美军水面舰艇作战试验研究及启示

在我军试验鉴定体制改革的大背景下,装备作战试验正式纳入装备试验鉴定体系,成为检验提高装备综合战技性能和效能的关键因素。介绍了美军武器装备作战试验的概念及内涵,重点分析了美军水面舰艇作战试验运行机制,总结归纳其开展作战试验的主要特点,通过对美军舰艇作战试验的总体研究,为我军水面舰艇作战试验提出启示建议。     

美军舰艇编队远洋作战油料保障现状分析

舰艇编队远洋作战油料保障是远洋作战后装保障的重要组成部分。针对美军舰艇编队远洋作战油料保障现状,梳理了其理论研究、保障模式、基地建设和装备发展情况,总结了其对我军建设的启示。     

美21世纪海上主战力量

美军从上世纪80年代适时将无人机引入海军装备,分别装备到航母,巡洋舰,驱逐舰等大型舰艇以及巡防舰,导弹艇等小型舰艇,并从水面舰艇搭载向潜艇,其作战平台不断扩大,成为海军多功能的舰载武器装备。     

台护卫舰编队反舰作战方法及强弱点透析

台湾海军经过50多年的建设,已经成为一支具有较强作战能力的地区性海军。截止目前其装备有大中型水面作战舰艇40余艘,是执行其“固守防卫、有效吓阻”和“先制反制”战略的急先锋。台湾海军水面舰艇装备技术的发展和作战指导思想均受到美国海军的重要影响,逐步形成了一定的现代海战作战思想与战术方法。     

评析美军无人作战系统的发展

面对未来可能的复杂战场环境,美军在装备建设上刮起了一阵强劲的“无人”风,各军种在装备采购上都将目光瞄向了用途各异的无人智能作战系统,这是美军作战指导思想和理论在装备建设上的具体体现,将对美军建设产生深远的影响。     

军中“硅谷”决战信息化海战场——记海军大连舰艇学院作战软件研究中心

这里是中国海军作战软装备发源地,第一个舰艇作战软件、第一套舰艇作战软件系统……第一套舰艇编队作战软件系统就诞生在这里。这里是中国海军惟一的水面舰艇作战软件研制基地,从这里“出炉”的作战软装备,已成为我舰艇战斗力跃升的“倍增器”。这里是中国海军舰艇作战软件人才的重要培养基地,从这里走出的大批博士、硕士和学士,已成为海军信息化建设的生力军。这里就是军中“硅谷”——海军大连舰艇学院作战软件研究中心。勇做探路者——中国“芯片”横空出世如果把一艘军舰比喻成一座高科技城堡,那么作战软件就是这座城堡的核心“芯片”。…     

美国海军舰载电子战系统及发展趋势

美国海军为了加强和提高各类舰艇的作战能力,自20世纪60年代就十分重视舰载和潜载电子战系统的发展和部署。尤其进入20世纪70年代后,美国海军的各种舰载、潜载电子战系统以及其它电子装备得到了迅速发展,它们的战术技术性能不断提高。电子战系统已经成为美国当前400艘左右的主要作战舰艇(包括航空母舰、巡洋舰、驱逐舰、护卫舰、潜艇)和近200艘其他作战舰船作战与武器系统的一个不可或缺的一部分。在历次作战中,美国海军舰艇的电子战设备对于提高海战生存力及作战的胜利都发挥了重要的、不可取代的作用。一、美军舰载电子战系统近年来,美国…     

美军非对称作战特点

“非对称作战”是近年来美军提出的一种新的作战理论。它是指“不同类型部队之间的交战”,如空军对海军、海军对陆军的作战等。美军在1991年颁发的第1号联合出版物《美国武装部队的联合作战》中首次提出这一概念,当时被称为“不对等作战”。1993年在其出版的第3号联合出版物《联合作战纲要》中,又改为“非对称作战”,并作了具体论述。此后,美军在《2010年联合构想》(1996年)、《四年防务审查报告》(1997年)和新版《作战纲要》(1998年)等条令和文件中,进一步发展了“非对称作战”思想。之后,在1998年底的“沙漠之狐”军事行动和近期的科索沃战争中对这一理论进行了验证。由此,“非对称作战”正式成为美军重要的     

美军联合全域指挥控制发展动向及影响分析

介绍了美军联合全域指挥控制的提出背景和概念内涵,全面梳理了相关系统技术发展情况,包括美空军“先进作战管理系统”、美陆军“融合计划”、美海军“超越计划”等;深入分析了联合全域指挥控制对美军战场态势感知、指挥决策、体系化对抗能力可能产生的影响,并提出了关于作战概念开发、装备体系发展的几点启示。     

美军作战试验与鉴定发展研究

当前,军队装备试验鉴定正由性能试验向作战试验、在役考核全领域拓展。在装备试验鉴定体系全面重塑的历史背景下,为适应军队装备试验鉴定发展新变化,探索装备试验鉴定新理论,推进装备试验鉴定自主创新发展,亟需开展装备试验鉴定技术研究。美军相对较早开展了装备试验与鉴定工作,在作战试验与鉴定工作方面已形成了较完善的法规制度体系和规范的操作流程,有较成熟的理论与方法成果可供借鉴。与此同时,美军作战试验与鉴定工作也面临许多新问题。本文剖析了美军作战试验与鉴定的内涵和管理模式,研究了2018和2019年美军作战试验与鉴定的重点技术领域,并进行了对比分析,以期掌握近期美军作战试验与鉴定工作的发展变化。     

Rising Tide,Dispersing Waves: Opportunities and Challenges for Chinese Seapower Development

Abstract

This article surveys China’s current naval forces and considers key dynamics and possible Chinese naval futures to 2020, the projected end of Beijing’s ‘strategic window of opportunity’, the idea that a peaceful external environment for economic development, globalization, and integration of China into the global economy allows China to benefit from diversion of US attention to countering terrorism. It considers broad possibilities through 2030, the general limit of public US government projections, and by which time multiple factors will likely slow China’s growth and compete for leadership focus and resources.     

Counterinsurgency force ratio: strategic utility or nominal necessity

As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, ‘How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?’     

Effective attacks in the salvo combat model: Salvo sizes and quantities of targets

This article considers two related questions of tactics in the context of the salvo model for naval missile combat. For a given set of targets, how many missiles should be fired to produce an effective attack? For a given available salvo size, how many enemy targets should be fired at? In the deterministic version of the model I derive a simple optimality relationship between the number of missiles to fire and the number of targets to engage. In the stochastic model I employ the expected loss inflicted and the probability of enemy elimination as the main performance measures and use these to derive salvo sizes that are in some sense “optimal.” I find that the offensive firepower needed for an effective attack depends not only on a target's total strength but also on the relative balance between its active defensive power and passive staying power. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Expanding the Dragon’s Reach:The Rise of China’s Anti-access Naval Doctrine and Forces

Among the multiple dimensions of the tous azimuths modernisation of Chinese naval forces, the development of China’s anti-access capacity has recently elicited considerable interest. The important link between this capacity and an overarching vision of the use of force – i.e. a naval doctrine – has, however, often been left implicit. This article shows that the particular development of China’s naval anti-access forces – more precisely, forces with an impact on the naval balance – can be explained by a shift of China’s naval doctrine towards a distinctly pre-emptive posture, which, itself, stems from the set of constraints imposed by the framework of ‘local war under informationised conditions’.     

