Interval estimation of a global optimum for large combinatorial problems

Consider an “intractable” optimization problem for which no efficient solution technique exists. Given a systematic procedure for generating independent heuristic solutions, we seek to obtain interval estimates for the globally optimal solution using statistical inference. In previous work, accurate point estimates have been derived. Determining interval estimates, however, is a considerably more difficult task. In this paper, we develop straightforward procedures which compute confidence intervals efficiently in order to evaluate heuristic solutions and assess deviations from optimality. The strategy presented is applicable to a host of combinatorial optimization problems. The assumptions of our model, along with computational experience, are discussed.     

Reconciling strategic studies … with itself: a common framework for choosing among strategies

Three distinct, and seemingly irreconcilable, schools of thought are identified within the strategic studies literature. One which searches for “universal principles of war,” a second, “context-dependent,” approach that seeks to embed each instance of warfare within its concurrent social, political, technological milieu and, finally a “paradoxical logic” school, which equates strategy with the generation of uncertainty. The author offers some intuitive concepts from non-cooperative game theory to develop a “dominate-mix” approach to strategy choice. In doing so, he helps to reconcile these disparate approaches and provides a simple framework to assist researchers in framing military decisions as well as to assist planners in choosing among strategies.     

Changing the paradigm: Simulation,now a method of first resort

Decades ago, simulation was famously characterized as a “method of last resort,” to which analysts should turn only “when all else fails.” In those intervening decades, the technologies supporting simulation—computing hardware, simulation‐modeling paradigms, simulation software, design‐and‐analysis methods—have all advanced dramatically. We offer an updated view that simulation is now a very appealing option for modeling and analysis. When applied properly, simulation can provide fully as much insight, with as much precision as desired, as can exact analytical methods that are based on more restrictive assumptions. The fundamental advantage of simulation is that it can tolerate far less restrictive modeling assumptions, leading to an underlying model that is more reflective of reality and thus more valid, leading to better decisions. Published 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 293–303, 2015     

Steady-state approximation of a multiechelon multi-indentured repairable-item inventory system with a single repair facility

We model a two-echelon multi-indentured repairable-item inventory system where each “base” has a maximum number of identical online machines, and each machine consists of several module types. Machine failures are due to module failures and occur according to an exponential distribution. When a machine fails, the failed module is replaced by an identical spare module if one is available. Otherwise, the module is backordered. All failed modules go to a single “depot” repair facility which consists of a finite number of identical repairmen who are able to repair any module type in an exponentially distributed time, although the repair rates for different module types may differ. The principal contribution of this article is an approximation algorithm for calculating the steady-state characteristics of the system. In comparison with simulation results, the algorithm is quite accurate and computationally efficient. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

An attack-defense game with matrix strategies

This paper presents the results and the method of analysis for an attack-defense game involving allocation of resources. Each player is assumed to have several different types of resources to be divided in optimal fashion among a fixed set of targets. The payoff function of the game is convex. The “No Soft-Spot” principle of M. Dresher, and the concept of the generalized inverse of a matrix are used to determine optimal strategies for each player and the value of the game.     

Localization of optimal strategies in certain games

Assume the payoffs of a matrix game are concave in the index of the maximizing player. That player is shown to have an optimal strategy which uses at most two consecutive pure strategies, identifiable through approximate solution of a related continuous game. Generalizations are given, and the results are applied to a motivating hidden-target model due to Shapley. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Interchange fee rate,merchant discount rate,and retail price in a credit card network: A game‐theoretic analysis

