Interdiction models for delaying adversarial attacks against critical information technology infrastructure

Information technology (IT) infrastructure relies on a globalized supply chain that is vulnerable to numerous risks from adversarial attacks. It is important to protect IT infrastructure from these dynamic, persistent risks by delaying adversarial exploits. In this paper, we propose max‐min interdiction models for critical infrastructure protection that prioritizes cost‐effective security mitigations to maximally delay adversarial attacks. We consider attacks originating from multiple adversaries, each of which aims to find a “critical path” through the attack surface to complete the corresponding attack as soon as possible. Decision‐makers can deploy mitigations to delay attack exploits, however, mitigation effectiveness is sometimes uncertain. We propose a stochastic model variant to address this uncertainty by incorporating random delay times. The proposed models can be reformulated as a nested max‐max problem using dualization. We propose a Lagrangian heuristic approach that decomposes the max‐max problem into a number of smaller subproblems, and updates upper and lower bounds to the original problem via subgradient optimization. We evaluate the perfect information solution value as an alternative method for updating the upper bound. Computational results demonstrate that the Lagrangian heuristic identifies near‐optimal solutions efficiently, which outperforms a general purpose mixed‐integer programming solver on medium and large instances.     

The politics of multinational military operations

Today, few countries fight alone; most fight as allies or partners in multilateral campaigns. The end of the Cold War opened a window of opportunity for multinational military operations (MMOs). These have seen varying degrees of participation, enthusiasm, and success. This special forum is devoted to the politics of multilateral warfare including their formation, maintenance, and durability. The introduction sketches past research and derives some key questions of continuing relevance. The contributions shed light on the domestic and international politics of MMOs, focusing on the implementation of national restrictions and their repercussions for MMOs, party politics of military intervention, the conditions under which states decide to defect from military operations, and the role of junior partners in MMOs. In sum, this forum offers a fresh look at the politics of MMOs, including conceptual contributions to the study of national restrictions, domestic constraints, and coalition warfare.     

National restrictions in multinational military operations: A conceptual framework

Recent scholarship in security studies has started to explore the causes and consequences of various forms of national restrictions in multinational military operations (MMOs). This article makes a conceptual contribution to this literature by developing a theoretical framework of national restrictions in MMOs that distinguishes between structural, procedural, and operational restrictions. I argue that these types of restrictions are governed by different causal mechanisms. Structural restrictions are relatively stable over time and effect deployment decisions irrespective of other factors. Procedural restrictions, on the other hand, can constitute veto points against deployment only in combination with distinct political preferences. Finally, operational restrictions directly affect the rules of engagement of troop contributing countries. The article illustrates the three types of restrictions and their interaction with empirical examples from a range of countries and sketches their impact on MMO deployment decisions and mandates.     

New inequalities for finite and infinite group problems from approximate lifting

In this paper, we derive new families of facet‐defining inequalities for the finite group problem and extreme inequalities for the infinite group problem using approximate lifting. The new valid inequalities for the finite group problem include two‐ and three‐slope facet‐defining inequalities as well as the first family of four‐slope facet‐defining inequalities. The new valid inequalities for the infinite group problem include families of two‐ and three‐slope extreme inequalities. These new inequalities not only illustrate the diversity of strong inequalities for the finite and infinite group problems, but also provide a large variety of new cutting planes for solving integer and mixed‐integer programming problems. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

A poissonian binomial model with constrained parameters

The article examines ways of computing cumulative probabilities for a constrained Poissonian binomial distribution arising from a model of a weapon defense system.     

Benders' cuts guided large neighborhood search for the traveling umpire problem

This article introduces the use of Benders' cuts to guide a large neighborhood search to solve the traveling umpire problem, a sports scheduling problem inspired by the real‐life needs of the officials of a sports league. At each time slot, a greedy matching heuristic is used to construct a schedule. When an infeasibility is recognized first a single step backtracking is tried to resolve the infeasibility. If unsuccessful, Benders' cuts are generated to guide a large neighborhood search to ensure feasibility and to improve the solution. Realizing the inherent symmetry present in the problem, a large family of cuts are generated and their effectiveness is tested. The resulting approach is able to find better solutions to many instances of this problem. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2016

During the period 1996–2006, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) waged overt people’s war to seize state power and institute a new order that realized the party’s understanding of ‘New Democracy’ as posited by Mao Tse-tung. Contextual shifts led to a crucial strategic turning point in September 2005, when the Maoists agreed to a united front with estranged legal parties to oust the monarchy and establish a republic. Though touted as acceptance of political reintegration, the move was tactical rather than strategic. The party had no intention of supporting a parliamentary version of democracy and thus, 2006–2016, engaged in a covert effort to seize power. Central to this effort was the paramilitary Young Communist League (YCL), the members of which responded to inflammatory party verbiage and exhortations with attacks upon rival political actors. These attacks, academically and legally, were terrorism and offered a salient illustration of intra-state unrestricted warfare. Ultimately, organizational, national, and regional circumstances caused the main Maoist movement to move decisively away from its covert approach. By that time, however, radical splinters had embraced the use of terrorism against rival political actors, creating a situation whereby local politics is yet a dangerous endeavor in certain areas and at certain times.     

基于非线性Kalman滤波的导航系统误差补偿技术

针对非线性非高斯导航系统信息处理问题,采用自组织算法、神经网络和遗传算法等改进传统非线性Kalman滤波算法,构建一种自适应的组合导航系统。应用具有冗余趋势项的自组织算法、Volterra神经网络和遗传算法,建立导航系统误差的非线性预测模型,进而计算得到其预测值;将该预测值与Kalman滤波算法求得的估计值进行比较得到差值,以此监测Kalman滤波算法的工作状态;采用自适应控制方法,在导航系统结构层面改进Kalman滤波算法,构建新型的导航系统误差补偿模型。开展基于导航系统KIND-34的半实物仿真研究,应用所提出的改进方法改善了导航系统误差的补偿效果,提高了组合导航系统的自适应能力和容错能力。     

United Nations rapid reaction mechanisms: Toward a global force on standby?

This article analyses the main challenges and future prospects of creating United Nations (UN) rapid reaction mechanisms, particularly in the light of past attempts and current discussions about a “UN Vanguard Force” in the wake of the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations report. The article reviews major initiatives (in particular lessons from the Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations) and assesses the main achievements, failures, and challenges related to past UN-led rapid reaction mechanisms. In line with the overall aim of this special forum, the article highlights the future potentials and institutional, operational, financial, and political challenges that need to be overcome in order to design and create a pragmatic and effective rapid reaction tool at the disposal of the UN.