‘Brown Bess’ vs ‘Miss Minie’

Following the publication of the article ‘Trusty Bess’: the Definitive Origins and History of the term 'Brown Bess', the author was made aware of an intriguing illustration that perfectly captures the meaning of that famous nickname. This short note details this archival document and sheds light on both its place in the lore of ‘Brown Bess’ and its wide historical context in terms of the Victorian attitudes to military small arms development.     

农村外出‘兵’员宜实行‘双向管理’

社会主义市场经济体制的逐步建立与发展,使农村民兵、预备役兵员外出打工经商的人数日益增多并有继续增多的趋势。这种新情况成为民兵、预备役工作中亟待解决的突出问题。我认为,解决这个问题,应实行户籍属地和流向属地“双向管理”。这是由当前兵员流动中存在的以下几个特点决定的。     

‘Fighting for peace’

In Africa, most of the present conflicts are civil, intra-state wars where belligerent groups use guerrilla tactics to achieve various political, economic or ideological objectives. The atrocities and the effect of these on-going wars on innocent civilians, human suffering, poverty and development are beyond comprehension. Not surprisingly, the majority of current peace operations are in Africa, with more than 70 countries contributing forces to these conflict zones. On the continent, South Africa has come to assume a leading role in peace operations and is now a major troop-contributing country to UN and AU missions. In the past 11 years, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has taken part in no fewer than 14 peace missions. This article provides a brief background of the conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, the different United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) mandates under which peacekeepers had to operate as well as their objectives, and the extent of South Africa's involvement in the various missions. In the last section, the major challenges, that these operations have posed are highlighted.     

The ‘African COP’

The 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) had been anticipated as the ‘African COP’, not only due to the African venue but also due to the opportunity it would afford African countries – with South Africa at the helm – to steer the debate on a global climate change regime. With the conference now over, lobby groups, international organisations, negotiators, observers and commentators alike have been taking stock of its outcome. Despite the litany of developmental and security implications of climate change, COP17 got underway with little hope that much might actually be achieved. In light of the discouraging condition of the global economy, with leading developed economies suffering financially, states were hardly in a mood to be making concessions that would impact their fiscal health. Nonetheless, an agreement was reached. Questions remain, however, about the significance of the outcome of the African COP for the world at large, but ultimately also for Africa.     

应防止刊‘觉’

去年以来,笔者在一些乡镇武装部看到,《中国民兵》、《西南民兵》等民兵刊授教材迟迟没有分发到民兵手中,有的办公桌上已堆成了书山。据民兵反映,他们有时少则一二月,多则半年看不到刊授教材。据了解,这一现象在很多地方普遍存在,刊授教育根本没有达到应有的效果。     

The ‘Third’ US Offset Strategy and Europe’s ‘Anti-access’ Challenge

Over the last two decades, a number of countries (most notably China, Russia and Iran) have been developing so-called anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, such as ballistic and cruise missiles, offensive cyber-weapons, electronic warfare, etc. The development of A2/AD capabilities by non-Western countries undermines the foundations of US power projection and global military-technological supremacy. In order to overcome, or at least mitigate, the impending A2/AD challenge, the US Department of Defense (DoD) began to roll out its so-called ‘third’ offset strategy in late 2014. The strategy aims to bring about innovative operational concepts and technologies and spur new doctrinal and organisational debates. This article assesses which of the operational concepts and capabilities informing current US discussions on offset may be relevant in the context of the A2/AD challenges Europeans face on their eastern ‘flank‘ and in their ‘extended southern neighbourhood‘, and which may not. Europeans must grapple with the same conceptual puzzle as the US: how to strike the right balance between defeating A2/AD capabilities and hedging against them, i.e. through alternative strategies that are less dependent on unhindered access and resort to asymmetric forms of warfare. However, they must take into account the geographical features of their eastern flank and extended southern neighbourhood, the level of technological maturity of their challengers, and their own military-technological prowess and political limitations. This suggests a somewhat different approach to offsetting A2/AD than that adopted by the US.     

海湾美军的‘心脏’

在浩瀚的阿拉伯大沙漠深处,有一座高深莫测的军事基地,它就是沙特阿拉伯王国苏丹王子空军基地。“倒萨”战争已经如箭在弦,但如果想看看“9·11”后新技术战争如何展开。这里可能是最佳选择,因为这座基地有“海湾美军的心脏”之称。一旦战争爆发,这里将是美军所有空中作战行动的司令部和指挥中心。     

THE ‘PRICE’ OF TERRORISM

Security measures are said to increase the price of terrorism. This price has not been hitherto defined in an economically meaningful way. This paper provides a precise definition by treating the terrorists’ resource endowment as a parcel of contingent claims to political influence with a price equal to the summed value of those contingent claims in potential states of the world. Equipped with this definition, an equilibrium model of the price of terrorism is deployed. Important insights are gained into the effect of terrorists’ risk aversion at the level of the price of terrorism in different states of the world and the theoretical conclusion is reached that higher security is associated with a lower price of terrorism rather than a higher price. The implications for policy are discussed.     

The Taliban's ‘military courts’

The Taliban's ‘code of conduct’, which lists rules of discipline for the fighters, has been widely discussed, but do the Taliban try to implement it? This article discusses the structures that the Taliban have put in place for this purpose and their evolution over the years. It assesses that while the Taliban's ‘military justice’ system is still work in progress, the fact that it has attracted a significant investment in human resources bears witness to a serious intent of the leadership. However, the Taliban's concern with the behaviour of their fighting force is driven by their own political calculus, not by any sympathy for the international law of conflict.     

A ‘transparent gold’ rush?

Abstract

The signing of a new treaty on the equitable sharing of the Nile waters – signed last May in Kampala by Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania – has the potential of derailing relations with Sudan and Egypt. According to the latter countries, this new agreement replaces the 1959 Nile agreement – that awarded them with 90 per cent control over the Nile water – giving other Nile Basin countries the possibility to implement water-related projects in agriculture and energy. This new development, according to Egypt and Sudan, places their water level security in jeopardy. Furthermore, the use of land grabs and water consumption for food security by wealthy foreign countries contributes to the sensitive situation the nine Nile Basin countries are now facing. Water is a red line when it comes to Egypt and Sudan and the future of the whole region depends on whether this line will be crossed.     

蓬莱新‘八仙’谈国防

蓬莱阁人杰地灵。“八仙过海”的典故已为无数人所知喻。在商品经济的大潮中,蓬莱又涌现出了新“八仙”。中央电视台拍摄的电视系列片《新八仙》,已使我们目睹了新“八仙”在商品经济的大潮中的搏击形象。下边献给读者的是他们在和平的环境里对生存大事——国防问题的见地与思索。1.司家庄村党支部书记司继双:我读了几本古书。占人云“不得民心者不得天下”。但是,一个国家,民众没有国防意识也保不住天下。我们村共有21个企业,年人     

“没‘关系’没关系”

2003年初,我从作战部队交流到人武系统,为了让别人早点发现我这个“人才”,工作之余,我经常加班写稿,想证实我这个新武装的“实力”。可一连写了好多篇都如泥牛入海,使我很是尴尬狼狈。