Is Russia a revisionist military power in the Arctic?

In contrast with a widespread perception of Russia as an expansionist power in the Arctic, this article argues that Moscow does not seek military superiority in the region. Rather, Moscow's military strategies in the Arctic pursue three major goals: first, to demonstrate and ascertain Russia's sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the region; second, to protect its economic interests in the High North; and third, to demonstrate that Russia retains its great power status and still has world-class military capabilities. The Russian military modernization programs are quite modest and aim at upgrading the Russian armed forces in the High North rather than providing them with additional offensive capabilities or provoking a regional arms race. The Russian ambitions in the Arctic may be high, but they are not necessarily implying the intentions and proper capabilities to confront other regional players by military means. On the contrary, Moscow opts for soft rather than hard power strategy in the Arctic.     

Population transfers in counter-insurgency: a recipe for success?

Since control over the population constitutes the most crucial determinant for victory in irregular warfare, how should a state authority isolate the insurgents (the “fish” in Maoist terms) from the population (the “sea” in which the “fish” thrive)? Should a state authority simply drain the “sea” by diverting its “water” elsewhere? Does the forcible transfer of the local people who support an insurgency truly work? This article studies how the royalist regime of Greece forcibly transferred thousands of villagers (over 10% of the total population) to counter the communist insurgency during the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) and shows whether and how these deportations could be crowned with success.     

“Respect” as a personal attribute in the British Army

This article describes the results of research into the social phenomenon of “respect” as framed by junior members of the British Army, as part of a wider study into the Values and Standards of the British Army. This research was interview based, using qualitative analysis software to detect, manage, and draw conclusions from the qualitative data recorded in those interviews. The data indicated that the primary situation in which “respect” was visualised by the participants was the unit context, and that it comprised a combination of three different strands: respect for rank or “hierarchical respect,” “professional respect” for a person's military competence, and “personal respect” for an individual's character, personal behaviour, and attributes. The overall respect that an individual is given arises from the combination of these three areas. “Respect” as a concept was, in the soldiers’ characterisation, something that had to be earned (except for the “given” represented by rank) and was not stable: a person's fund of respect could go up or down in social value. Respect was also linked to trust: the more respect a person had, the more they could be trusted. Although the unit context was the primary one for discussing their framing of the concept of respect, many of the participants reported a wider dimension in which every human being deserves a basic level of respect simply for being human, and this level could not be forfeited.     

Why did Sudan Lose a small war in Southern Sudan?

ABSTRACT

When on the wrong end of an asymmetry in the projection of hard power, weaker sides countenance the grim arithmetic of avoiding direct and massed confrontations. Invariably, insurgents have over the ages tended to employ indirect tactical methods to render their stronger opponents ineffective. Ultimately – interest asymmetry, regime type, asymmetries of strategy, and external intervention – combine in a complex interplay and pattern, to militate against a strong side. In Sudan, these factors interacted throughout the civil wars to produce regional autonomy and finally an independent South Sudan in 2011. Similar strategic logic had confronted many large African states battling insurgencies in Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Zaire, and apartheid-era South Africa. Oftentimes, weakening public resolve has caused these governments to accommodate, capitulate or withdraw even if they try not to blink. Notwithstanding the regime type, it can be concluded that the majority of strong actors are prone to fail in a protracted, asymmetric conflict. Hence, the notion of linking victory in counterinsurgency to the degree of openness (democratic polyarchies); or closeness (totalitarianism) – is still valid but highly contestable in the case of Africa’s large dysfunctional states.     

Aligning national “logics” in a European military helicopter program

This article analyzes the public side of the NH90 network consisting of four participating countries (Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands) and their industrial partners. Comparable to observations in earlier international projects in the defense sector, the development and production of the NH90 defense helicopter did not match original plans and costs estimates. On the basis of four mechanisms that were intended to facilitate the cooperation between the partnering countries (the General Memorandum of Understanding; coalition formation; the role of the central agency; and the process of vertical escalation) the question is posed whether or not there was a true alignment of national interests and “logics.” The lack of standardization, as well as program delays and issues concerning the division of the work-share, lead to the emerging alignment being characterized as “quasi-alignment” at best.     

The rules of engagement in Somalia – a judge advocate's primer 1

Scholars disagree on the prevailing focus on insurgent ideology. Some claim that the dominant Marxist ideology of the Cold War era has been supplanted by a new focus on ethnic and national identity. Others claim that many insurgencies were always focused on identity, but the Cold War and superpower antipathies distorted perceptions of insurgencies as politically-economically focused. Yet the heart of the matter is that analysts are not faced with an ‘either/or’ proposition.     

The partisan war in north-west Russia 1941–44: a re-examination

This article examines the extent to which the limited achievements of the Soviet partisan movement in north-west Russia during the first months of the Great Patriotic War can be attributed largely to inadequacies in the organisation, leadership, equipment and training of the movement as emphasised in Soviet and post-Soviet Russian published works. On the basis of Soviet archival sources the author concludes that while these factors were important, German occupation policies were far more effective in inhibiting partisan activity in the area concerned than existing published material would have us believe. However, these policies seem only to have been effective in the context of the German military successes or perceived successes at the front. The author goes on to examine factors contributing to the dramatic increase in Soviet partisan activity towards the end of the period of German occupation.     

Building Trust in the Mission Area: a Weapon Against Terrorism?

Military units on missions abroad face, among other challenges, terrorism. Terrorists are hard to recognize since they operate non-uniformed. Detection of terrorists in the area of operation can best be done by winning the trust of the local population, who can provide information. However, since the military rotates its units regularly, it is hard to build up a trusting relationship with the local population. Other players in the field of international operations are civil aid organisations. They remain in the area for a lengthy period of time, and often build up trusting relationships with the local population. Trust between civil aid organisations and the military is a triple edged sword, as it enables co-operation: the civil aid organisations get the protection they need from the military, the military gets the information it needs through civil aid organisations and the local population is supported in rebuilding society by repressing terrorism.     

Civil–military relations in France: is there a gap?

Since President Jacques Chirac's 1996 decision to professionalise the armed forces, many political and military leader expressed concerns about its potential consequences on civil–military relations. Will the shift to an all-volunteer force create a gap in civil–military relations? The goal of the article is to provide a preliminary assessment of civil–military relations in France before the full professionalisation of the armed forces. Using the results of existing polls conducted annually, I lay out a basis of comparison to evaluate the future evolution of civil–military relations on several dimensions: image of the military, perception of civil–military relations, social and political values, and the legitimacy of the use of force. Although civil–military relations in France have never been as harmonious since the Second World War as they are today, the article argues that these relations are not as rosy as they may seem.     

‘What is in a Name?’: The Role of (Different) Identities in the Multiple Proxy Wars in Syria

Abstract

Post-uprisings Middle East politics is frequently described as a ‘regional cold war’ involving proxy warfare that emphasises the role of shared identities linking external and local actors. But does the ‘content’ of identities impact proxy war dynamics? This article considers the present ‘battle for Syria’, a local conflict that became a theatre for multiple proxy wars involving actors emphasising identities on various levels, most notably national, religious/ sect and ethnic. It suggests that identity content does matter, with global powers more reluctant than regional players to back groups identifying at sub-national level, while foreign non-state actors are enthusiastic backers of sub-national identity.     

When is a base stock policy optimal in recovering disrupted cyclic schedules?

The extended economic lot scheduling problem (EELSP) is concerned with scheduling the production of a set of items in a single facility to minimize the long-run average holding, backlogging, and setup costs. Given an efficient cyclic production schedule for the EELSP, called the target schedule, we consider the problem of how to schedule production after a single schedule disruption. We propose a base stock policy, characterized by a base stock vector, that prescribes producing an item until its inventory level reaches the peak inventory of the target schedule corresponding to the item's position in the production sequence. We show that the base stock policy is always successful in recovering the target schedule. Moreover, the base stock policy recovers the target schedule at minimal excess over average cost whenever the backorder costs are proportional to the processing times. This condition holds, for example, when the value of the items is proportional to their processing times, and a common inventory carrying cost and a common service level is used for all the items. Alternatively, the proportionality condition holds if the inventory manager is willing to select the service levels from a certain set that is large enough to guarantee any minimal level of service, and then uses the imputed values for the backorder costs. When the proportionality condition holds we provide a closed-form expression for the total relevant excess over average cost of recovering the target schedule. We assess the performance of the base stock policy when the proportionality condition does not hold through a numerical study, and suggest some heuristic uses of the base stock policy. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Ruminations of a pachyderm or what I learned in the counter‐insurgency business

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has created a pervasive climate of fear in northern Uganda. This study addresses the purpose of this conduct. Diverging from the traditional ‘greed-grievance’ approach to the study of new wars, the LRA's behaviour is analyzed from a strategic perspective. Specifically, the article focuses on the LRA's use of mutilation, abduction, surprise, and unpredictable attacks. The conclusion is that the LRA is strategically using fear as a force multiplier, to further its organizational survival, and as a way to fight a political ‘dirty war’.     

