One size does not fit all: personalized incentives in military compensation

A critical element in implementing a compensation scheme including nonmonetary incentives (NMIs) is recognizing that preferences vary widely across Service members. There are at least three sources of variability: across different population classes, across individuals within a population class, and across NMI packages for a particular individual. Surveys across different military communities, ranks, and years of Service show the difficulty of identifying any NMI that has significant value for even 50% of the active duty force. At the same time, approximately 80% of the surveyed Service members expressed a significant positive value for at least one NMI. Therefore, one-size-fits-all incentive packages will not be nearly as effective as more personalized incentive packages. The authors discuss variability in Service member NMI preferences and outline an approach to implementing personalized NMI packages in military compensation through a sealed-bid reverse auction, where Service members select individual NMIs from a “cafeteria-style” menu of options.     

The asymptotic joint distribution of the state occupancy times in an alternating renewal process

An alternating renewal process starts at time zero and visits states 1,2,…,r, 1,2, …,r 1,2, …,r, … in sucession. The time spent in state i during any cycle has cumulative distribution function F_i, and the sojourn times in each state are mutually independent, positive and nondegenerate random variables. In the fixed time interval [0,T], let U_i(T) denote the total amount of time spent in state i. In this note, a central limit theorem is proved for the random vector (U_i(T), 1 ≤ i ≤ r) (properly normed and centered) as T → ∞.     

Extrapolation of the mean lifetime of a large population from its preliminary survival history

A large population of independent identical units having finite mean lifetime T is observed. From the history A(y) of cumulative arrivals and the history B(y) of cumulative removals in the interval 0 ≦ y ≦ τ one must predict at time τ the desired T . Two lifetime predictors X(τ) and Y(τ) and related simple predictors obtained from A(y) and B(y) are shown to converge to T with a rate of convergence dependent on the structure of the failure rate function of the units. This dependence is studied theoretically and numerically.     

A method for reducing coefficients in integer linear inequalities

Approaches are considered for the reduction of coefficients in linear integer inequalities. It is shown that coefficients may be reduced easily in many practical examples. The (0-1) problem is also reconsidered and certain areas of exploration developed.     

Some limiting distributions associated with sequences of multinomial trials

A series of independent trials is considered in which one of k ≥ 2 mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes occurs at each trial. The series terminates when m outcomes of any one type have occurred. The limiting distribution (as m → ∞) of the number of trials performed until termination is found with particular attention to the situation where a Dirichlet distribution is assigned to the k vector of probabilities for each outcome. Applications to series of races involving k runners and to spares problems in reliability modeling are discussed. The problem of selecting a stopping rule so that the probability of the series terminating on outcome i is k^?1 (i.e., a “fair” competition) is also studied. Two generalizations of the original asymptotic problem are addressed.     

A game theoretic approach to a two firm bidding problem

In this paper a model is developed for determining optimal strategies for two competing firms which are about to submit sealed tender bids on K contracts. A contract calls for the winning firm to supply a specific amount of a commodity at the bid price. By the same token, the production of that commodity involves various amounts of N different resources which each firm possesses in limited quantities. It is assumed that the same two firms bid on each contract and that each wants to determine a bidding strategy which will maximize its profits subject to the constraint that the firm must be able to produce the amount of products required to meet the contracts it wins. This bidding model is formulated as a sequence of bimatrix games coupled together by N resource constraints. Since the firms' strategy spaces are intertwined, the usual quadratic programming methods cannot be used to determine equilibrium strategies. In lieu of this a number of theorems are given which partially characterize such strategies. For the single resource problem techniques are developed for determining equilibrium strategies. In the multiple resource problem similar methods yield subequilibrium strategies or strategies that are equilibrium from at least one firm's point of view.