The Needs of Political Policy versus the Reality of Military Operations: Royal Navy Opposition to the Arctic Convoys, 1942

It has become commonplace, especially in the post-Vietnam strategic environment, to quote Clausewitz's dictum that war is the continuation of policy by other means. We are told that military operations are dictated by, and must serve, clear political ends. Such thinking has been invoked to support everything from punitive strikes, to peacekeeping missions, to the ‘Powell’ doctrine and its political ‘exit strategies’, but at times political policy and military operations do not mix. In 1942 the Royal Navy bowed to political pressure and, against its collective better judgement, continued the Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union. These military operations culminated in the destruction of convoy PQ 17 in early July. This conflict between political policy and military strategy provides an object lesson of why in war issues of means and priorities must outweigh the importance of any given political policy.     

Schlock and Blah: Counter-insurgency Realities in a Rapid Dominance Era

This article examines the concept of ‘shock and awe’ in US military thought. It argues that the term derives from two main sources in defense thinking: rapidity in operations and overwhelming military superiority and is reflected in the concept of ‘full spectrum dominance’. However, the concept is not well attuned to fighting net-based counter insurgency war in a terrain such as Iraq which depends upon both intelligence gathering and adaptive military organizations. The article concludes that US military thinking should be more attuned to the effects of military force especially on political processes and the capacity of insurgents to mobilize popular support.     

‘Masters of today’: military intelligence and counterinsurgency in Colombia, 1990–2009

Military intelligence forms a vital element of counter-insurgency operations. When the Colombian military suffered setbacks at the hands of the FARC in the 1990s, military intelligence received much of the blame. It was also accused of human rights violations. With the help of US. financed Plan Colombia, military intelligence has been reorganized, expanded, strengthened with upgraded technical capabilities, constrained to operate within defined legal boundaries, and refocused to match the government's strategic priorities. Human intelligence has laid the groundwork for impressive tactical and operational results since 2006. Nevertheless, like all intelligence services, that of the Colombian military continues to experience problems of structure and political outlook.     

基于多栅格的基建营房保障信息耦合研究

合理利用军地资源实施一体化保障是现代战争或非战争军事行动基建营房保障的重要内容,然而,包含大量此类信息的商用网络、行业网络和平时基建营房业务管理网络的信息如何能被有效利用却是一个令人头疼的问题。依托军事信息栅格和地方多个行业信息网络,研究、设计缓冲数据库和数据订制服务软件,安全可靠地将分布在多个信息栅格中的基建营房保障所需信息耦合到军事后勤信息网络中,为快速、科学制定基建营房保障计划和实施战时基建营房一体化保障提供强有力的信息支持。     

Wellington's use of deception tactics in the Peninsular War

Wellington's use of intelligence developed throughout his military career. Arguably, his experiences in India taught him the importance of intelligence, but it was during the Peninsular War that he honed his analytical techniques. As the war progressed, he developed sophisticated methods for the integration of strategic intelligence – largely gathered by civilian agents – with operational intelligence – collected by military personnel. This allowed him to develop operational conceptualisation, which in turn contributed to the successes he achieved over the French forces in Iberia. However, more than anything, it was his considered use of intelligence, combined with intricate deception operations in the latter stages of the conflict, which deprived the French of reliable intelligence on his own movements, and demonstrated his understanding of the importance of intelligence. This article investigates Wellington's increasing awareness of the importance of intelligence and deception during the Peninsular War.     

A view from Berlin: Colonel Frederick trench and the development of British perceptions of German aggressive intent, 1906–1910

This essay traces the image of Germany that emerges from the reports of Colonel Frederick Trench (1857–1942), British military attache in Berlin from 1906 to 1910. At this time, the British Army possessed only the most limited intelligence‐gathering apparatus and had to rely heavily on the reports of military attaches for information about their continental rivals. Trench, who believed that Germany planned to wage war against Britain and said so categorically in his reports, was the main source of data on the German Army. From the limited surviving records of who read these reports and how they responded to them, this essay posits that Trench's views contributed to the growing British perception of a German threat, a perception that did much to influence British strategic planning in this period.     