Guerrillas and bandits in the Serranía de Ronda, 1810–1812

The Spanish Guerrilla (1808–1812) which has given its name to ideologically motivated insurgencies is usually portrayed as a patriotic uprising against the French occupation forces of Napoleon. It was that, in part, but also many other things besides. This case study illustrates its overlap and convergence with banditry but also with social unrest turned into uprisings directed by poor Spaniards against their creditors, as in the storming of Ronda by insurgents in 1810. From the propaganda of the day to the subsequent Spanish patriotic historiography, there has been a tendency to exaggerate the amplitude of events and also the damage that was done to the French forces and the casualty figures inflicted on them.     

Civil–military relations in francophone Africa and the consequences of a mistaken analysis

The Building Security Overseas Strategy is at its core an ‘Intervention to end all Interventions’ – from a Western as well as an African perspective. Two of its main pillars are security sector reform in specific countries and systematic support to the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture. This article addresses the question why such efforts have met little success in francophone Africa. It argues that the failure of Western advisers to understand the sociological dynamics of African armed forces, shaped by a political culture based on personal loyalty to the leader, is at the root of the problem. In that context, the Huntingtonian-type distinction between the civilians and the military does not apply as military and civilians act in concert within common clientelism systems. As a result of the curtailing of the state-formation experience in most African countries, the military never had to demonstrate its performance as a state builder, nor did it have to bargain its legitimacy against the support of the citizens. Partnership in that context will remain a misnomer, at least until African military can credibly demonstrate commitment to state-building grounded in a broad-based social contract.     

Competitive Statehood in Libya: Governing Differently a Specific Setting or Deconstructing its Weak Sovereign State with a Fateful Drift Toward Chaos?

Abstract

Libya in 2011 witnessed a real process of political change, though different from all the policy-oriented jargon equating transition with a teleological transition to democracy. Due to the resilience of the Qadhafi regime in power and with the essential role of NATO intervention, the process was eased out by a eight-month civil war. Governance in post-Qadhafi Libya was not done through the rebuilding of centralized authorities. But it took the specific form of the emergence of multiple non-state actors embedded in local dynamics and then connected with weakened central authorities that had access to the huge Libyan resources. That raised complex questions about the quality of this mode of governance, especially at a time of pressing problems for Libya and its neighbors, whether direct ones (Tunisia, Egypt, Mali) or farther countries across the Mediterranean sea: terrorism with the expansion of Da’esh into the country and flows of refugees crossing Libya’s uncontrolled borders and flowing into Italy and then Europe by thousands.     

EU Global Strategy in a changing world: Brussels’ approach to the emerging powers

The world is entering a period of power transition, at the outcome of which some new form of global order (or disorder) is likely to emerge. Critical to this process is the interaction between the established powers, the USA and the European Union (EU), and the emerging powers, particularly China, Brazil, India and Russia. Many analysts have classified the EU as a declining power, a perception that has been enhanced with the triple crises of sovereignty that have rocked the Union since the mid-2000s (money, borders and defence). In this context, the publication of the EU Global Strategy was an opportunity for the EU to state clearly the nature of its ongoing and future relations with the rest of the world. This article argues that, in reality, Europe as a bloc (as opposed to its member states severally) has very limited purchase with the other major powers, and an ambivalent or ill-defined grasp of how to engage with them. They, for their part, have difficulty in knowing how to understand the EU as an actor and prefer to deal bilaterally with its key member states.     

Multilateral defense cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region: Tentative steps toward a regional NATO?

Some U.S. military leaders have asserted that the United States, Japan, Australia, and India and the Republic of Korea are developing multilateral defense cooperation to deter aggression and uphold norms much like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has in Europe. Frequent military exercises and China’s threats to freedom of navigation (FoN) and North Korea’s nuclear missiles comprise the motive force for such cooperation. However, cooperation thus far has been trilateral and minimal, given divergent national interests and dispersed geopolitical locations. Cooperation among Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States is increasing given the threat, but ROK’s public opinion is divided about Japan. Australia, Japan, and India have increased cooperation with the United States but are reluctant to conduct FoN operations with the United States to challenge China’s expansionism in the South China Sea. If China becomes more aggressive and blocks FoN or seizes territory, development toward an Asian NATO is possible.