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单兵电源作为单兵作战系统的重要组成部分,对提升单兵作战能力和生存能力具有重要作用。文章论述了单兵作战系统的作用及其对单兵电源的需求,对国内外单兵电源系统的研究进展进行了综述分析,指出了单兵电源系统研究面临的挑战。 相似文献
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Christopher D. Kolenda 《战略研究杂志》2019,42(7):992-1014
ABSTRACTThe United States government has no organised way of thinking about war termination other than seeking decisive military victory. This implicit assumption is inducing three major errors. First, the United States tends to select military-centric strategies that have low probabilities of success. Second, the United States is slow to modify losing or ineffective strategies due to cognitive obstacles, internal frictions, and patron-client challenges with the host nation government. Finally, as the U.S. government tires of the war and elects to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries prevent successful transitions (building the host nation to win on its own) or negotiations. 相似文献
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David M. Barnes 《Journal of Military Ethics》2016,15(1):58-64
Case summary, by James Cook (Case Study Editor):In the final issue of the 2015 volume of the Journal of Military Ethics, we published a case study entitled “Coining an Ethical Dilemma: The Impunity of Afghanistan’s Indigenous Security Forces”, written by Paul Lushenko. The study detailed two extra-judicial killings (EJKs) by Afghan National Police (ANP) personnel in an area stabilized and overseen by a US-led Combined Task Force (CTF). To deter further EJKs following the first incident, the CTF’s commander reported the incidents up his chain of command and used the limited tools at his disposal to influence local indigenous officials directly. Apparently, the ANP unit took no notice. In his commentary on the case study, Paul Robinson considered moral compromise in war more generally. Coalition troops in Afghanistan, for instance, have encountered not just EJKs but also sexual abuse of minors, killing of non-combatants, kidnapping, torture, and widespread corruption. What should the soldier on the ground do if indigenous personnel violate Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) with impunity? Refusing to serve will not right or prevent moral wrongs, while staying on to fight the good but futile fight will mire the soldier in moral compromise. “?… [S]oldiers faced with this dilemma have no good options. The systemic failings surrounding them mean that it is probable that nothing they do will help”. In a concluding note, I suggested that while an individual soldier may indeed have no good options, as Paul Robinson suggests, that soldier’s military and nation at large are obliged to do what they can. At least, they must keep to the moral high ground so as not to give indigenous security forces an excuse to misbehave, and determine the nature of crimes such as EJKs: are they outlaw acts or in fact endorsed by the indigenous culture and perhaps even government? Below Colonel Dave Barnes, himself a veteran of Operation Enduring Freedom, analyzes Paul Lushenko’s case study at “?…?the local, tactical level: If a commander is in this situation – where her unit witnesses an EJK or other war crime – what should she do?” 相似文献
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Rufus Phillips 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2019,30(1):81-100
ABSTRACTInsurgencies remain political projects, and thus the American experience in Vietnam remains relevant in any search for approaches. A population-first strategy – with tactics compatible with protecting people and winning their willing support – is essential, as much for success in local pacification as in retaining support in the homeland which has deployed its personnel abroad to assist another state. In the actual area of operations, decentralization of effort is required to get as close as possible to the population base being targeted by the insurgents. This remains essential for all mobilization in support of a polity, regardless of the extent to which insurgent challenge is grounded in grievances or simply based on coercive power. 相似文献
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Matthew P. Dearing 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2019,30(1):101-139
