以可靠性为中心的维修

以可靠性为中心的维修(Reliability Centered maintenance——RCM)是美国航空界和美国防部制订装备预防维修大纲时所使用的一种维修理论,其主要目的是以最低的费用保持复杂装备的固有可靠性水平。本文跟踪RCM的发展过程,简述其基本原理和基本内容,并在综述国内外有关文献的基础上提出了笔者对RCM的认识及在军械系统应用RCM的必要性。     

基于案例的RCM分析系统研究

提出了利用基于案例的推理（CBR）技术开发以可靠性为中心的维修（RCM）分析系统的设想。提出了基于案例的RCM分析系统的结构,讨论了在开发系统原型机的过程中所采用的RCM案例的表示和组织,同类案例优先的检索策略,利用规则组合及调整案例等主要技术。     

以可靠性为中心的维修及其模型支持

从RCM分析的基本过程入手,分析了进行RCM决策模型研究的必要性,简要介绍了RCM分析决策过程,探讨了RCM决策模型的分类方法,提出了RCM建模研究的基本设想。     

武器雷达装备RCM推广应用中存在的问题及对策

分析了目前RCM推广应用中存在的问题,提出了加大宣传力度,统一思想认识等5项对策,对于在武器雷达装备上进一步推广应用RCM,具有重要的借鉴作用。     

基于RCM2200应用的专用网关设计

以太网作为现代主要的数据传输方式,以其高速性和很高的数据稳定性,已经从个人计算机到智能设备深入到世界的每个角落。研究了基于RCM2200设计专用网关将各种设备接入以太网中;介绍了RCM2200以太网微控制器以及DynamicC软件开发环境,讲述了如何利用DynamicC语言通过RCM2200核心模块实现专用网关设计。     

认知测试性——维修保障理论的新发展

基于信息化条件下,装备发展体系化、网络化、智能化的要求,针对装备保障理论的新发展,详细阐述了认知测试性的概念。首先介绍了认知测试性以及RCM,PHM的概念和原理,分析了认知测试性与RCM,PHM的区别与联系,并对认知测试性的指标体系进行了简要说明,阐明了认知测试性的必要性和可行性,认知测试性是未来装备测试性的发展方向,对装备的发展将产生深远的影响。     

基于灰色关联度的装备故障风险分析

由于各种故障模式的风险水平不同,而传统RCM定量风险分析方法没有考虑各因素间的权重,影响故障风险分析的准确性;在传统FMEA的基础上,通过灰色关联度分析,可实现各故障模式的风险排序,较传统RCM风险分析方法具有更高的精度,并用实例进行验证。     

武器雷达装备RCM分析决策系统

详细介绍了武器雷达装备RCM分析决策系统的体系结构、功能模块划分和数据库设计方法,并给出了系统的实现方案以及后续开发的设想。     

装备维修决策系统功能分析

本文分析了维修决策的特点,提出了装备维修决策系统应当具备的四项基本功能:RCM逻辑决断、预防性维修决策、修理级别决策、维修备件决策,并分别进行了初步的讨论。     

以可靠性为中心的装备维修

文章结合自行高炮在维修中存在的问题,通过分析现有的维修思想存在的误区,在现有维修体制中引入RCM的思想,并提出了优化决策的基本理论和方法。     

Putin – the masked nemesis of the strategy of ambiguity

Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive approach employed by Russia to reassert influence in Europe. The changing face of Russia’s strategy commenced in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia. This was followed by a large Russian conventional attack against Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas of the nation. 2014 witnessed the Russian annexation of Crimea where in just a week, Russia seized control of Crimea “without firing a shot.” The annexation of Crimea was rapidly followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in eastern Ukraine. The common thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and confuse decision makers in the West.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

