Book reviews

Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of “Ethnic Cleansing”. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. Pp.xiv + 247; app., map, notes, cartoon.

Maria Jose Moyano, Argentina's Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969–1979. New Haven: Connecticut Yale University Press, 1995. Pp.xiii + 226, biblio., abbreviations, 10 figures, 1 map, tables, index; $25/£16.95. ISBN 0–300–01622–6.

Donald E. Schulz and Deborah Sundloff Schulz, The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America, Westview Thematic Studies in Latin America, Boulder, Co: Westview, 1994. Pp.368, map, figure, select biblio., abbreviations, index. $52.50/£37.50; (cloth) $17.95/£11.95 (paper). ISBN 0–8133–1324–4 and 1323–6.

Joseph H. Alexander and Merrill L. Bartlett, Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare 1945–1991. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Pp.iii + 178, 1 map, 29 illus, biblio, index. $32.95. ISBN

Gary P. Cox, The Halt in the Mud: French Strategic Planning from Waterloo to Sedan. Westview Press, 1994. Pp.258, maps, notes, biblio, index. £33.50. ISBN 0–133–1536–0.     

Whatever happened to South America's splendid little wars?

South America has gained international media attention due to its ongoing arms race, with politicians and analysts warning about the possibility of war. Nevertheless, since the Chaco War in the 1930s, the region has seldom faced major inter-state wars, all of which have been short-lived and with relatively few casualties. This article will discuss in greater detail the ongoing arms race in South America, portraying it as a race ‘of levels’, with not all countries carrying out massive weaponry purchases. Finally, I will discuss regional geopolitics, geosecurity and integration as part of an analysis regarding the unlikelihood of war.     

It's all the rage: why mechanization doesn't explain COIN outcomes

A recent article, ‘Rage Against the Machines’, does a disservice to the debate over what explains counterinsurgency (COIN) success. While it establishes a negative correlation between the diffusion of military mechanization in the state system and COIN success, its theoretical argument does not hold up under close scrutiny and its micro-case comparison of two units in Iraq during 2003–2004 ignores obvious counter-examples and factors that influence COIN success, such as leadership. A deeper inquiry would have revealed that there is much more to COIN success than simply not having access to vehicles.     

Taking advantage of insurgencies: effective policies of state-sponsorship

Taking insurgency sponsorship as an instrument states have available for achieving foreign policy objectives, I consider how state-sponsors could best manipulate their support to maximize control of the proxy group. Building on research that models the state-sponsor–insurgent relationship using a principal–agent framework, I identify two key vulnerabilities to which the state-sponsor is exposed: adverse selection and agency slack. As an original contribution to the literature on state-sponsorship of insurgency, I articulate reasons why certain forms of support would be most conducive to overcoming these problems and illustrate how South Africa and Iran used those kinds of support to influence the behavior of their proxies, RENAMO and Hezbollah. Additionally, I consider how this principal–agent analysis of insurgency sponsorship also could apply when the principal is an international terrorist organization such as al Qaeda. Finally, I address the relevance of these ideas to two contemporary conflicts taking place in Syria and the Congo.     

British counter‐insurgency in Kenya, 1952–56: Extension of internal security policy or prelude to decolonisation?

Despite considerable post‐war planning, the British counter‐insurgency campaign in Kenya did not constitute a Colonial Office strategy for decolonisation. COIN in Kenya had one purpose: to re‐impose law and order, or British control. If for no other reason, this is demonstrated by the initial reluctance of the Colonial Office to intervene. Frequent re‐assessments and postponement of the ending of the State of Emergency, and the subordination of socio‐economic and political reforms to military objectives, show clearly that decolonisation was not high on the British list of priorities in Kenya. This article questions the relationship between COIN and decolonisation, and the validity of models of British counter‐insurgency.     

关于我国突发事件应急救援体系的思考

进入新世纪以来,如何构建我国突发事件应急救援体系,形成灵活、高效、统一的政府应急救援联动机制,是当前急需着手解决的问题,是积极应对各种突发公共事件、保障社会和谐安全的主要对策。从突发事件应急管理现状出发,剖析了当前应急救援体系建设中存在的问题,提出了增强我国突发事件应急救援能力建设的方法,探讨了整体推进应急救援体系建设的途径。     

A multilevel passenger screening problem for aviation security

Passenger prescreening is a critical component of aviation security systems. This paper introduces the Multilevel Allocation Problem (MAP), which models the screening of passengers and baggage in a multilevel aviation security system. A passenger is screened by one of several classes, each of which corresponds to a set of procedures using security screening devices, where passengers are differentiated by their perceived risk levels. Each class is defined in terms of its fixed cost (the overhead costs), its marginal cost (the additional cost to screen a passenger), and its security level. The objective of MAP is to assign each passenger to a class such that the total security is maximized subject to passenger assignments and budget constraints. This paper shows that MAP is NP‐hard and introduces a Greedy heuristic that obtains approximate solutions to MAP that use no more than two classes. Examples are constructed using data extracted from the Official Airline Guide. Analysis of the examples suggests that fewer security classes for passenger screening may be more effective and that using passenger risk information can lead to more effective security screening strategies. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006