ABSTRACTThe American way of war in Afghanistan presents a conundrum for proponents of 21st-century state-building projects. How can liberal peace proponents engage in efficient state building without sacrificing their ideals? The US learned that state-building allocates a degree of command and control to powerbrokers operating in the shadows to launder aid money, traffic illicit narcotics, and engage in extrajudicial punishments. These clients failed to represent the liberal values foreign patrons endorsed, because the latter not only offered resources without conditions but also rewarded bad behavior. This issue is examined by looking at the case of post-2001 northern Afghanistan, where powerful warlords should have held greater control over their paramilitary forces, limited predatory behavior, and built stronger relationships with the community. Instead, warlords-turned-statesmen expanded their material and social influence in the north, while holding onto the informal instruments of racketeering and patronage that overwhelmed Western ideals and shaped the predatory state present in Afghanistan today. Moreover, paramilitaries were influenced by material, social, and normative incentives that rewarded violent and predatory behavior and further eroded already weak community control mechanisms at the subdistrict level. 相似文献
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Dr Paul Jackson 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):145-160
Fourth Generation Warfare is a theory of contemporary warfare that posits a number of different ideas that are able to shed light on current conflicts. Whilst much of the debate has been concentrated on the linear development of warfare and also on analysis of the current situation of US forces in Iraq, it has resonance for a number of different conflicts taking place in Africa, if only because the US has become involved in contemporary conflicts in Somalia and the Mahgreb. There are clearly significant issues with the US-centric, flawed linear approach to history, but the actual analysis of modes of warfare has much to offer policymakers in a continent that is under-represented in the literature, and is also in danger of being forgotten in the shadow of analysis of Iraq. This paper moves on from criticising the stepped approach to history and looks at patterns of warfare in contemporary Africa, arguing that there is much in the theory that could be used to explain seemingly illogical tactics or patterns, and thus has much to tell policymakers engaged in conflict analysis. Rebellions can be made 2 per cent active in a striking force, and 98 per cent passively sympathetic.1 相似文献
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信息向战术层面的渗透,从本质上改变了决定战斗胜负的关键因素。在分析信息化条件下战斗特点的基础上,采用系统动力学的方法和思想,提出并构建了信息化条件下战斗SD对抗模型,对信息化条件下战斗的基本过程进行了仿真模拟。模型较好反映信息化条件下战斗的本质。模拟结果可以为指挥员正确决策提供定量的理论支持。 相似文献
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针对虚拟士兵在城市作战仿真领域的需求,重点研究了虚拟士兵在城市环境中路径规划问题。通过对三维城市虚拟环境空间进行分层信息处理,生成虚拟士兵能够感知的虚拟信息层。用A*算法求出虚拟士兵从初始位置到达目标位置的最佳路径,并给出算法的具体设计与实现。 相似文献
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海军兵棋演习系统研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
兵棋演习系统是我军未来开展模拟训练的重要手段,针对国内外对兵棋推演系统现状及技术发展趋势进行研究,提出海军兵棋演习系统的发展方向和设计方法,并结合海军兵棋推演的研究内容重点,给出作战规则建模、指挥关系建模等主要关键技术的解决方法,为我国海军未来兵棋推演系统设计、研究和发展提供技术支撑。 相似文献
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Andrew R. Novo 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):414-431
This article examines the ambiguous role played by the Cyprus Police Force during the Greek Cypriot insurgency against Britain between 1955 and 1959. A multiethnic force policing a multiethnic society, the CPF struggled to fulfill its duties. Greek Cypriot officers became ineffective as sympathy for, or fear of insurgents undermined their ability to function. Some collaborated, others resigned. Those who stayed became targets of their own people. Turkish Cypriot officers, recruited in greater numbers to compensate for a reduction in Greek Cypriot officers, worked to enforce the law, but exacerbated intercommunal relations in doing so. In spite of the peculiar conditions present in Cyprus, the case has valuable implications for contemporary policymakers on the vulnerabilities inherent in the use of local police forces to restore law and order in ethnically divided societies. 相似文献
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Rhys Ball 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):119-141
In 1955, the New Zealand government authorised the creation of a Special Forces unit to operate with British forces in Malaya to counter a communist-inspired guerrilla insurgency. Drawing upon the operational experiences of the New Zealand SAS largely taken from the Cold War period, and underpinned by Colin Gray's Special Forces essentials of ‘economy of force’ and ‘expansion of choice’, this article will show how New Zealand's SAS is now accepted not only as a respected and relevant part of the nation's military capability, but also empowers its political decision-makers with the confidence to take on significant, and at times difficult, strategic foreign-policy choices. 相似文献
