Book reviews

Encyclopaedia of Modern Air Force Squadrons. By Chris Ashworth. Patrick Stephens, London (1989), ISBN 1-8526-013-6, £19.95

The Future of Sea Power. By Eric Grove. Routledge, London (1990), ISBN 0-415-00482-9, £35.00

Soviet Strategic Interests in the North. By Kirsten Amundsen. Pinter, London (1990), ISBN 0-86187-018-2, £30.00

Soviet Seapower in Northern Waters. Edited by John Skogan and Arne Brundtland. Pinter, London (1990), ISBN 0-86187-038-7, £35.00

Glasnost, Perestroika, and U.S. Defense Spending. By William W. Kaufmann, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC (1990), ISBN 0-8157-4881-7, $8.95

The Educating of Armies. Edited by Michael D. Stephens. Macmillan, London (1989), ISBN 0-333-43447-1, £35.00     

The procurement problem: An integer programming problem well suited to a solution using duality

A procurement problem, as formulated by Murty [10], is that of determining how many pieces of equipment units of each of m types are to be purchased and how this equipment is to be distributed among n stations so as to maximize profit, subject to a budget constraint. We have considered a generalization of Murty's procurement problem and developed an approach using duality to exploit the special structure of this problem. By using our dual approach on Murty's original problem, we have been able to solve large problems (1840 integer variables) with very modest computational effort. The main feature of our approach is the idea of using the current evaluation of the dual problem to produce a good feasible solution to the primal problem. In turn, the availability of good feasible solutions to the primal makes it possible to use a very simple subgradient algorithm to solve the dual effectively.     

Determining confidence bounds for highly reliable coherent systems based on a paucity of component failures

A computationally simple method for obtaining confidence bounds for highly reliable coherent systems, based on component tests which experience few or no failures, is given. Binomial and Type I censored exponential failure data are considered. Here unknown component unreliabilities are ordered by weighting factors, which are firstly presumed known then sensitivity of the confidence bounds to these assumed weights is examined and shown to be low.     

All Counterinsurgency is Local: Counterinsurgency and Rebel Legitimacy

Abstract

Although the concept of legitimacy is central to Western counterinsurgency theory, most discourse in this area black-boxes the concept. It hence remains under-specified in many discussions of counterinsurgency. Fortunately, recent research on rebel governance and legitimacy contributes to our understanding of the problems faced by counterinsurgents who want to boost state legitimacy while undermining that of the rebels. Taken together, this research illustrates that a rational choice approach to legitimacy is simplistic; that micro-level factors ultimately drive legitimacy dynamics; and that both cooption of existing legitimate local elites and their replacement from the top–down is unlikely to succeed. Western counterinsurgency doctrine has failed to grasp the difficulties this poses for it.     

Value added analysis for army equipment modernization

This paper describes the Value Added Analysis methodology which is used as part of the U.S. Army's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System to assist the Army leadership in evaluating and prioritizing competing weapon system alternatives during the process of building the Army budget. The Value Added Analysis concept uses a family of models to estimate an alternative system's contribution to the Army's effectiveness using a multiattribute value hierarchy. A mathematical optimization model is then used to simultaneously determine an alternative's cost‐benefit and to identify an optimal mix of weapon systems for inclusion in the Army budget. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 233–253, 1999     

Learning to Fight and Fighting to Learn: Practitioners and the Role of Unit Publications in VIII Fighter Command 1943–1944

A military cannot hope to improve in wartime if it cannot learn. Ideally, in wartime, formal learning ceases and the application of knowledge begins. But this is optimistic. In 1942, USAAF Eighth Air Force assumed it had the means necessary for victory. In reality, its technique and technology were only potentially – rather than actually – effective. What remained was to create the practice of daylight bombing – to learn. This article (1) recovers a wartime learning process that created new knowledge, (2) tests existing tacit hypotheses in military adaptation research, and (3) offers additional theoretical foundation to explain how knowledge is created in wartime