Terrorism,Radicalisation and Moral Panics: Media and Academic Analysis and Reporting of 2016 and 2017 ‘Terrorism’

Radicalism or radicalisation has become a serious political and academic theme in recent years and any incident involving Muslims now almost automatically acquires the cachet, as events in 2016 and 2017 have shown. However, despite vast sums and resources expended on the subject no one can define what they mean by ‘it’. This should make us pause and question what precisely it is that causes so much alarm and is it worth the resources, time and effort employed to respond to it?     

Institutions,information, and commitment: the role of democracy in conflict

This paper explores the hypothesis that both the preexisting quality of democracy in a polity at the onset of conflict and the quality of democracy expected to emerge in the aftermath influence the likelihood of civil war. An empirical investigation of the hypothesis presents a challenge due to concerns of endogeneity and selection: the post-conflict level of democracy is endogenous to the pre-conflict level. Further, for a given time period, either a number of countries have not experienced civil war; or if they did, did not resolve the conflict. We overcome this selection bias by implementing a three-step extension to the Heckman procedure using an unbalanced cross-country panel of 77 countries over the period 1971–2005. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that a standard deviation improvement in the existing level of democracy reduces the probability of civil war by approximately 9 percentage points and a corresponding improvement in expected post-conflict democratization increases the probability of conflict by approximately 48 percentage points.     

Life in the “Gray Zone”: observations for contemporary strategists

The term “Gray Zone” is gaining in popularity as a way of describing contemporary security challenges. This article describes the “short-of-war” strategies – the fait accompli, proxy warfare, and the exploitation of ambiguous deterrence situations, i.e. “salami tactics” – that are captured by the term and offers several explanations for why state and non-state actors are drawn to these strategies. The analysis highlights why defense postures based on deterrence are especially vulnerable to the short-of-war strategies that populate the “Gray Zone.” The article concludes by suggesting how defense officials might adapt defense policies to life in the “Gray Zone.”     

Strength in Numbers: The Labour Government and the Size of the Polaris Force

Previous historical accounts have simplified the Labour government's decision to commission a four-boat strategic nuclear deterrent, or ‘Polaris force’, in early 1965. Utilising previously classified sources, this article shows that a number of key strategic concerns led the decision-making process. Nevertheless, broader economic and diplomatic considerations were also important in determining the size of the Polaris force. A tremendous balance of payments deficit and ongoing debates regarding levels of conventional and nuclear involvement in NATO certainly influenced the government's final decision. Moreover, competing strategic and economic interests resulted in continued debate throughout the decision-making process.     

Encircled by enemies: Stalin's Perceptions of the capitalist world, 1918 – 1941

The article examines Stalin's intelligence on the capitalist world, including materials from military archives, diplomatic archives, and Stalin's private papers. It explores how these materials were collected, interpreted and shaped by Stalin's prejudices. It concludes that, from the end of the Civil War to the Nazi invasion, Stalin and the Soviet leadership believed that the Soviet Union was under a nearly constant threat of invasion from shifting coalitions of capitalist powers. No such threat existed until the late 1930s, but Stalin's perceptions have important implications for our understanding of Soviet foreign and domestic politics in the interwar period.     

China's Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean

This article argues that an increasingly sea-power-minded China will neither shelter passively in coastal waters, nor throw itself into competition with the United States in the Pacific Ocean. Rather, Beijing will direct its energies toward South and Southeast Asia, where supplies of oil, natural gas, and other commodities critical to China's economic development must pass. There China will encounter an equally sea-power-minded India that enjoys marked geostrategic advantages. Beijing will likely content itself with ‘soft power’ diplomacy in these regions until it can settle the dispute with Taiwan, freeing up resources for maritime endeavors farther from China's coasts.