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161.
The classical “Colonel Blotto” games of force allocation are generalized to include situations in which there are complementarities among the targets being defended. The complementarities are represented by means of a system “characteristic function,” and a valuation technique from the theory of cooperative games is seen to indicate the optimal allocations of defense and attack forces. Cost trade-offs between systems defense and alternative measures, such as the hardening of targets, are discussed, and a simple example is analyzed in order to indicate the potential of this approach. 相似文献
162.
James G. Morris 《海军后勤学研究》1975,22(1):155-164
The Weber Problem generalized to the location of several new points with respect to existing points is formulated as a linear programming problem under the assumption that distances are rectangular. The dual problem is then formulated and subsequently reduced to a problem with substantially fewer variables and constraints than required by an existent alternative linear programming formulation. Flows may exist between new as well as between new and existing points. Linear constraints can be imposed to restrict the location of new points. Pairwise constraints limiting distances between new points and between new and existing points can also be accommodated. 相似文献
163.
James G. Taylor 《海军后勤学研究》1973,20(1):25-39
We show that the well-known necessary and sufficient conditions for a relative maximum of a nonlinear differentiable objective function with nonnegative variables constrained by nonlinear differentiable inequalities may be derived using the classical theory of equality constrained optimization problems with unrestricted variables. To do this we transform the original inequality-constrained problem to an equivalent equality-constrained problem by means of a well-known squared-variable transformation. Our major result is to show that second order conditions must be used to obtain the Kuhn-Tucker conditions by this approach. Our nonlinear programming results are motivated by the development of some well-known linear programming results by this approach. 相似文献
164.
James G. Taylor 《海军后勤学研究》1983,30(1):113-131
This article considers combat between two homogeneous forces modeled by variable- coefficient Lanchester-type equations of modern warfare and develops new “simple-approximate” battle-outcome-prediction conditions for military engagements terminated by two different types of prescribed conditions being met (fixed-force-level-breakpoint battles and fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battles). These battle-outcome-prediction conditions are sufficient (but not necessary) to determine the outcome of battle without having to explicitly compute the force-level trajectories, and they are characterized by their simplicity, requiring no advanced mathematical knowledge or tabulations of “special functions” for their application. Integrability properties of the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients figure prominently in their results, and involved in their development is a generalization of Lanchester's famous square law to variable-coefficient Lanchester-type combat and several other novel mathematical developments for the analysis of ordinary differential equations. Examples are given, with the attack of a mobile force against a static defensive position (both sides armed with weapons whose firepower is range dependent) being examined in detail. 相似文献
165.
This paper represents a continuation of three previous papers [1-.3] in the study of competitive bidding processes. It treats the case where a bidder's knowledge of his competitor's cost i s given by a probability distribution over a certain interval. The results obtained extend the work of Vickrey [4] to the case where the cost intervals a r e not necessarily symmetric. 相似文献
166.
Paul Meyer James 《海军后勤学研究》1968,15(4):595-604
Learning curves have been used extensively for predictive purposes in the airframe and other industries. In many instances this has led to erroneous results because analysts failed to extend learning curve theory and develop adequate analytical techniques in the turbulent regime of the cost history characterizing these industries. It is this area where a series of design changes induces a series of perturbations whose turbulence intensity is a function of the frequency of occurrence and magnitudes of the design changes under consideration. In Ref. 1, a series of formulations amenable to machine programming was developed for the accurate determination of perturbed unit costs. This development was based on additions of new learning having a constant slope. In this discussion, the development of Ref. 1 will be generalized by developing formulas for the addition of new effort having variable slopes. Consideration will also be given to the expressions involving elementary unit cost expressions so that cumulative average and cumulative total values can readily be obtained from existing experience curve tables. Conversely, the problem of determining the magnitudes of design changes and the slopes of new effort from graphical data will also be considered. 相似文献
167.
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169.
In this article we explore how two competing firms locate and set capacities to serve time‐sensitive customers. Because customers are time‐sensitive, they may decline to place an order from either competitor if their expected waiting time is large. We develop a two‐stage game where firms set capacities and then locations, and show that three types of subgame perfect equilibria are possible: local monopoly (in which each customer is served by a single firm, but some customers may be left unserved), constrained local monopoly (in which firms serve the entire interval of customers but do not compete with each other), and constrained competition (in which firms also serve the entire interval of customers, but now compete for some customers). We perform a comparative statics analysis to illustrate differences in the equilibrium behavior of a duopolist and a coordinated monopolist. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008 相似文献
170.