We consider two game‐theoretic settings to determine the optimal values of an issuer's interchange fee rate, an acquirer's merchant discount rate, and a merchant's retail price in a credit card network. In the first setting, we investigate a two‐stage game problem in which the issuer and the acquirer first negotiate the interchange fee rate, and the acquirer and the retailer then determine their merchant discount rate and retail price, respectively. In the second setting, motivated by the recent US bill “H.R. 2695,” we develop a three‐player cooperative game in which the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant form a grand coalition and bargain over the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate. Following the cooperative game, the retailer makes its retail pricing decision. We derive both the Shapley value‐ and the nucleolus‐characterized, and globally‐optimal unique rates for the grand coalition. Comparing the two game settings, we find that the participation of the merchant in the negotiation process can result in the reduction of both rates. Moreover, the stability of the grand coalition in the cooperative game setting may require that the merchant should delegate the credit card business only to the issuer and the acquirer with sufficiently low operation costs. We also show that the grand coalition is more likely to be stable and the U.S. bill “H.R. 2695” is thus more effective, if the degree of division of labor in the credit card network is higher as the merchant, acquirer, and issuer are more specialized in the retailing, acquiring, and issuing operations, respectively. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

Strategic capacity decision‐making in a stochastic manufacturing environment using real‐time approximate dynamic programming

In this study, we illustrate a real‐time approximate dynamic programming (RTADP) method for solving multistage capacity decision problems in a stochastic manufacturing environment, by using an exemplary three‐stage manufacturing system with recycle. The system is a moderate size queuing network, which experiences stochastic variations in demand and product yield. The dynamic capacity decision problem is formulated as a Markov decision process (MDP). The proposed RTADP method starts with a set of heuristics and learns a superior quality solution by interacting with the stochastic system via simulation. The curse‐of‐dimensionality associated with DP methods is alleviated by the adoption of several notions including “evolving set of relevant states,” for which the value function table is built and updated, “adaptive action set” for keeping track of attractive action candidates, and “nonparametric k nearest neighbor averager” for value function approximation. The performance of the learned solution is evaluated against (1) an “ideal” solution derived using a mixed integer programming (MIP) formulation, which assumes full knowledge of future realized values of the stochastic variables (2) a myopic heuristic solution, and (3) a sample path based rolling horizon MIP solution. The policy learned through the RTADP method turned out to be superior to polices of 2 and 3. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2010     

“Respect” as a personal attribute in the British Army

This article describes the results of research into the social phenomenon of “respect” as framed by junior members of the British Army, as part of a wider study into the Values and Standards of the British Army. This research was interview based, using qualitative analysis software to detect, manage, and draw conclusions from the qualitative data recorded in those interviews. The data indicated that the primary situation in which “respect” was visualised by the participants was the unit context, and that it comprised a combination of three different strands: respect for rank or “hierarchical respect,” “professional respect” for a person's military competence, and “personal respect” for an individual's character, personal behaviour, and attributes. The overall respect that an individual is given arises from the combination of these three areas. “Respect” as a concept was, in the soldiers’ characterisation, something that had to be earned (except for the “given” represented by rank) and was not stable: a person's fund of respect could go up or down in social value. Respect was also linked to trust: the more respect a person had, the more they could be trusted. Although the unit context was the primary one for discussing their framing of the concept of respect, many of the participants reported a wider dimension in which every human being deserves a basic level of respect simply for being human, and this level could not be forfeited.     

Transportation type problems with quantity discounts

It is known to be real that the per unit transportation cost from a specific supply source to a given demand sink is dependent on the quantity shipped, so that there exist finite intervals for quantities where price breaks are offered to customers. Thus, such a quantity discount results in a nonconvex, piecewise linear functional. In this paper, an algorithm is provided to solve this problem. This algorithm, with minor modifications, is shown to encompass the “incremental” quantity discount and the “fixed charge” transportation problems as well. It is based upon a branch-and-bound solution procedure. The branches lead to ordinary transportation problems, the results of which are obtained by utilizing the “cost operator” for one branch and “rim operator” for another branch. Suitable illustrations and extensions are also provided.     

Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value

It is shown that the Banzhaf value can be obtained by differentiating the multilinear extension of a game at the midpoint of the unit cube. This gives us a composition theorem for the value of compound games. As an example, the values of the electoral college and presidential election “games” are approximated by the method of extensions.     

