The essence of war: French armies and small war in the Low Countries (1672–1697)

In the late seventeenth century during the Dutch War (1672–1678) and the Nine Years War (1688–1697), French armies relied on small war for the accomplishment of essential tasks and as part of an overall strategy of exhausting their opponents in the Low Countries. The purposes of small war included the imposition of contributions on enemy populations, the destruction of the enemy base of operations, blockades of fortresses, and the general support of campaign armies. The expression ‘small war’ in the French language appeared with growing frequency in the 1690s. Small war can be viewed as both a cause and consequence of the characteristics of these wars. The limited policy goals of Louis XIV the king of France required a strategy that minimised risk and accomplished the goal of reducing if not eliminating the Spanish presence in the Low Countries that bordered the north of France. As French armies increased in size during this period, the demand for specialists at small increased in order to provide security and ensure supply. Small war in the late seventeenth century was thus not ideologically motivated insurgency, but in the minds of French commanders an essential component of strategy and the nature of war.     

Winning hearts and minds in the ‘war on terrorism’

Ten days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon US President George W Bush addressed a joint session of Congress. In an emotional speech he declared war on terrorism and vowed that the US would not rest until all of the perpetrators were brought to justice and A1 Qaeda destroyed. In virtually the next breath he hastened to add that the US-led campaign would not be a war on Islam, a promise Muslims might have found more reassuring had the President not sounded so much like a Baptist preacher. Whatever its propaganda value, the speech distorted the reality of the struggle facing the West while tacitly acknowledging an important truth. Since terror is merely a weapon in a larger struggle, there can be no war on terrorism per se. The West faces a counterinsurgency campaign on a global scale. Winning the hearts and minds of disaffected people in lands where terrorism thrives must be central to conducting this campaign.     

De Gaulle,the ‘Anglo-Saxons’, and the Algerian war

Rejecting the orthodoxy of French diplomatic historiography that de Gaulle was the founder of a new French independence and effected a revolution in French diplomacy after freeing himself from the Algerian yoke in 1962, this essay argues that de Gaulle sought from 1958 to make Algeria a central plank of his diplomatic strategy. That strategy sought to transform the relationship with Algeria in order forit to become the key to a neo-colonial French community, the basis for French leadership in Europe and the foundation of a new relationship of equality with Britain and the United States. However, largely as a result of de Gaulle's own making this policy failed to materialise.     

Has war a future?

On Future War, Martin van Creveld. London: Brassey's (UK), 1991. Pp.254, £24.50. ISBN 0–08–041796–5.     

A critique of Paul Collier's ‘greed and grievance’ thesis of civil war

Paul Collier has produced a well-written and apparently plausible thesis on ‘greed and grievance’, evidenced in several published texts, which concludes unambiguously that greed, not grievance, is overwhelmingly the cause of conflict. However, Collier has based these findings upon narrowly defined quantitative measures–three defined indices of greed and four indices of grievance. Collier consciously omitted indices which he found difficult to measure, such as suppliers of armaments and opportunities for bureaucratic corruption. However, he appears to have unwittingly omitted some further factors, including governance, management mechanisms for natural resources and the influence that charismatic leadership can have on rebel groups. These omissions can be viewed as a major flaw in Collier's work. They also explain why Collier has diagnosed that civil wars are more likely to occur in some countries in the developing world without offering adequate explanation of why this may be so.     

Daily life and motivation in war: The wehrmacht in the Soviet Union∗

Lucio Ceva, Le Forze armate. Turin: UTET, 1981, Pp. 641; L.48,000.

Bernd Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten: Die Waffen‐SS 1933–1945. Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1982. Pp. 363; DM48.

Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, Les avertissements qui venaient de Berlin, 9 octobre 1939–10 mai 1940. Paris‐Gembloux: Editions Duculot, 1982. Pp. 398; Fr.90.

Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma. New York: Simon &; Schuster. Pp. 587; $22.50.

Nigel Hamilton, Monty: Master of the Battlefield, 1942–1944. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1983. Pp.xxxi + 863; £12.95.

