Value added analysis for army equipment modernization

This paper describes the Value Added Analysis methodology which is used as part of the U.S. Army's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System to assist the Army leadership in evaluating and prioritizing competing weapon system alternatives during the process of building the Army budget. The Value Added Analysis concept uses a family of models to estimate an alternative system's contribution to the Army's effectiveness using a multiattribute value hierarchy. A mathematical optimization model is then used to simultaneously determine an alternative's cost‐benefit and to identify an optimal mix of weapon systems for inclusion in the Army budget. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 233–253, 1999     

Learning to Fight and Fighting to Learn: Practitioners and the Role of Unit Publications in VIII Fighter Command 1943–1944

A military cannot hope to improve in wartime if it cannot learn. Ideally, in wartime, formal learning ceases and the application of knowledge begins. But this is optimistic. In 1942, USAAF Eighth Air Force assumed it had the means necessary for victory. In reality, its technique and technology were only potentially – rather than actually – effective. What remained was to create the practice of daylight bombing – to learn. This article (1) recovers a wartime learning process that created new knowledge, (2) tests existing tacit hypotheses in military adaptation research, and (3) offers additional theoretical foundation to explain how knowledge is created in wartime     

‘Mad Dog?’ Samuel Huntington and the Vietnam War

Harvard professor Samuel P. Huntington has frequently been considered a Vietnam War hawk. His observation that ‘forced-draft urbanization’ might help the United States win the war has come to define his engagement in contemporary strategic debates. This essay argues that both Huntington’s academic work and his private policy advice to the U.S. Government in fact urged a political settlement to the conflict. It argues that in spite of this, Huntington refused to break publicly with the U.S. policy because of his wider concern over what he saw as a crisis of authority in the U.S. foreign policy and governing institutions in the era.     

Shots per casualty: an indicator of combat efficiency for the first Australian task force in South Vietnam

ABSTRACT

In combat, the ratio of shots fired per casualty inflicted can provide a measure of the combat effectiveness of a force. The shots per casualty ratio achieved by the 1st Australian Task Force in Vietnam is shown to change according to factors including marksmanship, tactics and combat type. While, over the course of the campaign, 1ATF fired an increasing number of shots to achieve a casualty, this is explained by improvements in the quality of Viet Cong and People’s Army small arms. Australian Task Force and US Army shots per casualty ratios are briefly compared..     

Rendezvous of three agents on the line

This paper considers a three‐person rendezvous problem on the line which was introduced earlier by the authors. Three agents are placed at three consecutive integer value points on the real line, say 1, 2, and 3. Each agent is randomly faced towards the right or left. Agents are blind and have a maximum speed of 1. Their common aim is to gather at a common location as quickly as possible. The main result is the proof that a strategy given by V. Baston is the unique minimax strategy. Baston's strategy ensures a three way rendezvous in time at most 3.5 for any of the 3!2³ = 48 possible initial configurations corresponding to positions and directions of each agent. A connection is established between the above rendezvous problem and a search problem of L. Thomas in which two parents search separately to find their lost child and then meet again. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 244–255, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10005     

Acceptance sampling,imperfect production,and the optimality of zero defects

Acceptance sampling is often used to monitor the quality of raw materials and components when product testing is destructive, time-consuming, or expensive. In this paper we consider the effect of a buyer-imposed acceptance sampling policy on the optimal batch size and optimal quality level delivered by an expected cost minimizing supplier. We define quality as the supplier's process capability, i.e., the probability that a unit conforms to all product specifications, and we assume that unit cost is an increasing function of the quality level. We also assume that the supplier faces a known and constant “pass-through” cost, i.e., a fixed cost per defective unit passed on to the buyer. We show that the acceptance sampling plan has a significant impact on the supplier's optimal quality level, and we derive the conditions under which zero defects (100% conformance) is the policy that minimizes the supplier's expected annual cost. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 515–530, 1997     

Does Military Spending Nonlinearly Affect Economic Growth in South Africa?

Using annual data collected from 1988 to 2015, this study provides evidence of a non-linear relationship between military spending, economic growth and other growth determinants for the South African economy. The empirical study is based on estimates of a logistic smooth transition regression (LSTR) model and our empirical results point to an inverted U-shaped relationship between military spending and economic growth for the data. Furthermore, our empirical results suggest that the current levels of military spending, as a component of total government expenditure, are too high in the South African economy and need to be transferred towards more productive non-military expenditure in order to improve the performance of economic growth and other growth determinants.