SUICIDE TERRORISM AND THE BACKLASH EFFECT

This paper presents a game‐theoretic model of suicide terrorism containing three agents: the terrorist leader; a targeted government; and potential terrorist supporters. Supporters join the terrorist group if they gain more from their participation than from their economic opportunities. Preemptive measures by the government can result in a backlash that encourages recruitment through new grievances. Suicide attacks can also lead to recruitment. Increases in preemption costs and/or economic opportunities can reduce the overall level of terrorism, while increasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks. An increase in the effect of preemption on recruitment, or the propaganda effect of suicide bombings has the opposite effect of increasing normal and suicide attacks, but decreasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks in the terrorist organization’s strategy profile.     

A cost–benefit analysis of terrorist attacks

A cost–benefit analysis of terrorist attacks is developed and placed within a systematic theoretical structure. For the target or object of the attack, we consider the lost value of human lives, lost economic value, and lost influence value, counted as benefits for the terrorist. The corresponding losses for the terrorist are counted as costs. The terrorist attacks if benefits outweigh costs. Bounded rationality is enabled where the three kinds of benefits and costs can be weighted differently. We account for two ex ante probabilities of successful planning and attack, and enable the terrorist to assign different weights to its multiple stakeholders. We introduce multiple time periods, time discounting, attitudes towards risk, and subcategories for the benefits and costs. The cost–benefit analysis is illustrated with the 11 September 2001 attack, and 53 incidents in the Global Terrorism Database yielding both positive and negative expected utilities. The paper is intended as a tool for scientists and policy-makers, as a way of thinking about costs and benefits of terrorist attacks.     

Weakest‐link attacker‐defender games with multiple attack technologies

In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology — e.g., suicide attacks — when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti‐terrorism measures.© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

Do migrant remittances react to bouts of terrorism?

This paper examines the short-run behaviour of migrant remittances in the face of terrorism. Using monthly data for post 9/11 terrorist attacks in Pakistan, the study finds evidence of increase in the volume of remittances sent from abroad. This increase is evident in the aggregate, as well as for the three main source regions of North America, the Persian Gulf and Europe. The positive association holds for all the top five migrant-hosting countries of Pakistan. The findings point in favour of an altruistic behaviour of migrant remittances at the macroeconomic level.     

Modern Irregular Warfare: The ISIS Case Study

ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) has become a key political and military actor in the Middle East and in North Africa. This essay aims at outlining ISIS warfare through an analysis of its operations in the frame of hybrid warfare theory proposed by Frank Hoffman. Therefore, the paper deals with: the role of terrorist tactics in ISIS warfare and the relationship between terrorism and insurgency; ISIS use of technology, mainly with regard to suicide attacks and to drones; and the relevance of urban warfare. Finally, the paper highlights how ISIS operates and the most threatening features of its warfare.     

Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism

Many scholars and analysts have studied intelligence failure and surprise and developed theories to explain disasters such as the attack on Pearl Harbor. Others, especially since the 9/11 attacks, have examined the rising threat of terrorism and see it as posing a particularly difficult challenge for the intelligence community. But little work has been done to integrate the earlier literature on intelligence failure with the newer threat of terrorist attack. This article attempts such an integration, by examining the bombing of the US Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983; it concludes that most studies of the Beirut bombing are mistaken in their assessment of the role played by intelligence in that disaster, and suggests that our understanding of intelligence failure against surprise attacks needs to be revised in the age of terrorism.     

TERRORISM AND TOURISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY

Using a time series method called ‘transfer function’, this paper examines the effect of terrorism on tourism in Turkey. The results indicate that there exists a negative but small impact of terrorism, which is observed within approximately one year. However, terrorist attacks in Turkey have accounted for a reduction of six million foreign tourists over the last nine years. Moreover, the economic cost of terrorism in the tourism industry was more than $700 million in 2006. However, terrorist attacks in continental Europe and America, and an active war involving a neighboring country, had no effects on tourism in Turkey.     

