complicates exact moment fittings. In this article, we present a minimal and unique Laplace‐Stieltjes transform (LST) representations for MAP(n)s. Even though the LST coefficients vector itself is not a minimal representation, we show that the joint LST of stationary intervals can be represented with the minimum number of parameters. We also propose another minimal representation for MAP(3)s based on coefficients of the characteristic polynomial equations of the two transition rate matrices. An exact moment fitting procedure is presented for MAP(3)s based on two proposed minimal representations. We also discuss how MAP(3)/G/1 departure process can be approximated as a MAP(3). A simple tandem queueing network example is presented to show that the MAP(3) performs better than the MAP(2) in queueing approximations especially under moderate traffic intensities. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 549–561, 2016     

Synopsis of Community of insecurity: SADC's struggle for peace and security in southern Africa

This article presents a synopsis of Community of insecurity: SADC's struggle for peace and security in southern Africa, published by Ashgate in 2012. It focuses on SADC's efforts to establish a common security regime; conflict and peacemaking in southern Africa between 1992 and 2011; and the prospects of SADC becoming a security community. It summarises the reasons for SADC's difficulties in the sphere of regional security and politics, namely the weakness of member states, their unwillingness to surrender sovereignty to communal mechanisms, and the absence of common values among them. The main conclusion is that these problems lie primarily at the national level and cannot be solved at the regional level. SADC is a forum of states and it cannot do anything that these states will not permit it to do.     

Pricing bridges to cross a river

We consider a pricing problem in directed, uncapacitated networks. Tariffs must be defined by an operator, the leader, for a subset of m arcs, the tariff arcs. Costs of all other arcs in the network are assumed to be given. There are n clients, the followers, and after the tariffs have been determined, the clients route their demands independent of each other on paths with minimal total cost. The problem is to find tariffs that maximize the operator's revenue. Motivated by applications in telecommunication networks, we consider a restricted version of this problem, assuming that each client utilizes at most one of the operator's tariff arcs. The problem is equivalent to pricing bridges that clients can use in order to cross a river. We prove that this problem is APX‐hard. Moreover, we analyze the effect of uniform pricing, proving that it yields both an m approximation and a (1 + lnD)‐approximation. Here, D is upper bounded by the total demand of all clients. In addition, we consider the problem under the additional restriction that the operator must not reject any of the clients. We prove that this problem does not admit approximation algorithms with any reasonable performance guarantee, unless P = NP, and we prove the existence of an n‐approximation algorithm. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Inventory policies with quantized ordering

This article studies (nQ, r) inventory policies, under which the order quantity is restricted to be an integer multiple of a base lot size Q. Both Q and r are decision variables. Assuming the one-period expected holding and backorder cost function is unimodal, we develop an efficient algorithm to compute the optimal Q and r. The algorithm is facilitated by simple observations about the cost function and by tight upper bounds on the optimal Q. The total number of elementary operations required by the algorithm is linear in these upper bounds. By using the algorithm, we compare the performance of the optimal (nQ, r) policy with that of the optimal (s, S) policy through a numerical study, and our results show that the difference between them is small. Further analysis of the model shows that the cost performance of an (nQ, r) policy is insensitive to the choice of Q. These results establish that (nQ, r) models are potentially useful in many settings where quantized ordering is beneficial.     

Introduction: Exploring the jungle of terminology

When twentieth-century authors wrote about ‘partisan warfare’, they usually meant an insurgency or asymmetric military operations conducted against a superior force by small bands of ideologically driven irregular fighters. By contrast, originally (i.e. before the French Revolution) ‘partisan’ in French, English, and German referred only to the leader of a detachment of special forces (party, partie, Parthey, détachement) which the major European powers used to conduct special operations alongside their regular forces. Such special operations were the classic definition of ‘small war’ (petite guerre) in the late seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries. The Spanish word ‘la guerrilla’, meaning nothing other than ‘small war’, only acquired an association with rebellion with the Spanish War of Independence against Napoleon. Even after this, however, armies throughout the world have continued to employ special forces. In the late nineteenth century, their operations have still been referred to as prosecuting ‘la guerrilla’ or ‘small war’, which existed side by side with, and was often mixed with, ‘people's war’ or popular uprisings against hated regimes.     

Colombian Military Thinking and the Fight against the FARC-EP Insurgency, 2002–2014

This article attempts to place in historical perspective the latest effort by Colombia’s military (Colmil) to defeat the now half century old insurgency of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP). It argues that the ‘surge’ initiated under President Álvaro Uribe in 2002 with the assistance of the United States can only be fully analyzed in the context of the Colmil’s intellectual framework for counter-insurgency. Specifically, this article will explain how the protracted engagement with counter-insurgency has shaped the Colmil’s understanding of the nature of the conflict, as well as its attitudes towards its adversary, civil authority and the instrumentality of force. An understanding of the Colmil’s strategic tradition can also help to explain their apprehensions about the ongoing peace negotiations with the FARC-EP.     