An Unlikely Alliance: Portuguese and South African Airpower in Angola, 1968–1974

The war that Portugal was obliged to fight in Africa began in 1961 and immediately stretched the resources of its armed forces. Nowhere was this thinness more apparent than in policing the vast territory of Angola. The east and southeast of Angola were particularly vulnerable, as the area was a vast, sparsely populated region characterised by enormous featureless plains or chanas covered in tall grass and broken by an extensive river system and mountainous forests. The only military solution to policing these immense spaces was aviation and specifically the helicopter that could carry troops into battle, protect them with a gunship and bring them home when the operation was concluded. The immediate problem for the Portuguese Air Force (Força Aérea Portuguesa or FAP) in Angola and elsewhere was a scarcity of helicopters. The solution was an alliance with South Africa, which had a strong inventory of Alouette IIIs, to help in policing the east. This move was likewise in the interest of South Africa, as its threat came from Zambia through south-eastern Angola. This article examines the strategic and tactical development of this unusual, cross-cultural alliance and the symbiotic relationship that resulted in destruction of the enemies of both in Angola.     

国内外结构钢焊条研究的现状与发展

本文主要介绍了国外焊条的现状和发展趋势,包括焊条的高韧性、高效率、低尘低毒和耐吸潮性能,为国内的焊条研究提供了参考依据。     

A Sign of Victory?: ‘Scottish Swords’ and Other Weapons in the Possession of the ‘Auld Innemie’

Many late medieval documents, notably inventories of arms and armour, of Englishmen contain references to ‘Scottish swords’ and other weapons. What did the compilers of these documents mean when they described a weapon as ‘Scottish’? How did such weapons come to be in the possession of these men? This article will attempt to explain this phenomenon drawing on primary documentary sources and surviving material culture from Glasgow Museums’ collections and others, as well as artworks from the period.     

Reviews

Douglas S. Derrer, We Are All the Target: A Handbook of Terrorism Avoidance and Hostage Survival. Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1992. Pp. x+135, notes, index. $14.95. ISBN 01–55750–150–5

Ian Knight, Zulu: Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift, 22–23 January 1879. London: Windrow & Greene, 1992. Pp.136, 150 illus., incl 8 colour plates, maps, biblio. £35. ISBN 1–872004–23–7

Ian Knight, By the Orders of the Great White Queen: Campaigning in Zululand through the Eyes of the British Soldiers, 1879. London: Greenhill Books and Novato: Presidio Press, 1992. Pp. 272, 17 illus., 1 map. £18.95. ISBN 1–85367–122–3

Manfried Rauchensteiner and Erwin A. Schmidl (eds.), Formen des Krieges: vom Mittelalter zum ‘Low‐intensity’ Conflict’. Graz : Verlag Styria, 1991. Pp.208. DM35. ISBN 3–22–12139–7

Harold J. Kearsley, Maritime Power and the Twenty‐First Century. Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing Company, Limited, 1992. Pp.xv + 203, 13 diagrams, index. £32.50. ISBN 1–85521–288–9     

Cyberpower in Strategic Affairs: Neither Unthinkable nor Blessed

Abstract

This article explores the effect of connectivity on strategic affairs. It argues that the effect on war's character is potentially, although not yet shown in practice, considerably large. Its effect upon the distribution of power among states in the international system is small, contrary to the claims of ‘cyberwar’ alarmists. All told, however, its effect upon strategic affairs is complex. On the one hand, it represents a significant advance in the ‘complexification’ of state strategies, understood in the sense of the production of intended effects. On the other hand, strategists today – still predominantly concerned with the conflicts and confrontations of states and organised military power – are generally missing the power which non-traditional strategic actors, better adapted to the network flows of the information age, are beginning to deploy. These new forms of organization and coercion will challenge the status quo.     

Panjwai: a tale of two COINs in Afghanistan

The US Army has two approaches to counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. One is hard, or combat-focused, and the other is soft, or development-focused. This study examines two US Army task forces deployed to Panjwai District, Afghanistan from 2012 to 2013. CTF 4-9 and 1-38 offer a meaningful comparison because they pursued these contrasting approaches among the same population and against the same enemy at the same time and place. The study compares each unit’s approach and finds that neither approach was successful absent the other. The article concludes by recommending further research into combining the approaches at the operational level.