Bounds and properties of the expected value of sample information for a project-selection problem

In this article we extend the work of Mehrez and Stulman [5] on the expected value of perfect information (EVPI) to the expected value of sample information (EVSI) for a class of economic problems dealing with the decision to reject or accept an investment project. It is shown that shifting the mean of the underlying a priori distribution of X, the project's monetary value from zero in either direction will decrease the associated EVSI of Y, the random sampled information. A theorem is then presented which gives an upper bound on the EVSI over all distributions of Y, as well as the structure of the posterior mean E[X|Y] for which this upper bound is achieved. Finally, the case where E[X|Y] is linear in Y is discussed and its performance compared with that of the optimal case.     

Quadratic bottleneck problems

We study the quadratic bottleneck problem (QBP) which generalizes several well‐studied optimization problems. A weak duality theorem is introduced along with a general purpose algorithm to solve QBP. An example is given which illustrates duality gap in the weak duality theorem. It is shown that the special case of QBP where feasible solutions are subsets of a finite set having the same cardinality is NP‐hard. Likewise the quadratic bottleneck spanning tree problem (QBST) is shown to be NP‐hard on a bipartite graph even if the cost function takes 0–1 values only. Two lower bounds for QBST are derived and compared. Efficient heuristic algorithms are presented for QBST along with computational results. When the cost function is decomposable, we show that QBP is solvable in polynomial time whenever an associated linear bottleneck problem can be solved in polynomial time. As a consequence, QBP with feasible solutions form spanning trees, s‐t paths, matchings, etc., of a graph are solvable in polynomial time with a decomposable cost function. We also show that QBP can be formulated as a quadratic minsum problem and establish some asymptotic results. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Principal-agent maintenance problem

This article studies a maintenance problem that is applicable for multidivision organizations on lessee-lessor relationships. It is assumed that the parties sign a contract for a fixed time period. Within the period, the lessor is allowed to use the equipment supplied by the lessee. The availability of the equipment that may suffer from breakdown depends on the preventive maintenance policy adopted by the lessor. The properties of this policy as well as other features of the problem are analyzed using a one-period model that takes into account the economic value of the contract as perceived by the lessor and the lessee. The optimal contracting arrangements are analyzed from the perspective of efficient risk sharing and incentive provisions.