US–China military relations: competition and cooperation

ABSTRACT

China’s efforts to build a ‘new type of great power relations’ and a ‘new type of military-to-military relations’ do not constitute a major turning point in relations with the United States. Political relations set limits on military cooperation, and the two sides have been unable to construct a sustainable strategic basis for relations. This has contributed to an ‘on-again, off-again’ pattern in military ties. Trends show a pattern of frequent disruptions in military-to-military relations from 2000 to 2010, followed by an increase in interactions beginning in 2012. Nevertheless, obstacles on both sides are likely to limit mutual trust and constrain future development of military-to-military relations.     

Civil–Military Relations in India: The China Crisis and After

The pattern of civil–military interaction in India is informed by the notion that civilians should refrain from involvement in operational matters. The emergence of this trend can be traced back to the defeat against China in 1962. In its aftermath, the belief that the debacle occurred because of civilian interference took hold. Thereafter, politicians restricted themselves to giving overall directives, leaving operational matters to the military. The Indian ‘victory’ in the subsequent war with Pakistan was seen as vindicating this arrangement. This essay argues that the conventional reading of the China crisis is at best misleading and at worst erroneous. Further, it contends that the subsequent war with Pakistan actually underscores the problems of civilian non-involvement in operational issues. The historical narrative underpinning the norm of civilian abstention is at the very least dubious.     

Measuring hard power: China’s economic growth and military capacity

China’s rapid economic growth is facilitating massive increases in its military spending and causing increased security concerns in Asia and the Western Pacific. But there is uncertainty over how large China’s military spending is relative to other countries, or how fast it is growing in real terms. We address this issue by deriving a relative military cost price index based on the relative unit costs of inputs. We find that China’s real military spending is much larger than suggested by exchange rate comparisons, and even larger than standard purchasing power parity comparisons. We also find, however, that the real growth of China’s military spending has been smaller than conventionally thought. This is due to rapidly growing wages in China and the large share of personnel in China’s military budget.     

China and American Seapower in East Asia: Is Accommodation Possible?

Abstract

Debates about the future of American seapower in East Asia turn on the argument that American seapower presents a risky and costly luxury that undercuts the cooperative potential of US–China relations. This article asks whether accommodation between China and the United States on the possession and exercise of American seapower in East Asia is possible. Accommodation on this front could significantly lower the risks of unintended escalation and in turn undermine arguments that favour an American retreat from East Asia. The article outlines how accommodation can be achieved on the exercise of American seapower in the region.     

Defense spending and economic growth: evidence from China, 1952–2012

This paper examines whether defense expenditures contributed to economic growth in China for the 1952–2012 period. We examine the contribution of defense to economic growth using recently published official data on economic activity, defense, and government expenditures. We employ the Feder-Ram and augmented Solow models of economic growth to explore the defense-growth relationship. The Feder-Ram model appears to poorly explain economic growth in China. The augmented Solow model suggests, however, that a 1% increase in defense expenditures raises the economic growth rate by approximately 0.15–0.19%.     

China’s ‘Three Warfares’: Origins,Applications, and Organizations

Entering the twenty-first century, China has demonstrated an assertive foreign policy, not only in employing various types of economic and military leverage but also in conducting the Three Warfares (三战) – psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare. This article attempts to identify the motives and methods of China’s Three Warfares by analyzing its history, logic, and agents. Based on this analysis, the author also presents the position of the Three Warfares in China’s foreign policy and the warfares’ impact on the international security environment involving other major powers and China’s neighbors.     

Innovation in China’s Defense Technology Base: Foreign Technology and Military Capabilities

ABSTRACT

China’s defense science, technology, and industrial system has been undergoing a far-reaching transformation over the past two decades and the single biggest factor behind this turnaround is the role of external technology and knowledge transfers and the defense industry’s improving ability to absorb these inputs and convert into localized output. China is pursuing an intensive campaign to obtain defense and dual-use civil–military foreign technology transfers using a wide variety of means, which is explored in this article.     

Hardening the Hard,Softening the Soft: Assertiveness and China’s Regional Strategy

There is a growing view that the emerging brand of Chinese regional diplomacy in recent years is increasingly assertive. This article attempts to make better sense of this perceived more forceful Chinese diplomacy. It argues that Chinese regional behavior is more profitably understood through the lens of a two-pronged foreign policy strategy that combines two particular aspects. One is a tougher and more uncompromising approach toward issues that China regards as concerning its core interests. The other is a more flexible and cooperative position toward interests that, while significant, are of secondary importance.     

UNCLOS and maritime security: the “securitisation” of the South China Sea disputes

This Critical Comment seeks to situate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) within the context of South China Sea (SCS) dispute. Bearing in mind that maritime actions of the main disputants – China, Vietnam, and the Philippines – increasingly “securitise” these long-standing disputes and vice versa, the study examines the concept of a maritime “regime complex.” Whereas efforts have being made to examine UNCLOS and indeed the dispute within the framework of a maritime “regime complex,” the key finding shows that the increased “securitisation” of the disputes makes it difficult to envisage effective engagement of UNCLOS as a resolution mechanism. It will also reveal that China's firmly established expansionist agenda in the SCS region is indicative of Beijing's susceptibility to compromise a diplomatic solution to these long-standing disputes. These discoveries are structured around the knowledge that the spatial relation of the SCS critically espouses not only its geo-strategic significance in terms of natural resources endowment, but also the enduring maritime disputes within the region.     

