Delusion of Defeat: The United States and Iraq, 1990–1998

This article challenges the widely held belief that that the United States ‘won the war but lost the peace’ following the war with Iraq in 1991. Fears of a resurgent Iraq grew throughout the decade, despite abundant evidence that Iraq was becoming desperately weak and was no longer a threat to regional security. In fact, the United States won the war as well as the peace by any meaningful definition of the term. The article also discusses the reasons why US policymakers and observers convinced themselves that they had lost. The final section considers implications for strategy and policy in wars of limited objectives.     

The UK,interrogation and Iraq, 2003–2008

The UK’s interrogation operations during the conflict in Iraq (2003–2008) are often portrayed by the media as involving significant amounts of mistreatment. This article demonstrates that these practices are not necessarily representative of the UK’s interrogation operations across this conflict. In doing so it contributes to the limited literature on the practice of interrogation and on the UK’s combat operations in Iraq. The UK’s interrogation capability, and therefore its intelligence-gathering capability, is shown to have rested primarily with the military’s Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT). The JFIT suffered from limitations to the number, training and experience of its interrogators and interpreters. It is argued that maintaining a permanent, higher level of preparedness for interrogation by the British armed forces is desirable.     

The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004–05

The political side of counterinsurgency has long been recognized as more important than the military side. The major works on counterinsurgency call for political reform that redresses legitimate insurgent grievances. Thereby, insurgents are encouraged to pursue their aims via political instead of military means. In western Iraq, insurgent perceptions of US weakness inhibited effective political reform. Moderate Sunnis did not engage the Coalition or Iraqi government until these perceptions had been revised. The connection between insurgent perceptions and effective political reform deserves greater attention. With the exception of some arguments from the political science field, the literature on counterinsurgency insufficiently addresses the importance of insurgent perceptions.     

The rationalisation of warship building in the United Kingdom, 1945–2000

After the Second World War the Admiralty and shipbuilding industry agreed that the largest possible capacity for warship building should be maintained. This proved impossible as the Royal Navy struggled to evoke a strategy in the nuclear era and the price of increasingly complex vessels rose remorselessly. As the shipbuilding industry wilted in the 1960s in the face of international competition a process of natural selection was followed by increasing political intervention in the industry. Nationalisation in the 1970s aimed to preserve capacity and employment, policy aims which were reversed by privatisation in the 1980s and which, ultimately resulted in an oligopoly in the warship building sector.     

Dangerous Demographics? The Effect of Urbanisation and Metropolisation on African Civil Wars, 1961–2010

Whether urbanisation promotes or inhibits the risk of civil war is disputed: while case studies usually support the former, quantitative investigations have found either the latter or no significant correlation at all. I argue that this contradiction is due to a conceptual and operational over-aggregation of urbanisation, ignoring its intrastate variation. I claim that a high relative concentration of the urban population and political, economic and social institutions in the largest city – so-called metropolisation – can increase both the motivation for and the feasibility of rebellion in a country. Triangulating case study evidence with a quantitative cross-national time series design, I show that metropolisation significantly and robustly increases the risk of governmental conflict in particular and hence civil war in general.     

The structure of defense production in the United States, 1929‐∗

This article contains a critical review of the literature on the economics of military affairs in Greece and Turkey as of December 1999. In particular, I review (a) arms race models; (b) models of the demand for military expenditure; (c) models measuring the economic impact of military expenditure; and (d) literature and issues related to indigenous arms production. I conclude with a number of summary lessons and observations of how future research might improve upon the existing body of work.     

The Kennedy Administration,US Foreign Internal Security Assistance and the Challenge of ‘Subterranean War’, 1961–63

US foreign internal security assistance, that is, support to ‘Free World’ governments threatened by subversion, terrorism, and insurgency, formed a central part of the Kennedy administration's strategy for defeating ‘wars of national liberation’. As part of the administration's counterinsurgency policy, support to police and paramilitary forces abroad was intended to improve the ability of friendly governments to identify and root our perceived threats to the states. Under the tenets of modernization theory embraced by administration officials, strong internal security forces were expected to contribute to nation-building by protecting the fragile development process underway in the developing world. However, in attempting to export the American police model, policymakers failed to consider whether US notions about internal security were appropriate for fractious and unstable regions of the world.     