A three‐stage procurement optimization problem under uncertainty

This article examines a problem faced by a firm procuring a material input or good from a set of suppliers. The cost to procure the material from any given supplier is concave in the amount ordered from the supplier, up to a supplier‐specific capacity limit. This NP‐hard problem is further complicated by the observation that capacities are often uncertain in practice, due for instance to production shortages at the suppliers, or competition from other firms. We accommodate this uncertainty in a worst‐case (robust) fashion by modeling an adversarial entity (which we call the “follower”) with a limited procurement budget. The follower reduces supplier capacity to maximize the minimum cost required for our firm to procure its required goods. To guard against uncertainty, the firm can “protect” any supplier at a cost (e.g., by signing a contract with the supplier that guarantees supply availability, or investing in machine upgrades that guarantee the supplier's ability to produce goods at a desired level), ensuring that the anticipated capacity of that supplier will indeed be available. The problem we consider is thus a three‐stage game in which the firm first chooses which suppliers' capacities to protect, the follower acts next to reduce capacity from unprotected suppliers, and the firm then satisfies its demand using the remaining capacity. We formulate a three‐stage mixed‐integer program that is well‐suited to decomposition techniques and develop an effective cutting‐plane algorithm for its solution. The corresponding algorithmic approach solves a sequence of scaled and relaxed problem instances, which enables solving problems having much larger data values when compared to standard techniques. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

How not to pay for the war

As a result of allied subsidy and the influence of sunk costs, the marginal cost of the Gulf War to the US was reduced to negligible size. This result is at variance with the Olson‐Zeckhauser thesis that in an alliance “the small exploit the large.” A game theoretic alternative explanation suggests that the relation between allies resembles the game of Chicken, successfully played by the US. The ability to shift the marginal costs of war in the short term raises questions about the possible underestimation of long term effects.     

The effects of customer rebates and retailer incentives on a manufacturer's profits and sales

In some industries such as automotive, production costs are largely fixed and therefore maximizing revenue is the main objective. Manufacturers use promotions directed to the end customers and/or retailers in their distribution channels to increase sales and market share. We study a game theoretical model to examine the impact of “retailer incentive” and “customer rebate” promotions on the manufacturer's pricing and the retailer's ordering/sales decisions. The main tradeoff is that customer rebates are given to every customer, while the use of retailer incentives is controlled by the retailer. We consider several models with different demand characteristics and information asymmetry between the manufacturer and a price discriminating retailer, and we determine which promotion would benefit the manufacturer under which market conditions. When demand is deterministic, we find that retailer incentives increase the manufacturer's profits (and sales) while customer rebates do not unless they lead to market expansion. When the uncertainty in demand (“market potential”) is high, a customer rebate can be more profitable than the retailer incentive for the manufacturer. With numerical examples, we provide additional insights on the profit gains by the right choice of promotion.© 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

War,vagueness and hybrid war

It has frequently been observed in the literature on hybrid wars that there is a grey zone between peace and war, and that hybrid wars are conflicts which are not clear cases of war. In this paper, I attempt to illuminate this grey zone and the concept and nature of war from the philosophical discussions of vagueness and institutional facts. Vague terms are characterized by the fact that there is no non-arbitrary boundary between entities which lie in their extension, and entities which do not lie in their extension. I apply a theory of vagueness to notions such as “war” and “peace” and go on to suggest that the exact boundary for what counts as a war or not is arbitrary. However, the context in which the conflict occurs determines a range of possible locations for this boundary. The most important contextual parameter is in this respect how the parties to the conflict themselves conceptualize the conflict. I suggest that this can in various ways help us understand grey-zone conflicts.     

