The pitfalls of learning from historical experience: the British Army’s debate on useful lessons for the war in Afghanistan

Why do armies often fail to transmit and coherently apply lessons from their past? Using the concept of ‘layered organizational culture’, this article formulates a pioneering theoretical argument to explain how military organizations learn from their historical experience. Analysing empirical material from internal debates within the British Army, the article observes an inherent incompatibility between lessons gleaned from, on the one hand, the Anglo-Afghan Wars and, on the other hand, British counterinsurgency campaigns after 1945. This is less a result of actual differences in the external context but of changing organizational ‘filters’: different layers of military organizational culture result in different ways of selecting and transmitting relevant lessons from warfare experience. Older and newer cultural layers can interact and thus contribute to incoherent strategy-making in the present. This argument is illustrated by reviewing the layering process within the British Army since the 19th century. The article shows a shift from emphasizing the specificity of local contexts towards the application of universal principles. This has contemporary relevance: co-exisiting yet incompatible historical lessons contributed to significant incoherence in operational strategy during the initial months of the British deployment in Afghanistan in 2006.     

The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004–05

The political side of counterinsurgency has long been recognized as more important than the military side. The major works on counterinsurgency call for political reform that redresses legitimate insurgent grievances. Thereby, insurgents are encouraged to pursue their aims via political instead of military means. In western Iraq, insurgent perceptions of US weakness inhibited effective political reform. Moderate Sunnis did not engage the Coalition or Iraqi government until these perceptions had been revised. The connection between insurgent perceptions and effective political reform deserves greater attention. With the exception of some arguments from the political science field, the literature on counterinsurgency insufficiently addresses the importance of insurgent perceptions.     

Israeli counter‐insurgency strategy and the war in South Lebanon 1985–97

Little has been written about attempts to alter the domestic political systems of these countries, even though this was central to the missions. The latter two cases were selected as extremes on a ‘degree of difficulty’ scale. In Somalia there was basically no governing structure; the US had to build one in order to end the starvation caused by civil war. In Panama the US took over a government in place and had an alternative national leader; the problem was to change the existing state system. The cases reveal a stress on short‐run security issues over long‐term political questions.     

Counterinsurgency or irregular warfare? Historiography and the study of ‘small wars’

This article argues that the history of irregular warfare provides a valuable analytical and critical perspective for the study of counterinsurgency campaigns and counterinsurgency doctrine. A focus on the history of irregular warfare highlights the close relationship between warfare in Europe and in the colonies. Moreover, it enables us to identify more exactly the intersection of multiple factors that lead to an escalation of violence in small wars. Finally, it also sheds light on the lack of strategic reflection on the use of irregular auxiliaries that is characteristic for many counterinsurgency campaigns.     

Winning hearts and minds in the ‘war on terrorism’

Ten days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon US President George W Bush addressed a joint session of Congress. In an emotional speech he declared war on terrorism and vowed that the US would not rest until all of the perpetrators were brought to justice and A1 Qaeda destroyed. In virtually the next breath he hastened to add that the US-led campaign would not be a war on Islam, a promise Muslims might have found more reassuring had the President not sounded so much like a Baptist preacher. Whatever its propaganda value, the speech distorted the reality of the struggle facing the West while tacitly acknowledging an important truth. Since terror is merely a weapon in a larger struggle, there can be no war on terrorism per se. The West faces a counterinsurgency campaign on a global scale. Winning the hearts and minds of disaffected people in lands where terrorism thrives must be central to conducting this campaign.     

Daily life and motivation in war: The wehrmacht in the Soviet Union∗

Lucio Ceva, Le Forze armate. Turin: UTET, 1981, Pp. 641; L.48,000.

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Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, Les avertissements qui venaient de Berlin, 9 octobre 1939–10 mai 1940. Paris‐Gembloux: Editions Duculot, 1982. Pp. 398; Fr.90.

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Nigel Hamilton, Monty: Master of the Battlefield, 1942–1944. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1983. Pp.xxxi + 863; £12.95.

Bernard Burrows and Geoffrey Edwards, The Defence of Western Europe. London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982. Pp.155; £16.

