Single machine just‐in‐time scheduling problems with two competing agents

In scheduling problems with two competing agents, each one of the agents has his own set of jobs to be processed and his own objective function, and both share a common processor. In the single‐machine problem studied in this article, the goal is to find a joint schedule that minimizes the total deviation of the job completion times of the first agent from a common due‐date, subject to an upper bound on the maximum deviation of job completion times of the second agent. The problem is shown to be NP‐hard even for a nonrestrictive due‐date, and a pseudopolynomial dynamic program is introduced and tested numerically. For the case of a restrictive due‐date (a sufficiently small due‐date that may restrict the number of early jobs), a faster pseudopolynomial dynamic program is presented. We also study the multiagent case, which is proved to be strongly NP‐hard. A simple heuristic for this case is introduced, which is tested numerically against a lower bound, obtained by extending the dynamic programming algorithm. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 1–16, 2014     

A nonatomic‐game model for timing clearance sales under competition

We deal with dynamic revenue management (RM) under competition using the nonatomic‐game approach. Here, a continuum of heterogeneous sellers try to sell the same product over a given time horizon. Each seller can lower his price once at the time of his own choosing, and faces Poisson demand arrival with a rate that is the product of a price‐sensitive term and a market‐dependent term. Different types of sellers interact, and their respective prices help shape the overall market in which they operate, thereby influencing the behavior of all sellers. Using the infinite‐seller approximation, which deprives any individual seller of his influence over the entire market, we show the existence of a certain pattern of seller behaviors that collectively produce an environment to which the behavior pattern forms a best response. Such equilibrium behaviors point to the suitability of threshold‐like pricing policies. Our computational study yields insights to RM under competition, such as profound ways in which consumer and competitor types influence seller behaviors and market conditions. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 365–385, 2014     

Untruthful probabilistic demand forecasts in vendor‐managed revenue‐sharing contracts: Coordinating the chain

Vendor‐managed revenue‐sharing arrangements are common in the newspaper and other industries. Under such arrangements, the supplier decides on the level of inventory while the retailer effectively operates under consignment, sharing the sales revenue with his supplier. We consider the case where the supplier is unable to predict demand, and must base her decisions on the retailer‐supplied probabilistic forecast for demand. We show that the retailer's best choice of a distribution to report to his supplier will not be the true demand distribution, but instead will be a degenerate distribution that surprisingly induces the supplier to provide the system‐optimal inventory quantity. (To maintain credibility, the retailer's reports of daily sales must then be consistent with his supplied forecast.) This result is robust under nonlinear production costs and nonlinear revenue‐sharing. However, if the retailer does not know the supplier's production cost, the forecast “improves” and could even be truthful. That, however, causes the supplier's order quantity to be suboptimal for the overall system. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?

A defender wants to detect as quickly as possible whether some attacker is secretly conducting a project that could harm the defender. Security services, for example, need to expose a terrorist plot in time to prevent it. The attacker, in turn, schedules his activities so as to remain undiscovered as long as possible. One pressing question for the defender is: which of the project's activities to focus intelligence efforts on? We model the situation as a zero‐sum game, establish that a late‐start schedule defines a dominant attacker strategy, and describe a dynamic program that yields a Nash equilibrium for the zero‐sum game. Through an innovative use of cooperative game theory, we measure the harm reduction thanks to each activity's intelligence effort, obtain insight into what makes intelligence effort more effective, and show how to identify opportunities for further harm reduction. We use a detailed example of a nuclear weapons development project to demonstrate how a careful trade‐off between time and ease of detection can reduce the harm significantly.     

Reconsidering Truman's claim of ‘half a million American lives’ saved by the atomic bomb: The construction and deconstruction of a myth

This essay, based on substantial archival research, critically examines President Harry S. Truman's often‐cited post‐World War II claim that he had received pre‐Hiroshima counsel in 1945 that the invasion(s) of Japan could cost ‘half a million American lives’. This essay concludes that there is no 1945 archival evidence supporting Truman's postwar contention, and that there is substantial evidence undercutting his claim. Moreover, in view of the total size of American forces scheduled for 1945–46 operations against Japan, any claim of 500,000 American dead seems implausible. This essay also critically examines how Truman's postwar memoir claim of ‘half a million American lives’ was constructed, and this essay discusses the many and rather varied casualty/fatality numbers that Truman presented during his White House and post‐presidential years. Such an analysis also focuses on the numbers he privately provided in the construction of his memoirs by ‘ghost’ writers. Reaching beyond the specific question of Truman's claims, this essay also discusses the dangers of analysts relying heavily upon post‐event memoir and interview sources, and this essay emphasises the need generally to instead privilege contemporaenous archival materials. Otherwise, analysts risk letting policymakers, often in self‐serving recollections, shape the history of crucial events.     

