PIRA Lessons Learned: A Model of Terrorist Leadership Succession

In the global war against terrorism key questions need to be asked concerning how Al Qaeda is reorganizing and who will be leading it. In the absence of, at the very least adequate open source data, how can we answer these vital questions and predict the next evolution of this deadly menace? One possible solution is to study the emergence and evolution of leadership within another terrorist organization. Based on an analysis of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, it is assessed that there have been at least two and possibly three distinct generations of leadership in that group. It is important to note, however, that although these three generations have emerged sequentially, they may well all be in positions of power at the same time. These generations are designated as; early or founding leaders; follow-on and continuity leaders; and embryonic leaders. Such analysis will not tell us whom the new and emerging leaders of Al Qaeda actually are but it might help us to frame the right questions to ask our intelligence collectors.     

Scheduling economic lot sizes in deteriorating production systems

The paper considers the economic lot scheduling problem (ELSP) where production facility is assumed to deteriorate, owing to aging, with an increasing failure rate. The time to shift from an “in‐control” state to an “out‐of‐control” state is assumed to be normally distributed. The system is scheduled to be inspected at the end of each production lot. If the process is found to be in an “out‐of‐control” state, then corrective maintenance is performed to restore it to an “in‐control” state before the start of the next production run. Otherwise, preventive maintenance is carried out to enhance system reliability. The ELSP is formulated under the capacity constraint taking into account the quality related cost due to possible production of non‐conforming items, process inspection, and maintenance costs. In order to find a feasible production schedule, both the common cycle and time‐varying lot sizes approaches are utilized. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 650–661, 2003     

When is model complexity too much? Illustrating the benefits of simple models with Hughes' salvo equations

The simulations that many defense analysts rely upon in their studies continue to grow in size and complexity. This paper contrasts the guidance that the authors have received—from some of the giants of military operations research—with the current practice. In particular, the analytic utility of Hughes' simple salvo equations is compared with that of the complex Joint Warfighting System (JWARS), with respect to JWARS' key performance parameters. The comparison suggests that a family of analytic tools supports the best analyses. It follows that smaller, more agile, and transparent models, such as Hughes' salvo equations, are underutilized in defense analyses. We believe that these models should receive more attention, use, and funding. To illustrate this point, this paper uses two very simple models (by modern standards) to rapidly generate insights on the value of information relative to force strength. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003     

Justifying Cyber-intelligence?

The surge in threats aided by or carried out through cyberspace has placed significant pressure on the intelligence community to adapt or leave itself open to attack. Indeed, many in both political and intelligence circles argue for access to ever greater amounts of cyber information in order to catch potential threats before they become real. By collecting all our digital information, the intelligence community argues that it is not only able to detail what people have done or are currently doing but also predict what their next move might be. However, the ethical implications are unclear and the backlash following Edward Snowden’s revelations have shown that such activities are not without controversy. This leaves the debate stuck between the important, ethical role that intelligence can play and the potential for its unrestrained use to cause undue harm. This paper will resolve this by giving greater detail to cyber-intelligence practices, highlighting the different levels of harm that the various intelligence operations can cause. The essence of this paper is not that cyber-intelligence should be banned outright, but that it can be justified given the necessary circumstances. Therefore, the paper will develop a specialised set of Just Cyber-Intelligence Principles, built on the just war tradition, to outline if and when such activities are justified.     

Network design for time‐constrained delivery

To meet customer demand, delivery companies are offering an increasing number of time‐definite services. In this article, we examine the strategic design of delivery networks which can efficiently provide these services. Because of the high cost of direct connections, we focus on tree‐structured networks. As it may not be possible to identify a tree‐structured network that satisfies all of the delivery guarantees, we allow these guarantees to be violated but seek to minimize the sum of the violations. We establish the complexity of the problem and exploit an empirically identified solution structure to create new neighborhoods which improve solution values over more general neighborhood structures. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Polaris,East of Suez: British Plans for a Nuclear Force in the Indo-Pacific, 1964–1968

This article investigates the little-known plans formulated by Harold Wilson's Labour government to deploy Polaris submarines in the Indo-Pacific region. The scheme was first proposed in 1965 as a response to several problems faced by British policy-makers, including China's acquisition of a nuclear capability, Britain's wish to maintain a meaningful position ‘East of Suez’ at reduced cost, and German pressure for equal treatment within NATO on nuclear matters. Despite extensive high-level discussion, the plans were finally abandoned in mid-1968, as Labour moved more decisively to forsake the world role.     

Varieties of Assurance

Strategies that seek to assure other states about their security have the potential to reduce international conflict and dissuade states from seeking nuclear weapons. Yet, relative to other tools of statecraft such as deterrence, assurance remains understudied. To facilitate further empirical research on assurance strategies, this article identifies variations in the terminology scholars and policymakers have used to refer to such strategies and describes the concept of assurance associated with each variant. It seeks to clarify and standardize usage and show that there is a general, overarching concept of assurance that links the different variants. It also summarizes existing bodies of empirical research that are relevant to assessing the utility of different forms of assurance.