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151.
152.
James Harris 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(3):513-545
The article examines Stalin's intelligence on the capitalist world, including materials from military archives, diplomatic archives, and Stalin's private papers. It explores how these materials were collected, interpreted and shaped by Stalin's prejudices. It concludes that, from the end of the Civil War to the Nazi invasion, Stalin and the Soviet leadership believed that the Soviet Union was under a nearly constant threat of invasion from shifting coalitions of capitalist powers. No such threat existed until the late 1930s, but Stalin's perceptions have important implications for our understanding of Soviet foreign and domestic politics in the interwar period. 相似文献
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Anthony G. Pazzanita 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(1):148-152
Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pp.xvi + 353, biblio., figs, maps, index. $55 (cloth); $18.95 (paper). ISBN 0–226–81302–9. 相似文献
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This article aims to review some of the key lessons learnt by the Royal Ulster Constabulary's (RUC) Special Branch in the 37 years of the troubles in Northern Ireland. Above all counter-terrorism is an intelligence led operation and Special Branch are the key agency for this in all UK police forces, who have now benefited enormously from the expertise that the RUC's Special Branch built up over the years and have passed on to their colleagues throughout the UK. Intelligence is more often than not a human role and relies on human agencies, which was the case in Northern Ireland. The bulk of intelligence gathering was carried out at quite low levels although the sifting and analysing of it became a more specialist skill. Electronic intelligence and computerised systems were often quite low down in the order of priorities and uses, which tends to confound popular impressions. Agents, informers and good old fashioned ‘coppers’ who knew their patch were much more important both in terms of gathering information and in terms of undermining the terrorists morale from within and it was these factors that fundamentally defeated the IRA in Northern Ireland. 相似文献
157.
James K. Wither 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3-4):611-635
This article examines British Army operations in Iraq. It focuses on the causes of the army's apparent failure to live up to its reputation for the conduct of small wars. The paper discusses the British experience of small wars in the context of Iraq, the influence of doctrine and strategy, and the political and moral factors that shaped the army's performance. The paper's conclusions suggest that the Iraq War may cause a significant reappraisal, not just of military doctrine and strategy, but also of Britain's role in future small wars. 相似文献
158.
Casualty figures suggest that the US/Allied Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) policy and the present allocation of national assets, resources, and intellectual capital have not been very successful. A number of explanations for why this has been the case are discussed and critiqued here. 相似文献
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James J. Hentz 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(5-6):839-862
ABSTRACTThe debate concerning the Nigerian terrorist Boko Haram is typically simplified across two false dichotomies. First, it is treated as either a local conflict in northeast Nigeria with its epicentre in Borno State or part of a broader conflict in Northwest Africa (and beyond), encompassing northern Cameroon, southern Chad, Niger, and reaching into Libya and Mali. The second dichotomy concerns whether it is animated by local material conditions on the ground, or is part of a broader anti-West jihad. The Boko Haram insurgency is not that simple. It is, rather, a multidimensional conflict and can change overtime. 相似文献