The Wretched of the Empire: Politics,Ideology and Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia, 1965–80

This article examines the vital importance of political ideology in formulating effective counterinsurgency, by examining the case of Rhodesia between 1965 and 1980. During this period, the Rhodesian Front (RF) Government of Ian Smith adopted a radical right-wing ‘world-struggle ideology’ to justify settler resistance to African decolonisation. The RF's ideology, based on settler-status anxiety, upheld a conspiratorial interpretation of modern politics that emphasised virulent forms of Anglophobia, anti-communism, anti-internationalism and anti-liberalism. The Smith Government portrayed African nationalism not as an indigenous political phenomenon, but as an external instrument of world communism and Western appeasement. After 1972, when Rhodesia faced a protracted insurgency, many of the principles of RF ideology were applied to counterinsurgency warfare with disastrous results. Because the Rhodesian Government viewed African guerrilla warfare as unrelated to domestic politics, Rhodesian counterinsurgency lacked a realistic political dimension. The dictates of settler ideology blinded the Rhodesian Government to the vital need to win ‘hearts and minds’ by applying timely principles of political pacification and reform to its counterinsurgency effort. Instead a Rhodesian counterinsurgency campaign of maximum force was pursued. Such a campaign proved counter-productive accelerating strategic deterioration and leading ultimately to the political victory of the African guerrilla cause in 1980.     

The ‘first’ surge: the repulse of the Easter Invasion in South Vietnam, 1972 – implications for Iraq and Afghanistan

In a military intervention, do surges work? I compare the failed ‘surge’ in Vietnam, the repulse of the Easter Invasion in 1972, as a means of assessing the more ambiguous surges in Iraq and Afghanistan. I identify four features of a surge for this analysis: the military dimensions and strategy of the surging forces, the military capabilities of the host forces, the political vitality and will of the host country, and the political commitment in the domestic politics of the intervener. I find that the last feature is the most critical; and, in all three surges, the American political commitment was lacking.     

The evolution of Hezbollah's strategy and military performance, 1982–2006

This article fills a gap in the research on Hezbollah by evaluating their military performance from their formation in 1982 and up till the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war. This study tests the theses that Hezbollah had developed a very strong tactical proficiency in the late 1990s and that there are more similarities in their strategy and tactics during the 2006 war and the 1982–2000 insurgency in Southern Lebanon than previously assumed. Another central theme of this article is how Hezbollah has been constantly adapting and evolving for the duration of its existence.     

The political and military effectiveness of Commonwealth forces in Confrontation 1963–661

Low-intensity conflicts such as counterinsurgencies tend to be characterized by a large number of contacts. The sheer number and often inconclusive nature of these incidents makes it difficult to determine whether military operations are effective. This article uses Confrontation as a case study, first building a database of incidents (including contacts) and then analysing the database statistically to identify patterns. This process shows that the British Commonwealth security forces succeeded in controlling the number of incidents and the space to force ratio. They also dominated the contact battle. The article helps to account for the British Commonwealth success at the operational and tactical level.     

The British government and the end of French Algeria, 1958–62

Unlike France, Britain viewed the Algerian conflict from 1958 to 1962 primarily as a colonial war. The British government regarded Algérie française as an anachronism, which France would have to relinquish one day. Though Britain was no stranger to ‘dirty’ colonial wars, as simultaneous operations against EOKA nationalists in Cyprus continued to prove, it was not averse to displaying a certain smugness at having averted the kind of mess Algeria seemed to represent. Britain's interest in the latter stages of the Algerian conflict centred on four major areas: Perceptions of colonial warfare; de Gaulle's Algeria policy; Algeria and Britain's view of France in Europe and NATO; Negotiating the ceasefire and ending the conflict.