Elmar Dinter and Paddy Griffith, Not Over by Christinas: NATO's Central Front in World War III. Chichester, Sussex: Antony Bird Publications, 1983. Pp.xiv + 178; £8.95.

David Capitanchik and Richard C. Eichenberg, Defence and Public Opinion. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983. Pp.ix + 98; £4.95.

Ian Clark, Limited Nuclear War. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982. Pp.266; £16.50.

Bhupendra Jasani (ed.), Outer Space ‐ A New Dimension of the Arms Race. London: Taylor and Francis, 1982. Pp. xviii + 423; £18.50.

William J. Taylor, Jr. and Steven A. Maaranen (eds.), The Future of Conflict in the 1980s. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982. Pp. xiii + 505.

Joseph S. Himes, Conflict and Conflict Management. Athens, GA; University of Georgia Press. 1980. Pp.333.

Richard Burt (ed.), Arms Control and Defense Postures in the 1980s. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press and London: Croom Helm, 1982. Pp.x + 230; £15.95.     

Monitoring the market or the salesperson? The value of information in a multilayer supply chain

We study a supply chain in which a manufacturer relies on a salesperson to sell the products to the consumers. The sales outcome is determined by a random market condition and the salesperson's service level, both of which are privately observed by the salesperson. Apart from them, there are two types of resellers: a knowledgeable reseller observes the market condition, whereas a diligent reseller can monitor the service level. While delegating to a reseller enhances information acquisition, it may also result in double marginalization and inefficiency. We identify several operating regimes in which double marginalization can be eliminated via simple contracts and establish the benefit of monitoring the salesperson over monitoring the market. Our dominance result is not prone to our model characteristics regarding the complementarity of market condition and sales effort, the relative importance of adverse selection and moral hazard, and the contract form. We then generalize our model and re‐establish the dominance result in the presence of reseller's risk aversion or private monitoring expertise. We also quantify the performance gaps among different selling schemes under various scenarios. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Are non‐lethal weapons a viable military option to strengthen the hearts and minds approach in Afghanistan?

Commanders of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have repeatedly stressed the hearts and minds approach in Afghanistan, in saying that the human terrain is decisive for a successful outcome of the mission. Avoidance of civilian casualties is considered of strategic importance, and by nature highly dependent on the management of tactical level Escalation of Force (EoF) situations. Non‐lethal weapons (NLWs) are expected to enable tactical commanders to avoid innocent civilian casualties in such situations. This article considers a selected NLW on its potential to accomplish this requirement. It uses a defence technology assessment approach to analyse EoF situations experienced by Dutch ISAF forces in which the NLW is inserted. The analysis demonstrates that a range of contextual factors in the Afghanistan high‐risk environment tend to narrow down the window of opportunity for the NLW to help defuse the risk of unintended civil casualties.     

The essence of war: French armies and small war in the Low Countries (1672–1697)

In the late seventeenth century during the Dutch War (1672–1678) and the Nine Years War (1688–1697), French armies relied on small war for the accomplishment of essential tasks and as part of an overall strategy of exhausting their opponents in the Low Countries. The purposes of small war included the imposition of contributions on enemy populations, the destruction of the enemy base of operations, blockades of fortresses, and the general support of campaign armies. The expression ‘small war’ in the French language appeared with growing frequency in the 1690s. Small war can be viewed as both a cause and consequence of the characteristics of these wars. The limited policy goals of Louis XIV the king of France required a strategy that minimised risk and accomplished the goal of reducing if not eliminating the Spanish presence in the Low Countries that bordered the north of France. As French armies increased in size during this period, the demand for specialists at small increased in order to provide security and ensure supply. Small war in the late seventeenth century was thus not ideologically motivated insurgency, but in the minds of French commanders an essential component of strategy and the nature of war.     