9/11: WHAT DID WE KNOW AND WHEN DID WE KNOW IT?

In February 1998, Osama Bin Laden published a signed statement calling for a fatwa against the United States for its having ‘declared war against God’. As we now know, the fatwa resulted in the unprecedented attack of 9/11. The issue of whether or not 9/11 was in any way predictable culminated in the public debate between Richard Clarke, former CIA Director George Tenet and the White House. This paper examines whether there was any evidence of a structural change in the terrorism data at or after February 1998 but prior to June 2001, controlling for the possibility of other breaks in earlier periods. In doing so, we use the standard Bai–Perron procedure and our sequential importance sampling (SIS) Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method for identifying an unknown number of breaks at unknown dates. We conclude that sophisticated statistical time‐series analysis would not have predicted 9/11.     

Dying to prove a point: The methodology of Dying to Win

Dying to Win is one of the most important works on suicide terrorism. It purports to unravel the strategic, social, and individual logic that gives suicide terrorism its coercive value. The methodology that Pape uses to support his various assertions is problematic for three reasons. First, he defines his key terms in such a way as to artificially set suicide terrorism apart from other forms of political violence. Second, in a number of cases Pape selects data from single sources to support particular assertions when other sources of data, used together, could provide more rigorous and useful insights into the phenomenon of suicide bombing. Finally, Pape codes his data on suicide attacks according to a loose set of criteria which, if recoded, calls into question some of his broader conclusions about the strategic utility of suicide terrorism campaigns.     

A Note on the Effect of Terrorism on Economic Sentiment

This study documents that unforeseen events like terrorist attacks can be linked to the formation of Economic Sentiment after controlling for sentiment’s economic drivers. By utilizing dynamic panel techniques, the Economic Sentiment Indicator, as well as one of its constituents Consumer Sentiment, for a pan-European panel of 27 countries appear to be negatively influenced by terrorism activity. Moreover, these negative effects are significant only in the post-9/11 era.     

恐怖活动中公众心理恐惧效应对社会稳定的影响及对策

恐怖活动往往导致公众的巨大心理恐惧效应,极易造成一定程度甚至是大规模的社会恐慌,严重影响社会稳定。因此,降低公众对恐怖袭击活动的心理恐惧效应、提高其心理承受能力,对恐怖活动发生时维护社会稳定具有重要意义。     

Military support and transnational terrorism

Analysing the relationship between the provision of military support and the probability of becoming the target of a terrorist attack, this paper contributes to the literature on the causes of transnational terrorism. We find that deployment of military troops of country X in country Y increases the probability of a terrorist attack on citizens of country X by a terrorist group located in country Y. Exporting weapons to country Y seems to increase the probability of being attacked by the terrorists of this country Y as well. Deploying materials, however, does not seem to significantly influence the probability of attack. Including lagged values for our military support variables ensures that the causality direction is from military support to terrorist attacks. Moreover, these results indicate that while the effect of military deployment on the probability of attack lasts for more than 1 year, the effect is rather short-lived.     

The Randomization of Terrorist Attacks

The purpose of this article is to explore the economic theoretical foundations of the idea that rational terrorist organizations deliberately randomize their attacks (by type, timing, location, and targets) to generate uncertainty and intimidation. A choice theoretic framework is applied to the analysis of the terrorist organization's behavior to determine whether welfare (utility) gains from the randomization of terrorist attacks are plausible and feasible. The randomization of attacks can appear to promise higher amounts of political influence for each resource input but it turns out that randomization cannot manufacture a situation where higher amounts of political influence are obtained for each resource input.The results imply that, rather than randomization and instability, the rational terrorist organization is more likely to prefer stability. The findings and implications provide a theoretical explanation for the non-randomness of terrorist attacks.Thismay be one small step towards explaining the patterns – non-randomness – in the time-series of terrorist incidents.     

