Warehouse sizing to minimize inventory and storage costs

This paper considers a warehouse sizing problem whose objective is to minimize the total cost of ordering, holding, and warehousing of inventory. Unlike typical economic lot sizing models, the warehousing cost structure examined here is not the simple unit rate type, but rather a more realistic step function of the warehouse space to be acquired. In the cases when only one type of stock‐keeping unit (SKU) is warehoused, or when multiple SKUs are warehoused, but, with separable inventory costs, closed form solutions are obtained for the optimal warehouse size. For the case of multi‐SKUs with joint inventory replenishment cost, a heuristic with a provable performance bound of 94% is provided. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 299–312, 2001     

Book reviews

Encyclopaedia of Modern Air Force Squadrons. By Chris Ashworth. Patrick Stephens, London (1989), ISBN 1-8526-013-6, £19.95

The Future of Sea Power. By Eric Grove. Routledge, London (1990), ISBN 0-415-00482-9, £35.00

Soviet Strategic Interests in the North. By Kirsten Amundsen. Pinter, London (1990), ISBN 0-86187-018-2, £30.00

Soviet Seapower in Northern Waters. Edited by John Skogan and Arne Brundtland. Pinter, London (1990), ISBN 0-86187-038-7, £35.00

Glasnost, Perestroika, and U.S. Defense Spending. By William W. Kaufmann, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC (1990), ISBN 0-8157-4881-7, $8.95

The Educating of Armies. Edited by Michael D. Stephens. Macmillan, London (1989), ISBN 0-333-43447-1, £35.00     

THE LONG‐RUN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AND GDP IN TAIWAN

Using the Solow–Swan growth model and the time‐trend included in the aggregate production function, this study applies the multivariate cointegration approach to re‐investigate the long‐run and causal relationships between defence expenditures and GDP while controlling for capital and labour input in Taiwan during the 1955–2002 period. It examines the long‐run causal relationship using the weak exogeneity test and utilizes general impulse response functions to determine whether a shock to defence expenditures affects economic growth or vice versa. Our findings provide substantive evidence in favour of the existence of a long‐run equilibrium cointegrated relationship between defence expenditures, GDP, labour and capital stock. The results of the weak exogeneity test indicate that a bi‐directional causal relationship exists in the long‐run between defence expenditures and GDP. Thus, the main policy implication that emerges from the long‐run results is that increasing defence expenditures in Taiwan is an effective means to boost overall economic performance and, with this improved economy, it should then be able to increase its defence expenditures further. Lastly, from our dynamic vector error correction model estimations, it is found that defence expenditures are a major means of adjusting for disequilibria that occur within the system.     

Missile systems: “Flexible modularity” and incremental technological change in military production∗

It is often stated that technological change in the military field is characterised by the introduction of radical innovations rather than by incremental processes of technological change. This article illustrates the diversity of military innovation by arguing that technological change in missiles systems is dominated by incremental change. While some large weapons platforms display the design rigidities normally associated with complex systems, missiles are characterised by “flexible modularity”. Flexible modularity facilitates the continuous introduction of upgrades, and makes missile systems amenable to gradual technological change. Besides, it has significant implications for the future role of missile systems, and poses special problems for missile disarmament and technology control initiatives.     

RAISING THE COST OF REBELLION: THE ROLE OF THIRD‐PARTY INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT

This paper presents a simple model to characterize explicitly the role that an intervening third party plays in raising the cost of rebellion in an intrastate conflict. Extending the Gershenson‐Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]) framework of conflict in a two‐stage game to the case involving outside intervention in a three‐stage game as in Chang et al. (2007b Chang, Y.‐M., Potter, J. and Sanders, S. 2007b. War and peace: third‐party intervention in conflict. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(4): 954–974.  [Google Scholar]), we examine the conditions under which an outside party optimally intervenes such that (i) the strength of the rebel group is diminished or (ii) the rebellion is deterred altogether. We also find conditions in which a third party optimally intervenes but at a level insufficient to deter rebellion. Such behavior, which improves the incumbent government’s potential to succeed in conflict, is overlooked in some conflict studies evaluating the effectiveness of intervention. One policy implication of the model is that an increase in the strength of inter‐governmental trade partnerships increases the likelihood that third‐party intervention deters rebellion.