公安现役部队非战争军事行动训练面临的挑战与对策

当前,边境安全形势复杂、训练理念陈旧、部队勤训矛盾突出、训练内容与安排不合理、训练保障能力有限等主客观因素,制约着公安现役部队非战争军事行动训练的开展,对公安现役部队形成非战争军事行动战斗力构成了挑战。树立科学的非战争军事行动训练指导思想与理念,创新训练方法和手段,优化训练内容,加强教员队伍建设和训练基地建设,是改进非战争军事行动训练的有效对策。     

Iraq, 2003–2011: succeeding to fail

ABSTRACT

This study examines the US experience during the Iraq war, from the planning phase that began in 2001 to the withdrawal of US forces in 2011. It reveals a dearth of planning and intelligence leading up to the invasion; reluctance by conventional coalition military forces to conduct reconstruction, political and security capacity-building; and, later, full spectrum counterinsurgency operations. These forces took on some missions traditionally reserved for special operations forces, and they increasingly assumed diplomatic roles as they interfaced with the Iraqi leadership and local kingpins. Although these efforts yielded some impressive organizational learning and limited operational successes, they were hampered by lack of adequate preparation, a poor understanding of the human terrain, shortsighted strategies, and ultimately a dearth of political will to stay the course. The outcome was far from the model Middle East democracy envisioned by the invasion’s architects, and the American experience in Iraq instead became a cautionary tale for military intervention.     

Visions of the Enemy from the Field and from Abroad: Revisiting CIA and Military Expectations of the Tet Offensive

As the January 1968 Tet holiday approached, CIA analysts and American commanders in South Vietnam developed more accurate conclusions about communist military strategy than did intelligence analysts at CIA headquarters. Besides valuing different types of intelligence, General William Westmoreland, Lieutenant General Frederick Weyand, and CIA analysts in Saigon also placed greater emphasis on new information about communist military strategy than did CIA analysts at Langley. These different reactions to information highlight reasons why military commanders and intelligence analysts stationed in the theater of operations might develop more accurate conclusions about enemy military strategy than intelligence analysts stationed at their national headquarters.     

Attrition modeling in the presence of decoys: An operations-other-than-war motivation

Under various operational conditions, in particular in operations other than war (OOTW) or peacekeeping, an intervening force, here Blue, must occasionally engage in attrition warfare with an opposing force, here Red, that is intermingled with noncombatants. Desirably, Red armed actives are targeted, and not the unarmed noncombatants. This article describes some simple Lanchesterian attrition models that reflect a certain capacity of Blue to discriminate noncombatants from armed and active Red opponents. An explicit extension of the Lanchester square law results: Blue's abstinence concerning the indiscriminate shooting of civilians mixed with Red's is essentially reflected in a lower Blue rate of fire and less advantageous exchange rate. The model applies to other situations involving decoys, and reflects the value of a discrimination capability. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44 : 507–514, 1997     

British counter‐insurgency in Kenya, 1952–56: Extension of internal security policy or prelude to decolonisation?

Despite considerable post‐war planning, the British counter‐insurgency campaign in Kenya did not constitute a Colonial Office strategy for decolonisation. COIN in Kenya had one purpose: to re‐impose law and order, or British control. If for no other reason, this is demonstrated by the initial reluctance of the Colonial Office to intervene. Frequent re‐assessments and postponement of the ending of the State of Emergency, and the subordination of socio‐economic and political reforms to military objectives, show clearly that decolonisation was not high on the British list of priorities in Kenya. This article questions the relationship between COIN and decolonisation, and the validity of models of British counter‐insurgency.     

Are the Baltic States and NATO on the right path in deterring Russia in the Baltic?

ABSTRACT

The aim of the current study is to discuss which particular factors Russia considers as sufficient deterrent capabilities and whether the national defence models implemented in the Baltic countries have the potential to deter Russia's military planners and political leadership. Whilst the existing conventional reserves of NATO are sizeable, secure, and rapid, deployment is still a critical variable in case of a conflict in the Baltic countries because of the limited range of safe transportation options. However, whilst the Baltic States are developing their capabilities according to the priorities defined by NATO in 2010; which were updated after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian military planners have meanwhile redesigned both their military doctrine and military forces, learning from the experience of the Russo-Georgian war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and other recent confrontations. Accordingly, there is a risk that the efforts of the Baltic countries could prove rather inefficient in deterring Russia.     

Super-Weapons and Subversion: British Deterrence by Deception Operations in the Early Cold War

This article examines British deception operations in the early Cold War. It illustrates how, in the years before Britain could threaten atomic retaliation, Britain’s deception organisation, the London Controlling Section (LCS) was tasked with conducting operations to deter the USSR and China from starting a war or threatening British interests. It introduces a number of their ploys – some physical and military, others subversive and political. It argues that the LCS faced significant challenges in implementing its deceptions. Repeating the great strategic successes of the Second World War was extremely difficult; what remained for the Cold War were more limited deceptions.     

