A search game with a protector

A classic problem in Search Theory is one in which a searcher allocates resources to the points of the integer interval [1, n] in an attempt to find an object which has been hidden in them using a known probability function. In this paper we consider a modification of this problem in which there is a protector who can also allocate resources to the points; allocating these resources makes it more difficult for the searcher to find an object. We model the situation as a two‐person non‐zero‐sum game so that we can take into account the fact that using resources can be costly. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium when the searcher's probability of finding an object located at point i is of the form (1 − exp (−λ_ix_i)) exp (−μ_iy_i) when the searcher and protector allocate resources x_i and y_i respectively to point i. An algorithm to find this Nash equilibrium is given. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47:85–96, 2000     

Note: Minimizing the variability of the waiting times in a globally gated elevator polling system

A polling system comprising n queues and a single server is considered. Service is performed according to an elevator scheme under the globally gated regime. The problem of arranging the channels to minimize a measure of the variability of the waiting times is addressed. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 605–611, 1997     

On a ruckle problem in discrete games of ambush

The following zero-sum game is considered. Red chooses in integer interval [1, n] two integer intervals consisting of k and m points where k + m < n, and Blue chooses an integer point in [1, n]. The payoff to Red equals 1 if the point chosen by Blue is at least in one of the intervals chosen by Red, and 0 otherwise. This work complements the results obtained by Ruckle, Baston and Bostock, and Lee. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 353–364, 1997     

Damage accumulation and probability of kill for gun and target engagements

Determination of the gunfire probability of kill against a target requires two parameters to be taken into consideration: the likelihood of hitting the target (susceptibility) and the conditional probability of kill given a hit (vulnerability). Two commonly used methods for calculating the latter probability are (1) treating each hit upon the target independently, and (2) setting an exact number of hits to obtain a target kill. Each of these methods contains an implicit assumption about the probability distribution of the number of hits‐to‐kill. Method (1) assumes that the most likely kill scenario occurs with exactly one hit, whereas (2) implies that achieving a precise number of hits always results in a kill. These methods can produce significant differences in the predicted gun effectiveness, even if the mean number of hits‐to‐kill for each distribution is the same. We therefore introduce a new modeling approach with a more general distribution for the number of hits‐to‐kill. The approach is configurable to various classes of damage mechanism and is able to match both methods (1) and (2) with a suitable choice of parameter. We use this new approach to explore the influence of various damage accumulation models on the predicted effectiveness of weapon‐target engagements.     

Is human trafficking the dark side of economic freedom?

Economic freedom has increased living standards worldwide. Concurrent with such gains are rising concerns about potential human costs associated with free markets. This paper uses data on human trafficking and anti-trafficking policies, in conjunction with a measure of economic freedom, to examine whether free markets exacerbate or attenuate the incidence of human trafficking and policies designed to combat it. We do not find evidence suggesting that economic freedom is associated with human trafficking. In addition, our results suggest that economically free countries are more likely to enact and enforce policies to fight human trafficking.     

On the reduction of total‐cost and average‐cost MDPs to discounted MDPs

This article provides conditions under which total‐cost and average‐cost Markov decision processes (MDPs) can be reduced to discounted ones. Results are given for transient total‐cost MDPs with transition rates whose values may be greater than one, as well as for average‐cost MDPs with transition probabilities satisfying the condition that there is a state such that the expected time to reach it is uniformly bounded for all initial states and stationary policies. In particular, these reductions imply sufficient conditions for the validity of optimality equations and the existence of stationary optimal policies for MDPs with undiscounted total cost and average‐cost criteria. When the state and action sets are finite, these reductions lead to linear programming formulations and complexity estimates for MDPs under the aforementioned criteria.© 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 66:38–56, 2019     

Exact analysis of (R,s, S) inventory control systems with lost sales and zero lead time

We study an (R, s, S) inventory control policy with stochastic demand, lost sales, zero lead‐time and a target service level to be satisfied. The system is modeled as a discrete time Markov chain for which we present a novel approach to derive exact closed‐form solutions for the limiting distribution of the on‐hand inventory level at the end of a review period, given the reorder level (s) and order‐up‐to level (S). We then establish a relationship between the limiting distributions for adjacent values of the reorder point that is used in an efficient recursive algorithm to determine the optimal parameter values of the (R, s, S) replenishment policy. The algorithm is easy to implement and entails less effort than solving the steady‐state equations for the corresponding Markov model. Point‐of‐use hospital inventory systems share the essential characteristics of the inventory system we model, and a case study using real data from such a system shows that with our approach, optimal policies with significant savings in inventory management effort are easily obtained for a large family of items.     

Scheduling parallel dedicated machines with the speeding‐up resource

We consider a problem of scheduling jobs on m parallel machines. The machines are dedicated, i.e., for each job the processing machine is known in advance. We mainly concentrate on the model in which at any time there is one unit of an additional resource. Any job may be assigned the resource and this reduces its processing time. A job that is given the resource uses it at each time of its processing. No two jobs are allowed to use the resource simultaneously. The objective is to minimize the makespan. We prove that the two‐machine problem is NP‐hard in the ordinary sense, describe a pseudopolynomial dynamic programming algorithm and convert it into an FPTAS. For the problem with an arbitrary number of machines we present an algorithm with a worst‐case ratio close to 3/2, and close to 3, if a job can be given several units of the resource. For the problem with a fixed number of machines we give a PTAS. Virtually all algorithms rely on a certain variant of the linear knapsack problem (maximization, minimization, multiple‐choice, bicriteria). © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Evolutionary determinants of war

This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use the concept of evolutionary stability in finite populations. We find that players’ evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.