美国国防太空力量发展的动向及应对 ——基于对美国2020年《国防太空战略》的解读

发展国防太空力量是美国谋划大国竞争的战略支点。特朗普政府执政以来,为捍卫一超独霸的太空地位,加速推进太空军事化进程,已制定《国家太空战略》,签署新的太空政策指令,成立第六军种“天军”。2020年6月,美国公开最新版《国防太空战略》报告。本文对其梳理分析以研判美国国防太空力量发展动向,并运用网络调研法搜集近年美国政府部门关于国防太空力量发展的权威政策文本及知名智库的深度研究报告。在此基础上,把美国2020年最新版《国防太空战略》作为中心文本,以文献分析法归纳美国国防太空力量发展的动因、目标及行动计划。中国作为负责任的发展中太空大国,应当积极借鉴并应对美国2020年《国防太空战略》：内强素质,提升国防太空军事技术硬实力;外树形象,在国际场合积极推动太空和平利用的政策议程。     

U.S. SPACE WEAPONS

Under the administration of President George W. Bush, Pentagon rhetoric has increasingly articulated a more robust vision of space as a future battlefield. This analysis details some of the ongoing spending for research and development programs identified in current U.S. Air Force, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and Defense Advanced Research and Planning Agency (DARPA) planning and budget documents related to “space control” and “space force projection.” This analysis finds that current support for “space superiority” and “space control” systems remains largely rhetorical—with little actual budgetary support. Unclassified technology development programs included in the six-year Future Years Defense Plan are a decade or more away from deployment. Programs related to offensive counterspace, space-based missile defense interceptors, and space-based strike total slightly less than $300 million in FY 2006 funding. We conclude significantly higher expenditures in research and development would be required to develop and deploy killer micro satellites, space-based missile defense interceptors, and military space planes.     

Making defense planning meaningful: the evolution of strategic guidance in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense

Hungary, a former communist state, adapted a Western-style defense planning system during the 1990s and 2000s. Although on the surface the elements of this planning system were similar to the planning programming budgeting system (PPBS) developed by the US Department of Defense, strategic guidance for defense planning has not been properly developed until recently. Thus, albeit PPBS-based defense plans were developed in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense (Hungarian MoD) regularly, they lacked both an expression of clear priorities and strategic focus. This article delineates the evolution of strategic guidance in the Hungarian MoD concentrating on current developments, and introduces the newly elaborated analytical concepts and tools, which helped to create needed strategic guidance in Hungary.     

Space,the New Domain: Space Operations and Chinese Military Reforms

ABSTRACT

The Chinese military has embarked on a series of organizational and doctrinal reforms intended to better enable it to fight modern war. Prominent among these reforms is the growing emphasis on space to enable long-range precisions strikes and on counterspace to deny space capabilities to an adversary. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has officially designated space as a new domain and established an organization to command space forces. With this increased focus on space, the PLA may begin to develop a doctrine to govern the use of space in military operations. The higher priority given to space, especially space control, by the PLA coincides with similar actions by the US military, increasing the possibility of warfare in space and the risks of escalation.     

The rise and fall of counterproliferation policy

The US government initiated a Defense Counterproliferation Initiative to address the concern that, in the post-Cold War years, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons would be widespread and create a significant challenge to the US military’s combat operations. In particular, non-nuclear states might use chemical or biological warfare agents against US forces with the belief that nuclear weapons would not be used against them in retaliation. Following the events of September 11, 2001, defense strategy and policy shifted to a wider view of the threat of adversarial use of “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) and the term “counterproliferation” was replaced by “combating” or “countering WMD.” Over time, the Defense Department increasingly moved away from counterproliferation principles with the detrimental effect of losing capabilities that US forces still need for contemporary adversaries. This shift has been aggravated by other US government agencies’ use of “counterproliferation” in lieu of what would have been termed “nonproliferation” activities in the 1990s. The loss of clarity within the US government on these terms has led to the inability to focus the “whole of government” on this significant national security challenge. To alleviate this challenge, the US government needs a top-down initiative to refocus policy on the distinctly different aspects of WMD with respect to military combat operations, combating terrorism, and homeland security.     

‘Full spectrum dominance’: Donald Rumsfeld,the Department of Defense,and US irregular warfare strategy, 2001–2008

This article examines the evolution of US irregular warfare (IW) doctrine and practice from 2001 onwards. It argues that, after 9/11, top-tier civilian policymakers in the US Department of Defense (DoD) and across the US government developed a heightened awareness of asymmetric threats and non-conventional forms of warfare, especially those shaped by contemporary globalisation. The result was a gradual turn towards irregular warfare, led by Rumsfeld and the DoD, designed to ensure ‘full spectrum dominance’ across all modes of conflict. This pre-dated the insurgency in Iraq and the promotion of counterinsurgency in the US Army by General David Petraeus and others. Policymakers' reluctance to acknowledge the insurgency in Iraq was not down to a failure to understand the concept of IW, but because they had viewed Iraq in conventional terms for so many years and were reluctant to admit their mistake.     

The national defense function and federalism: the importance of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act

Countries with a federalist system of government have different arrangements for providing national security. US national security is provided by national and State defense forces. The quintessential national function – national defense – experienced some changes that enhanced the role of the States. Policy changes in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (2008 NDAA) introduced new roles for the Governors and the State defense forces, or the National Guard. This article explores how the interests of Congress and States aligned in the 2008 NDAA such that the national defense function changed. This article finds that the national government continues to have the central coordinating role, but that the politics and provisions of the 2008 NDAA changed the national–State relationship in mission, decision-making, and command and control so that US federalism in the national defense function is evolving in unexpected ways.     

美国应对外空国际条约的做法简析

针对现行国际空间法存在的诸多漏洞和缺陷,国际空间大国积极利用这些漏洞寻求开展外空试验的依据,并规避法律的约束以发展外空武器装备,使得外空存在被武器化的风险,外空军备竞赛日益激烈。因此,研究并利用外空条约、关注空间大国开展外空试验的现实做法,可以为开展外空活动提供借鉴和依据。本文重点研究了美国海基反卫试验和轨道快车试验,从试验背景、目的、对外口径以及对外反应几个方面,综合对比分析了试验的现实做法,剖析了美国应对外空条约的做法,从技术上、政策上和法律上得出了如何应对的方法和途径。研究成果可为我国合理合法地开展外空行动提供借鉴,从而赢得国际社会的认可。     

‘A fly in outer space’: Soviet ballistic missile defence during the Khrushchev period

Although the Soviet missile defence effort was begun to protect the USSR from attack by nuclear missiles, Khrushchev was quick to see its political value, and used the prospect of an anti‐ballistic missile system to emphasize Soviet technological superiority. Within the Soviet armed forces there was widespread consensus about the importance of ABM's damage‐limiting role. The debates about strategy for future war in Soviet military publications demonstrate that support in the armed forces for an ABM capability transcended service loyalties and remained remarkably strong even after 1962, when technical problems and an effort to improve relations with the US following the Cuban Missile Crisis meant that the missile defence project no longer enjoyed the public backing of senior Party and military figures.     

US strategic preferences in the early twenty-first century

This article investigates how US national security planners have envisioned the emerging strategic environment during the early twenty-first century and evaluates how their perceptions of this strategic environment have changed during these years. This conceptual evolution can be seen in how defense planners define threats, identify defense priorities, and design security strategies. Five key strategic planning documents serve as the basis for this analysis and illustrate significant shifts in how the US government has envisioned its own security requirements as well as the context within which its strategic vision will need to be realized. These planning documents are: (1) Joint Vision 2020, (2) the Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, (3) the Obama Administration's 2010 National Security Strategy, (4) US Strategic Defense Guidance entitled Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21^st Century Defense, and (5) the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020.     

Hard Balancing in the Age of American Unipolarity: The Russian Response to US Ballistic Missile Defense during the Bush Administration (2001–2008)

One of the central debates in contemporary international relations scholarship concerns the issue of whether balancing has occurred in response to US-based unipolarity, and if it has, how this should be characterised. Existing research has seen analysts argue that major power responses to unipolarity can be placed in one of either three categories: an absence of balancing, soft balancing, and hard balancing. This article contributes to the scholarly literature by providing a case study of hard internal Russian balancing against the US’s development and deployment of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems during the Bush Administration (2001–08). Russian hard balancing against the US has involved: (1) fielding new strategic nuclear and conventional weapons equipped with BMD countermeasures, and, relatedly, (2) making changes in military doctrine. As a result, security dilemma dynamics are increasingly in evidence in US relations with Russia.     

US paramilitary programs in comparative perspective: CIA,the US Army Special Forces,and the question of organizational form

Assumed in the long-standing debate over which agency, CIA or the Department of Defense, should conduct US paramilitary operations is the idea that these organizations’ paramilitary programs are fundamentally the same kinds of things. This article questions that assumption by investigating the organizational forms underlying these agencies’ paramilitary programs in four empirical cases drawn from South Vietnam and post-9/11 Afghanistan. A typology is constructed around two identified organizational forms: “franchising” for CIA vs. “company ownership” for the US Army Special Forces. Different paramilitary organizational forms are found to have significant operational implications that should inform the paramilitary transfer debate.     

美国国防部资助的实验室体系架构

美国国防部管理或委托管理的实验室散布在大学、联邦资助的研发中心和直属科研机构中,是美国国防科技创新体系的一支重要力量。文章从科研经费、人员规模、研究特色等方面对这些实验室进行分类介绍和分析,勾勒出其体系架构,以期对我们布局和建设以国防科技研发为核心任务的实验室、中心等科研机构提供参考。     

A trajectory for homeland ballistic missile defense

The Ground-based Midcourse Defense system is intended to protect the US homeland against limited attacks from intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles. It has succeeded in intercepting target missiles and can engage a threat launched from North Korea or the Middle East, targeting any point in the USA. Nevertheless, high-profile struggles and program changes related to homeland ballistic missile defense (BMD) continue to make headlines. The most significant struggle has been a string of three straight intercept test failures over five years, followed by the recent successful intercept test in June 2014. This article first briefly reviews the current threats of concern. It then examines homeland BMD policy objectives, followed by the current major technical issues in supporting these objectives and, then, the likelihood of negating a warhead. Finally, it highlights major considerations that should be part of the trajectory the US government takes moving forward.     

浅析信息化体系结构在潜艇装备维修保障中的应用

分析了武器装备维修保障信息化的基本内涵,阐述了信息化体系结构的基本概念,在分析目前主流的信息化体系结构的基础上,对构建潜艇武器装备维修保障信息化体系结构需要解决的主要问题进行论述,并给出基于美国国防部体系结构框架规范的潜艇武器装备维修保障信息化业务活动模型。     

导弹防御系统中的雷达目标识别研究

以评估美国国家导弹防御(NMD)系统雷达识别能力为背景,分析了地基雷达识别弹道导弹目标的技术途径。根据弹道导弹目标群在飞行中段和再入段表现出的特性差异,提出了涉及目标结构特性、姿态特性以及再入特性的综合识别策略,并初步分析了各种识别措施的可行性。     

An Empirical Analysis of the Arms Race Between South and North Korea

This study analyses an arms race between South and North Korea over the period 1963–2000. Despite the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula, the arms race between South and North Korea has rarely been studied. In this study, the South–North arms race is empirically estimated using Richardson’s action–reaction model. The pattern of South–North arms race between the Cold War (1963–1989) and the post‐Cold War eras (1990–2000) as well as the existence of an arms race is examined comparing both countries’ defence spending, number of military personnel and tactical aircraft.     

基于ABM方法的空间碎片网捕体系结构建模

空间碎片网捕是一种新型的空间碎片清理方式。首先介绍了基于活动的建模方法(ABM)以及进行体系结构建模的流程,之后基于系统的基本工作流程,使用System Architect软件对空间碎片网捕任务的体系结构进行了可视化建模,得到了典型的作战视图,并进行了任务流程的仿真;对理解空间目标网捕系统的功能、研究空间碎片网捕任务的流程,提出系统构建需求具有一定的参考价值。。     

Impediments to Fighting the Islamic State: Private Contractors and US Strategy

The United States has returned to Iraq, this time to combat the Islamic State. President Barack Obama’s strategy to ‘degrade, and ultimately destroy the terrorist group’ faces serious problems due to political obstacles in obtaining Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) and more importantly because of neglect of the crucial role of private contractors. Although the narrative has changed, and there is no public mention of contractors, they remain central to all that the Department of Defense does in the US and abroad. Suggestions are offered on how their performance can be improved to support President Obama’s strategy.     

应用地面电磁发射清除空间碎片方法

针对传统化学发射的空间碎片清除技术成本过高、难以实施的问题,提出应用地基电磁发射方式的空间碎片清除新方法。通过地面电磁发射的方式以低成本将射弹运送至空间,并通过释放空间微粒云团控制空间碎片离轨,进而实现对空间碎片的清除。由于取消使用占绝大部分成本的化学推进剂,所提出的应用地基电磁发射的空间碎片清除技术为空间碎片低成本清除提供了有效解决途径。