A Survey of Lebanese Shi'i attitudes towards Hezbollah

The Taliban has recently re-emerged on the Afghan scene with vengeance. Five years after being defeated in Afghanistan by a US coalition, the resurgent Taliban, backed by al-Qaeda, are mounting an increasingly virulent insurgency, especially in the east and south, near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The Taliban now represents a significant challenge to the survival of President Hamid Karzai's government. This article assesses the narrative strategy the Taliban has employed to garner support with the Afghan people. Specifically, this paper assesses the narratives of Taliban shabnamah, commonly referred to as ‘night letters’ in an effort unravel what the Taliban represents.     

Warlords as alternative forms of Governance

Warlord is a label that currently besets us on all fronts. The 2001–2002 military action in Afghanistan is illustrative of the West's ambivalent view of armed factions in the developing world in general. The demonisation of the Taliban and the elevation of the former ‘warlords’ of the opposition to the rather more grandiose sounding ‘Northern Alliance’, at once formalising the hitherto informal nature of the warlord system, implies that the term ‘warlord’ is synonymous with anarchy, violence and a breakdown in civilised values. ‘Warlord’ has become an ugly, detrimental expression, evoking brutality, racketeering and terrorism. Analysts referring to violence across developing countries routinely refer to ‘new wars’ and ‘post-modern’ conflict, and yet the language used to describe these phenomena is usually pre-modern (medievalism, baronial rule, new feudalism). This article outlines some examples of historical warlords and draws out the common issues. In particular it emphasises the fact that warlords have been present for centuries and have periodically emerged whenever centralised political-military control has broken down. All that has changed through history is the technology available to each generation and the relative economic base. The article concludes with a series of implications for policy-makers currently considering intervention in warlord-based economies.     

Regional Support for Afghan Insurgents: Challenges for Counterinsurgency Theory and Doctrine

After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, several thousand Afghan Taliban forces fled across the border to Pakistan, and the area became a safe haven for Afghan insurgents. In 2014, the transnational dimension of the insurgency is still highly prominent. Although regional support for insurgents is not uncommon, how to counter this aspect is mostly ignored in counterinsurgency (COIN) theory and doctrines. In this article, a regional counterinsurgency framework is developed, using the regional counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan as an example. The framework will facilitate the systematic inclusion of regional COIN measures in theory and doctrine.     

Concepts of Legitimacy: Congruence and Divergence in the Afghan Conflict

ABSTRACT

Revisiting the US-led counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, we examine to what extent the concepts of legitimacy of the Taliban and the US counterinsurgents showed congruence with pre-existing Afghan notions of legitimacy. We move beyond dominant approaches of social contract theory and materialist legitimacy by using a threefold model of legitimacy to assess the different concepts of legitimacy. Both the Taliban and the US, we argue, diverged markedly from historically developed notions of legitimate rule. The article demonstrates that counterinsurgents need to be aware of and adapt to local norms. Moreover, we point towards relevant norms in the case of Afghanistan.     

Counterinsurgency Challenge in Post-2001 Afghanistan

Although the Taliban insurgency was internally divided and unable to coordinate its activities in 2014–2015, the Afghan security forces were not able to contain it and steadily lost ground throughout 2015. Until 2015, there had been little effort to develop an indigenous Afghan counterinsurgency strategy, but a sense of urgency emerged after a string of Taliban victories. At the beginning of 2016, it was still not clear if and when the National Unity Government would be able to produce a counterinsurgency strategy and, in any case, the need for a coherent counterinsurgency approach became questionable as the Taliban appeared to be transitioning towards conventional warfare.     

Analyzing Taliban taranas (chants): an effective Afghan propaganda artifact

This article describes and analyzes a little understood Afghan Taliban propaganda tool: chants or taranas . These melodic refrains effectively use historical narratives, symbology, and iconic portraits. The chants are engendered in emotions of sorrow, pride, desperation, hope, and complaints to mobilize and convince the Afghan population of the Taliban's worldview. The chants represent culturally relevant and simple messages that are communicated in a narrative and poetic form that is familiar to and resonates with the local people. They are virtually impossible for the United States and NATO to counter because of Western sensitivities concerning religious themes that dominate the Taliban narrative space, not to mention the lack of Western linguistic capabilities, including the understanding and mastering the poetic nature of local dialects.     

Warfare by other means: special forces,terrorism and grand strategy

This contribution looks at the role of Special Forces in anti-terrorist operations with particular emphasis on the British Special Air Service. It argues that Special Forces have played a pivotal role in such operations since the era of Palestinian terrorism in the early 1970s. The essay looks at the operations in Afghanistan leading to the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 and shows that the seven Special Forces involved there proved crucial to the success of the limited ground forces. In particular they served a valuable force multiplier by acting as a nexus between the regional warlords and the use of air power as well as mobile strike units against fortified Al Qaeda and Taliban positions. In the latter instance their success was mixed, involving attacks on difficult cave hideouts, though overall it can be concluded that Special Forces have demonstrated their capacity in fighting unconventional warfare against mobile and transnational terrorist groupings.     

