China's Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean

This article argues that an increasingly sea-power-minded China will neither shelter passively in coastal waters, nor throw itself into competition with the United States in the Pacific Ocean. Rather, Beijing will direct its energies toward South and Southeast Asia, where supplies of oil, natural gas, and other commodities critical to China's economic development must pass. There China will encounter an equally sea-power-minded India that enjoys marked geostrategic advantages. Beijing will likely content itself with ‘soft power’ diplomacy in these regions until it can settle the dispute with Taiwan, freeing up resources for maritime endeavors farther from China's coasts.     

Research communication

A UK House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC) Report on the Gulf War recommended that the UK should be self‐sufficient in supporting its Armed Forces in times of crisis and not even rely on its Allies. This recommendation is at odds with UK Government policy which rejects any formal strategy of support for the defence industrial base preferring international open competition as its procurement philosophy. This paper examines the various factors ranging from the supply of raw materials, production capacity, stockpiling, international joint ventures, and competition through to the effects on the technological update of weapon systems resulting from this philosophy. It draws conclusions supporting the HCDC recommendation and calls for joint MOD‐Industry action to address the issues involved and thereby reduce the risks to the Defence of the Realm.     

Rent seeking and defence expenditure

A plethora of arguments from the ‘public choice school’ suggest that public goods are ‘under‐supplied’ by comparison with public sector provision of more private goods. The implication is that rent seeking by the ‘military‐industrial complex’ serves, in some measure, to offset potential allocative inefficiency. In this paper a comparison of rent seeking by producers of public goods and producers of private goods identifies a bias that favours public good supply. The bias results from the different way in which collective demand for public goods and for private goods is expressed. The prospect of larger rents to the ‘military‐industrial complex’ implies greater rent‐seeking expenditures in this sector. The extent to which public goods (and, in particular, defence) are ‘under supplied’ is much exaggerated.     

POTENTIAL PROLIFERATION POINTERS FROM THE PAST: Lessons from the British Nuclear Weapons Program, 1952–69

Becoming a nuclear weapon state and sustaining a militarily credible nuclear weapons capability is far from trivial, especially for medium powers. Such a capability is demonstrated by much more than firing a first test or acquiring significant quantities of fissile material; capability is indicated by factors including weaponization, delivery of weapons, reliability and effectiveness of weapons and their delivery systems, fissile material availability, and nuclear and non-nuclear testing. Files in the British National Archives shed considerable light on the problems faced by the nuclear weapon program of the United Kingdom from 1952 through the late 1960s. The question is whether this experience is unique or if it instead offers insights into the potential problems faced by, or facing, other medium or aspiring nuclear weapon states. The proliferation-related topics highlighted include: fissile material production, nuclear testing, the first weapon, weapon delivery rates, non-nuclear testing, delivery platform problems, and long-term maintenance and capability sustainability. Further research could provide clearer insights.     

Screening multi-dimensional heterogeneous populations for infectious diseases under scarce testing resources,with application to COVID-19

Testing provides essential information for managing infectious disease outbreaks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. When testing resources are scarce, an important managerial decision is who to test. This decision is compounded by the fact that potential testing subjects are heterogeneous in multiple dimensions that are important to consider, including their likelihood of being disease-positive, and how much potential harm would be averted through testing and the subsequent interventions. To increase testing coverage, pooled testing can be utilized, but this comes at a cost of increased false-negatives when the test is imperfect. Then, the decision problem is to partition the heterogeneous testing population into three mutually exclusive sets: those to be individually tested, those to be pool tested, and those not to be tested. Additionally, the subjects to be pool tested must be further partitioned into testing pools, potentially containing different numbers of subjects. The objectives include the minimization of harm (through detection and mitigation) or maximization of testing coverage. We develop data-driven optimization models and algorithms to design pooled testing strategies, and show, via a COVID-19 contact tracing case study, that the proposed testing strategies can substantially outperform the current practice used for COVID-19 contact tracing (individually testing those contacts with symptoms). Our results demonstrate the substantial benefits of optimizing the testing design, while considering the multiple dimensions of population heterogeneity and the limited testing capacity.     

Auctions in the post‐change‐order period

A change order is frequently initiated by either the supplier or the buyer, especially when the contract is long‐term or when the contractual design is complex. In response to a change order, the buyer can enter a bargaining process to negotiate a new price. If the bargaining fails, she pays a cancellation fee (or penalty) and opens an auction. We call this process the sequential bargaining‐auction (BA). At the time of bargaining, the buyer is uncertain as to whether the bargained price is set to her advantage; indeed, she might, or might not, obtain a better price in the new auction. To overcome these difficulties, we propose a new change‐order‐handling mechanism by which the buyer has an option to change the contractual supplier after bargaining ends with a bargained price. We call this the option mechanism. By this mechanism, the privilege of selling products or services is transferred to a new supplier if the buyer exercises the option. To exercise the option, the buyer pays a prespecified cash payment, which we call the switch price, to the original supplier. If the option is not exercised, the bargained price remains in effect. When a switch price is proposed by the buyer, the supplier decides whether or not to accept it. If the supplier accepts it, the buyer opens an auction. The option is exercised when there is a winner in the auction. This article shows how, under the option mechanism, the optimal switch price and the optimal reserve price are determined. Compared to the sequential BA, both the buyer and the supplier benefit. Additionally, the option mechanism coordinates the supply chain consisting of the two parties. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 248–265, 2015     

Signal‐to‐interference‐plus‐noise ratio estimation for wireless communication systems: Methods and analysis

The Signal‐to‐Interference‐plus‐Noise Ratio (SINR) is an important metric of wireless communication link quality. SINR estimates have several important applications. These include optimizing the transmit power level for a target quality of service, assisting with handoff decisions and dynamically adapting the data rate for wireless Internet applications. Accurate SINR estimation provides for both a more efficient system and a higher user‐perceived quality of service. In this paper, we develop new SINR estimators and compare their mean squared error (MSE) performance. We show that our new estimators dominate estimators that have previously appeared in the literature with respect to MSE. The sequence of transmitted bits in wireless communication systems consists of both pilot bits (which are known both to the transmitter and receiver) and user bits (which are known only by the transmitter). The SINR estimators we consider alternatively depend exclusively on pilot bits, exclusively on user bits, or simultaneously use both pilot and user bits. In addition, we consider estimators that utilize smoothing and feedback mechanisms. Smoothed estimators are motivated by the fact that the interference component of the SINR changes relatively slowly with time, typically with the addition or departure of a user to the system. Feedback estimators are motivated by the fact that receivers typically decode bits correctly with a very high probability, and therefore user bits can be thought of as quasipilot bits. For each estimator discussed, we derive an exact or approximate formula for its MSE. Satterthwaite approximations, noncentral F distributions (singly and doubly) and distribution theory of quadratic forms are the key statistical tools used in developing the MSE formulas. In the case of approximate MSE formulas, we validate their accuracy using simulation techniques. The approximate MSE formulas, of interest in their own right for comparing the quality of the estimators, are also used for optimally combining estimators. In particular, we derive optimal weights for linearly combining an estimator based on pilot bits with an estimator based on user bits. The optimal weights depend on the MSE of the two estimators being combined, and thus the accurate approximate MSE formulas can conveniently be used. The optimal weights also depend on the unknown SINR, and therefore need to be estimated in order to construct a useable combined estimator. The impact on the MSE of the combined estimator due to estimating the weights is examined. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004