The Wretched of the Empire: Politics,Ideology and Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia, 1965–80

This article examines the vital importance of political ideology in formulating effective counterinsurgency, by examining the case of Rhodesia between 1965 and 1980. During this period, the Rhodesian Front (RF) Government of Ian Smith adopted a radical right-wing ‘world-struggle ideology’ to justify settler resistance to African decolonisation. The RF's ideology, based on settler-status anxiety, upheld a conspiratorial interpretation of modern politics that emphasised virulent forms of Anglophobia, anti-communism, anti-internationalism and anti-liberalism. The Smith Government portrayed African nationalism not as an indigenous political phenomenon, but as an external instrument of world communism and Western appeasement. After 1972, when Rhodesia faced a protracted insurgency, many of the principles of RF ideology were applied to counterinsurgency warfare with disastrous results. Because the Rhodesian Government viewed African guerrilla warfare as unrelated to domestic politics, Rhodesian counterinsurgency lacked a realistic political dimension. The dictates of settler ideology blinded the Rhodesian Government to the vital need to win ‘hearts and minds’ by applying timely principles of political pacification and reform to its counterinsurgency effort. Instead a Rhodesian counterinsurgency campaign of maximum force was pursued. Such a campaign proved counter-productive accelerating strategic deterioration and leading ultimately to the political victory of the African guerrilla cause in 1980.     

The Weight of the Past(s): The Impact of the Bundeswehr’s Use of Historical Experience on Strategy-Making in Afghanistan

This article seeks to explain the basic dynamics of the development of the German military approach in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2010 by looking at the impact of the Bundeswehr’s established uses of historical experience. First, the German military approach in Afghanistan has slowly evolved from a peacebuilding and mediation mission towards a full-fledged combat deployment. Second, the Bundeswehr’s exclusive focus on the World War II experience has contributed to the emergence of the Balkans experience as a formative experience that shaped initial operational thinking in Afghanistan. Third, because a thorough debate on the historical foundation of counterinsurgency remained absent, the operational shift in 2009 was perceived as a return to ‘classical’ military tasks and thus led to an almost exclusive focus on training for combat.     

Saudi Arabia,Wahhabism, and the Taliban of Afghanistan: ‘Puritanical reform’ as a ‘revolutionary war’ program

This article argues that the Taliban's revolutionary war (RW) program is puritanical reform informed by the Islamic legal duty of al-amr bi'l-ma‘ruf wa'l-nahy ‘an al-munkar (‘commanding what is good and forbidding what is reprehensible’). It also examines the history of this duty with examples of puritanical reform movements emerging from Berber tribes in North Africa and tribes in Arabia. Furthermore, the importance of this duty in Wahhabi Saudi Arabia, and its exportation to Pakistan where Taliban leaders imbibed this ideology, are discussed. Finally the article shows that corruption and abuses by the Afghan regime have given impetus to puritanical reformers: the condition precedent for puritanical reform is pervasive wrongdoing in an Islamic society.     

The partisan war in north-west Russia 1941–44: a re-examination

This article examines the extent to which the limited achievements of the Soviet partisan movement in north-west Russia during the first months of the Great Patriotic War can be attributed largely to inadequacies in the organisation, leadership, equipment and training of the movement as emphasised in Soviet and post-Soviet Russian published works. On the basis of Soviet archival sources the author concludes that while these factors were important, German occupation policies were far more effective in inhibiting partisan activity in the area concerned than existing published material would have us believe. However, these policies seem only to have been effective in the context of the German military successes or perceived successes at the front. The author goes on to examine factors contributing to the dramatic increase in Soviet partisan activity towards the end of the period of German occupation.     

Friend or foe? The Cyprus Police Force and the EOKA insurgency

This article examines the ambiguous role played by the Cyprus Police Force during the Greek Cypriot insurgency against Britain between 1955 and 1959. A multiethnic force policing a multiethnic society, the CPF struggled to fulfill its duties. Greek Cypriot officers became ineffective as sympathy for, or fear of insurgents undermined their ability to function. Some collaborated, others resigned. Those who stayed became targets of their own people. Turkish Cypriot officers, recruited in greater numbers to compensate for a reduction in Greek Cypriot officers, worked to enforce the law, but exacerbated intercommunal relations in doing so. In spite of the peculiar conditions present in Cyprus, the case has valuable implications for contemporary policymakers on the vulnerabilities inherent in the use of local police forces to restore law and order in ethnically divided societies.