Currency Warfare and Just War: The Ethics of Targeting Currencies in War

ABSTRACT

Is Currency Warfare defined as, the use of monetary or military force directed against an enemy’s monetary power as part of a military campaign, a just way to fight a war? This article explores the ethics of waging currency warfare against the Just War Tradition’s principles of jus in bello (just conduct in war) and its criteria of discrimination and proportionality. The central argument is that currency warfare is inherently indiscriminate but may be proportionate when policy makers consider the nature of the threat confronted and the targeted currency's level of internationalization, that is, to what degree it is used in foreign transactions or used as a foreign currency reserve. I evaluate this argument against historical cases during the Second World War (1939–1945), the Gulf War (1990–1991), subsequent operations against Saddam Hussein in the early 1990s, and the ongoing campaign against ISIS.     

Bounds and properties of the expected value of sample information for a project-selection problem

In this article we extend the work of Mehrez and Stulman [5] on the expected value of perfect information (EVPI) to the expected value of sample information (EVSI) for a class of economic problems dealing with the decision to reject or accept an investment project. It is shown that shifting the mean of the underlying a priori distribution of X, the project's monetary value from zero in either direction will decrease the associated EVSI of Y, the random sampled information. A theorem is then presented which gives an upper bound on the EVSI over all distributions of Y, as well as the structure of the posterior mean E[X|Y] for which this upper bound is achieved. Finally, the case where E[X|Y] is linear in Y is discussed and its performance compared with that of the optimal case.     

SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT A FIRST STRIKE

This article critiques recent articles in Foreign Affairs and International Security that argue that in the foreseeable future the United States could acquire an assured first-strike capability vis-à-vis Russia and China thanks to technological improvements in U.S. nuclear delivery systems and a general decline in the numbers and capabilities of Russian nuclear forces. Notwithstanding these articles, this analysis finds that mutual deterrence will persist regardless of the scale of possible future imbalances because deterrence is a highly flexible phenomenon. The pertinent question is not whether the United States will be able, in a surprise first strike, to cripple severely Russian response capabilities, but whether political stakes in any foreseeable conflict could justify the risk of even a small retaliatory strike on the United States. This article also assesses whether the Foreign Affairs and International Security articles could inadvertently exacerbate an already highly charged anti-American sentiment in Russia, possibly laying the foundation for a revitalization and expansion of the Russian nuclear arsenal.     

The Harmful and Residual Effects on Civilians by Bombing Dual-purpose Facilities

This article addresses what we owe to the civilians of a state with which we are militarily engaged. The old notion of noncombatant immunity needs to be rethought within the context of both human rights and into the postwar phase. No doubt, civilians will be killed in war. However, much more can be done during and after the fighting to protect civilians’ basic human rights from the ills of war. I argue for making belligerents accountable ex post by requiring them to repair destroyed dual-purpose facilities that are essential for securing basic human rights of the civilian populace. I argue also that a belligerent’s targeting decisions should be reviewed ex post by an impartial commission.     

(Un)justified expectations on nuclear deterrence of non-nuclear NATO members: the case of Estonia and Latvia?

ABSTRACT

Nuclear assets are one of the cornerstones of credible collective deterrence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Paradoxically, the most endangered member states are the ones without nuclear capabilities, left with the hope and expectation that the owners of nuclear assets will defend them and that their potential enemies are deterred by these capabilities. However, the expectations from one side, practical commitment of allies from other side may not go in harmony and synchronisation. Is there a capability gap which needs to be fulfilled? If yes then, is the gap in the side of nuclear powers or is it on the side of those endangered states who need to understand what can or cannot realistically be expected? The current article focuses on the question of how the political and military elite of the Baltic states describes their expectations in terms of using Alliance's nuclear capabilities to deter Russia's regional ambitions.     

‘The extraordinary successes which the Russians have achieved’ - the Conquest of Central Asia in Callwell’s Small Wars

ABSTRACT

Charles Callwell’s Small Wars (1896, 1899, 1906) is widely considered both an ur-text for modern counter-insurgency studies, and a primer for the racialized late-Victorian approach to war against ‘savages’: either way it is usually only considered within a British context. Alongside the numerous examples Callwell used from British colonial campaigns, he frequently referred to those of other European powers – notably the Russian conquest of Central Asia. This article will seek to analyse Callwell’s views of Russian colonial warfare, establish the sources on which he relied, and evaluate his accuracy and the effect which the Russian example had on his thinking.