Book reviews

Red Banner: the Soviet Military System in Peace and War. By Christopher Donnelly. Jane's Information Group, Coulsdon, UK (1988), 288 pp., £35.00

Images of T. E. Lawrence. By S. E. Tabachnick and C. Matheson. Jonathan Cape, London (1988); The Letters of T. E. Lawrence. Edited by Malcolm Brown. Dent, London (1988); T. E. Lawrence. By J. Wilson. National Portrait Gallery Publications, London (1988); Lawrence and the Arab Revolts. By D. Nicolle. Osprey, London (1989)

Liddell Hart and the Weight of History. By John Mearsheimer. Brassey's, London (1989), £15.95

Science and Mythology in the Making of Defence Policy. Edited by Margaret Blunden and Owen Greene. Brassey's, London (1989), £27.50/$44.00

Warfare in the Twentieth Century. Edited by Colin McInnes and G. D. Sheffield. Unwin Hyman, London (1988), 239 pp., £25.00     

Book reviews

Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny. By Joshua Muravchik, American Enterprise Institute (1991) ISSN 0–8447–3734–8. $12.95.

Generals in the Palacio. By Roderick Ai Camp. Oxford University Press, (1992), ISBN 0–19–507300–2, £45.

L'Armement en France. Genèse, Ampleur et Coût d'une Industrie By François Chesnais and Claude Serfati, Editions Nathan, Collection Economie/Sciences Sociales, Paris (1992), ISBN 2–09–190086–9.

The Têt Offensive. Intelligence Failure in War. By James Wirtz, Cornell University Press, New York (1991), ISBN 0–8014–2486–0. $38.50.

Restructuring of arms producton in Western Europe. Edited by Michael Brzoska and Peter Lock. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1992), ISBN 0–1982–9147–7. £25.00.

What is Proper Soldiering? A study of new perspectives for the future uses of the Armed Forces of the 1990s. By Michael Harbottle. The Centre for International Peacebuilding, Chipping Norton (1992), £3.50.

The Strategic Defence Initiative By Edward Reiss, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1992), ISBN 0–521–41097–5. £30.00.     

Evaluation of force structures under uncertainty

A model, for assessing the effectiveness of alternative force structures in an uncertain future conflict, is presented and exemplified. The methodology is appropriate to forces (e.g., the attack submarine force) where alternative unit types may be employed, albeit at differing effectiveness, in the same set of missions. Procurement trade-offs, and in particular the desirability of special purpose units in place of some (presumably more expensive) general purpose units, can be addressed by this model. Example calculations indicate an increase in the effectiveness of a force composed of general purpose units, relative to various mixed forces, with increase in the uncertainty regarding future conflicts.     

Reformulating zero-sum games with multiple goals

This paper investigates the two-person zero-sum multiple payoff game in which the objective is to minimize a player's total underachievement from a fixed set of goals. It is demonstrated that a previous formulation of this problem can be substantially simplified.     

A dual criteria sequencing problem with earliness and tardiness penalties

We consider the problem of sequencing n jobs on a single machine, with each job having a processing time and a common due date. The common due date is assumed to be so large that all jobs can complete by the due date. It is known that there is an O(n log n)‐time algorithm for finding a schedule with minimum total earliness and tardiness. In this article, we consider finding a schedule with dual criteria. The primary goal is to minimize the total earliness and tardiness. The secondary goals are to minimize: (1) the maximum earliness and tardiness; (2) the sum of the maximum of the squares of earliness and tardiness; (3) the sum of the squares of earliness and tardiness. For the first two criteria, we show that the problems are NP‐hard and we give a fully polynomial time approximation scheme for both of them. For the last two criteria, we show that the ratio of the worst schedule versus the best schedule is no more than . © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 422–431, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10020     

Constrained minimax optimization of continuous search efforts for the detection of a stationary target

Analytical resolution of search theory problems, as formalized by B.O. Koopman, may be applied with some model extension to various resource management issues. However, a fundamental prerequisite is the knowledge of the prior target density. Though this assumption has the definite advantage of simplicity, its drawback is clearly that target reactivity is not taken into account. As a preliminary step towards reactive target study stands the problem of resource planning under a min–max game context. This paper is related to Nakai's work about the game planning of resources for the detection of a stationary target. However, this initial problem is extended by adding new and more general constraints, allowing a more realistic modeling of the target and searcher behaviors. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Production to order and off‐line inspection when the production process is partially observable

This study combines inspection and lot‐sizing decisions. The issue is whether to INSPECT another unit or PRODUCE a new lot. A unit produced is either conforming or defective. Demand need to be satisfied in full, by conforming units only. The production process may switch from a “good” state to a “bad” state, at constant rate. The proportion of conforming units in the good state is higher than in the bad state. The true state is unobservable and can only be inferred from the quality of units inspected. We thus update, after each inspection, the probability that the unit, next candidate for inspection, was produced while the production process was in the good state. That “good‐state‐probability” is the basis for our decision to INSPECT or PRODUCE. We prove that the optimal policy has a simple form: INSPECT only if the good‐state‐probability exceeds a control limit. We provide a methodology to calculate the optimal lot size and the expected costs associated with INSPECT and PRODUCE. Surprisingly, we find that the control limit, as a function of the demand (and other problem parameters) is not necessarily monotone. Also, counter to intuition, it is possible that the optimal action is PRODUCE, after revealing a conforming unit. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Probabilistic resource pooling games

We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation.