An F approximation for two-parameter weibull and log-normal tolerance bounds based on possibly censored data

An approximation suggested in Mann, Schafer and Singpurwalla [18] for obtaining small-sample tolerance bounds based on possibly censored two-parameter Weibull and lognormal samples is investigated. The tolerance bounds obtained are those that effectively make most efficient use of sample data. Values based on the approximation are compared with some available exact values and shown to be in surprisingly good agreement, even in certain cases in which sample sizes are very small or censoring is extensive. Ranges over which error in the approximation is less than about 1 or 2 percent are determined. The investigation of the precision of the approximation extends results of Lawless [8], who considered large-sample maximum-likelihood estimates of parameters as the basis for approximate 95 percent Weibull tolerance bounds obtained by the general approach described in [18]. For Weibull (or extreme-value) data the approximation is particularly useful when sample sizes are moderately large (more than 25), but not large enough (well over 100 for severely censored data) for asymptotic normality of estimators to apply. For such cases simplified efficient linear estimates or maximum-likelihood estimates may be used to obtain the approximate tolerance bounds. For lognormal censored data, best linear unbiased estimates may be used, or any efficient unbiased estimators for which variances and covariances are known as functions of the square of the distribution variance.     

A bayesian approach to evaluating military investments in product improvement and testing

Two issues of frequent importance in new product development are product improvement and reliability testing. A question often faced by the developer is: Should the product be distributed in its present state, or should it be improved further and/or tested before distribution? A more useful statement of the question might be: What levels of investment in further improvement and testing are economically permissible? Products for which this question is relevant may vary widely in type and intended use. This paper presents a model for determining these levels for one such product—an equipment modification procedure. The model presented makes use of present value analysis to compare cost streams and of Bayesian statistics to relate the costs to various outcomes under conditions of uncertainty. The model is applied to an actual military problem and a method is described for examining the sensitivity of the results to changes in the prior probabilities and discount rate.     

The political economy of drones

This paper provides a political economy analysis of the evolution of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), or ‘drones’ in the USA. Focus is placed on the interplay between the polity and private economic influences, and their impact on the trajectory of political, economic, and military outcomes. We identify the initial formation of the drone industry, trace how the initial relationships between the military and the private sector expanded over time, and discuss present relationships. Understanding the historical evolution of UAV technology, as well as the major players in the industry today, is important for ongoing policy debates regarding the use of drones both domestically and internationally.     

The effect of deployment on first‐ and second‐term re‐enlistment in the US active duty force

Why should deployment affect re‐enlistment? In our model, members enter the military with naïve beliefs about deployment and use actual deployment experience to update their beliefs and revise their expected utility of re‐enlisting. Empirically, re‐enlistment is related to the type and number of deployments, consistent with the learning model. Non‐hostile deployment increases first‐term re‐enlistment but hostile deployment has little effect except for the Army, where the effect is positive. Both types increase second‐term re‐enlistment. Interestingly, first‐term members with dependants tend to respond to deployment like second‐term members. In addition, deployment acts directly to affect re‐enlistment, not indirectly through time to promotion.     

U.S.–RUSSIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND THE CTBT

Post-Cold War “lab-to-lab” collaborations on unclassified scientific issues between U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons laboratories set the stage for bilateral cooperation in materials control and other nuclear areas. They also became the major element in a cooperative process initiated by a Presidential Decision Directive to ensure Russia's compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. These collaborations have always been highly favored by leaders of the Russian nuclear weapons complex—the same leaders who oversee Russia's participation in various government-to-government programs. This article reviews these collaborations and examines the possibility that U.S. rebuffs of Russian proposals and the U.S. failure to keep promises of expanded collaboration could contribute to Russia's reluctance in major programs and even lead to a return to nuclear testing by Russia. The author argues that a renewed U.S. commitment to the process should be an immediate goal of the Obama administration and is an essential step in re-engaging Russia to solve the nuclear problems remaining from the Cold War. Steps for doing so are recommended.     

Nuclear‐ and missile‐related trade and developments for selected countries,July‐October 1997

The material in this overview is drawn from selected abstracts that appear in the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ nuclear and missile databases. Transactions of nuclear and missile technologies, parts, and materials are listed according o the recipient country. Other developments are listed according to the country where the event or development took place.     

Strategic terrorism: The framework and its fallacies

This article seeks to lay out a comprehensive framework by which those who utilize a campaign of strategic terrorism seek to attain their ends. It identifies a distinctive modus operandi: 1) disorientation: to alienate the authorities from their citizens, reducing the government to impotence in the eyes of the population; 2) target response: to induce a target to respond in a manner that is favorable to the insurgent cause; 3) gaining legitimacy: to exploit the emotional impact of the violence to insert an alternative political message. By elucidating the strategy of terrorism, the analysis also reveals its inherent limitations. Resting on the premise that a militarily more powerful adversary will in some way feel restrained from bringing the full force of its military superiority to bear, the strategy relies exclusively on the exploitation of the psychological effects of armed action, thereby rendering it vulnerable to those who are willing to view the resolution of clashes of interest principally in terms of the tangibles of military power.