Growth and Fiscal Consequences of Terrorism in Nigeria

Abstract

In spite of government counter-terrorism expenditure and efforts, the incidence of terrorism in Nigeria appears to be rising. This paper examines the growth and fiscal consequences of terrorism in Nigeria by estimating the terrorism–macroeconomy relation using different measures of terror incidence. The results show that terrorism has an economically and statistically significant negative impact on growth; although this impact is considerably small and short-lived, manifesting only after a lag of about three years. Specifically, the cost of terrorism to Nigeria, in terms of lost GDP per annum, is estimated at 0.82%. Moreover, there is evidence that terrorism leads to the reallocation of economic activity away from private investment spending to government spending; that is, terrorism crowds out investment at a higher rate than its potential to crowd in government spending. Lastly, terrorism alters the composition of government expenditure – with the defence component of government expenditure rising vis-a-vis other expenditure items. The results are robust to allowing for dynamic interactions between terrorism and macroeconomic aggregates.     

Empirical Investigation into the Determinants of Terrorism: Evidence from Fragile States

Abstract

This study investigates the determinants of terrorism in countries that are in the top category of the Fragile States Index (FSI), and are also prone to terrorism. Panel data for 38 countries mainly from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia for the years 2005–2014 are used. Findings from the negative binomial and fixed effects estimation show that fragile state, number of refugees and youth unemployment have positive and significant impacts on terrorism. Military spending is positive but less robust across models. Conversely, FDI and remittances have a negative impact on terrorism with the former less robust. Governance and foreign aid are negative and insignificantly related to terrorism. Policy implications follow from the findings.     

Thirty Years of Conflict and Economic Growth in Turkey: A Synthetic Control Approach

Abstract

This study seeks to estimate the causal effects of PKK separatist terrorism on economic development in Turkey using the synthetic control method. By creating a synthetic control group that reproduces the Turkish Gross Domestic Product (GDP) before PKK terrorism emerged in the late 1980s, we compare the GDP of the synthetic Turkey and the actual for the period 1955–2008. Our study finds that the Turkish per capita GDP would have been higher by about $2600 had it not been exposed to terrorism. This translates into an average of 21.4% higher per capita GDP over a period of 21 years.     

TERRORISM: FACTS FROM FIGURES 1

If international terrorism is on a rising trend, an important source of confirmation or refutation of this is time‐series data on terrorist activity. Using chiefly data collected by the RAND/MIPT consortium we show using basic statistical analysis that in the period 1968–2005 the yearly number of all international terrorist incidents shows no trend over time, but fluctuates year on year in a random manner. On the other hand some indicators do show a definite trend over time, principally the steady rise in the number of incidents that are death‐dealing in nature. A further conclusion is drawn, showing that the proportion of these incidents leading to deaths above a given level is virtually fixed.     

How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence

Deterrence has been a crucial element in fighting terrorism, both in actual politics and rational choice analyses of terrorism. But there are superior strategies to deterrence. One is to make terrorist attacks less attractive. Another to raise the opportunity cost - rather than the material cost - to terrorists. These alternative strategies effectively dissuade potential terrorists. The strategies suggested here build on the "benevolence" system and tend to produce a positive sum game among the interacting parties. In contrast, the deterrence system is based on "threats" and tends to produce a negative sum game interaction.     

Terrorism research: should we focus on the opponent or on our own people?

In terrorism research, three different sources of information and data exist: the terrorists and their environment; the incidents; and the population. This article discusses the strengths and weaknesses of research that is concerned with, or relies on, any of the mentioned sources. An in-depth understanding of the methodological issues that come with these sources is important to correctly interpret results from scientific studies. It is highlighted how the different scientific approaches add to a holistic view of terrorism as a phenomenon. Furthermore, the double-edged sword of information in the field of terrorism is discussed. From these deliberations, guidance concerning the future work of both scholars and decision-makers can be deducted.     

End of the cycle: assessing ETA’s strategies of terrorism

ABSTRACT

In May 2018, the Basque insurgent group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) officially disbanded after a 60-year struggle. This inquiry assesses ETA’s violent campaigns using recent conceptual and theoretical advancements from the field of terrorism studies. Three conclusions concerning the group’s strategies of terrorism are advanced. First, ETA regularly targeted civilians to achieve goals other than coercing the Government of Spain; these objectives included outbidding rival separatist groups and spoiling negotiation processes. Second, ETA’s most rapid period of organizational growth occurred as the result of an aggressive terrorist campaign, demonstrating that civilian targeting can serve as a stimulus to rebel group recruitment. Finally, while terrorism did not advance ETA’s primary political objective of creating an independent Basque state, it did enable the group to assume a leading position within the radical Basque separatist movement, helping extend ETA’s lifespan and making the group an embedded actor within the contentious political processes surrounding the question of Basque self-determination. Collectively, these conclusions support recent theoretical findings arguing that non-state terrorism often enables insurgent groups to prolong their lifespans while paradoxically making it more difficult for them to advance their long-term political objectives.     