Bernard Burrows and Geoffrey Edwards, The Defence of Western Europe. London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982. Pp.155; £16.

Elmar Dinter and Paddy Griffith, Not Over by Christinas: NATO's Central Front in World War III. Chichester, Sussex: Antony Bird Publications, 1983. Pp.xiv + 178; £8.95.

David Capitanchik and Richard C. Eichenberg, Defence and Public Opinion. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983. Pp.ix + 98; £4.95.

Ian Clark, Limited Nuclear War. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982. Pp.266; £16.50.

Bhupendra Jasani (ed.), Outer Space ‐ A New Dimension of the Arms Race. London: Taylor and Francis, 1982. Pp. xviii + 423; £18.50.

William J. Taylor, Jr. and Steven A. Maaranen (eds.), The Future of Conflict in the 1980s. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982. Pp. xiii + 505.

Joseph S. Himes, Conflict and Conflict Management. Athens, GA; University of Georgia Press. 1980. Pp.333.

Richard Burt (ed.), Arms Control and Defense Postures in the 1980s. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press and London: Croom Helm, 1982. Pp.x + 230; £15.95.     

Israeli counter‐insurgency strategy and the war in South Lebanon 1985–97

Little has been written about attempts to alter the domestic political systems of these countries, even though this was central to the missions. The latter two cases were selected as extremes on a ‘degree of difficulty’ scale. In Somalia there was basically no governing structure; the US had to build one in order to end the starvation caused by civil war. In Panama the US took over a government in place and had an alternative national leader; the problem was to change the existing state system. The cases reveal a stress on short‐run security issues over long‐term political questions.     

Chemical weapons and the Iran‐Iraq war: A case study in noncompliance

Policy makers and scholars have drawn improper lessons from the Ukrainian case of disarmament. Employing a content analysis of Ukrainian and Russian news sources, as well as a series of interviews with Ukrainian officials conducted by the author, this paper argues that Ukraine did not surrender its nuclear arsenal because it received compensation or faced financial and technical hurdles in securing effective command and control over the weapons. Instead, Ukraine surrendered its nuclear weapons due to a lack of demand for them. The historical interactions between Ukrainians and Russians led the majority of Ukrainian leaders to reject a conception of the Ukrainian national identity that cognitively perceived Russia as a security threat. Only with a proper understanding of this case study can the international community understand how the nonproliferation norm succeeded.     

Facing ‘people's war’: Moltke the elder and Germany's military options after 1871

Prof. Dr Werner Hahlweg (ed.), Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege. Neunzehnte Auflage. Bonn: Duemmler, 1980. Pp. 1406; DM. 98.00.*

Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914–1918. The Live and Let Live System. London: The Macmillan Press, 1980. Pp. 226; £15.

Stephen Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet: Earl Beatty. London: Collins, 1980. Pp. 430; £12.95.

R.J. Overy, The Air War 1939–1945. London: Europa Publications, 1980. Pp. 250; £12.50.

Martin Binkin and Irene Kynakopoulos, Youth or Experience? Manning the Modern Military. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1980. Pp. 84; NP.

Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Bennett (eds), The Political Influence of the Military. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980. Pp. 508; £22.50; £6.90 (paperback).

Edward M. Spiers, The Army and Society 1815–1914. Themes in British Social History. London: Longman, 1980. Pp. 318; £9.95, £5.75 (paperback).

Richard K. Ashley, The Political Economy of War and Peace: The Sino‐Soviet‐American Triangle and the Modern Security Problematique. London: Frances Pinter, 1980. Pp. 384; £15.     

War and rumours of war,do improvements in space technologies bring space conflict closer?

Combat in near-Earth orbit is emerging as a more realistic possibility. The argument here is that changes in space technologies combined with a sea change in political rhetoric is bringing the possibility of military conflict in space technologies. This movement reflects a generational shift as the original decisions regarding military conflict in space are now being reassessed by a generation who did not experience World War II or the Cold War. For these, the sanctuary approach to space activities is not as persuasive and new enhanced space technologies bring the possibility of victory or at least survival possible during a conflict in space.