Franchising cooperation through chance cross‐constrained games

This paper explores the role of franchising arrangements in the context of game theory. We assume a single franchisor and a single franchisee channel and address the impact of fixed lump‐sum fees, royalties, wholesale price, and retail price on the franchise contracts. We start with the chance cross‐constrained noncooperative situation where the franchisor, as the leader, first specifies his/her strategies. The franchisee, as the follower, then decides on his/her decision. We then relax the assumption of franchisee's inability to influence the franchisor's decisions and discuss cooperative situation between the franchisor and the franchisee. Nash's bargaining model is utilized to select the best Pareto‐efficient payment scheme for the franchisor and the franchisee to achieve their cooperation. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 669–685, 2000     

The loss‐averse newsvendor problem with supply options

In this article, we consider a loss‐averse newsvendor with stochastic demand. The newsvendor might procure options when demand is unknown, and decide how many options to execute only after demand is revealed. If the newsvendor reserves too many options, he would incur high reservation costs. Yet reserving too few could result in lost sales. So the newsvendor faces a trade‐off between reservation costs and losing sales. When there are multiple options available, the newsvendor has to consider how many units of each to reserve by studying the trade‐off between flexibility and costs. We show how the newsvendor's loss aversion behavior affects his ordering decision, and propose an efficient algorithm to compute his optimal solution in the general case with n options. We also present examples showing how the newsvendor's ordering strategy changes as loss aversion rises. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:46–59, 2015     

Determination of suppliers' optimal quantity discount schedules with heterogeneous buyers

Although the quantity discount problem has been extensively studied in the realm of a single supplier and a single buyer, it is not well understood when a supplier has many different buyers. This paper presents an analysis of a supplier's quantity discount decision when there are many buyers with different demand and cost structures. A common discrete all‐unit quantity discount schedule with many break points is used. After formulating the model, we first analyze buyers' responses to a general discrete quantity discount schedule. This analysis establishes a framework for a supplier to formulate his quantity discount decision. Under this framework, the supplier's optimal quantity discount schedule can be formulated and solved by a simple non‐linear programming model. The applicability of the model is discussed with an application for a large U.S. distribution network. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 46–59, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.1052     

Unconventional warfare philosophers

The philosophies of unconventional warfare philosophers can be divided into four schools. The classicists, or early school, represented by Sun Tzu and his ‘indirect approach’, have existed for thousands of years. Marxist‐Leninist revolutionaries gave new emphasis to unconventional warfare as a vehicle for revolution. The theories of these philosophers of the middle school were opposed by those of counterrevolutionaries. With the end of the Cold War, a new strategic environment is emerging, giving rise to new school philosophers reacting to that challenge. They include both those who seek to undermine the nation‐state and those, who, like the earlier counter‐revolutionaries, seek to defend and promote its interests.     

Counter‐punching on the Mudzi: D Company, 1st Rhodesian African Rifles,on operation ‘Mardon’ 1 November 1976

Designed to harrass and weaken Ian Smith's principal enemy, Robert Mugabe, in his safe haven of Mozambique, Operation ‘Mardon’ involved co‐ordinated incursions over the Rhodesian border on a wide front. The secondary purpose was to persuade the African nationalist insurgents to abandon their incursion routes in the north‐east and south‐east in favour of those from the east where the mountainous terrain favoured their interception. Although other Rhodesian units wreaked more physical damage, D Company, 1st Battalion, the Rhodesian African Rifles, inflicted the heaviest casualties in their classic infantry attack on Mudzi Camp.¹     

Stochastic regret minimization for revenue management problems with nonstationary demands

We study an admission control model in revenue management with nonstationary and correlated demands over a finite discrete time horizon. The arrival probabilities are updated by current available information, that is, past customer arrivals and some other exogenous information. We develop a regret‐based framework, which measures the difference in revenue between a clairvoyant optimal policy that has access to all realizations of randomness a priori and a given feasible policy which does not have access to this future information. This regret minimization framework better spells out the trade‐offs of each accept/reject decision. We proceed using the lens of approximation algorithms to devise a conceptually simple regret‐parity policy. We show the proposed policy achieves 2‐approximation of the optimal policy in terms of total regret for a two‐class problem, and then extend our results to a multiclass problem with a fairness constraint. Our goal in this article is to make progress toward understanding the marriage between stochastic regret minimization and approximation algorithms in the realm of revenue management and dynamic resource allocation. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 433–448, 2016     

公元四百零三年——论陶渊明的归隐

陶渊明是中国诗歌史上最伟大的诗人之一,他在公元403年所作的诗,占了其一生诗作的六分之一强,表达了其归隐的强烈欲望,结合陶渊明一生的主要经历,便可知其归隐的主要原因乃是晋室情结,而他决定归隐的年份即此年.     