SECURITY BRIEF

September 11 2001 precipitated the introduction of anti-terrorism legislation in most states and enhanced cooperation between states around the world. Africa may not have witnessed many incidents of international terrorism on its soil, yet the continent has, in the post 9/11 era, often been referred to as the ‘breeding ground of terrorism’ or the conduit for international terrorists. The assumption that countries with weak governments and failing economies (as in most of the continent) seems to be one of the factors that earned Africa this negative image. While the validity of the assumption is debatable, it is clear that prosecuting cases of terrorism is fraught with legal intricacies. This article deals with the difficulties involved.     

Terrorism and the macroeconomy: Evidence from Pakistan

Pakistan with highest number of terrorism related deaths of any country over the past decade, the number exceeding the total terrorism related deaths for both the European and North American continents, provides an ideal laboratory to study impact of terrorism on the macroeconomy. Quasi-Structural VAR, Vector Error Correction Model, Impulse Response Functions and Granger-Causality tests on a sample that covers over 4500 terrorist incidents and consequent 10, 200 deaths [from 1973 to 2010] are employed to study the relationship between terrorism and the macroeconomy. One of the major advantages of the current methodology is that it not only enables one to circumvent the heterogeneity biases inherent in cross-country studies but it also allows distinguishing between short and long-run effects. It is documented that cumulatively terrorism has cost Pakistan around 33.02% of its real national income i.e. terrorism costs Pakistan around 1% of real GDP per capita growth every year.     

Spatial Distribution of Minority Communities and Terrorism: Domestic Concentration versus Transnational Dispersion

Qualitative studies of terrorist movements frequently highlight the importance of diaspora communities as important factors in producing and sustaining terrorist activity in countries. The underlying theoretical argument is that bifurcation of tight-knit minority communities between countries nurtures separatist or irredentist sentiments among affected community members, thus prompting terrorist activity, while minority community members in other countries might mobilize financial and political resources to support terrorist activity among their compatriots. In this study, we empirically test whether transnational dispersion, versus domestic concentration, of minority communities in countries produces higher incidents of terrorism. Conducting a series of negative binomial estimations on a reshaped database of around 170 countries from 1981 to 2006, derived from the Minorities at Risk database and the Global Terrorism Database, we determine that both transnational dispersion of kin minority communities and domestic concentration of minorities within countries increase terrorism and that transnational dispersion is a particularly robust predictor of terrorist attacks.     

The Political Economy of Legislation on Terrorism

^{1 1}This research was funded in part by a grant from the Lowe Institute of Political Economy. The corresponding author is S. Brock Blomerg. We thank Chris Blomberg and Brianna Loyosa for their excellent research assistance on the project. This paper presents an empirical analysis of what drives congressional legislation on terrorism during the period 1995 to 2010. We utilize and augment current methodology to compile and analyze data on sponsorship and cosponsorship of terrorism related data. Our results on the sources of legislation on terrorism are largely in line with past examinations of the importance of committee membership and leadership, party majority-ship, and other political factors. Further, we find that the most significant and robust drive for legislation on terrorism is the September 11^th attacks. And while the impact of 9/11 affected legislative productivity everywhere, we find that it most significantly affected states surrounding New York and Washington D.C. Our results indicate that the economy may be one factor motivating politicians to legislate on terrorism; however, these results are not robust.     

The ‘War on Terrorism’: What Does it Mean to Win?

Abstract

The war on al-Qaeda and its affiliates appears to be endless but every war must end. Winding down the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has been difficult, but both were embedded in what was then called the ‘war on terrorism.’ What does ‘success’ in that war mean? With the death of bin Laden and the increase in drone operations, how far is the US from achieving it? Can this war end? The article analyzes the ongoing US response to the 9/11 attacks in historical context, revealing four patterns common to all prolonged wars: means become ends, tactics become strategy, boundaries are blurred, and the search for a perfect peace replaces reality. It concludes by laying out an effective strategy for ending the war.     

Rising Tide,Dispersing Waves: Opportunities and Challenges for Chinese Seapower Development

Abstract

This article surveys China’s current naval forces and considers key dynamics and possible Chinese naval futures to 2020, the projected end of Beijing’s ‘strategic window of opportunity’, the idea that a peaceful external environment for economic development, globalization, and integration of China into the global economy allows China to benefit from diversion of US attention to countering terrorism. It considers broad possibilities through 2030, the general limit of public US government projections, and by which time multiple factors will likely slow China’s growth and compete for leadership focus and resources.     