THE EFFECT OF 9/11 ON US EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF TOURISM

Several studies have investigated whether the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have had an ongoing or merely transitory effect on US trade in tourism. All conclude in favor of the latter. However, limitations in either the data and/or methodology employed by these studies give cause to query their findings. The present study avoids these limitations and finds strong evidence that, once other factors are held constant, real US exports and imports of tourism have both remained significantly below their pre‐2001 level.     

The Effects of Terrorism on Turkish Financial Markets

Abstract

In this research, we analyzed how Turkish financial markets and foreign investors in the stock market reacted to the terror attacks in Turkey. Our analysis, which was performed using the terror index for the stock market and the foreign exchange market, revealed that returns, abnormal returns, and cumulative abnormal returns were not affected by the terror attacks; however, foreign investors in the stock market were affected. When the geographic regions of the terror attacks were analyzed, the findings showed that foreign investors were negatively affected mainly by the terror attacks that occurred in southeast Anatolia. Attack type and target type were important only for foreign investors. An evaluation of the interaction between the terror attacks and the markets with the involvement of the terrorist organizations indicated that only the foreign investors in the stock market were affected by Al-Qaeda and PKK-linked terror attacks. An evaluation of the effect of terror attacks in foreign countries on Turkish financial markets revealed no effect on the domestic stock market and foreign exchange markets. We also examined the volatility spillovers from the terror index to the stock market and found that terrorist attacks increased the volatility of the stock market.     

The effect of crowd density on the expected number of casualties in a suicide attack

Utilizing elementary geometric and probability considerations, we estimate the effect of crowd blocking in suicide bombing events. It is shown that the effect is quite significant. Beyond a certain threshold, the expected number of casualties decreases with the number of people in the arena. The numerical results of our model are consistent with casualty data from suicide bombing events in Israel. Some operational insights are discussed. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

French foreign and security challenges after the Paris terrorist attacks

The Paris terrorist attacks in January and November 2015 have changed the relationship between French society and security. For the first time since the end of the Second World War, the assumption that France is experiencing a new form of territorial war is explicit in the public debate. It has reinforced the strong conviction among the French politicians and diplomats that security requires close cooperation with the USA and a renouncement of the Gaullist paradigm of exceptionalism. This paper analyses why the terrorist attacks have been perceived in France as a form of territorial war. Second, it explains why terrorism contributes to a growing mistrust of the French public vis-à-vis the European Union. Finally, it shows the reasons but also the limits of French military activism outside Europe, in close connection with the US-led strategy.     

The Political Economy of Legislation on Terrorism

^{1 1}This research was funded in part by a grant from the Lowe Institute of Political Economy. The corresponding author is S. Brock Blomerg. We thank Chris Blomberg and Brianna Loyosa for their excellent research assistance on the project. This paper presents an empirical analysis of what drives congressional legislation on terrorism during the period 1995 to 2010. We utilize and augment current methodology to compile and analyze data on sponsorship and cosponsorship of terrorism related data. Our results on the sources of legislation on terrorism are largely in line with past examinations of the importance of committee membership and leadership, party majority-ship, and other political factors. Further, we find that the most significant and robust drive for legislation on terrorism is the September 11^th attacks. And while the impact of 9/11 affected legislative productivity everywhere, we find that it most significantly affected states surrounding New York and Washington D.C. Our results indicate that the economy may be one factor motivating politicians to legislate on terrorism; however, these results are not robust.     

An Integro-Differential Approach To Terrorism Dynamics

This article introduces integro-differential equations as a new technique to study terrorism dynamics. An integro-differential equation is a mathematical expression that contains derivatives of the required function and its integral transforms. The technique is applied to two different dynamic models in terrorism: terrorism and tourism, and terrorist innovations. In the first model the number of tourists that appears in an integral term and also in a derivative term is impacted by the number of terrorists. In the second model the integro-differential equation for terrorist innovations relates them to terrorist attacks. The article shows how to solve, analyze, interpret, and deal with integro-differential equations. Integro-differential equations shed light on aspects of the models ignored when other techniques are used. This is particularly important for the evaluation of current counterterrorist policies, as well as to the formulation of new ones.