Recasting Afghan strategy

The following article aims to examine current counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan to posit an untried theoretical concept of operations for the war being waged there. By doing so it shall argue that Coalition and NATO forces operating there may be required to fundamentally recast Afghan war-policy if a resurgent Taliban and Al-Qa'eda are to be countered in both the military and political spheres of present day Afghanistan. By way of strategy this article shall posit that a more optimal strategy in Afghanistan, in light of the campaign's apparent difficulties, might be to seed local security apparatuses, designated herein as ‘Rural Paramilitary Forces’.     

Operation ‘enduring freedom’: a victory for a conventional force fighting an unconventional war

The track record of the US military in unconventional wars has not been good and there were fears that Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ might suffer the same fate as previous campaigns. This contribution explores why the Taliban were defeated so easily by the US in 2001. It challenges the view that America's victory was due solely to changes in its modus operandi or that the outcome heralds a change in the fortunes of the US when fighting unconventional war. It also questions the idea that America's victory was a consequence of Taliban incompetence. Instead, it explains the defeat of the Taliban in terms of the prevailing political conditions within Afghanistan, which made them vulnerable to attack. The essay concludes that current political circumstances could, in the long run, permit the resurrection of the Taliban and undermine the US-led coalition's victory.     

Saudi Arabia,Wahhabism, and the Taliban of Afghanistan: ‘Puritanical reform’ as a ‘revolutionary war’ program

This article argues that the Taliban's revolutionary war (RW) program is puritanical reform informed by the Islamic legal duty of al-amr bi'l-ma‘ruf wa'l-nahy ‘an al-munkar (‘commanding what is good and forbidding what is reprehensible’). It also examines the history of this duty with examples of puritanical reform movements emerging from Berber tribes in North Africa and tribes in Arabia. Furthermore, the importance of this duty in Wahhabi Saudi Arabia, and its exportation to Pakistan where Taliban leaders imbibed this ideology, are discussed. Finally the article shows that corruption and abuses by the Afghan regime have given impetus to puritanical reformers: the condition precedent for puritanical reform is pervasive wrongdoing in an Islamic society.     

The Afghan model in northern Iraq

In Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, as the Coalition's heavy forces fought in the South, in the North a handful of special operations forces, working with Kurdish rebels, clashed with the Iraqi army along the Green Line. In operations reminiscent of those used a year earlier to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, the lightly armed and heavily outnumbered Coalition forces called in air strikes to defeat Iraq's regular and Republican Guard army divisions. This article tells the story of these operations and discusses some of their implications for future US military policy. The success of the Afghan model in Iraq goes a long way toward demonstrating the efficacy of new air-heavy tactics and shows the strategic value of using light indigenous allies to replace heavy US land forces in both conventional combat and occupation operations.     

Winning with warlords in Afghanistan

A fundamental contradiction has been built into America's intervention in Afghanistan since the first days of the war in 2001. On the one hand, US policymakers have viewed the promotion of liberal democracy, economic development, and strong centralized state institutions as essential to achieve victory over the long term. On the other hand, however, the US has relied on local warlords to win its battles against the Taliban from the first days of the intervention. The Obama administration's tortured policy review reflects the intractable dilemmas involved in trying to build a modern democratic state while relying on local warlords as crucial allies in the war against the Taliban.     

Conceptual failure,the Taliban's parallel hierarchies,and America's strategic defeat in Afghanistan

ISAF exists to protect the Afghan constitutional model. This strategic objective will be defeated because the GIRoA model has a conceptual flaw that renders it incapable of delivering governance at the local level (Tier IV). This fatal flaw has enabled the Taliban, by developing parallel hierarchies, to displace GIRoA and establish itself in southern locales as the political authority. The Taliban are fighting a revolutionary war, a Maoist displacement strategy that uses guerrilla tactics to advance a political program. Petraeus and McChrystal failed to recognize the character of war, and believed the Taliban are pursuing an exhaustion strategy. They failed to devise a counter-RW strategy. The ‘Surge’ was doomed ab initio.     

The origin of internal security in Colombia: Part I — A CIA special team surveys La Violencia, 1959–60

In October 1959 the Eisenhower administration dispatched a CIA Special Team to survey the violence problem in Colombia. This article, part one of a two‐part series, examines this first significant attempt by a US administration to influence that nation's internal security situation. It investigates the Special Team's actions and analyses its recommendations for transforming Colombia's conventionally‐orientated security forces. The Team's survey, which focuses on counter‐insurgency tactics, civil action, intelligence operations, psychological warfare, and covert action, is the foundation from which Colombia's modern internal security structures are derived.     

Leadership at NATO: Secretary General Manfred Woerner and the Crisis in Bosnia

NATO's post-Cold War transformation, as well as the military alliance's decision to use force in Bosnia in 1994 and 1995, has been examined from multiple perspectives. Among an array of diplomatic, historical and political approaches, however, analysts have given little attention to the role played by NATO's top civilian leader in Brussels, the Secretary General. On the crisis in Bosnia, no research has been devoted to the leadership of Secretary General Manfred Woerner, who oversaw NATO as it moved toward aggressive military action in the Balkans. Using an approach that examines the Secretary General's leadership from three perspectives, this article provides the first assessment of Woerner's role in shaping alliance policy on Bosnia. The findings suggest that Woerner was a critical leader in influencing NATO decisions, which provides new explanations for NATO's conduct in the Balkans, and speaks to the broader literature on NATO's evolution after the Cold War.     

NATO and the broader Middle East, 1949–2007: The history and lessons of controversial encounters

The engagement of the Atlantic Alliance in the Middle East dates back to the founding of the Alliance. With one eye on this history and one eye on current controversies, this article investigates the preconditions for and nature of the allies' engagement in the region in order to assess whether the Middle East today is causing a rupture within the Alliance. The article finds that the Alliance was never likely to engage as one in the region. The Alliance instead guarded its cohesion by either letting the Alliance leader, the United States, take a lead role or by acting as a coalition enabling framework. This latter option has prevailed since the early 1980s. Today, NATO can preserve its cohesion and simultaneously engage in the region if it continues this legacy of coalition-making from within the allied framework. Conversely, an effort to engage collectively in the region will likely set of internal tensions to the extent that the Alliance itself will be at risk.     

General Matthei's refelation and Chile's role during the Falklands War: A new perspective on the conflict in the South Atlantic

Chile's controversial and little known role in the Flaklands Islands War has been the subject of much speculation. Recently, retired General Fernando Matthei, a former member of Chile's military regime and Commander-in-Chif of the Air Force, revealed key details about Chilean support of the British Task Force in the South Atlantic. This article analyses Matthei's statement and offers an initial assessment of the imapct of Chile's contribution to the military campaign. It explains the regional and international factors that conditioned Santiago's decision to support London. The article concludes that while it is impossible to determine with absolute certainty if the outocme of the conflict would have been different without Chile's support, it is clear that the campaign would have been longer and much more complicated without Santiago's cooperation.     

Special Forces for Counter Revolutionary Warfare: The South African Case

Special Forces have long formed a central part of counter-revolutionary warfare. In the South African case, between 1974 and 1990, these were central to Pretoria's regional strategies. Serving as the primary tool for inflicting punishment on any Frontline State that allowed the ANC and its allies basing rights, the Special Forces conducted sabotage, raids, bombings and assassinations throughout the Frontline States, alongside the Special Tasks contra-mobilization programmes throughout the region and internally. When these tools proved insufficient - especially internally - the security forces turned to the medical Special Forces, who were at the centre of South Africa's chemical and biological warfare programme, for assistance in incapacitating and killing the state's opponents. Overall, these units worked under the banner of the state's 'Total Counter-Revolutionary Strategy' and in co-operation with the more covert elements of the security forces (such as the Civil Co-operation Bureau, the SAP's Koevoet and C1 counter-intelligence units, and the Directorate of Covert Collection) involved in the direct-targeting of the state's opponents.     

Counterinsurgency American style: Considering David Petraeus and twenty-first century irregular war

This article examines the complex legacy of David Petraeus who was a key figure in the emergence of the US military shift towards counterinsurgency doctrine in the years after 2006. Although Petraeus has been perceived by critics as a publicity seeker, he can be credited with laying the foundations for a more serious commitment to COIN involving in particular in integrating conventional and Special Forces in arenas like village stability operations. The article looks a Petraeus's role in both Iraq and Afghanistan: it concludes that, in the case of Afghanistan, it is too early to assess whether counterinsurgency has had a decisive impact of the outcome of the war against the Taliban.     

Rebels of the frontier: origins,organization, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban

The Pakistani Taliban, factionalized into some 40 groups, form a decentralized insurgent movement, often characterized by infighting, divergent motivations, and a shifting web of alliances. The Pakistani Taliban remain little understood because most scholars have avoided a serious treatment of the insurgent movement and instead focused on analyzing the geopolitics of the region and Pakistan's ‘double game’. This article seeks to fill this gap by dissecting the movement through selected theories of organization and mobilization. First, I explain the various dimensions of the conflict and the origins of the insurgency. Next, I discuss the Pakistani Taliban's political organization, categorizing it as composed of various warlord regimes. I further list the Taliban's component groups and numerical strength and chart the leadership structure. Lastly, I analyze insurgent recruitment strategies, accounting for the role of selective incentives, coercion, and genuine grievances.