Uranium yellowcake trafficking incidents in Africa

The perpetuation of an otherwise astute fissile material safeguards model by the current non-proliferation regime raises a number of concerns, not least the efficacy of the approach in reducing clandestine weapon developments and the nuclear terrorism threat. Mindful of potential shifts in illicit nuclear material and weapon acquisition, following an excessive focus on fissile material safeguards and the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology, this article uses proliferation trend and scenario analysis in a bid to identify potential proliferation threats and non-proliferation opportunities. The results of the article's assessment of reported incidents (1992–2013) involving theft, unauthorised possession, and attempts to smuggle or sell highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, low-enriched uranium (LEU), natural uranium and uranium yellowcake reveal a decline in occurrences involving fissile material but an increase in uranium yellowcake incidents, particularly in Africa. Presumptions that yellowcake may have provided the newest threat to clandestine weapon developments and nuclear terrorism wane amid concerns over possible biases in reporting, scepticism over an organised and demand-driven nuclear black market, and the difficulties of non-state actors’ development of crude nuclear weapons off the tedious yellowcake conversion-enrichment-fabrication pathway. To secure Africa's uranium yellowcake from potential proliferators, the article proposes concerted domestic, regional and multilateral non-proliferation efforts.     

FORECASTING SERIES CONTAINING OFFSETTING BREAKS: OLD SCHOOL AND NEW SCHOOL METHODS OF FORECASTING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Transnational terrorism data are difficult to forecast because they contain an unknown number of structural breaks of unknown functional form. The rise of religious fundamentalism, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the rise of al Qaeda have changed the nature of transnational terrorism. ‘Old School’ forecasting methods simply smooth or difference the data. ‘New School’ methods use estimated break dates to control for regime shifts when forecasting. We compare the various forecasting methods using a Monte Carlo study with data containing different types of breaks. The study's results are used to forecast various types of transnational terrorist incidents.     

The ligaments of counter-terrorism regime: sexual violence and the vicarious traumatisation of female non-governmental organisation workers: evidence from Nigeria

ABSTRACT

There is a dearth of studies on indirect victims of sexual violence in counter-terrorism efforts. Using Nigeria as a case study, this paper argues that global and state-level counter-terrorism policies have generally failed to account for the psychological effects of the engagement of female NGO workers in counter-terrorism operations or mitigating the effects of terrorism in conflict zones. Specifically, there has been an increase in sexual violence perpetrated by some members of the security agencies involved in counter-terrorism operations in North-eastern Nigeria. As a result, female NGO workers carry out Medicare, psychosocial counselling and advocacy for these victims. Female NGO workers become exposed to the trauma of victims of sexual violence, which affects their mental health and thus performances in counter-terrorism activities in the country. This altered their worldview on issues of safety even among secured locations or among the presence of security agents and reinforced feelings of powerlessness.     

Doing Away with “Legitimate Authority”

ABSTRACT

I argue in this article that traditional just war theory did allow private, indeed even individual war, and that arguments in support of a legitimate authority criterion, let alone in support of the “priority” of this criterion, fail. I further argue that what motivates the insistence on “legitimate authority” is the assumption that doing away with this criterion will lead to chaos and anarchy. I demonstrate that the reasoning, if any, underlying this assumption is philosophically confused. The fact of the matter is that wars need not necessarily be authorized by some higher authority (such as a king, president, or parliament) in order to be justified, and this moral fact does not need to lead to chaos and anarchy. Accordingly, the criterion of legitimate authority cannot be relied on to delegitimate individual war, private war, guerrilla war, or even terrorism. Finally, I consider some other defenses of authorization and demonstrate that the “authorization” these accounts defend is either not needed for justification or already provided by other just war criteria or, indeed, entirely fictitious.     

Worth many sins: Al-Shabaab’s shifting relationship with Kenyan women

ABSTRACT

What happens when the world’s ‘oldest profession’ interacts with history’s oldest form of war? In the Horn of Africa, a symbiotic relationship between prostitutes and terrorists has emerged, illuminating critical information about the group’s ideology and strategy. In this article, we argue that al-Shabaab’s differential treatment of Somali and other East African women reveals the group’s strategic focus on Somalia, despite its claims to be a globally focused Islamic extremist organization. Through original ethnographic fieldwork in Kenya, the authors explore al-Shabaab’s deliberate relationships with different groups of women and explain how this helps scholars better understand the group. This article suggests the next phase of scholarship on gender and terrorism, encouraging scholars not only to pay attention to the relationship between women and terrorist groups, but to also examine the nuanced relationships between different categories of women and terrorist groups.     

Competitive Statehood in Libya: Governing Differently a Specific Setting or Deconstructing its Weak Sovereign State with a Fateful Drift Toward Chaos?

Abstract

Libya in 2011 witnessed a real process of political change, though different from all the policy-oriented jargon equating transition with a teleological transition to democracy. Due to the resilience of the Qadhafi regime in power and with the essential role of NATO intervention, the process was eased out by a eight-month civil war. Governance in post-Qadhafi Libya was not done through the rebuilding of centralized authorities. But it took the specific form of the emergence of multiple non-state actors embedded in local dynamics and then connected with weakened central authorities that had access to the huge Libyan resources. That raised complex questions about the quality of this mode of governance, especially at a time of pressing problems for Libya and its neighbors, whether direct ones (Tunisia, Egypt, Mali) or farther countries across the Mediterranean sea: terrorism with the expansion of Da’esh into the country and flows of refugees crossing Libya’s uncontrolled borders and flowing into Italy and then Europe by thousands.