The Amritsar Massacre and the minimum force debate

This article re-examines one of the most infamous incidents in British imperial history: the Amritsar Massacre of 1919, and analyses it within the context of the British Army's minimum force philosophy. The massacre has long been regarded as the most catastrophic failure of minimum force in the history of the British Army. This article reconsiders the arguments over the shooting at Amritsar and the role of Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, and questions the accepted view that the massacre was such a failure of minimum force. It argues that the circumstances surrounding the massacre must be understood before judging the incident and given these factors it is possible to see it within a minimum force framework.     

The Myth of British Minimum Force in Counterinsurgency Campaigns during Decolonisation (1945–1970)

This article argues that the dominant paradigm in studies of British small wars positing a central role of minimum force in doctrinal guidelines for counterinsurgency needs to be even more fundamentally revised than has been argued in recent debates. More specifically, it argues that minimum force is nowhere to be found in British doctrine during the small wars of decolonisation. The need for revision also applies to the way British counterinsurgency is usually sharply contrasted with French counterinsurgency. British doctrine during this period is better understood when placed in its proper historical context. This means comparing it with the other two most significant examples of doctrinal development for small wars of decolonisation – those of France and Portugal. This comparison shows that British counterinsurgency was not uniquely population-centric, and this characteristic cannot, therefore, be the reason for its arguably superior if far from infallible performance. Evidence for these arguments comes primarily from doctrinal sources developed specifically to deal with counterinsurgency, complemented with insights from key military thinkers and archival sources of relevance practices. Some wider implications of this analysis for the relationship between combat experience and doctrinal development as well as for counterinsurgency are identified.     

Protecting the Raj: The Army in India and Internal Security,c. 1919–39

This article examines the role of the Army in India in internal security duties during the inter-war years. It contends that the army's approach was much more pragmatic and nuanced than hitherto assumed. Evidence is presented to show that the army's internal security doctrine underwent far-reaching changes after the massacre in Amritsar in 1919. Thenceforth, minimum force became the central imperative and the other doctrinal principles served to reinforce it. The army also evolved a tactical drill which closely adhered to this doctrine. The article argues that the changing attitudes towards use of force are evident in the role of technology in internal security duties. Lastly, it examines the system of training which played a crucial role in ensuring compliance with the army's evolving approach to internal security.     

Preventing the ‘Smiling Buddha’: British-Indian nuclear relations and the Commonwealth Nuclear force, 1964–68

This article examines two related issues: the policy objectives pursued by the British government to prevent India from developing nuclear weapons and the challenges presented to the Indian government in balancing Gandhian idealism with the reality of nuclear diplomacy. Building on recent research, the following issues are explored: the implementation of Anglo-American non-proliferation policy in Asia, the provision of security guarantees for India and Pakistan and the UK proposal to establish a Commonwealth Nuclear force as a means of maintaining British influence in the region. The analysis is placed within the context of Britain's overall defence policy during the 1960s focusing particularly on the British withdrawal from East of Suez and the development of nuclear-sharing arrangements within NATO. The article argues that the Wilson government regarded security guarantees for India as an obstacle towards the successful conclusion of a non-proliferation agreement. Britain's primary objective in advancing the concept of a Commonwealth Nuclear Force was not to increase Indian security in the face of Chinese nuclear threats but to explore possible options to internationalise Britain's nuclear forces after initial plans for a NATO nuclear force had failed.     

Schlock and Blah: Counter-insurgency Realities in a Rapid Dominance Era

This article examines the concept of ‘shock and awe’ in US military thought. It argues that the term derives from two main sources in defense thinking: rapidity in operations and overwhelming military superiority and is reflected in the concept of ‘full spectrum dominance’. However, the concept is not well attuned to fighting net-based counter insurgency war in a terrain such as Iraq which depends upon both intelligence gathering and adaptive military organizations. The article concludes that US military thinking should be more attuned to the effects of military force especially on political processes and the capacity of insurgents to mobilize popular support.     

Privatizing the struggle against Somali piracy

Pirate attacks against commercial vessels in the Western Indian Ocean and nearby seas reached an unprecedented level in 2011. Despite concerted efforts by the international community and shipping companies to address this threat by conducting naval patrols and equipping commercial vessels with non-lethal defenses, the frequency of pirate attacks continues to increase. The general ineffectiveness of existing anti-piracy measures has sparked interest in expanding the use of armed private security contractors to protect commercial vessels from pirate attacks. This article argues that armed private security contractors can, indeed, enhance the security of commercial vessels because these actors can provide onsite protection for commercial vessels, which should allow them to respond very quickly to pirate attacks, and because these actors are willing to use deadly force against pirates. However, this article also argues that expanding the use of these actors may increase the degree of violence used during pirate attacks, pose threats to the safety of innocent civilians, and violate a number of domestic and international laws.     