Maximizing project cash availability

Consider a project during the life cycle of which there are cash payouts and in‐flows. To better meet his financial commitments, the project owner would like to meet all deadlines without running out of cash. We show that the cash availability objective is similar to the total weighted flowtime used to measure work‐in‐progress performance in the scheduling and inventory control literatures. In this article we provide several specialized solution methods for the problem of minimizing total weighted flowtime in an arbitrary acyclic project network, subject to activity release times and due dates, where the activity weights may be positive or negative and represent cash in‐ and out‐flows. We describe the structure of an optimal solution and provide several efficient algorithms and their complexity based on mincost and maxflow formulations. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Book reviews

Jurgen Brauer's comment presents what he calls a replication of an earlier study by Higgs and Kilduff (1993) and uses it to criticize the adequacy of the Higgs‐Kilduff model. In several respects, however, Brauer has not actually performed a replication: he uses different data, a different sample period, and arrives at different results. His criticisms rest on his own setup, not that of Higgs and Kilduff. Therefore they have no strict applicability to the latter. Moreover, Brauer's stepwise model has no bearing on the Higgs‐Kilduff model, as it violates that model's specification requirements.     

A search game taking account of attributes of searching resources

This article deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game (SAG), in which a searcher and a target participate as players. The searcher distributes his searching resources in a search space to detect the target. The effect of resources lasts a certain period of time and extends to some areas at a distance from the resources' dropped points. On the other hand, the target moves around in the search space to evade the searcher. In the history of search games, there has been little research covering the durability and reachability of searching resources. This article proposes two linear programming formulations to solve the SAG with durable and reachable resources, and at the same time provide an optimal strategy of distributing searching resources for the searcher and an optimal moving strategy for the target. Using examples, we will analyze the influences of two attributes of resources on optimal strategies. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2008     

Optimal control of an M/G/1 queue with impatient priority customers

An optimal operating policy is characterized for the infinite‐horizon average‐cost case of a single server queueing control problem. The server may be turned on at arrival epochs or off at departure epochs. Two classes of customers, each of them arriving according to an independent Poisson processes, are considered. An arriving 1‐customer enters the system if the server is turned on upon his arrival, or if the server is on and idle. In the former case, the 1‐customer is selected for service ahead of those customers waiting in the system; otherwise he leaves the system immediately. 2‐Customers remain in the system until they complete their service requirements. Under a linear cost structure, this paper shows that a stationary optimal policy exists such that either (1) leaves the server on at all times, or (2) turns the server off when the system is empty. In the latter case, we show that the stationary optimal policy is a threshold strategy, this feature being commonplace in most of priority queueing systems and inventory models. However, the optimal policy in our model is determined by two thresholds instead of one. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 201–209, 2001     

The effects of information on a queue with balking and phase‐type service times

This article generalizes the models in Guo and Zipkin, who focus on exponential service times, to systems with phase‐type service times. Each arriving customer decides whether to stay or balk based on his expected waiting cost, conditional on the information provided. We show how to compute the throughput and customers' average utility in each case. We then obtain some analytical and numerical results to assess the effect of more or less information. We also show that service‐time variability degrades the system's performance. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non-constant-sum game

An inspector's game is a non-constant-sum two-person game in which one player has promised to perform a certain duty and the other player is allowed to inspect and verify occasionally that the duty has indeed been performed. A solution to a variant of such a game is given in this paper, based on the assumption that the inspector can announce his mixed strategy in advance, if he so wishes, whereas the other player, who has already given his promise, cannot threaten by explicitly saying that he will not keep his word.     

Search and the introduction of improved technologies

Modeling R&D as standard sequential search, we consider a monopolist who can implement a sequence of technological discoveries during the technology search process: he earns revenue on his installed technology while he engages in R&D to find improved technology. What is not standard is that he has a finite number of opportunities to introduce improved technology. We show that his optimal policy is characterized by thresholds ξ_i(x): introduce the newly found technology if and only if it exceeds ξ_i(x) when x is the state of the currently installed technology and i is the number of remaining introductions allowed. We also analyze a nonstationary learning‐by‐doing model in which the monopolist's experience in implementing new technologies imparts increased capability in generating new technologies. Because this nonstationary model is not in the class of monotone stopping problems, a number of surprising results hold and several seemingly obvious properties of the stationary model no longer hold. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Dynamic server assignment policies for assembly‐type queues with flexible servers

We seek dynamic server assignment policies in finite‐capacity queueing systems with flexible and collaborative servers, which involve an assembly and/or a disassembly operation. The objective is to maximize the steady‐state throughput. We completely characterize the optimal policy for a Markovian system with two servers, two feeder stations, and instantaneous assembly and disassembly operations. This optimal policy allocates one server per station unless one of the stations is blocked, in which case both servers work at the unblocked station. For Markovian systems with three stations and instantaneous assembly and/or disassembly operations, we consider similar policies that move a server away from his/her “primary” station only when that station is blocked or starving. We determine the optimal assignment of each server whose primary station is blocked or starving in systems with three stations and zero buffers, by formulating the problem as a Markov decision process. Using this optimal assignment, we develop heuristic policies for systems with three or more stations and positive buffers, and show by means of a numerical study that these policies provide near‐optimal throughput. Furthermore, our numerical study shows that these policies developed for assembly‐type systems also work well in tandem systems. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008