A dynamic-programming approach to continuous-review obsolescent inventory problems

Inventory models of modern production and service operations should take into consideration possible exogenous failures or the abrupt decline of demand resulting from obsolescence. This article analyzes continuous-review versions of the classical obsolescence problem in inventory theory. We assume a deterministic demand model and general continuous random times to obsolescence (“failure”). Using continuous dynamic programming, we investigate structural properties of the problem and propose explicit and workable solution techniques. These techniques apply to two fairly wide (and sometimes overlapping) classes of failure distributions: those which are increasing in failure rate and those which have finite support. Consequently, several specific failure processes in continuous time are given exact solutions. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 757–774, 1997     

Violence in context: Mapping the strategies and operational art of irregular warfare

The malaise that the United States, and the West, have experienced in recent campaigns stems in large part from unclear thinking about war, its political essence, and the strategies needed to join the two. Instead, analysis and response are predicated on entrenched theoretical concepts with limited practical utility. The inadequacy of understanding has spawned new, and not so new, terms to capture unanticipated trends, starting with the re-discovery of “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” and leading to discussion of “hybrid threats” and “gray-zone” operations. New terminology can help, but the change must go deeper. Challenging analytical orthodoxy, this article sets out a unifying approach for the study of political violence, or more accurately: violent politics. It provides a conceptual foundation that helps to make sense of recent shifts in warfare. In effect, it offers sorely needed theoretical insights into the nature of strategy and guides the process of responding to nontraditional threats.     

Requirements of an “optimizer” for computer simulations

Computer simulation has many advantages. However, one major disadvantage is that, in all too many cases, the attempt to use computer simulation to find an optimum solution to a problem rapidly degenerates into a trial-and-error process. Techniques for overcoming this disadvantage, i. e., for making optimization and computer simulation more compatible, are applicable at two points in the development of the overall computer simulation. Techniques which are used within actual construction of the mathematical models comprising the simulation will be labeled as internal methods, while those which are used after the simulation has been completely developed will be termed external methods Because external methods appear to offer the largest potential payoff, discussion is restricted to these methods, which are essentially search techniques. In addition, the development of an “Optimizer” computer program based on these techniques is suggested Although drawbacks to the use of search techniques in the computer simulation framework exist, these techniques do offer potential for “optimization.” The modification of these techniques to satisfy the requirements of an “Optimizer” is discussed.     

‘The only good jihadist is a dead jihadist’:Boko Haram and de-radicalization around Lake Chad

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the shortcomings of the “de-radicalization doctrine” in sub-Saharan Africa. The issues raised are illustrated by the war against Boko Haram, which involves Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Relying on interviews with security officers, insurgents, civil servants, displaced people, humanitarian workers and Muslim and Christian clerics in Nigeria, Niger and Chad since 2005, the investigation shows that the four states focused on repression rather than demobilisation programs in prison or outdoors. The Boko Haram crisis is mainly a story of mismanagement. The article thus challenges the assumptions of the “de-radicalization doctrine” in Muslim Africa South of the Sahara. First, attempts to de-radicalize jihadi terrorists tend to focus too much on religious fanaticism and the exegesis of the Quran. Secondly, they are neither feasible nor efficient. Finally, they obscure priorities that are more important to counter extremism and demobilize insurgents.     

Capacity allocation with traditional and Internet channels

In this paper we study a capacity allocation problem for two firms, each of which has a local store and an online store. Customers may shift among the stores upon encountering a stockout. One question facing each firm is how to allocate its finite capacity (i.e., inventory) between its local and online stores. One firm's allocation affects the decision of the rival, thereby creating a strategic interaction. We consider two scenarios of a single‐product single‐period model and derive corresponding existence and stability conditions for a Nash equilibrium. We then conduct sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium solution with respect to price and cost parameters. We also prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a generalized model in which each firm has multiple local stores and a single online store. Finally, we extend the results to a multi‐period model in which each firm decides its total capacity and allocates this capacity between its local and online stores. A myopic solution is derived and shown to be a Nash equilibrium solution of a corresponding “sequential game.” © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006