涉外非战争军事行动的法律保障问题研究

近年来,随着军队使命任务的拓展,涉外非战争军事行动日益成为国家运用军事力量的重要方式。因此,必须加强涉外非战争军事行动中法律保障问题研究,使其在法律框架下进行。加强对涉外非战争军事行动的法律保障,有助于为军队遂行多样化军事任务提供有力的法律支持和保障。     

纳卡冲突无人机效能分析及启示

大量无人机和巡飞弹的参战成为亚美尼亚与阿塞拜疆在纳卡地区持续四十多天的冲突的焦点,引发世界各国对无人机作战应用的关注。本文回顾了冲突过程,对比了两国战损情况,介绍了主要参战无人机的技术指标与性能优势。无人机在冲突中能够实时获取高清战场图像,发挥情报侦察优势,对重点军事目标进行精准而有效的打击,发挥了较高的作战效能;同时,采取灵活高效的诱饵探测、饱和攻击以及心理威慑等战术,能够进一步提升无人机作战能力。通过分析纳卡冲突中无人机在性能、体系运用方面的不足,本研究提出应根据不同作战需求,在低烈度战争中发挥无人机性价比优势,现代空中作战开展近距支援作战,面向未来战争要在目标识别等方面发展智能信息处理技术,结合无人机不同功能构建新型无人机战术与作战体系,以实现无人机智能化作战。     

非战争军事行动视角下的军校英语教学对策研究

非战争军事行动的实施,要求我军具备军事素质过硬、英语能力强的复合型人才,而目前我国军事院校英语教学已不能满足这一时代新需求。从多个层面探讨改进军队英语教学的对策,以期促进军校英语教学又好又快地发展,培养更多部队急需的军事人才。     

The sixteenth-century antecedents of special operations ‘small war’

The first conceptual, theoretical treatises about small war (la petite guerre) as special operations appeared only from the middle of the seventeenth century. The term is not used in the eighteenth-century sense of ‘special operations’ in older sources. The supposed absence of any treatment of the subject is surprising considering the obsession with the ‘art of war’ in the Renaissance, but other authors attribute it to a supposed antinomy between chivalric ideals and irregular warfare. But the absence of explicit manuals on the subject is not evidence of absence of advanced reflection on this kind of operations in the Middle Ages and in Early Modern times. We should thus look elsewhere, in other genres, for writings that contain and pass on military knowledge. Epics, romances, educational and military treatises, and memoirs in fact contain elements of a theory of special operations, even though these genres differ from our conception of rationality inherited from the Enlightenment.     

Basra and the Referent Points of Twofold War

British operations in Basra during the 2003 war in Iraq are a paradigmatic example of twofold war in which strategies for regime change and reconstruction require a mix of conventional operations and internal security operations. This is not a new form of war, but it is a noticeable trend whose referent points and lines of demarcation deserve identification. Basra also offers insight into the way in which military force is applied in the post-11 September world, indicates how operations in urbanised societies are developing, and emphasises the role of security as a process or means.     

无人系统路线图自主性分析

在第三次抵消战略的驱动下,受军费预算不断削减、内部成本日益增长的影响,为遏制中俄等国日益崛起的军事力量,谋求和维持未来军事优势,美军只能将目光聚焦于创新作战概念,发展以无人系统为代表的更具成本效益和作战威力的武器装备。随着人工智能和机器学习技术的进步,无人系统的自主能力得到了大幅提高,未来将可能根据任务需要,实现从远程控制、自动化系统到近乎完全自主。本文认为,美国国防部除将加快发展人工智能和机器学习技术,聚焦于自主系统带来的作战效率和效能的提高,持续评估自主系统以提升作战人员的信任水平之外,也正加紧制定相关的政策法规,以确保自主系统的研发更加规范有序。     

The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of Reagan's Maritime Strategy

Washington's so-called Maritime Strategy, which sought to apply US naval might against Soviet vulnerabilities on its maritime flanks, came to full fruition during the 1980s. The strategy, which witnessed a major buildup of US naval forces and aggressive exercising in seas proximate to the USSR, also explicitly targeted Moscow”s strategic missile submarines with the aim of pressuring the Kremlin during crises or the early phases of global war. Relying on a variety of interviews and newly declassified documents, the authors assert that the Maritime Strategy represents one of the rare instances in history when intelligence helped lead a nation to completely revise its concept of military operations.