Misapplying lessons learned? Analysing the utility of British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland, 1971–76

This article examines the British Army's deployment in support of the civil power in Northern Ireland. It argues that the core guiding principles of the British approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) – employing the minimum use of force, firm and timely action, and unity of control in civil–military relations – were misapplied by the Army in its haste to combat Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorism between 1971 and 1976. Moreover, it suggests that the Army's COIN strategy was unsuccessful in the 1970s because commanders adhered too closely to the customs, doctrine, and drill applied under very different circumstances in Aden between 1963 and 1967, generally regarded as a failure in Britain's post-war internal security operations. The article concludes with a discussion of the British government's decision to scale back the Army's role in favour of giving the Royal Ulster Constabulary primacy in counter-terrorist operations, a decision which led ultimately to success in combating IRA violence.     

Britain’s ‘Independent’ V-Bomber Force and US Nuclear Weapons, 1957–1962

This article examines a secret Anglo-American programme, Project ‘E’, which equipped the RAF’s V-bomber Force with US nuclear weapons for use in wartime. It shows Project ‘E’ was ineffective as a warhead supply programme and, furthermore, that it crippled the operational effectiveness of the V-bomber Force as a whole between 1958 and 1962. This article argues that as a result of Project ‘E’, the V-Force was neither operationally nor politically independent as a nuclear deterrent force. This challenges the traditional view of the V-Force as the benchmark of nuclear independence to assess the Skybolt, Polaris and Trident programmes.     

Being there: US Navy organisational culture and the forward presence debate

ABSTRACT

This article argues that the US Navy’s roles (which have historically been bifurcated between warfighting and political use of force) manifest in its organisational culture as two different concepts of war: the US Navy as diplomatic actor and the US Navy as warfighting force. The conflict between these different concepts of war can be seen in the current debate about the definition and function of presence. The debate about presence is not just theoretical, but represents a deep and enduring conflict within the Navy as an organisation about its concept of war. Since the end of WWII, the Navy has been designing its fleet architecture according to a Mahanian concept of war, despite the preponderance of non-lethal missions and activities. The result is a mismatch between platforms and tasks.     

Civil–military relations in France: is there a gap?

Since President Jacques Chirac's 1996 decision to professionalise the armed forces, many political and military leader expressed concerns about its potential consequences on civil–military relations. Will the shift to an all-volunteer force create a gap in civil–military relations? The goal of the article is to provide a preliminary assessment of civil–military relations in France before the full professionalisation of the armed forces. Using the results of existing polls conducted annually, I lay out a basis of comparison to evaluate the future evolution of civil–military relations on several dimensions: image of the military, perception of civil–military relations, social and political values, and the legitimacy of the use of force. Although civil–military relations in France have never been as harmonious since the Second World War as they are today, the article argues that these relations are not as rosy as they may seem.     

Joint Publication 3-07.15 Tactics,Techniques and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces and the American Mission

US Army Major Paul Marks discusses the history of American advisory efforts during the Cold War and recommends that the concept and the use of advisors be revived as a tool of contemporary American foreign policy. The failure of American advisors to turn the South Vietnamese armed force into a viable entity and the lack of public knowledge about the success of advisors in El Salvador in the 1980s contribute to a bias against advisors in the public, the government, and the military. The article argues that in today's evolving security environment where the large scale commitment of US troops is neither feasible nor necessary, US national interests can still be advanced through the judicious use of advisors. The article proposes a Joint publication as the doctrinal basis for the employment of advisors.     

French Military Adaptation in the Afghan War: Looking Inward or Outward?

ABSTRACT

For some, a specific feature of the French armed forces' adaptation process in the adaptation process would be the capacity to look inward instead of outward in order to identify relevant solutions to tactical/doctrinal problems. This article questions such a narrative, and argues that the French armed forces are as quick as any to borrow from other countries’ experiences. In order to do so, this article introduces the concept of ‘selective emulation’, and compares the French and German military adaptation processes in Afghanistan. The article argues that there is indeed something distinctive about French military adaptation, but it is not what the fiercest defenders of the French ‘exceptionalism’ usually account for.     

Norm dilemmas and international organizational development: humanitarian intervention in the crisis of Bosnia and the reorganization of North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Conventional constructivism presents conforming to normative expectations as a constituent force in state legitimacy. However, what is broadly considered appropriate is not necessarily realized since concrete action can collide with other norms, just as prevention of human rights violations is generally viewed as desirable, but related action provokes a debate over sovereign integrity and the use of force. This article argues that this ‘norm dilemma’ prompts states to develop international organizations. That is to say, if international mechanisms exist to deal with regional contingencies effectively, such dilemmas that accompany intervention are more likely to be pre-empted. For this reason, states move towards development of institutions for security management. This article examines this claim by analyzing North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) reorganization through the intervention in Bosnia and explains why investigating norm dilemmas elucidates more aspects of this case than paying attention to the influence of humanitarian norms alone. Given the stress placed on conflict ‘prevention’ in NATO today, instead of promotion of intervention, as reiterated in the 2010 Strategic Concept, analysis of the first major crisis in post-Cold War Europe offers important insights into future management of norm dilemmas by the Alliance.     