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齐紫微 《军械工程学院学报》2013,(2):66-69
基于复杂网络理论,分析了信息化作战系统网络结构,构建了传统作战系统和信息化作战系统拓扑模型的生成算法,并通过对传统作战系统和信息化作战系统结构拓扑模型度量性质的比较,说明了信息化战争下的作战系统结构特点,为进一步研究网络化战争提供了良好的模型基础. 相似文献
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Andrew Ross 《Defense & Security Analysis》2018,34(4):410-423
ABSTRACTIn combat, the ratio of shots fired per casualty inflicted can provide a measure of the combat effectiveness of a force. The shots per casualty ratio achieved by the 1st Australian Task Force in Vietnam is shown to change according to factors including marksmanship, tactics and combat type. While, over the course of the campaign, 1ATF fired an increasing number of shots to achieve a casualty, this is explained by improvements in the quality of Viet Cong and People’s Army small arms. Australian Task Force and US Army shots per casualty ratios are briefly compared.. 相似文献
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Sameer P. Lalwani 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2017,28(1):119-165
The military effectiveness literature has largely dismissed the role of material preponderance in favor of strategic interaction theories. The study of counterinsurgency, in which incumbent victory is increasingly rare despite material superiority, has also turned to other strategic dynamics explanations like force employment, leadership, and insurgent/adversary attributes. Challenging these two trends, this paper contends that even in cases of counterinsurgency, material preponderance remains an essential—and at times the most important—factor in explaining battlefield outcomes and effectiveness. To test this, the paper turns to the case of the Sri Lankan state’s fight against the Tamil Tiger insurgency, a conflict which offers rich variation over time across six periods and over 25 years. Drawing on evidence from historical and journalistic accounts, interviews, memoirs, and field research, the paper demonstrates that material preponderance accounts for variation in military effectiveness and campaign outcomes (including military victory in the final campaign) better than strategic explanations. Additionally, a new quantitative data-set assembled on annual loss-exchange ratios demonstrates the superiority of materialist explanations above those of skill, human capital, and regime type. 相似文献
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Nori Katagiri 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):170-195
The strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is considered key to successful counterinsurgency, but it often works at the expense of political control over the course of war. This happens when the strategy requires the counterinsurgent to work with a local nationalist group that takes advantage of its lack of access to civilians. This exposes the counterinsurgent to a dilemma inherent in the strategy; because working with the group is a crucial part of the strategy, victory would be impossible without it. Yet when the strategy is implemented through the group, it compromises the policy it serves. I show how this dilemma undermined British political control during the Malayan Emergency. 相似文献
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张颖 《武警工程学院学报》2012,(5):30-33
近代以来,在西方列强坚船利炮的重创之下,中华民族在军事上接连失败。在严酷的现实面前,中华民族流传两千多年的传统战争哲学理念,受到了前所未有的挑战。在近代战争的冲击下,中国传统战争哲学理念开始了缓慢的嬗变历程。主要表现为三点:“避战求和”理念的破产与激变;“义战必胜”理念的质疑与超越;“道器合一”理念的背离与回归。 相似文献
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B.K. GREENER-BARCHAM 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):90-112
Some scholars would have us believe that the distinctions between military and policing roles, methods and objectives have become increasingly blurred by the security demands of a post-Cold War and post-11 September global and domestic order. This article explores the current state of the police–military divide through a conceptual and case study analysis. It concludes that, in this case, there is some conflation occurring at a macro-level as international and domestic affairs have become increasingly indistinct, but the article also demonstrates that the actual ethos and practice of these agencies still differs strongly. Most importantly, the article argues that this distinction is in fact a very useful one in planning for future peace support operations 相似文献