A model for geographically distributed combat interactions of swarming naval and air forces

This article describes the Distributed Interaction Campaign Model (DICM), an exploratory campaign analysis tool and asset allocation decision‐aid for managing geographically distributed and swarming naval and air forces. The model is capable of fast operation, while accounting for uncertainty in an opponent's plan. It is intended for use by commanders and analysts who have limited time for model runs, or a finite budget. The model is purpose‐built for the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, and supports analysis of the following questions: What happens when swarms of geographically distributed naval and air forces engage each other and what are the key elements of the opponents’ force to attack? Are there changes to force structure that make a force more effective, and what impacts will disruptions in enemy command and control and wide‐area surveillance have? Which insights are to be gained by fast exploratory mathematical/computational campaign analysis to augment and replace expensive and time‐consuming simulations? An illustrative example of model use is described in a simple test scenario. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 562–576, 2016     

现代舰载光电装备与高科技局部海战

以现代物理、计算机、自动控制、信息处理与融合等高新技术为支撑的现代舰载光电装备技术,在现代海战中有着举足轻重的作用.根据现代海战的基本特点,论证了高科技局部海战对光电装备的3大需求,阐述了现代舰载光电装备的类别及其发展趋势.     

SLOWING DOWN TO KEEP THE LEAD IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

We develop a model of military technology competition among states. States can choose to introduce new military technology, mimic rivals’ level of technology, or withdraw from the contest. States can choose to implement any level of technology within their current feasible technologies. We find that states with significant technological leads should sometimes withhold new technologies, only strategically releasing them to trump rivals’ efforts. We develop the model by refining Admiral Jackie Fisher’s roughly articulated concept of ‘plunging’. We then use this refined argument to reanalyze the case of naval rivalries among European powers between the Crimean War and the First World War. Finally, we conclude by discussing the model’s implications for current US military force structure planning.     

The ‘War on Terrorism’: What Does it Mean to Win?

Abstract

The war on al-Qaeda and its affiliates appears to be endless but every war must end. Winding down the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has been difficult, but both were embedded in what was then called the ‘war on terrorism.’ What does ‘success’ in that war mean? With the death of bin Laden and the increase in drone operations, how far is the US from achieving it? Can this war end? The article analyzes the ongoing US response to the 9/11 attacks in historical context, revealing four patterns common to all prolonged wars: means become ends, tactics become strategy, boundaries are blurred, and the search for a perfect peace replaces reality. It concludes by laying out an effective strategy for ending the war.     

The misguided and mismanaged intervention in Libya: Consequences for peace

In this paper, I critically analyse the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), as it relates to the responsibility of intervening forces towards the people they claim to protect and the challenges that the situation in Libya now poses in the region and for the African Union (AU). I focus most of my attention on the coercive elements of the RtoP framework (Pillar III). This is the most contested element in the framework. Three questions guide this article: were there legitimate grounds to justify an external intervention in Libya? In the words of Hugh Roberts in Who Said Gaddafi Had to Go, ‘[w]hat if anything has Libya got in exchange for all the death and destruction that have been visited on it’ since 2011? What are the practical implications and consequences of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention, led by the United States (US), for regional peace? I discuss the problems surrounding the US–NATO intervention, followed by an analysis of the various positions and narratives leading up to the intervention, the framing and justifications provided for the intervention, and an analysis of the AU's proposal for the resolution of the Libyan crisis. I analyse the various debates that took place in the US (Pentagon/White House), at the United Nations, among scholars in the West and in Africa, and among various actors who tried to broker a ceasefire in Libya before and during the intervention. I conclude with a discussion of the implications for regional peace.     

Regina Maris and the Command of the Sea: The Sixteenth Century Origins of Modern Maritime Strategy

The concept of the command of the sea has its roots in medieval notions of the sovereignty of coastal waters, as claimed by several monarchs and polities of Europe. In the sixteenth century, a surge of intellectual creativity, especially in Elizabethan England, fused this notion with the Thucydidean term ‘thalassocracy’ – the rule of the sea. In the light of the explorations of the oceans, this led to a new conceptualisation of naval warfare, developed in theory and then put into practice. This falsifies the mistaken but widespread assumption that there was no significant writing on naval strategy before the nineteenth century.