Building the sinews of power: India in the Second World War

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the military transformations that India underwent during the Second World War. It focuses on the institutional dimension of these changes and considers the longer-term changes wrought by the war in the composition of the army, the logistical and support infrastructure and the emergence of an indigenous military industrial base. Taken together, the article argues, these changes positioned India as a potential regional military power that was qualitatively different from the interwar period.     

Colombian Military Thinking and the Fight against the FARC-EP Insurgency, 2002–2014

This article attempts to place in historical perspective the latest effort by Colombia’s military (Colmil) to defeat the now half century old insurgency of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP). It argues that the ‘surge’ initiated under President Álvaro Uribe in 2002 with the assistance of the United States can only be fully analyzed in the context of the Colmil’s intellectual framework for counter-insurgency. Specifically, this article will explain how the protracted engagement with counter-insurgency has shaped the Colmil’s understanding of the nature of the conflict, as well as its attitudes towards its adversary, civil authority and the instrumentality of force. An understanding of the Colmil’s strategic tradition can also help to explain their apprehensions about the ongoing peace negotiations with the FARC-EP.     

Desert insurgency: lessons from the third Tuareg rebellion

This article provides an in-depth examination and analysis of the 2006–2009 Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger. It identifies the underlying reasons behind the rebellion, explores contrasting counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies employed by the two governments, and presents some lessons learned. While both COIN approaches ultimately produced similar peace settlements, the article argues that the Malian strategy of reconciliation combined with the selective use of force was far more effective than the Nigerien iron fist approach at limiting the size and scope of the insurgency and producing a more sustainable peace. It concludes by looking at the role of external actors, particularly the United States, and how the failure to internationalize the conflict was actually more beneficial to the local COIN effort, as well as to the longer strategic interests of the United States in the region.     

CIVIL SOCIETY AND VIOLENCE—HOW TO MANAGE IN THE TOWNSHIPS WITHOUT THE ARMY

This article discusses the validity of national security threats in Botswana and whether they justified the creation of the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (DISS), which has been controversial since its formation. Since its inception in 2008, the DISS has been accused of many human rights violations and politicisation. Without fully deliberating on the basis for its creation, some discourses have focused on the politicised operations without relation to what the DISS is supposed to be doing. The author works under the assumption that debates should be shaped by whether it was necessary to create the DISS, and, if so, how we can shape and steer debates on its oversight, management, reform and operations. This article argues that despite the politicisation of the DISS, Botswana's national security threats are both real and imagined; and that domestic threats to national security have moved from the conceptual ‘imagined’ category to the ‘real’. However, that in itself did not warrant the design and mandate of the DISS, and the article argues that it was external threats that really warranted the creation of a civilian intelligence agency. The article concludes that Botswana faces a plethora of external security threats – traditional and non-traditional – that warranted the creation and continuance of the DISS.     

Setting a place at the table: ending insurgencies through the political process

This article argues that, under certain conditions, allowing insurgents into the political process – through elections or government posts – can be a useful tool in the peace process and can help end insurgencies. However, bringing insurgents into the political process is unlikely to end insurgencies on its own, particularly if insurgents, the government, or the population believes that force is still a viable means of defeating the opponent and changing the status quo. The article begins with a brief overview of the causes of insurgency and on conflict resolution for internal wars. The article then considers two examples of insurgents that have entered the political process – the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and Hezbollah in Lebanon – and the differing degrees of success in transforming these insurgents to non-violent participants in the political process. It concludes by suggesting how insurgents can be brought into the political process as part of conflict resolution and the implications for Afghanistan.     

Majority rule,minority issues: The Macedonian question in the Dekemvriana

This article examines the role of the Macedonian Question in the 1944 December Uprising (Dekemvriana) in Greece. While the Dekemvriana is commonly portrayed in right–left terminology in the historiography, this article argues that part of the reason for the left’s failure was their inability to manage the Macedonian ethnic component of the struggle, either within their armed forces or in their relationship with Yugoslavia. As such, this article integrates the early phases of the Greek Civil War into the broader literature on minorities in civil conflict, while simultaneously exposing some of the myths about Macedonian involvement that result from its contemporary political ramifications.     

Ministries of peacebuilding in sub-Saharan Africa: rationale,functions and establishment

Abstract

This paper begins by explaining the concept of a culture of peace and contrasts it with a culture of violence. It argues that traditional ways of trying to achieve peace – based on force or threat of force – are costly, ineffective and of doubtful morality. At the same time, nonviolent means have achieved some formidable successes. The paper proposes the establishment of national ministries of peacebuilding to coordinate and implement the building cultures of peace in sub-Saharan Africa. The broad tasks and specific functions of such ministries are explained and some likely objections are answered. The paper concludes with a discussion of the necessary conditions for such ministries to be established and to be effective in building cultures of peace.