“This program will not be a threat to them”: Ballistic Missile Defense and US relations with Russia and China

Although the Obama Administration has differed from its predecessor in a number of respects, on the specific issue of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), there is a striking continuity. The Obama Administration has remained committed to the BMD project, even as it has modified the schedule of deployments and prioritized different systems from the Bush Administration. Significantly, this has led to Chinese and Russian balancing in the nuclear sphere. As a result, there is evidence of a security dilemma-type dynamics in US relations with China and Russia. At present, there is no study that analyzes Russian and Chinese hard internal balancing against the USA in the sphere of missile defense during the Obama Administration. This article fills this gap.     

The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Smart Power Quandary in Southeast Asia

Abstract

China has a strong interest in pursuing a smart power strategy towards Southeast Asia and has worked laboriously to engage with regional countries economically, socially, and politically. But China has been only partially successful in achieving its goals in the region. This paper argues that China’s security policy towards Southeast Asia significantly contradicts many other objectives that Beijing wishes to accomplish. Given the deep-seated, narrowly-defined national interests of the Chinese military in the South China Sea disputes, it is likely that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will continue to pose the main obstacle to the effective implementation of a Chinese smart strategy in Southeast Asia.     

Expanding the Dragon’s Reach:The Rise of China’s Anti-access Naval Doctrine and Forces

Among the multiple dimensions of the tous azimuths modernisation of Chinese naval forces, the development of China’s anti-access capacity has recently elicited considerable interest. The important link between this capacity and an overarching vision of the use of force – i.e. a naval doctrine – has, however, often been left implicit. This article shows that the particular development of China’s naval anti-access forces – more precisely, forces with an impact on the naval balance – can be explained by a shift of China’s naval doctrine towards a distinctly pre-emptive posture, which, itself, stems from the set of constraints imposed by the framework of ‘local war under informationised conditions’.     

Reforming China’s defense industry

ABSTRACT

Even with sizable economic inputs, access to foreign technologies, and considerable political will, China, up until the late 1990s, experienced only limited success when it came to the local design, development, and manufacture of advanced conventional weapons. Not surprisingly, therefore, reforming the local defense industry in order to upgrade its technology base and manufacturing capabilities and to make armaments production more efficient and cost-effective has long preoccupied the Chinese leadership. The fact that most of these efforts had little positive impact on the country’s military technological and industrial capabilities only encouraged Beijing to experiment with additional reforms in the hopes of finally getting it right.     

Arming China: Major powers’ arms transfers to the People’s Republic of China

The rise of China has been fuelled by a massive military modernisation programme relying, in large part, on the acquisition of foreign military equipment. The question of how the world’s major powers define their arms transfer policies towards China is therefore crucially important. This article makes two original contributions. First, drawing on neoclassical realism, it proposes an explanatory framework integrating international and domestic factors to explain variations in major powers’ arms transfers. Second, based on a large body of elite interviews and diplomatic cables, it offers the first comprehensive comparison of American, British, French and Russian arms transfer policies towards China since the end of the Cold War.     

The Dao of foreign policy: Understanding China’s dual strategy in the South China Sea

In the South China Sea, China neither implements power-maximizing policy nor engages a peaceful approach. Instead, China implements both coercion and cooperation in pursuing its strategic interest in the disputed area. How can we explain China’s paradoxical behavior? This article claims that the best way to explain China’s policy in the South China Sea is to understand the character of dualism in China’s strategic culture. Following constructivist theory that stresses culture, this article argues that Chinese duality approach in the South China Sea is rooted in the philosophy of Daoism. The symbol of Yin-Yang depicts Chinese assertive as well as cooperative behavior in dealing with the South China Sea dispute. Although from a normative perspective Daoism recognizes pacifism and non-violent behavior, the most important feature of Daoism is the assumption that reality consists of two opposing elements that are mutually embedded.     

Guns–butter tradeoff in contemporary China

This study offers an investigation of the relationship between defense and social spending in the People's Republic of China. In particular, three consecutive questions are answered here. Does a warfare–welfare tradeoff exist in China's budgetary allocation? Is it positive or negative? What is the causal direction involved? By applying a vector autoregression analysis for the period of 1952–2006, this study finds a unidirectional crowd-out effect going from defense to social spending.     

It Takes Two to Tango: Autocratic underbalancing,regime legitimacy and China’s responses to India’s rise

What factors do autocracies evaluate when responding to perceived threats and why might they fail to balance appropriately? I posit that autocratic leaders may choose greater exposure to an external threat if, by doing so, it preserves regime legitimacy. Specifically, the desire to promote a positive image to one’s domestic public creates incentives to publicly downplay a rival’s military progress, which then affects the state’s ability to mobilize resources to respond to the growing threat. I test this theory in the case of China’s response to India’s military rise. This research contributes to balancing theory and empirical work on East Asian security.